Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 2/16/2020 9:48 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 4:13 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 2/16/2020 2:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That is where the proof given by Kent comes into play. If in the
N trials you observe pN zeros and (1-p)N ones, you estimate the
probability for zero to be p, within certain confidence limits
that depend on the number of trials. Note that this is precisely
the 1p perspective, one person taking his actual data and making
some estimates. This person then considers that some other person
might have obtained r zeros, rather than the pN that he obtained.
Applying the binomial theorem, he estimates the probability for
this to occur as p^r(1-p)^{N-r}. This goes to zero in the limit
as N becomes very large, so our original observer believes that
he has the correct probability, since the probability of results
significantly deviant from his goes to zero as N becomes large.

The problem, of course, is that this reasoning applies equally
well for all the inhabitants (from their individual first-person
perspectives), whatever relative frequency p they see on their
branch. All of them conclude that their relative frequencies
represent (to a very good approximation) the branch weights. They
clearly can't all be right, so either there is no actual
probability underlying the events and their calculations are
misguided, or the theory itself is incoherent.


But exactly the same reasoning applies for any given true value of
p.  There will be different estimates by different experimenters
and they can't all be right.  Each will infer that any proportion
other than the one he observed will have zero measure in the limit
N->oo.


Exactly right. That is what my example of spin measurements on an 
ensemble of equally prepared spin states comes into play. If all 2^N 
bit strings are realized for one orientation of the S-G magnet, then 
exactly the same 2^N bit strings are realized for every other 
orientation.


?? Suppose the ensemble is equally prepared in spin-up.  What does it 
mean to say all 2^N bit strings are realized for the S-G oriented 
left/right?  We may expect they will be for any number of trials >>N.  
But certainly  not for the S-G oriented up/down.


Consequently, the coefficients in the expansion play no role in 
determining the data, and it makes no sense to talk of "the true value 
of p". There is no such true value if all values are realized.



In Kent's thought experiment, if you consider the self-location as
probabilistic then it's exactly the same as taking a sample of N
from an ensemble for which p=0.5 is the true proportion.  I think
you prove too much by saying the estimate of any proportion of the
other observers has zero measure in the limit, therefore everybody
is wrong.


That is a strange thing to say -- I prove too much by showing that the 
whole thing makes no sense?


No you prove too much by showing that everybody is necessarily wrong.

If you take a sample of N from an ensemble with true proportion 
p=0.5? The trouble is that you get the same ensemble even if the 
true proportion is 0.99, or 0.01. or any other value.


I don't understand that last remark.  If I take a sample of N from and 
ensemble with true proportion 0.5, then with high probability I get a 
sample with proportion near 0.5.  I don't know what you mean by "you get 
the same ensemble"?





If instead you estimate how many other experimenters will get
estimates which are consistent with yours by being of high
probability in your posterior Bayesian distribution, with high
probability you will find that most of them will.


Exactly. Even if you estimate p=0.01, you will dismiss branches with 
approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones as highly unlikely, and 
you expect other experimenters to verify your results.


But if you estimate p=0.01 you will find that no one agrees with you 
even approximately.  And the bigger is N the more singular will seem 
your result.  Every particular sequence of observed 1s and 0s is equally 
rare, the proportion of sequences with equal numbers of 1s and 0s is 
large.  So if you estimate p=0.5 you will have lots of agreeable 
replications.


If the number of trials N is large, there are N(N-1)/2 branches with 
exactly 2 zeros and N-2 ones. The probability for N/2 zeros and N/2 
ones is (2/N)^N/2*(1-2/N)^N/2 ~ N^{-N/2}, which goes to zero very 
rapidly for large N.



There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario.


If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are
still in Helsinki. If you predict that you die, then you
reject Mechanism (assumed here). If you predict P(W) = 1, the
city in Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong.
If you predict that your history is

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 4:13 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 2/16/2020 2:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> That is where the proof given by Kent comes into play. If in the N trials
> you observe pN zeros and (1-p)N ones, you estimate the probability for zero
> to be p, within certain confidence limits that depend on the number of
> trials. Note that this is precisely the 1p perspective, one person taking
> his actual data and making some estimates. This person then considers that
> some other person might have obtained r zeros, rather than the pN that he
> obtained. Applying the binomial theorem, he estimates the probability for
> this to occur as p^r(1-p)^{N-r}. This goes to zero in the limit as N
> becomes very large, so our original observer believes that he has the
> correct probability, since the probability of results significantly deviant
> from his goes to zero as N becomes large.
>
>
> The problem, of course, is that this reasoning applies equally well for
> all the inhabitants (from their individual first-person perspectives),
> whatever relative frequency p they see on their branch. All of them
> conclude that their relative frequencies represent (to a very good
> approximation) the branch weights. They clearly can't all be right, so
> either there is no actual probability underlying the events and their
> calculations are misguided, or the theory itself is incoherent.
>
>
> But exactly the same reasoning applies for any given true value of p.
> There will be different estimates by different experimenters and they can't
> all be right.  Each will infer that any proportion other than the one he
> observed will have zero measure in the limit N->oo.
>

Exactly right. That is what my example of spin measurements on an ensemble
of equally prepared spin states comes into play. If all 2^N bit strings are
realized for one orientation of the S-G magnet, then exactly the same 2^N
bit strings are realized for every other orientation. Consequently, the
coefficients in the expansion play no role in determining the data, and it
makes no sense to talk of "the true value of p". There is no such true
value if all values are realized.


