Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Of course, like Bohm, you can assume that there are particles, and
>> conspiratorial potential, but that looks like Ptolemeaus epicycles, and
>> worst, they prevent the computationalist theory of consciousness to apply.
>> Scientists don't do that. Only blind believers do.
>>
>
> Bohmian mechanics is just pure Schrödinger wave equation -- simply
> interpreted in a slightly different way from Everett. In fact, it is
> generally recognized that Bohmian mechanics is equivalent to a many worlds
> interpretation. (Another illustration of the fact that non-locality is
> inherent in QM -- not even Everett avoids non-locality.)
>
>
>
Bohmian mechanics is many worlds, with the added assumption that only one
of the branches is "really real" (as dictated by the pilot wave). All the
others are still there, but everyone in them is supposed to be a
philosophical zombie.

Jason

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Of course, like Bohm, you can assume that there are particles, and 
conspiratorial potential, but that looks like Ptolemeaus epicycles, 
and worst, they prevent the computationalist theory of consciousness 
to apply. Scientists don't do that. Only blind believers do.


Bohmian mechanics is just pure Schrödinger wave equation -- simply 
interpreted in a slightly different way from Everett. In fact, it is 
generally recognized that Bohmian mechanics is equivalent to a many 
worlds interpretation. (Another illustration of the fact that 
non-locality is inherent in QM -- not even Everett avoids non-locality.)


Bruce

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:

But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly 
different physics.


Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is only 
one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant here: the 
physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from the physics on 
earth).


In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current 
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example, would 
predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own fundamental 
constants and possibly different physical laws. In fact, this is a 
currently popular way to explain why the natural constants have their 
observed values:  all values are realized in some world or another, and 
anthropic arguments are used to explain why we are in a world that is 
consistent with our existence. (Another form of FPI perhaps, except that 
this theory requires that there are worlds in which life, and 
consciousness, are not possible. It does not seem that computationalism 
would allow the existence of such worlds.)



Physics is a sum on all worlds.


What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or only all 
worlds consistent with our existence?


Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and entirely 
determined by the theology of the universal machine. The pther worlds 
are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening the door and 
seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the electron and seeing 
it up.


If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the 
universe, that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the 
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is itself 
seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are necessarily in 
superposition, and most of these alternative worlds will have different 
physics from that of the world we inhabit. So if the only physics you 
can derive is unique, your account of FPI is not completely equivalent 
to Everettian quantum mechanics.


Bruce

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/23/2016 6:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



If a GoL universe exists and contains a Turing machine executing the 
universal dovetailer, no conscious entities within the programs 
executed by the universal dovetailer could ever know their ultimate 
substrate happens to be a GoL universe.


That's like a brain-in-a-vat argument.  If it's an undecidable 
speculation, then it's worthless.  That's why I press Bruno, from time 
to time, to come up with some prediction (not retrodiction) based on his 
theory.


Brent

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 12:55 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:34 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> ​I would say it would have to have *SOMETHING* physical as we know it
>>> or it wouldn't be another physical universe as we know it. ​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> So according to you, does every physical universe has to have hadrons,
>> electrons and photons, and 3 spatial dimensions?
>>
>
> ​No, according to ​me every physical universe must have something
> physical in it or it wouldn't be a physical universe.
>
>
> ​> ​
>> What in your mind delineates the physical from the mathematical?
>
>
> ​"Mathematics" is the best language minds have for thinking about the
> physical universe.
> And "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
> And "nothing" is anything that is
> infinite
> ​,​
> unbounded
> ​, and​
> homogeneous
> ​​
> ​ in both space and time.​
>
>
So if a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe, I am
guessing so would other cellular automata systems would. Some linear
cellular automata systems are even Turing universal:
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/UniversalCellularAutomaton.html

When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a grid of
cells with changing states, but an equally consistent view would be to
imagine the grid as a binary number, whose bits flip from one step to
another according to finite rules. For example, the game tic-tac-toe
(a.k.a. naughts and crosses) is often envisioned as completing a line, or
diagonal with X's or O's, but a mathematically equivalent view of the game
is the players complete for selecting unique numbers from 1 to 9, such that
the sum of their selected numbers adds to 15 (
https://www.mathworks.com/moler/exm/chapters/tictactoe.pdf ).

