date:20170925

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

You folks  want Profundity-If this is fact, it is, Profundity itself. A 
Japanese team came up with a super-duper quantum computing architecture, that 
looks to be able to eat the Protein Folding Problem, with pepper and salt. I 
don't feel this news is too good to be true. Needs much work, development, 
bottleneck fixing, progging, but, am guessing that you wanted a Singularity? Ya 
got a Singularity. 
https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/09/japanese-researchers-work-out-theoretical-universal-quantum-computer-that-could-scale-to-millions-of-qubits.html

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 25, 2017 3:37 pm
Subject: Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
The only

identity criteria

I remember agreeing to is
 "
the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow
.

> 
You have agreed that the Moscow Man (like the Washington Man)  is an honorable 
Helsinki Man survivor.

I have agreed that the 
Helsinki Man
 is a proper subset of the Moscow man but the two are NOT equivalent, if they 
were it would be stupid to give them different names. I also said the Helsinki 
man survives because the Moscow man remembers being the Helsinki man and 
remembering  is how I define "survival", but how you define survival I don't 
know.   

> 
Yes, the Helsinki man is in two places,

Then what are we arguing about?

> 
but the point is that he does not feel that way.

Oh yes now I remember, we are arguing about the identity

of the mysterious Mr. He.

> 
nobody can feel to be in two places at once with computationalism 

That is not a sacred axiom of computationalism! The Moscow man and the 
Washington man could be merged back together and the resulting 
Moscow/Washington man would have vivid memories of being in both cities at 
exactly the same time, as well as having memories of being just the Helsinki 
man. In fact you could feel to be in 2 cities at the same time even without a 
people duplicating machine, just feed in detailed sensory data from Moscow and 
Washington back to the fellow in Helsinki.

"I" is the usual indexical. You can duplicate it in the 3-1 picture, but not in 
the 1p view, viewed from that 1p view.

Good old "the"! Misusing personal pronouns is not the only way to sweep 
illogical thinking under the rug, forgetting that there is a difference between 
the English articles "the" and "a" also does a good job at muddying the waters. 

>> 
All the copies were NOT asked the question yesterday back in Helsinki,

> 
The prediction is asked to the Helsinki guy before the duplication. The copies 
are the Helsinki guy,

Yes the 
copies are the Helsinki guy
 because they are everything the Helsinki man was, but the Helsinki guy was 
never everything the copies are, one is a proper subset of the other. 
Not all connections between things have the 
Equivalence Relation
, equality does but "is grater than" does not, 4 is grater than 3 but 3 is 
not grater than 4. Personal identity also does not have the 
Equivalence 
Relation
, the Moscow man is the Helsinki man but the Helsinki man is not the Moscow 
man.

>> 
you ask "Which one will become the Moscow man?" and the answer of course is 
"the one the sees Moscow". 

> 
That does not help the Helsinki man,

Well I could add that the one the sees Moscow
 will turn out to be the Moscow man. That's all the help I can give the 
Helsinki man because I don't understand what he is asking.

> 
given that in helsinki he still doesn't know if he will feel to be being the 
M-man or not.

That's right, "he" still doesn't know and "he" will NEVER know because nobody 
will ever know what "he" means in the above.

> 
>
Yes that's a trivial answer but then it was a trivial question, and at least 
it's true just like all tautologies.

> 
But can be false when used to predict "moscow" in helsinki.

So the Moscow man didn't see Moscow?! Well then who did see Moscow, the 
Washington man??

> 
Answer this before we proceed, please. Should the H-man expect or not to drink 
tea when tea is promised to be given to both copies?

I still don't understand why you're more interested in expectations than 
reality but if you insist in a answer I will give you one. 

N
o, he should not expect to get tea he should expect the promise to be broken 
and it would be better if he expected to end up in 
Santa Claus's workshop
 instead. Why should he expect that? Because he will happier if he does, 
Santa Claus's workshop
 sounds like more fun than drinking tea. Of course expectations need not turn 
out to be correct to bring happiness

 John K Clark

--

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread Terren Suydam

On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 1:51 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 9:47 AM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> > 
>> Then we agree that expectations are important, since the wrong ones can
>> kill us.
>>
>
> 
> Forget important, expectations are not even meaningful in thought
> experiments involving people duplicating machines if
>  
> it is not clearly stated what is being expected.
>

You're arguing against things I haven't said. To be frank, I tuned out of
the John Clark/Bruno Marchal wars sometime last year... after a few dozen
times around that carousel I wanted off. So don't assume I'm going to say
something Bruno is saying. I do expect (ahem) to be able to clearly state
was is being expected in the thought experiment, without requiring personal
pronouns.