In Kent's thought experiment, if you consider the self-location as
> probabilistic then it's exactly the same as taking a sample of N from an
> ensemble for which p=0.5 is the true proportion.  I think you prove too
> much by saying the estimate of any proportion of the other observers has
> zero measure in the limit, therefore everybody is wrong.
>

That is a strange thing to say -- I prove too much by showing that the
whole thing makes no sense? If you take a sample of N from an ensemble with
true proportion p=0.5? The trouble is that you get the same ensemble
even if the true proportion is 0.99, or 0.01. or any other value.


If instead you estimate how many other experimenters will get estimates
> which are consistent with yours by being of high probability in your
> posterior Bayesian distribution, with high probability you will find that
> most of them will.
>

Exactly. Even if you estimate p=0.01, you will dismiss branches with
approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones as highly unlikely, and you
expect other experimenters to verify your results. If the number of trials
N is large, there are N(N-1)/2 branches with exactly 2 zeros and N-2 ones.
The probability for N/2 zeros and N/2 ones is (2/N)^N/2*(1-2/N)^N/2 ~
N^{-N/2}, which goes to zero very rapidly for large N.

There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario.
>>
>>
>> If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are still in
>> Helsinki. If you predict that you die, then you reject Mechanism (assumed
>> here). If you predict P(W) = 1, the city in Moscow will understand that the
>> prediction was wrong. If you predict that your history is the development
>> of PI, then only 1/2^N will be be confirmed, etc.
>>
>
>
> I turn the tables on you here, Bruno. You are confusing the 1p and 3p
> pictures. From each individual's personal perspective, he concludes,
> according to above argument, that his are the correct probabilities. It is
> only from the outside, third-person perspective, that we can see that he
> represents only a small fraction of the total population of 2^N branches.
>
> What is you prediction, if there is no probability. Keep in mind that “W”
>> and “M” does not refer to self-localisation, but to the first person
>> experience. Do you agree that in this case W and M are incompatible.
>> I just try to understand.
>>
>
> As I said, I make no prediction, since I do not think that the concept of
> probability can be meaningfully applied in cases of person duplication,
> such as the WM scenario, or, for that matter, Everettian quantum mechanics.
>
> This is also Adrian Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any
>> benefit you might seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every
>> "first person" will get a different eigen

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 2/16/2020 2:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:


On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:48, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the
WM-duplicatipon, when “W” refers to the first person experience?


No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to
assign any probability at all to the possibility that he will see
W (or M) tomorrow,


Do you accept the idea that if we offer him (to the two copies,
thus) a cup of coffee after reconstitution, in both M and W, that
he can say in Helsinki that if mechanism is correct, he will drink
coffee with probability one? What would you say if you were the H-guy?


If all copies are given a cup of coffee, then it is certain that W and 
M will drink coffee--by hypothesis.



The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit
of relative frequencies over a large number of trials.


But one trial is enough to refute P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 1. Or to
refute P(W & M) = 1, given that W and M are incompatible first
person experience (none of the copies will feel to be in two
cities at once).


One trial is enough to refute P(W)=1 if you take the view of the 
M-man. So what? We are talking about estimating the probability from 
repeated trials -- there is no other sensible way to estimate 
empirical probabilities. You can  estimate probabilities in the 
single-world case, say for coin tosses: if you assume that the coin 
and the tossing method are fair, then the probabilty for "heads" 
equals the probability for "tails"; again, by hypothesis. But in the 
duplication case we do not have this possibility available, so we must 
estimate probabilities from the relative frequencies in a number of 
trials.



If you perform the WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N
"first person experiences”


OK.

and many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from
0.5.


Not at all. In the limit most will say that it looks like white
noise: arbitrary sequence. We can show that most histories
(sequence of W and M) will be algorithmically incompressible, and
if the copies met, they can see that their population is well
described by the Pascal triangle (or Newton’s binomial).


That is where the proof given by Kent comes into play. If in the N 
trials you observe pN zeros and (1-p)N ones, you estimate the 
probability for zero to be p, within certain confidence limits that 
depend on the number of trials. Note that this is precisely the 1p 
perspective, one person taking his actual data and making some 
estimates. This person then considers that some other person might 
have obtained r zeros, rather than the pN that he obtained. Applying 
the binomial theorem, he estimates the probability for this to occur 
as p^r(1-p)^{N-r}. This goes to zero in the limit as N becomes very 
large, so our original observer believes that he has the correct 
probability, since the probability of results significantly deviant 
from his goes to zero as N becomes large.


The problem, of course, is that this reasoning applies equally well 
for all the inhabitants (from their individual first-person 
perspectives), whatever relative frequency p they see on their branch. 
All of them conclude that their relative frequencies represent (to a 
very good approximation) the branch weights. They clearly can't all be 
right, so either there is no actual probability underlying the events 
and their calculations are misguided, or the theory itself is incoherent.


But exactly the same reasoning applies for any given true value of p.  
There will be different estimates by different experimenters and they 
can't all be right.  Each will infer that any proportion other than the 
one he observed will have zero measure in the limit N->oo.


In Kent's thought experiment, if you consider the self-location as 
probabilistic then it's exactly the same as taking a sample of N from an 
ensemble for which p=0.5 is the true proportion.  I think you prove too 
much by saying the estimate of any proportion of the other observers has 
zero measure in the limit, therefore everybody is wrong.


If instead you estimate how many other experimenters will get estimates 
which are consistent with yours by being of high probability in your 
posterior Bayesian distribution, with high probability you will find 
that most of them will.






There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario.


If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are still
in Helsinki. If you predict that you die, then you reject
Mechanism (assumed here). If you predict P(W) = 1, the city in
Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong. If you
predict that your history is the developm

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:48, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the WM-duplicatipon, when
>> “W” refers to the first person experience?
>>
>
> No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to assign any
> probability at all to the possibility that he will see W (or M) tomorrow,
>
>
> Do you accept the idea that if we offer him (to the two copies, thus) a
> cup of coffee after reconstitution, in both M and W, that he can say in
> Helsinki that if mechanism is correct, he will drink coffee with
> probability one? What would you say if you were the H-guy?
>

If all copies are given a cup of coffee, then it is certain that W and M
will drink coffee--by hypothesis.