All this is to say that a "physically existing GoL universe" is from the
inside of that world, no different (in any testable way) from a recursive
function operating on an integer. So can anyone truly differentiate a
"physically existing GoL universe" from a "platonically existing recursive
computation" when both are  equivalent and for all intents and purposes
identical--sharing all the same internal relations isomorphically?

If a GoL universe exists and contains a Turing machine executing the
universal dovetailer, no conscious entities within the programs executed by
the universal dovetailer could ever know their ultimate substrate happens
to be a GoL universe.

Jason



> ​>>​
>>> ​Cells and particles are physical.​
>>>
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Would you say it is a particle even when the particles have only 1 bit of
>> information associated with them "exists in this cell"
>>
>
> ​Yes I would and that's why you're not talking about nothing, you're
> talking about something, you're talking about the physical. You use plural
> words like "particles" and "them". So there is more than one. So neither
> particles nor cells can be infinite, unbounded, and homogeneous in both
> space and time. So it can't be nothing. So it must be physical.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> what is clear cut is that the chain on "what caused that?" questions
>> either comes to an end or it does not.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Explanation and cause are conceptually different.
>

​Not if you want an explanation of what caused that.​

​> ​
> in fundamental physics "cause" has disappeared because the theories are
> time symmetric.
>

​Actually we know of one fundamental law that isn't time symmetric, a movie
of neutral kaon decay would look slightly different if run forward rather
than backward, but not if you looked at the backward running film in a
mirror and you assumed the electrical charges were reversed. CPT  (Charge
Parity Time) symmetry still holds true as far as we know. But more
important than that even if the laws of physics were time symmetric that
wouldn't be enough to conclude that physical systems evolve in a time
symmetrical way because that would also depend on initial conditions.
Entropy always increases because there are more ways to be high entropy
than low, so if the universe started out in a very low entropy state then
entropy will increase and time will have a direction even if the laws of
physics don't. That's why we can remember the past but not the future.


> ​> ​
> A causal theory now is just means one where no information can be
> propagated faster than c.  Explanation, on the other hand is a subjective
> linking of ideas that leads from something you don't understand to
> something you do.
>

​So one idea CAUSES you to understand another idea.​


​ John K Clark​



>

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> you've got to give those symbols a meaning, otherwise you're ​just
>> talking about squiggles. And by the way, "=" is just another squiggle. The
>> way we get around this problem and the reason mathematics and other
>> languages are not just silly squiggle games is that we can point to a
>> squiggle and then point to something in the real PHYSICAL world and people
>> get the connection.
>
>
> ​> ​
> The theory of model is a branch of pure mathematics. Model = semantic,
>


​As I said, without examples from the physical world ​
"=" is just another squiggle
​.​

​> ​
> To prove that the euclid axiom on parallel is not derivable from euclid
> geometry, mathematicians discovered this with the non riemannian geometry,
>

​Without space and physical things in it ​mathematicians would have
discovered neither euclidean geometry nor riemannian geometry and
"parallel" would just be another squiggle standing for nothing.

​> ​
> Physicalism might be true, but my point is that it is incompatible with
> the assumption that the brain is Turing emulable.
>

​The brain is NOT ​
Turing emulable
​, in fact nothing is ​
Turing emulable
​, not even arithmetic, UNLESS the Turing Machine in question is physical. ​

​> ​
> Arithmetic is about numbers. We develop intuition (and thus informal
> semantics) well before developing theories.
>

​If there was only one thing in the physical world mathematicians wouldn't
have the slightest intuition about what numbers mean, they'd just be
playing with squiggles. Of course if there was only one thing in the
physical world mathematicians couldn't even exist, but never mind. ​


​> ​
> That would contradict the UDA conclusion.
>

​And that would contradict the IHHA axiom.

