On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the
duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he
(at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because
although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still
just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and
make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will
not; it can never be determined if "he" won the bet because as soon
as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they
had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
> That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both
copies are the Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened
there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they
are identical, when the door is opened they see different things
and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they
have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are
no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was
opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but
please explain how it is contradictory.
There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W
and M refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the
experience diverge. For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so
write W in the diary, and for the other the measurement gives M, and
he write M in his diary. Both agree that they could not have predicted
that result, except by betting "W v M", which is undermined but true
at both place, and obviously the experience "W and M" is, well, not
even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an
intellectual belief.
> There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
"You" is both guys.
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the self-
localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living
in Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in
Washington having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a
mysterious entity experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one
bit of information from the push+self-localization measurement.
One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But "you"
will see only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open
a door, and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because "coffee"
is satisfied in both place. But "W or M" is also satisfied in both
place, and "W and M" is false in both place, as W and M refers to the
incompatible experience of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from
the direct first person experience. Indeed, only the mysterious entity
experiencing both places could wriite W and M, by the definition of
the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.
Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a
flat out logical contradiction.
Where? it is W & M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M
refers to the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other
contain W. None contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.
I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the
words "you will only see one city" to be true Bruno Marchal is
going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" ;
I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question
is about the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree
that there is a divergence, so I guess you understood that one write
in the diary W, and the other write M. Those are what makes the
divergence to exist. I keep the meaning of "you", and you are in both
city, but the point is that in both city you see only once city, so
the bet P(one city) = 1 was correct, and P(I see two cities at once
when opening the box) = 0. The prediction is on the personal
experience of what is seen when opening the door. It is NOT on the
third person localization of those experiences.
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work.
It works perfectly well. After the duplication, I interviewed all the
guys who remember having been the guy pushing on the button in
Helsinki, and they all told me that indeed, as predicted, the self-
localizaton measurement gave as a result only once city. P(one city)
was equal as P(coffe), for the exact same reason: that is what is
lived by all the continuations.
Bruno
John K Clark
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