> The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit of
> relative frequencies over a large number of trials.
>
>
> But one trial is enough to refute P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 1. Or to refute P(W
> & M) = 1, given that W and M are incompatible first person experience (none
> of the copies will feel to be in two cities at once).
>

One trial is enough to refute P(W)=1 if you take the view of the M-man. So
what? We are talking about estimating the probability from repeated trials
-- there is no other sensible way to estimate empirical probabilities. You
can  estimate probabilities in the single-world case, say for coin tosses:
if you assume that the coin and the tossing method are fair, then the
probabilty for "heads" equals the probability for "tails"; again, by
hypothesis. But in the duplication case we do not have this possibility
available, so we must estimate probabilities from the relative frequencies
in a number of trials.

If you perform the WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N "first person
> experiences”
>
>
> OK.
>
> and many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from 0.5.
>
>
> Not at all. In the limit most will say that it looks like white noise:
> arbitrary sequence. We can show that most histories (sequence of W and M)
> will be algorithmically incompressible, and if the copies met, they can see
> that their population is well described by the Pascal triangle (or Newton’s
> binomial).
>

That is where the proof given by Kent comes into play. If in the N trials
you observe pN zeros and (1-p)N ones, you estimate the probability for zero
to be p, within certain confidence limits that depend on the number of
trials. Note that this is precisely the 1p perspective, one person taking
his actual data and making some estimates. This person then considers that
some other person might have obtained r zeros, rather than the pN that he
obtained. Applying the binomial theorem, he estimates the probability for
this to occur as p^r(1-p)^{N-r}. This goes to zero in the limit as N
becomes very large, so our original observer believes that he has the
correct probability, since the probability of results significantly deviant
from his goes to zero as N becomes large.

The problem, of course, is that this reasoning applies equally well for all
the inhabitants (from their individual first-person perspectives), whatever
relative frequency p they see on their branch. All of them conclude that
their relative frequencies represent (to a very good approximation) the
branch weights. They clearly can't all be right, so either there is no
actual probability underlying the events and their calculations are
misguided, or the theory itself is incoherent.



> There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario.
>
>
> If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are still in
> Helsinki. If you predict that you die, then you reject Mechanism (assumed
> here). If you predict P(W) = 1, the city in Moscow will understand that the
> prediction was wrong. If you predict that your history is the development
> of PI, then only 1/2^N will be be confirmed, etc.
>


I turn the tables on you here, Bruno. You are confusing the 1p and 3p
pictures. From each individual's personal perspective, he concludes,
according to above argument, that his are the correct probabilities. It is
only from the outside, third-person perspective, that we can see that he
represents only a small fraction of the total population of 2^N branches.

What is you prediction, if there is no probability. Keep in mind that “W”
> and “M” does not refer to self-localisation, but to the first person
> experience. Do you agree that in this case W and M are incompatible.
> I just try to understand.
>

As I said, I make no prediction, since I do not think that the concept of
probability can be meaningfully applied in cases of person duplication,
such as the WM scenario, or, for that matter, Everettian quantum mechanics.

This is also Adrian Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any
> benefit you might seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every
> "first person" will get a different eigenvalue in 

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 12:03:00 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/16/2020 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't 
>> understand his argument, no doubt my failing. 
>>
>>
>> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to 
>> stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from 
>> the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once 
>> there is a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem 
>> that the only consistent measure is the Born rule.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT 
> derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI 
> or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by 
> measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a 
> one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since 
> in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are 
> indistinguishable.  AG 
>
>
> We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems 
> to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the 
> only difference being that that particle path. 
>
>
> They have to be in the same world.  Otherwise they wouldn't interfere.
>
> Brent
>
> The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many 
> computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as described as 
> the relevant level of description: indeed a universal machine cannot 
> distinguish them.
>
> “Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for 
> “worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations 
> are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.
>
> Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used 
> mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.
>
> Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon 
> Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
You remember that Sean Carroll has in the past posted on a "variation" of 
MWI - the MIWI.

*Guest Post: Chip Sebens on the Many-Interacting-Worlds Approach to Quantum 
Mechanics*

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/12/16/guest-post-chip-sebens-on-the-many-interacting-worlds-approach-to-quantum-mechanics/
 


"Worlds" are called "branches" in

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.08132.pdf

(where here branches apparently don't interact).

@philipthrift

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 2/16/2020 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:




On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:


Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible.
I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing. 



I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule
has to stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't
be derived from the linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has
to be introduced.  Once there is a probability measure, then it
can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the only consistent
measure is the Born rule.

Brent


I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one 
CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether 
one affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an 
ensemble generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot 
derive Born's rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible 
to do so with many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is 
observed -- the two interpretations are indistinguishable.  AG


We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles 
seems to go in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar 
worlds, with the only difference being that that particle path.


They have to be in the same world.  Otherwise they wouldn't interfere.

Brent

The statistics come from the fact that there are infinitely many 
computations (in arithmetic) going through or mental state (as 
described as the relevant level of description: indeed a universal 
machine cannot distinguish them.


“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for 
“worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all 
computations are realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true 
relations between numbers.


Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett 
used mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate 
from.


Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to 
abandon Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary 
discoveries).