 John K Clark ​

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:28, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/20/2016 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2016, at 20:15, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2016 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An axiom is supposed to be true in some structure, not existent.  
Then the axiom itself might be existent in some other theories.


Now in the case of "rich" (Gödel-Löbian), in fact in the case of  
all essentially undecidable theories, (like RA, PA, ZF, ...) the  
theory are rich enough so that their axioms and consequences are  
reflected in the relation between the objects they talk about.  
That is why both "2 + 2 = 4" and "ZF proves "2 + 2 = 4"" are  
elementary arithmetical propositions (even provable by the very  
weak non Löbian RA). In that sense the axiom are pré-existent,


It just means there is a structure to counting, a natural  
invention of evolution.


In which theory?





but only in the mind of the universal numbers. It is like the  
distribution of primes is well defined, even before the first  
mathematician discovered the prime number and look at its  
distribution.


You casually use words like "universal number" and "discovered";  
but these concepts were "discovered" only relative to axiom  
systems that were invented.


In which theory?

Well, any theory like that is refuted by digital mechanism.







May be you could try to formalize your physicalist theory to see  
if it assumes or not the numbers or any universal system at the  
start.


Physical theories are expressed in mathematics, because  
mathematics is just language made precise


Not at all. You confuse some mathematical reality with the language  
and theories used to shed some light on such reality.




so that it's "truth" preserving.  So it assumes the truth of some  
mathematics, but not existence.


Existence is just truth of existential proposition.


In mathematics and "existential proposition" just one that says some  
predicate can be satisfied.  Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that  
given a continuous map of a set into itself there exists at least  
one point that is mapped into itself.  That's an existential  
proposition.  But it's only "true" in the sense that if its premises  
are true then the theorem it true.  That does mean a set exists or a  
continuous map exists.


I guess you mean That does NOT mean that a set or a map exists. OK. It  
means that those things exists in all models of the theory involved.  
But no need to assume in the theory those models, which actually would  
lead to inconsistency, by incompleteness.




In the mathematical sense, there exists a companion of Sherlock  
Holmes who is an M.D.



No. Not in any interesting sense. You might say that the UD brought  
computations which simulates worlds with Sherlock Holmes, but this can  
happen in a similar sense with the solution of shroedinger equation  
too, and then Sherlock do exist physically too. No problem, in the  
normal worlds he will see the same physics as us, which is what counts.











Primary existence is truth of existential propositions taken from  
the base theory, or the "ontological" theory.


How can you know whether the proposition is true without assuming  
the theory - which is begging the question.



Because I have an intended model in the mind.

How could you search your keys if you don't have a model of reality  
where your keys is somewhere.


Now I insist: read Torket Franzen book "Inexhaustibility", as he is  
excellent on truth, on how to use the concept without doing  
philosophical involvement.












Here the problem is that with comp we can easily formalize the base  
theory, but physics is not really as much sophisticated as such.


But we don't do physics. We try to solve the mind-body problem and  
the search of TOE problem.


Solving the mind body problem requires a theory of body as well as  
mind.


qZ1* and qX1*, as well as qS4Grz1 are three theories of physical bodies.

Bruno







Brent



Some people here seems to decide of the solution, and ignore the  
problem ...


Bruno






Brent

Then all what UDA shows, is that if you do assume it, adding  
Matter just does not work for the mind-body problem.


Physicalism/computationalism is just testable. And then QM  
(without the dualist collapse) adds evidence to digital mechanism.


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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:18, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/20/2016 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2016, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2016 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Calculation have been defined mathematically, and shown to exist  
in elementary arithmetic.


Which is not the same as to exist in the world.


Indeed.

Especially when the world is made by a God in six days.

The question is which is the best to assume when we want to explain  
world appearance. But the UDA makes impossible to reify the notion  
of physical world and keep mechanism at the same time. So, once we  
assume computationalism, we already assume elementary arithmetic,  
and we can't assume anything more for the ontology. We can (and  
have to) assume more but we can only do that as convenient  
epistemological fiction or shortcut. That is why I "model" the  
ontology with RA, and the observer as PA. I put already the  
induction axioms of PA in PA's epistemology. Wuth UDA, we know that  
the physical reality is a psychological first person plural  
construct.