But before we continue, I need to be sure we agree that from your
first-person perspective, when it comes to making decisions based on some
future state, you only have the contents of your mind to work with. Your
mental model, your worldview, pick whatever language you like, it's what
gives you a sense of what to expect, and therefore the only basis one has
for placing bets. Do you disagree?

Terren

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> The only
>>  
>> identity criteria
>>  
>> I remember agreeing to is
>>  "
>> the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow
>> .
>>
>
> > 
> You have agreed that the Moscow Man (like the Washington Man)  is an
> honorable Helsinki Man survivor.
>

I have agreed that the 
Helsinki Man
 is a proper subset of the Moscow man but the two are NOT equivalent, if
they were it would be stupid to give them different names. I also said the
Helsinki man survives because the Moscow man remembers being the Helsinki
man and remembering  is how I define "survival", but how you define
survival I don't know.   

> > 
> Yes, the Helsinki man is in two places,
>

Then what are we arguing about?

> > 
> but the point is that he does not feel that way.
>

Oh yes now I remember, we are arguing about the identity

of the mysterious Mr. He.

> > 
> nobody can feel to be in two places at once with computationalism
>

That is not a sacred axiom of computationalism! The Moscow man and the
Washington man could be merged back together and the resulting
Moscow/Washington man would have vivid memories of being in both cities at
exactly the same time, as well as having memories of being just the
Helsinki man. In fact you could feel to be in 2 cities at the same time
even without a people duplicating machine, just feed in detailed sensory
data from Moscow and Washington back to the fellow in Helsinki.

"I" is the usual indexical. You can duplicate it in the 3-1 picture, but
> not in the 1p view, viewed from that 1p view.
>

Good old "the"! Misusing personal pronouns is not the only way to sweep
illogical thinking under the rug, forgetting that there is a difference
between the English articles "the" and "a" also does a good job at muddying
the waters.

>> >> 
>> All the copies were NOT asked the question yesterday back in Helsinki,
>
>
> > 
> The prediction is asked to the Helsinki guy before the duplication. The
> copies are the Helsinki guy,
>

Yes the 
copies are the Helsinki guy
 because they are everything the Helsinki man was, but the Helsinki guy
was never everything the copies are, one is a proper subset of the other.
Not all connections between things have the
Equivalence Relation
, equality does but "is grater than" does not, 4 is grater than 3 but 3
is not grater than 4. Personal identity also does not have the
Equivalence
Relation
, the Moscow man is the Helsinki man but the Helsinki man is not the
Moscow man.

>> >> 
>> you ask "Which one will become the Moscow man?" and the answer of course
>> is "the one the sees Moscow".
>
>
> > 
> That does not help the Helsinki man,
>

Well I could add that the one the sees Moscow
 will turn out to be the Moscow man. That's all the help I can give
the Helsinki man because I don't understand what he is asking.

> > 
> given that in helsinki he still doesn't know if he will feel to be being
> the M-man or not.
>

That's right, "he" still doesn't know and "he" will NEVER know because
nobody will ever know what "he" means in the above.

> >
>> >
>> Yes that's a trivial answer but then it was a trivial question, and at
>> least it's true just like all tautologies.
>
>

> 
> But can be false when used to predict "moscow" in helsinki.
>

So the Moscow man didn't see Moscow?! Well then who did see Moscow, the
Washington man??

> 
> Answer this before we proceed, please. Should the H-man expect or not to
> drink tea when tea is promised to be given to both copies?

I still don't understand why you're more interested in expectations than
reality but if you insist in a answer I will give you one.

N
o, he should not expect to get tea he should expect the promise to be
broken and it would be better if he expected to end up in 
Santa Claus's workshop
 instead. Why should he expect that? Because he will happier if he does,
Santa Claus's workshop
 sounds like more fun than drinking tea. Of course expectations need not
turn out to be correct to bring happiness

 John K Clark

>
>
>
>>
>>>
>
>>
>
>
>

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Re: Andrei Linde on consciousness

2017-09-25 Thread Jagmohan Solanki

Great analogy... The degrees of freedom of consciousness which constitute
gravity and all the thermostats of space time which in turn gives the
relativity of observation and quantum mechanics. If everything emerged from
it we can actually solve the problem. If it is emergent, then!

On 25-Sep-2017 8:06 PM, "David Nyman"  wrote:

> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gc89m2SaOAc=youtu.be
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 9:47 AM, Terren Suydam 
wrote:

> 
> Then we agree that expectations are important, since the wrong ones can
> kill us.
>

Forget important, expectations are not even meaningful in thought
experiments involving people duplicating machines if

it is not clearly stated what is being expected. And if there is no way to
tell if the prediction made

before the duplication turned out to be correct or not even AFTER the
duplication is completed because of the frequent use of personal pronouns
in a world that contains personal pronoun duplicating machines

then the entire exercise is useless.