Bruno








ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we
can ever measure is what observe in this world, and it is
from this world that we generate an ensemble after many
trials from which to observe and affirm Born's rule. What am
I missing, if anything? TIA, AG

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>  
>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS 
>> world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of 
>> measurement. 
>> AG 
>>
>
>
> That's nice.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

 Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in 
 this world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
 measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world 
 remaining 
 intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
 in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
 measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
 Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 
>>> and O2.
>>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>>
>>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" 
>>> and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One 
>>> is not privileged over the other in any way.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is 
>> pretty simple. AG
>>
>
>
> What you wrote has* nothing to do with MWI*. You created something 
> different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).
> But's OK to have your own interpretation. 
>
> It's *your own "interpretation"*, not MWI.  Publish it and call it 
> something else.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

I suppose I'm just following Tegmark; everything that CAN happen, MUST 
happen.  So, when an observer measures UP (or DN) in THIS world, another 
world comes into existence wherein an observer MUST measure DN (or UP). 
>From this I get N or less worlds for N trials where the results of 
measurements are binary, such as spin. Maybe not precisely MWI, but 
definitely less stupid -- but still egregiously stupid. How could MWI be 
remotely correctly if it alleges THIS world splits when it's never 
observed? But now you say that for Everett there's no such thing as THIS 
world. All this stuff, including Bruno's BS, is so profoundly dumb, I can't 
believe we're even discussing it! Was it Brent on another thread who 
claimed many physicists have become cultists? Whoever made that claim 
qualifies for sanity. AG

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:48, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 1:35 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> Just to be clear, are you OK with P(W) = 1/2 in the WM-duplicatipon, when “W” 
> refers to the first person experience?
> 
> No. As I have said before, the H-man has no basis on which to assign any 
> probability at all to the possibility that he will see W (or M) tomorrow,

Do you accept the idea that if we offer him (to the two copies, thus) a cup of 
coffee after reconstitution, in both M and W, that he can say in Helsinki that 
if mechanism is correct, he will drink coffee with probability one? What would 
you say if you were the H-guy?






> The trouble is that probabilities tend to be defined by the limit of relative 
> frequencies over a large number of trials.

But one trial is enough to refute P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 1. Or to refute P(W & M) 
= 1, given that W and M are incompatible first person experience (none of the 
copies will feel to be in two cities at once).





> If you perform the WM-duplication N times, there will be 2^N "first person 
> experiences”

OK.



> and many of them will assign probabilities greatly different from 0.5.


Not at all. In the limit most will say that it looks like white noise: 
arbitrary sequence. We can show that most histories (sequence of W and M) will 
be algorithmically incompressible, and if the copies met, they can see that 
their population is well described by the Pascal triangle (or Newton’s 
binomial).




> 
> There is no "intrinsic probability" in your scenario.

If there is no probability, what do you expect when you are still in Helsinki. 
If you predict that you die, then you reject Mechanism (assumed here). If you 
predict P(W) = 1, the city in Moscow will understand that the prediction was 
wrong. If you predict that your history is the development of PI, then only 
1/2^N will be be confirmed, etc. What is you prediction, if there is no 
probability. Keep in mind that “W” and “M” does not refer to self-localisation, 
but to the first person experience. Do you agree that in this case W and M are 
incompatible. 
I just try to understand.




> This is also Adrian Kent's objection to MWI, and it will also nullify any 
> benefit you might seek to gain from the "frequency operator" -- every "first 
> person" will get a different eigenvalue in the limit of infinite trials..

That is not correct. If it is the frequency operator which is measure, it gives 
the Born Probabilities, at least if the “simple” derivation is correct. But my 
question is independent of Everett, so even if Kent is correct for QM, it 
remains false for Mechanism. Let us agree first on the simple Mechanist case, 
and then come back to Everett.


Bruno


> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Feb 2020, at 08:10, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/15/2020 10:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 3:17 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> On 2/14/2020 2:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> I attach an extract from Kent's paper. Take up your argument with him if 
>>> you think he has got the statistics wrong.
>> 
>> I don't find it very convincing
>> 
>> Whether you are convinced or not does not really affect the logic of Kent's 
>> argument. I think, as I have thought for some time, that your intuitions are 
>> too conditioned by the probabilities of  coin tosses in a single world. You 
>> slip single word intuitions into your criticisms of the many-worlds picture.
>> 
>> He asserts “After N trials, the multiverse contains 2 N branches, 
>> corresponding to all 2 N possible binary string
>> outcomes."  which is not true if pushing the red button produces 0 or 1 with 
>> some fixed probability p0 (which isn't made clear).
>> 
>> It is true, whatever the probability associated with pushing the red button. 
>> And, in the case I consider, there simply is no matter-of-fact about such 
>> probabilities.
> 
> I took, " Suppose too that the inhabitants believe (correctly) that this is a 
> series of independent identical experiments,"  to mean there there is some 
> unknown, but fixed probability of writing a 0 or 1.  Otherwise I don't know 
> what "independent identical" means?  Those are commonly statistical terms.
> 
>> When the button is pushed, two new worlds are created, one with a 0 written 
>> on its tape and the other with a 1.
> 
> Which implies that number of 0's and 1's will be equal, though not along a 
> give tape.
> 
>> The button is pushed afresh in each of the created worlds, so in each world, 
>> two new worlds are created. This give 2^N branches or worlds for N trials. 
>> And these worlds will contain tapes, one in each world, on which is written 
>> the binary string corresponding to the history of results for that world. So 
>> there are 2^N different binary strings; that exhausts the space of possible 
>> binary strings of length N. Unless you get hold of this fact, the rest 
>> probably will not make sense.
>> 
>> Translate the red button into a Stern-Gerlach magnet measuring the x-spin of 
>> an ensemble of particles all prepared in a z-spin up eigenstate. If we 
>> record x-spin up as 0, and x-spin down as 1, we get exactly the same set of 
>> 2^N binary sequences after N trials, all sequences different, as we got from 
>> pushing the red button. The crunch comes when we rotate the S-G magnet by 10 
>> degrees and repeat. We still get all possible 2^N binary strings -- the same 
>> set of strings as we found before, because this set of exhausts the space of 
>> N binary strings. If  If you are still not convinced, rotate your S-G magnet 
>> by a further 20 degrees and repeat the N trials. Do you get any new binary 
>> strings? Of course not, the space of possible strings has already been 
>> exhausted.
>> 
>> The message is clear, the data that any observer in any world can get is 
>> independent of the coefficients in the original expansion of the prepared 
>> state in an appropriate basis. The Born rule can have no relevance in 
>> many-worlds -- whether Everettian or not.
>> 
>> 
>>  There is nothing which guarantees that all sequences will occur in any 
>> finite sample.
>> 
>> Think again, all 2^N sequences will occur in any set of N trials.
> 
> OK, each time the button is pushed and two new worlds created, which are 
> identical in their records up to the current writing and in one world 0 is 
> added to the tape and in the other 1 is added to the tape.  I understand that 
> is not consistent with observation.  And that there is no mechanism described 
> in Everett's evolution to deviate from this.  That's why I said that in order 
> to get the Born rule there must be many-worlds before the experiment which 
> are then divided, possibly unevenly, to produce the Born rule.
> 
>> 
>>   But I suppose we can pass over this noting that for large enough N it is 
>> highly probable, though not certain.
>> 
>> He's right that the citizens of different branches of the multiverse will 
>> infer different values of p from their experiments.  But isn't it also true 
>> that most of them will infer a value close to the true value.
>> 
>> Close to the true value? Have you not grasped the point that in the red 
>> button case, there is no  "true value". And whatever the coefficients in the 
>> original state, the majority of binary strings will have close to equal 
>> number of 0s and 1s -- that is just a fact about the binomial expansion. It 
>> says nothing about the "true value", because no such true value may exist.
> 
> That's just metaphysical angst.  1/2 is as "true" a value as science can ever 
> infer.  That's why I find these two paragraphs misleading:
> 
> “Let’s c