But we don't know that.  We only know that if the world is a  
computation then it appears among the infinite UD computations and  
this will include the computations that instantiate consciousness -  
because we've assume that.


You have been closer to the genuine understanding some years ago, it  
seems to me.


No: the physical reality is not a computation, nor any number of  
computations which appears in the UD.


Physics is the FPI calculus by the first person distributed in  
infinitely many computations. It is first person universal construct  
by all machines relatively to the infinitely many computations below  
their substitution level. That is what gives the qZ1* and qX1*  
theories, when provided by the introspecting universal machine.


You confuse digital mechanism with digital physicalism, but as I said;  
there are not compatible, even if they get close in case you lower the  
substitution level up to the entire universe. But if that is the case,  
that remain to be proved.


IF I am machine, neither mater nor mind are defined by one  
computation. They need all of them, due to the FPI. A priori it  
explains nothing as it predicts white rabbits all over the places at  
all instants, but computer science shows that this is far from being  
the case. the ignorance implcit in the FPI appears to be highly and  
non trivially structured.


Bruno

Bruno






Brent



Bruno






Brent

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2016 7:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

These diagrams might help give you a picture for what Bruno is  
talking about when he mentions Aristotelism. It relates to a  
question of reductionism and explaination. "Is physics the most  
fundamental science, or can it be explained and derived from  
something at a lower layer?"







That's fine, and Bruno has a theory about what explains physics,  
i.e. the UD and all possible computations.  The trouble is it  
"explains" both too much and too little.  It explains too much  
because, according to Bruno (I don't understand his argument) it  
explains QM, i.e. that the world is defined by a some theory that  
includes linear superposition of states.


Obeying quantum logic, yes. And intutively, it gives the "many world",  
but without any ontological extravagances, as they are just  
arithmetical objects (via terms or pseudo-terms).




But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly  
different physics.



Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is only  
one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant here: the  
physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from the physics on  
earth).


Physics is a sum on all worlds. Reality is the sum of all fictions.  
Physics is unique and entirely determined by the theology of the  
universal machine. The pther worlds are differe,t only on accidental  
facts, like opening the door and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin  
state of the electron and seeing it up.





On the other hand it doesn't explain why QM is based on complex  
fields instead of real or quaternion or octonion.


The technical evidence are that it will need the octonions, pehaps the  
sedenions too. The complex might be enough for the quantum part, but  
to get from arithmetical self-reference both the graviton and the  
electron, I bet the octonion will be needed. But we are not yet there.  
We need to progress on the qX1* and qZ1* logic. It is just a matter of  
work. *that* is the point of the work.


We have a quantum logic, and most models of it involves complex  
numbers when we assume a three dimension space, but that space is not  
yet derived, but if you got the point, all what I say, is that we have  
no choice in that matter.



If it actually solved, or even suggested a possible solution, to  
such questions it might be seriously considered as "explaining  
physics", but it doesn't.



It is the only theory which explain why there are physical laws, and  
it includes the qualia/quanta distinction. And it is 100% precise, and  
testable, even if that asks for works (which will never been done as  
long as it is ignored).


Physicalism just failed on qualia since 1500 years.

Some physicalists (not all!) confuse a fertile methodological  
simplification (the identity thesis) with a dogma, apparently.


I give a problem, and the universal machine's solution of the problem.

That machine theory extends Everett on Arithmetic, and I thought 30  
years ago, that it would be easy to show that there are too much white  
rabbits. Now, to see if there are white rabbits, we need to study the  
qX1* and the qZ1* theories. That's all.


In the academy, the rare problem came only from literary philosophers  
which dislike when science go on their territory.