Bruno says there is a thing that can't be predicted because of something he
calls first person indeterminacy, but he is unable to say exactly what it
is that can't be predicted, but maybe you can do what Bruno can't. Nobody
can give a answer if there is no question
 so 
precisely
what 
is it that

Terren Suydam

challenges John Clark to predict and claims can't be done?
But please don't do what Bruno does and start talking about "*THE* 1p"
without specifying which "*THE *1p" is being referred to because remember,
there are "*THE* 1p" duplicating machines on every street corner in this
thought experiment.

 John K Clark 

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Andrei Linde on consciousness

2017-09-25 Thread David Nyman

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gc89m2SaOAc=youtu.be

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread Terren Suydam

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 1:54 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> My expectation is after I enter the duplicator
>>> is 
>>> I will be in Santa Claus's workshop
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> On what basis would you expect that?
>>
>
> Freud
>  
> would say it's because I had bad potty training when I was a
> n
> infant
> , but 
> who know
> s and
> who
> cares what
> caused
> me to expect that
> ;
>  whatever the cause 
> the fact remains I
> do 
> expect to be in
> 
> Santa Claus's workshop
> , I may be wrong but that's what I expect. But How anybody's expectations
> have any relevance to the computational theory of mind is a utter mystery
> to me.
>
> >>
>> Even if you ask "what one and only one city will I be in?", your answer
>> is a reflection of what you *expect* to happen.
>>
>
> Who cares what I expect!!! What anybody expects to happen is irrelevant,
> what does happen is not.
>
> > 
>>  Almost every choice we make can be traced to an expectation of one kind
>> or another. We live and die by expectations.
>>
>
> And very ofter we make bad choices because our expectations turn out to
> be dead wrong.
>
>

Then we agree that expectations are important, since the wrong ones can
kill us. Even more so, because when it comes to making decisions about the
future, expectations are *all we have*. So for any theory of mind,
computational or otherwise, understanding how we come to expect or predict
what the world is going to do, is clearly of great importance.

Terren

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Re: Infinities

2017-09-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 24 Sep 2017, at 21:02, smitra wrote:

On 23-09-2017 10:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Sep 2017, at 13:47, David Nyman wrote:
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mathematicians-measure-infinities-find-theyre-equal-20170912/

[1]

A rare progress on the continuum hypothesis (CH). Shelah is amazingly
smart. There is that story that he arrived one week to early at a
congress of logic, and decided to follow a congress on group theory
instead, and depressed everybody by solving most open problems of
that
congress! His first question was "what is a group?", and people
taught

he was retarted!
Now, this does not necessarily concern us. I think. Even ZF and
ZF+Choice proves the same theorems in arithmetic. That is probably
not

the case for ZF and ZF + CH, but the comp ontology will not change.
For the phenomenology, that might change something though, making the
measure problem more easy or more difficult. We are not yet enough
advanced on this to decide, i think. model theory and set theory are
*quite* complex compared to arithmetic!
Bruno
Everything in physics suggests that infinities don't actually
exists, so perhaps more progress can be made if you use a finitistic
logics system.

That is the case for computationalism. It belongs to finitism. You can
interpret all the infinities which appears at the phenomenological
level as machine's inventions to study the finite realm. That is what
I do actually in the math treatment.

In fact, contrary to what I have thought some years ago, it even
admits an ultrafinist reading, although you need again some infinities
at the meta-level to prove this. Computationalism is consistent with
"there is a highest natural number". But no need of this to proceed,
unless we met a genuine ultra-finitist (that is very rare!).

Note that you cannot invoke a God or a Physical Universe to decide
what exists or not, or you beg the (metaphysical) question. Someone
could say that everything in physics suggest that there is no physical
reality existing per se, but only statistically interfering
computations "seen from inside". Look how quick people like Bohr and
Heisenberg were to abandon realism in physics. Fortunately Einstein
and Everett were not that quick, and computationalism go in that same
direction.

Bruno

Saibal

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Infinities

2017-09-25 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 25 Sep 2017, at 02:01, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 10:34:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Now, this does not necessarily concern us. I think. Even ZF and ZF
+Choice proves the same theorems in arithmetic. That is probably not
the case for ZF and ZF + CH, but the comp ontology will not change.
For the phenomenology, that might change something though, making
the measure problem more easy or more difficult. We are not yet
enough advanced on this to decide, i think. model theory and set
theory are *quite* complex compared to arithmetic!



If comp ontology does not depend on CH (seems plausible), but there is
an effect of phenomenology, then so much the worse for comp. Comp
predicts that phenomenology is purely derivable from comp.


The existence of the phenomenology is derivable.
Then it happens that its propositional part is entirely derivable, due  
to Solovay arithmetical completeness of G and G*.
But the first order part can be shown being highly undecidable and  
incomplete. For a theology, the contrary would have been embarrassing.