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Feb 2020, at 05:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/15/2020 9:09 AM, smitra wrote:
>>> 
>>> That's funny, since  20 lines above you invoked the_ lack_ of 
>>> isolation to explain measurements. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>> 
>> Measurement can be fully described by local interactions, so it's compatible 
>> with the entire system comprising of measured system plus observer, being 
>> completely isolated.
> 
> In a completely isolated system it can only be a mixed state FAPP unless 
> there is non-unitary evolution.

Is not the physical universe (assuming that exists) completely isolated?  If 
you were right, there would be no quantum mechanics. You lost me here.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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>  
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Feb 2020, at 21:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/14/2020 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 13 Feb 2020, at 23:59, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 11:16 PM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> On 7 Feb 2020, at 12:07, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
 
 I don't think you have fully come to terms with Kent's argument. How do 
 you determine the measure on the observed outcomes? The argument that such 
 'outlier' sequences are of small measure fails at the first hurdle, 
 because all sequences have equal measure -- all are equally likely. In 
 fact, all occur with unit probability in MWI.
>>> 
>>> Each individual sequence of head/tail would also occur with probability, in 
>>> the corresponding WM scenario, and in the coin tossing experience.
>>> 
>>> In the MWI, what you describe is what has motivated the introduction of a 
>>> frequency operator, and that is the right thing to do in QM.
>>> 
>>> I remembered reading something about such a "frequency operator" but 
>>> couldn't find the reference.
>> 
>> I have given it. It is in Graham paper in the selected papers by DeWitt and 
>> Graham on the MW (Princeton, 1973).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I see it was in a paper by David Albert, who writes:
>>> 
>>> "Here's an idea: suppose we measure the x-spin of each of an infinite 
>>> ensemble of electrons, where each of the electrons in the ensemble is 
>>> initially prepared in the state (alpha|x-up> + beta|x-down>). Then it can 
>>> easily be shown that in the limit as the number of measurements already 
>>> performed goes to infinity, the state of the world approaches an eigenstate 
>>> of the frequency of (say) up-results, with eigenvalue |alpha|^2. And note 
>>> that the limit we are dealing with here is a perfectly concrete flat-footed 
>>> limit of a sequence of vectors in Hilbert space, not a limit of 
>>> probabilities of the sort that we are used to dealing with in applications 
>>> of the probabilistic law of large numbers. And the though has occurred to a 
>>> number of investigators over the years that perhaps all it *means* to say 
>>> that the probability of an up-result in a measurement of the x-spin of an 
>>> electron in the state (alpha|x-up> + beta|x-down>) is |alpha|^2 is that if 
>>> an infinite ensemble of such experiments were to be performed, the state of 
>>> the world would with certainty approach an eigenstate of the frequency of 
>>> (say) up-results, with eigenvalue |alpha|^2. 
>> 
>> Yes, that is the idea. I think it was shown (with some rigour) first by 
>> Paulette Février (a student of De Broglie), but unfortunately, her master 
>> (De Broglie) came back to the hidden variable theory the “onde pilote”), and 
>> the work by Paulette Février has remained forgotten. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But the business of parlaying this thought into a fully worked-out account 
>>> of probability in the Everett picture quickly runs into very familiar and 
>>> very discouraging sorts of trouble. One doesn't know (for example) about 
>>> finite runs of experiments,
>> 
>> That is not correct, or correct for most practical use of probability.
>> 
>> 
>>> and one doesn't know what to say about the fact that the world is after all 
>>> very unlikely ever to be in an eigenstate of my undertaking to carry out 
>>> any particular measurement of anything.”
>> 
>> That does not make sense to me.
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Such reflections as those of David Albert here are probably why this 
>>> particular line of thinking has never gone anywhere. 
>> 
>> The frequency operator approach has been refined by different people, and 
>> generalised for non sharp partial measurement of subsystem.
>> 
>> Now, a quite similar idea has been developed by Finkelstein, and it shows 
>> how to derive relativity from quantum logic, but I have never completely 
>> understood. Selesnick (an expert in quantum logic) wrote an entire book on 
>> this idea by Finkelstein, and make the square law derivation (Born Rule) 
>> already in the first pages of the first chapter, then the math get a bit too 
>> much high for a classical logician, but I progress in it. Selesnick has 
>> written important paper in Quantum logic which can be used to show that the 
>> physics that I extract from the “dream of number” contains a quantum nor (I 
>> don’t bother you with a precise technical rendering of this theorem, and to 
>> be sure some lemma still needs some consolidation).
>> 
>> I am not sure why you say that such line of thinking never gone anywhere, 
>> except that you dislike both Everett  MWI, and the simplest (conceptually) 
>> arithmetical MWI.
>> 
>> I might later make a post on how Finkelstein derived the Born rule (in the 
>> simplest case of sharp measurement). But don’t hesitate to take a look on 
>> Graham paper.
>> 
>> Usually, though, I prefer to mention Gleason theorem (or even Ko