History just repeats itself.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:34 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​>> ​
>> ​I would say it would have to have *SOMETHING* physical as we know it or
>> it wouldn't be another physical universe as we know it. ​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> So according to you, does every physical universe has to have hadrons,
> electrons and photons, and 3 spatial dimensions?
>

​No, according to ​me every physical universe must have something physical
in it or it wouldn't be a physical universe.


​> ​
> What in your mind delineates the physical from the mathematical?


​"Mathematics" is the best language minds have for thinking about the
physical universe.
And "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
And "nothing" is anything that is
infinite
​,​
unbounded
​, and​
homogeneous
​​
​ in both space and time.​

​>>​
>> ​Cells and particles are physical.​
>>
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Would you say it is a particle even when the particles have only 1 bit of
> information associated with them "exists in this cell"
>

​Yes I would and that's why you're not talking about nothing, you're
talking about something, you're talking about the physical. You use plural
words like "particles" and "them". So there is more than one. So neither
particles nor cells can be infinite, unbounded, and homogeneous in both
space and time. So it can't be nothing. So it must be physical.

 John K Clark

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 23/06/2016 3:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2016, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 21/06/2016 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 20/06/2016 4:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but  
disowns, is for explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in  
which everything is explained in terms of other things  
ultimately forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" ->  
PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS   I call this  
"virtuously circular" if it is comprehensive so that everything  
is somewhere in the circle.


The thing about such a loop is that you can start at any point  
-- for instance, PHYSICAL, HUMANS, PHYSICS, or anywhere else.  
The question then is whether this actually achieves you anything?


Just stop on the simplest theory.


"Simple" is an undefined term. You might think the integers are  
simple, I might think that physics is simple. No-one is right in  
any absolute sense.


Why? We can define a theory to be simpler than another if it has  
less assumptions.


The primary criterion for the adequacy of a theory is that the  
theory be consistent with the data. Simplicity is at best a  
secondary consideration, and then largely in the eye of the  
beholder, or the way in which the theory is formulated. It is like  
the choice of a coordinate system for astronomy -- the calculation  
of the trajectory for an earth-moon mission is extremely difficult  
in a coordinate system centred on one of the moons of mars but quite  
simple in the coordinate system centred on the earth. But the  
physics is the same whatever the coordinate system. "Simplicity" is  
a loaded word, a word that should be avoided.


Simplicity is just occam. We prefer the theory according to which the  
earth is not fixed with all star and planet going around because it  
make us avoiding many needed supplementary hypothesis. For two  
theories with equal theorems we prefer the one which assumes the less.










Ig you can explain QM and consciousness from elementary  
arithmetic, you make a gain compared to starting from physicalist  
QM, which assumes Matter, QM (and thus arithmetic, as QM already  
assumes arithmetic).


Well, you should formalize your theory so that we can at least  
compare.


My theory is that the external objective physical world exists,  
independently of you or me, or even of consciousness.  
Consciousness is a property of certain forms of matter, and matter  
achieves those forms, and hence consciousness, by the process of  
evolution.


OK. So your theory asks for an ontological commitment in some  
Nature or Matter, being independent of us.


And your theory requires an ontological commitment to the existence  
of the integers.


Actually it does not. It needs only an agreement with the usual  
elementary arithmetical proposition. And, any Turing-complete theory  
would do. We don't need to make existence metaphysical, and indeed  
that was the genious progress of the mathematical logicians.


And all what I prove is that you cannot be simulatenously rational,  
agrees on elementary arithmetic (= give sense to the word "digital"),  
be Turing emulable, and use a notion of physical primary matter to  
rely consciousness (or first person) with the third person describable  
reality. And so it you are computationalist (like 99,99% of scientist)  
you have to derive the physical laws from the theology of numbers.  
There is just no choice in the matter.






You don't actually have fewer ontological assumptions.



I do science. I make zero ontological commitment. I make only  
hypothesis, and computationalism is ontologically neutral a priori.  
You need to understand, though, theorem in arithmetic, like Euclid's  
proof that there is no bigger prime number.