However, I tend to agree with Saibal that things like the CH will
prove irrelevant to phenomenology.


I agree for CH, which has no application at all (but of course: who  
knows?, and Kiesler' work might change this, although I am not sure).
It is a different matter for the axiom of choice (needed for having a  
base in all Hilbert spaces, for example). Anyway: the phenomenology,  
and the ONE have a complexity which is unboundable from "inside  
arithmetic". With Mechanism, all theories of mind are incomplete, and  
cannot be completed effectively.


Bruno





--


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 24 Sep 2017, at 20:02, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> We agreed that "the Moscow man" means the man who saw  
Moscow, but yesterday nobody saw  Moscow.

> That contradicts the identity criteria on which we have  
agreed.

What agreed on identity criteria does that  
violate? The only identity criteria I remember agreeing  
to is "the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow.

You have agreed that the Moscow Man (like the Washington Man)  is an  
honorable Helsinki Man survivor. The Moscow man is the Helsinki man,  
like the Washington Man is the Helsinki Man. Yes, the Helsinki man is  
in two places, but the point is that he does not feel that way. In  
both places, he feels like being in only once city, as nobody can feel  
to be in two places at once with computationalism and that protocol.

> The answer is simply: I expect [...]

Simple indeed if one refuses to consider just what "I" means and  
what the consequences of stepping into a "I" duplicating  
machine would be, but not simple in a good way.

"I" is the usual indexical. You can duplicate it in the 3-1 picture,  
but not in the 1p view, viewed from that 1p view.

> to find myself either in M or in W.

And it is so much simpler not to think about just what "myself"  
means with regards to the future. Not thinking is easier than  
thinking.

Yes, it is simpler to not answer the question asked, if the goal is to  
not understand the conclusion of the reasoning.

>> and which THE first person experience are you talking about?

> All the unicity experience of all copies.

If its all of them why do you express surprise and claim that all  
sorts of deep philosophical consequences can be drawn from the fact  
that one and only one answer is insufficient to describe the fate of  
several different things.  How could it be otherwise?

> I remind you the criteria: all copies must confirms the  
prediction rule in the finite duplication,

All the copies were NOT asked the question yesterday back in  
Helsinki,

The prediction is asked to the Helsinki guy before the duplication.  
The copies are the Helsinki guy, so they were asked too, as confirmed  
in all the diaries and personal memories. When the M-man open his  
diary in Moscow, he saw and remember his prediction written in the  
diary.

only Bruno Marchal was asked the question yesterday back in  
Helsinki; and we know today that Bruno Marchal ended up seeing both  
cities.

... only in the 3-1p view. Nobody ends up seeing two cities from the  
1p view.

Yes yes I know what you will say "you confuse the 1p and the 3p" but  
you are the one who is confused, it is you who hasn't thought deeply  
about what a people duplicating machine really means. If the body of  
Bruno Marchal is duplicated there will still be only one conscious  
entity if the two of them are in identical environments, it is only  
when the environments differs, such as being in different cities,  
that the two start to form different memories and become different  
conscious beings. But you ask "Which one will become the Moscow  
man?" and the answer of course is "the one the sees Moscow".

That does not help the Helsinki man, given that in helsinki he still  
doesn't know if he will feel to be being the M-man or not.

Yes that's a trivial answer but then it was a trivial question, and  
at least it's true just like all tautologies.

But can be false when used to predict "moscow" in helsinki.

> "THE" is used, because all those experience are incompatible  
from the first pov.

Which THE first pov is "THE" incompatible with?

Both are incompatible with the view of their corresponding doppleganger.

>> THE first person experience of the Helsinki man today? THE  
first person experience of the Helsinki man tomorrow?

> Yes, that one. That has been said since the start.

That one? Which one? You quoted two.

Because both  lives the unique experience of being in a unique city.

Each time you ask "which one lives the experience of seeing *the*  
city", the answer is always the same: both, but only one from their  
first person point of view. Indeed, that is the reason why in Helsinki  
only "W v M" is correct.

Which  first person experience Is Mr. You, which ONE is different  
from all the others and uniquely deserves the noble title of "THE"?

> All of them deserves the title of "THE"

And that is why your notation has the precision of a dogs  
breakfast. 

Only because you subtract the key ingredient: the distinction between  
1p and 3p.

>> We had agreed that "the Moscow man" means the man who saw  
Moscow, but yesterday nobody saw Moscow so obviously yesterday the  
Moscow man DID NOT EXIST.

> That contradicts the identity criterion.

The identity criterion, what a joke!  If  "The Moscow man"  
no longer means the man who saw

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Re: Andrei Linde on consciousness

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Andrei Linde on consciousness

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

Re: Infinities

Re: Infinities

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

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