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Feb 2020, at 23:29, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:32:47 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 12:01:20 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 10:55:30 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:42:13 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 10:22:14 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:19:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:04:31 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:05:26 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:32:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 2:55:48 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 7:14:24 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 3:55:13 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 9:48 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:49:44 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 8:45 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't 
>> understand his argument, no doubt my failing.
> 
> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to 
> stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the 
> linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is 
> a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that 
> the only consistent measure is the Born rule.
> 
> Brent
> 
> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT 
> derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI 
> or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by 
> measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a 
> one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since 
> in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are 
> indistinguishable.  AG 
> 
> That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from 
> there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are 
> generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the 
> observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that 
> they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the same ensembles 
> and thus the same distributions? AG 
> 
> No, The point of MWI is that other worlds get different data.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> On each individual trial of course, with the exception that some outcomes 
> have the identical probability.  But since the ensembles are generated by the 
> same wf, I think they're identical.  AG
> 
> 
> Think again. If there are N repetitions of the measurement with two possible 
> outcomes, there are 2^N different sets of results. 
> some sets have the same or similar frequencies, but others have very 
> different frequencies. So many different ideas about the probabilities are 
> obtained in different branches. The wave function does not affect this result.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> If there are only two possible outcomes in this world, won't the ensemble in 
> the unobserved world, be the complement of the ensemble in this world? AG 
> 
> More like clones than complements.
> 
> If there is a quantum coin flip (QCF) in world w, then there are two copies 
> (branches) w-0 and w-1 with w-0 and w-1 being clones of w with the difference 
> being the two possible outcomes. w no longer exists.
> 
> This proceeds with N QCFs via branching to 2^N worlds w-x[1]...x[N], x[i] in 
> {0,1}
> 
> So with just 1 QCFs there are now 
> 
> #python
> print(2**1)
> 
> 19950631168807583848837421626835850838234968318861924548520089498529438830221946631919961684036194597899331129423209124271556491349413781117593785932096323957855730046793794526765246551266059895520550086918193311542508608460618104685509074866089624888090489894838009253941633257850621568309473902556912388065225096643874441046759871626985453222868538161694315775629640762836880760732228535091641476183956381458969463899410840960536267821064621427940365255656495306031426802349694003359343166514592977732796657756061725820314079941981796073782456837622800373028854872519008344645814546505579296014148339216157345881392570953797691192778008269577356712306201875783632550272832378927071037380286639303142813324140162419567169057406141965434232463880124885614730520743199225961179625013099286024170834080760593232016126849228849625

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Feb 2020, at 18:04, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:05:26 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:32:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 2:55:48 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 7:14:24 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 3:55:13 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 9:48 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:49:44 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 8:45 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't 
>> understand his argument, no doubt my failing.
> 
> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to 
> stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the 
> linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is 
> a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the 
> only consistent measure is the Born rule.
> 
> Brent
> 
> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT 
> derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI 
> or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by 
> measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a 
> one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since 
> in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are 
> indistinguishable.  AG 
> 
> That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from 
> there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are 
> generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the 
> observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that 
> they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the same ensembles 
> and thus the same distributions? AG 
> 
> No, The point of MWI is that other worlds get different data.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> On each individual trial of course, with the exception that some outcomes 
> have the identical probability.  But since the ensembles are generated by the 
> same wf, I think they're identical.  AG
> 
> 
> Think again. If there are N repetitions of the measurement with two possible 
> outcomes, there are 2^N different sets of results. 
> some sets have the same or similar frequencies, but others have very 
> different frequencies. So many different ideas about the probabilities are 
> obtained in different branches. The wave function does not affect this result.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> If there are only two possible outcomes in this world, won't the ensemble in 
> the unobserved world, be the complement of the ensemble in this world? AG 
> 
> More like clones than complements.
> 
> If there is a quantum coin flip (QCF) in world w, then there are two copies 
> (branches) w-0 and w-1 with w-0 and w-1 being clones of w with the difference 
> being the two possible outcomes. w no longer exists.
> 
> This proceeds with N QCFs via branching to 2^N worlds w-x[1]...x[N], x[i] in 
> {0,1}
> 
> So with just 1 QCFs there are now 
> 
> #python
> print(2**1)
> 
> 199506311688075838488374216268358508382349683188619245485200894985294388302219466319199616840361945978993311294232091242715564913494137811175937859320963239578557300467937945267652465512660598955205500869181933115425086084606181046855090748660896248880904898948380092539416332578506215683094739025569123880652250966438744410467598716269854532228685381616943157756296407628368807607322285350916414761839563814589694638994108409605362678210646214279403652556564953060314268023496940033593431665145929777327966577560617258203140799419817960737824568376228003730288548725190083446458145465055792960141483392161573458813925709537976911927780082695773567123062018757836325502728323789270710373802866393031428133241401624195671690574061419654342324638801248856147305207431992259611796250130992860241708340807605932320161268492288496255841312844061536738951487114256315111089745514203313820202931640957596464756010405845841566072044962867016515061920631004186422275908670900574606417856951911456055068251250406007519842261898059237118057880729063952425483392219827074044731623767608466130337787060398034131971334936546227005631699374555082417809728109832913144035718775247685098572769379264332215993998768866608083688378380276432827751722736575727447841122943897338108616074232532919748131201976041782819656974758981645312584341359598627841301281854062834766490886905210475808826158239619857701224070443305