In the epistemology, given by the Löbian number, I use, with her,  
freely the smallest number principle. if some numbers have the  
property P, I assume there is a least one. In classical logic, this  
can be shown equivalent with Löbianity, or with the induction  
principles. Of course, P has to be describable by an arithmetical  
formula, as I avoid second-order logic (there).




Who said that the integers are simpler than nature? A number  
theorist might not agree!



Nor a logician, as we know that natural numbers, or integers, when  
they get the additive & multiplicative structure, the true  
propositions esacape all machines or effective theories. In that  
sense, numbers are unboundably complex. but that complexity is in the  
semantic: the theory is simple in the sense above: it has few  
assumption. Kxy = x with Sxyz = xz(yz) are already enough.






Note that the ontology is the integers, not some set of axioms.


It is not necessarily an ontology. You just need to play fair and say  
if you agree that zero is not a successor, that zero, when added to a  
number, gives that 

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2016 6:26 PM, John Clark wrote:



On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 3:37 PM, Jason Resch > wrote:


​Is ??? really the floor or does ??? need an explanation too?


Valid questions. As you see the answer is not so clear cut,


​But what is clear cut is that the chain on "what caused that?" 
questions either comes to an end or it does not.


Explanation and cause are conceptually different.  At the level of 
humans and agents it's useful to talk in terms of cause and effect, 
where "cause" refers to something we could change or at least could have 
been different.  But in fundamental physics "cause" has disappeared 
because the theories are time symmetric.  A causal theory now is just 
means one where no information can be propagated faster than c.  
Explanation, on the other hand is a subjective linking of ideas that 
leads from something you don't understand to something you do.


Brent


My hunch is it does come to an end but it's just a hunch, but It's 
also clear cut that if it does come to an end Bruno does not know what 
it is.​



​>>​
If not and there are only finitely many layers to your pyramid
then I think it more likely that physics =???, physics is the
explanatory floor and mathematics is just the best language
minds can use to describe physics.


​> ​
That's a possibility, but it is a belief you learn towards (at
least partially) on faith.


​Having ​a hunch is not the same as having faith. People with hunches 
are often correct but never certain, people with faith are seldom 
correct but always certain.


​ John K Clark​




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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jun 2016, at 23:35, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>> ​mathematics is the best language for describing physics, but  
the point is mathematics is a language​ ​and​ ​physics isn't,  
physics just is.


​> ​I give an example, with arithmetic.​ ​You have a  
language, that is, symbols and grammar.​ [blah blah]​ Then you  
have the semantics​


​But semantics is about meaning,


Indeed.


you've got to give those symbols a meaning, otherwise you're ​just  
talking about squiggles. And by the way, "=" is just another  
squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the reason  
mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is  
that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the  
real PHYSICAL world and people get the connection.



The theory of model is a branch of pure mathematics. Model = semantic,  
and it does not refer to physics, but to mathematical structure. A  
model is a set together with some structure. Then we define a notion  
of satisfaction, etc. Logicians studied the theories and their  
semantics. Semantics are indispensable to prove that some propositions  
are not theorems. That is old ideas. To prove that the euclid axiom on  
parallel is not derivable from euclid geometry, mathematicians  
discovered this with the non riemannian geometry, well before we  
suspect our physical world to be possibly non riemannian. To sum up,  
there is no physical assumption, and no physical ontological  
commitment, in the theory of models/semantics.






Using symbols is good way to think about something if you can make  
that connection, but without the physical there are no semantics,  
its just squiggles, it's literally meaningless.


You just do advertising for physicalism.

Physicalism might be true, but my point is that it is incompatible  
with the assumption that the brain is Turing emulable. Then I show  
that physics can be constructively derived from machine's theology,  
and where the logic of matter must appear, we got already a quantum  
logic, which has not yet been refuted (but could very well tomorrow).






​> ​Then you have the theories,

​And to be worth a damn theories have to be about something not  
just squiggles ​


Arithmetic is about numbers. We develop intuition (and thus informal  
semantics) well before developing theories. That intution might come  
from physical observation, but this does not make the numbers physical.






​> ​Robinson Arithmetic​ [...]

Squiggles.​

​> ​And we are not obsessed​ [by consciousness]​. We might be  
tired of its being pushed under the rug.


​For every sentence about how intelligent behavior ​works there  
are a thousand about how consciousness works because theorizing  
about consciousness is many orders of magnitude easier than  
theorizing about intelligence due to the fact that intelligence  
theories actually have to perform while a consciousness theory  
doesn't need to do anything.


Then you should appreciate my explanation that computationalism  
provide an experimentally testable theory of consciousness, notably.






​>> ​Whatever consciousness is one thing is very clear, it can't  
be produced entirely from the ​stuff at the ​fundamental level of  
reality,


​> ​Ah! Glad you saw this.

​So you agree with me that even if mathematics is the most  
fundamental thing you still need matter to produce intelligence and  
consciousness.​


No, as computationalism is monist (and has to be). I was just glad  
that you seem aware the stuff is not enough, but then, if you keep the  
stuff and take the rest, you are dualist.





​> ​The notion of computation belongs to arithmetic. Only a  
physical implementation of a computation needs physical assumptions.


​So you agree that arithmetic ​​alone is not sufficient for  
physical computations;


That would contradict the UDA conclusion.




therefore physics must have something that arithmetic doesn't.


Physics is a subbranch of the theology of numbers, if we assume  
computationalism. That is what has been proved, and this has led to  
the first explanation of why there is a physical reality, why it is  
quantum and have a many-world aspect.


Bruno









 John K Clark



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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2016 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2016, at 20:15, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2016 10:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An axiom is supposed to be true in some structure, not existent. 
Then the axiom itself might be existent in some other theories.


Now in the case of "rich" (Gödel-Löbian), in fact in the case of all 
essentially undecidable theories, (like RA, PA, ZF, ...) the theory 
are rich enough so that their axioms and consequences are reflected 
in the relation between the objects they talk about. That is why 
both "2 + 2 = 4" and "ZF proves "2 + 2 = 4"" are elementary 
arithmetical propositions (even provable by the very weak non Löbian 
RA). In that sense the axiom are pré-existent,


It just means there is a structure to counting, a natural invention 
of evolution.


In which theory?





but only in the mind of the universal numbers. It is like the 
distribution of primes is well defined, even before the first 
mathematician discovered the prime number and look at its distribution.


You casually use words like "universal number" and "discovered"; but 
these concepts were "discovered" only relative to axiom systems that 
were invented.


In which theory?

Well, any theory like that is refuted by digital mechanism.







May be you could try to formalize your physicalist theory to see if 
it assumes or not the numbers or any universal system at the start.


Physical theories are expressed in mathematics, because mathematics 
is just language made precise


Not at all. You confuse some mathematical reality with the language 
and theories used to shed some light on such reality.




so that it's "truth" preserving.  So it assumes the truth of some 
mathematics, but not existence.


Existence is just truth of existential proposition.


In mathematics and "existential proposition" just one that says some 
predicate can be satisfied.  Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that 
given a continuous map of a set into itself there exists at least one 
point that is mapped into itself.  That's an existential proposition.  
But it's only "true" in the sense that if its premises are true then the 
theorem it true.  That does mean a set exists or a continuous map 
exists.  In the mathematical sense, there exists a companion of Sherlock 
Holmes who is an M.D.




Primary existence is truth of existential propositions taken from the 
base theory, or the "ontological" theory.


How can you know whether the proposition is true without assuming the 
theory - which is begging the question.




Here the problem is that with comp we can easily formalize the base 
theory, but physics is not really as much sophisticated as such.


But we don't do physics. We try to solve the mind-body problem and the 
search of TOE problem.


Solving the mind body problem requires a theory of body as well as mind.

Brent



Some people here seems to decide of the solution, and ignore the 
problem ...


Bruno






Brent

Then all what UDA shows, is that if you do assume it, adding Matter 
just does not work for the mind-body problem.


Physicalism/computationalism is just testable. And then QM (without 
the dualist collapse) adds evidence to digital mechanism.