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Feb 2020, at 13:05, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:32:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 2:55:48 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 7:14:24 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 3:55:13 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 9:48 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:49:44 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 8:45 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't 
>> understand his argument, no doubt my failing.
> 
> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to 
> stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the 
> linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is 
> a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the 
> only consistent measure is the Born rule.
> 
> Brent
> 
> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT 
> derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI 
> or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by 
> measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a 
> one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since 
> in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are 
> indistinguishable.  AG 
> 
> That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from 
> there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are 
> generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For the 
> observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them that 
> they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the same ensembles 
> and thus the same distributions? AG 
> 
> No, The point of MWI is that other worlds get different data.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> On each individual trial of course, with the exception that some outcomes 
> have the identical probability.  But since the ensembles are generated by the 
> same wf, I think they're identical.  AG
> 
> 
> Think again. If there are N repetitions of the measurement with two possible 
> outcomes, there are 2^N different sets of results. 
> some sets have the same or similar frequencies, but others have very 
> different frequencies. So many different ideas about the probabilities are 
> obtained in different branches. The wave function does not affect this result.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> If there are only two possible outcomes in this world, won't the ensemble in 
> the unobserved world, be the complement of the ensemble in this world? AG 
> 
> More like clones than complements.
> 
> If there is a quantum coin flip (QCF) in world w, then there are two copies 
> (branches) w-0 and w-1 with w-0 and w-1 being clones of w with the difference 
> being the two possible outcomes. w no longer exists.
> 
> This proceeds with N QCFs via branching to 2^N worlds w-x[1]...x[N], x[i] in 
> {0,1}
> 
> So with just 1 QCFs there are now 
> 
> #python
> print(2**1)
> 
> 19950631168807583848837421626835850838234968318861924548520089498529438830221946631919961684036194597899331129423209124271556491349413781117593785932096323957855730046793794526765246551266059895520550086918193311542508608460618104685509074866089624888090489894838009253941633257850621568309473902556912388065225096643874441046759871626985453222868538161694315775629640762836880760732228535091641476183956381458969463899410840960536267821064621427940365255656495306031426802349694003359343166514592977732796657756061725820314079941981796073782456837622800373028854872519008344645814546505579296014148339216157345881392570953797691192778008269577356712306201875783632550272832378927071037380286639303142813324140162419567169057406141965434232463880124885614730520743199225961179625013099286024170834080760593232016126849228849625584131284406153673895148711425631511108974551420331382020293164095759646475601040584584156607204496286701651506192063100418642227590867090057460641785695191145605506825125040600751984226189805923711805788072906395242548339221982707404473162376760846613033778706039803413197133493654622700563169937455508241780972810983291314403571877524768509857276937926433221599399876886660808368837838027643282775172273657572744784112294389733810861607423253291974813120197604178281965697475898164531258434135959862784130128185406283476649088690521047580882615823961985770122407044330583075869039319604603404973156583208672105913300903752823415539745394397715257455

Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Feb 2020, at 22:31, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 6:14 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 2/14/2020 1:34 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> 
>> That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we can move on from 
>> there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible sets of measurements are 
>> generated, and most will give different values for the probabilities. For 
>> the observers getting the alternative data, there is nothing to tell them 
>> that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI is incoherent.
> 
> Since it's an interpretation, not a theory, then there's nothing to tell us 
> we're getting the wrong answer either.  We only think "answers" are wrong if 
> they aren't replicated.
> 
> Probably true... But that is exactly what happens in MWI with one branch per 
> outcome —

That never happens. It is always 2^aleph_0, at the least.




> the data obtained are independent of the amplitudes/coefficients in the 
> original state.

Yes, but the relative probabilities, knowing the present states, is dependent 
of those coefficients.



> So only a miracle could ensure that repeats of an experiment gave the same 
> results. Hence, by the "no miracles" argument, MWI is incoherent.

Your interpretation of the MW seems incoherent, to me. It is more like a 
many-histories, which are only the computations (run in the arithmetical 
reality) seen from inside, which can be defined using the tools of computer 
science (which belongs to arithmetic, but not necessarily in its computable 
part, due to the first person indeterminacy on all (relative) computational 
continuations.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Feb 2020, at 09:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible. I don't 
>> understand his argument, no doubt my failing.
> 
> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the Born rule has to 
> stuck in somehow.  It's not implicit in the SWE and can't be derived from the 
> linear evolution.  Somehow a probability has to be introduced.  Once there is 
> a probability measure, then it can be argued via Gleason's theorem that the 
> only consistent measure is the Born rule.
> 
> Brent
> 
> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI, one CANNOT 
> derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But whether one affirms MWI 
> or not, the only thing one has to work with is an ensemble generated by 
> measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot derive Born's rule using a 
> one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do so with many-worlds, since 
> in operational terms -- what is observed -- the two interpretations are 
> indistinguishable.  AG 

We are in many worlds simultaneously. The reason that the particles seems to go 
in two holes at once, is that we are in two similar worlds, with the only 
difference being that that particle path. The statistics come from the fact 
that there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic) going through or 
mental state (as described as the relevant level of description: indeed a 
universal machine cannot distinguish them.