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R: Re: Aristotle the Nitwit (an old quote)

['scerir' via Everything List]

"In all cases, Knowledge implies a combination of Thoughts and Things. 
Without this combination, it would not be Knowledge. 
Without Thoughts, there could be no connexion; 
without Things, there could be no reality. 
Thoughts and Things are so intimately combined in our Knowledge, 
that we do not look upon them as distinct." 

---William Whewell (1840)

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/20/2016 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2016, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2016 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Calculation have been defined mathematically, and shown to exist in 
elementary arithmetic.


Which is not the same as to exist in the world.


Indeed.

Especially when the world is made by a God in six days.

The question is which is the best to assume when we want to explain 
world appearance. But the UDA makes impossible to reify the notion of 
physical world and keep mechanism at the same time. So, once we assume 
computationalism, we already assume elementary arithmetic, and we 
can't assume anything more for the ontology. We can (and have to) 
assume more but we can only do that as convenient epistemological 
fiction or shortcut. That is why I "model" the ontology with RA, and 
the observer as PA. I put already the induction axioms of PA in PA's 
epistemology. Wuth UDA, we know that the physical reality is a 
psychological first person plural construct.


But we don't know that.  We only know that if the world is a computation 
then it appears among the infinite UD computations and this will include 
the computations that instantiate consciousness - because we've assume that.


Brent



Bruno






Brent

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/22/2016 10:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 23/06/2016 3:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2016, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 21/06/2016 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 20/06/2016 4:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:


The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but
disowns, is for explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in
which everything is explained in terms of other things
ultimately forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" ->
PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS   I call this
"virtuously circular" if it is comprehensive so that
everything is somewhere in the circle.


The thing about such a loop is that you can start at any point
-- for instance, PHYSICAL, HUMANS, PHYSICS, or anywhere else.
The question then is whether this actually achieves you anything?


Just stop on the simplest theory.


"Simple" is an undefined term. You might think the integers are
simple, I might think that physics is simple. No-one is right in
any absolute sense.


Why? We can define a theory to be simpler than another if it has
less assumptions.


The primary criterion for the adequacy of a theory is that the
theory be consistent with the data. Simplicity is at best a
secondary consideration, and then largely in the eye of the
beholder, or the way in which the theory is formulated. It is like
the choice of a coordinate system for astronomy -- the calculation
of the trajectory for an earth-moon mission is extremely difficult
in a coordinate system centred on one of the moons of mars but
quite simple in the coordinate system centred on the earth. But
the physics is the same whatever the coordinate system.
"Simplicity" is a loaded word, a word that should be avoided.



When two theories have equal explanatory power, but one has added 
assumptions, the theory with fewer assumptions is preferred.






Ig you can explain QM and consciousness from elementary
arithmetic, you make a gain compared to starting from
physicalist QM, which assumes Matter, QM (and thus arithmetic,
as QM already assumes arithmetic).

Well, you should formalize your theory so that we can at least
compare.


My theory is that the external objective physical world exists,
independently of you or me, or even of consciousness.
Consciousness is a property of certain forms of matter, and
matter achieves those forms, and hence consciousness, by the
process of evolution.


OK. So your theory asks for an ontological commitment in some
Nature or Matter, being independent of us.


And your theory requires an ontological commitment to the
existence of the integers. You don't actually have fewer
ontological assumptions. Who said that the integers are simpler
than nature? A number theorist might not agree! Note that the
ontology is the integers, not some set of axioms. Axioms are
statements that are true of the pre-existing integers, axioms are
not ontological statements.



The electron is a mathematical object. It has a quantum state that 
consists of complex/real numbers, bits, etc. To assume the electron is 
to bring with it the assumption of all the math necessary to describe 
it (which is a lot):


The /*theory*/ of the electron is a mathematical object, plus an 
interpretation.  If the electron were the mathematical object then it 
would make no sense to say we have tested the theory.  We can only test 
the theory because it describes and predicts what electrons will do.  A 
test can show the description to be wrong.


Brent

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