“Many-world” is a misleading label. There are no possible evidence for 
“worlds”, but it is easy (albeit tedious) to prove that all computations are 
realised, or emulated, in virtue of the true relations between numbers.

Are mechanism does put light on Everett QM, and that is why Everett used 
mechanism, but he failed to see where the compilations originate from.

Those advocating the existence of a (one) physical world have to abandon 
Mechanism (but then also Drawin, and most contemporary discoveries).

Bruno





> 
>> ISTM that whether we affirm one world or many worlds, all we can ever 
>> measure is what observe in this world, and it is from this world that we 
>> generate an ensemble after many trials from which to observe and affirm 
>> Born's rule. What am I missing, if anything? TIA, AG
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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>  
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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>  
> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS 
> world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. 
> AG 
>


 That's nice.

 @philipthrift 

>>>
>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this 
>>> world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
>>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining 
>>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
>>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
>>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
>>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and 
>> O2.
>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>
>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" 
>> and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One 
>> is not privileged over the other in any way.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is 
> pretty simple. AG
>


What you wrote has* nothing to do with MWI*. You created something 
different from MWI (in the Carroll sense).
But's OK to have your own interpretation. 

It's *your own "interpretation"*, not MWI.  Publish it and call it 
something else.

@philipthrift 

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

  
 I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS 
 world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. 
 AG 

>>>
>>>
>>> That's nice.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift 
>>>
>>
>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this 
>> world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining 
>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 
>>
>
>
>
> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and 
> O2.
> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>
> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" 
> and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One 
> is not privileged over the other in any way.
>
> @philipthrift
>

This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is 
pretty simple. AG

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>  
>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS 
>>> world doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. 
>>> AG 
>>>
>>
>>
>> That's nice.
>>
>> @philipthrift 
>>
>
> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this 
> world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining 
> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 
>



There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and 
O2.
There are not two measurements M1 and M2.

Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" 
and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One 
is not privileged over the other in any way.

@philipthrift

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>  
>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world 
>> doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 
>>
>
>
> That's nice.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this 
world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining 
intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 

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Re: MWI and Born's rule / Bruce

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>  
> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world 
> doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 
>


That's nice.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Feb 16, 2020 at 6:11 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 2/15/2020 10:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Feb 15, 2020 at 3:17 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 2/14/2020 2:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> I attach an extract from Kent's paper. Take up your argument with him if
>> you think he has got the statistics wrong.
>>
>>
>> I don't find it very convincing
>>
>
> Whether you are convinced or not does not really affect the logic of
> Kent's argument. I think, as I have thought for some time, that your
> intuitions are too conditioned by the probabilities of  coin tosses in a
> single world. You slip single word intuitions into your criticisms of the
> many-worlds picture.
>
> He asserts “After N trials, the multiverse contains 2 N branches,
>> corresponding to all 2 N possible binary string
>> outcomes."  which is not true if pushing the red button produces 0 or 1
>> with some fixed probability p0 (which isn't made clear).
>>
>
> It is true, whatever the probability associated with pushing the red
> button. And, in the case I consider, there simply is no matter-of-fact
> about such probabilities.
>
>
> I took, " Suppose too that the inhabitants believe (correctly) that this
> is a series of independent identical experiments,"  to mean there there is
> some unknown, but fixed probability of writing a 0 or 1.  Otherwise I don't
> know what "independent identical" means?  Those are commonly statistical
> terms.
>

Inpedendent and identical means just that, and no more. Why should there be
some notion of a probability associated with it? You are too hung up on
single-world statistical intuitions.


When the button is pushed, two new worlds are created, one with a 0 written
> on its tape and the other with a 1.
>
> Which implies that number of 0's and 1's will be equal, though not along a
> give tape.
>

Yes, but what are you trying to suggest by this?

The button is pushed afresh in each of the created worlds, so in each
> world, two new worlds are created. This give 2^N branches or worlds for N
> trials. And these worlds will contain tapes, one in each world, on which is
> written the binary string corresponding to the history of results for that
> world. So there are 2^N different binary strings; that exhausts the space
> of possible binary strings of length N. Unless you get hold of this fact,
> the rest probably will not make sense.
>
> Translate the red button into a Stern-Gerlach magnet measuring the x-spin
> of an ensemble of particles all prepared in a z-spin up eigenstate. If we
> record x-spin up as 0, and x-spin down as 1, we get exactly the same set of
> 2^N binary sequences after N trials, all sequences different, as we got
> from pushing the red button. The crunch comes when we rotate the S-G magnet
> by 10 degrees and repeat. We still get all possible 2^N binary strings --
> the same set of strings as we found before, because this set of exhausts
> the space of N binary strings. If  If you are still not convinced, rotate
> your S-G magnet by a further 20 degrees and repeat the N trials. Do you get
> any new binary strings? Of course not, the space of possible strings has
> already been exhausted.
>
> The message is clear, the data that any observer in any world can get is
> independent of the coefficients in the original expansion of the prepared
> state in an appropriate basis. The Born rule can have no relevance in
> many-worlds -- whether Everettian or not.
>
>
>  There is nothing which guarantees that all sequences will occur in any
>> finite sample.
>>
>
> Think again, all 2^N sequences will occur in any set of N trials.
>
>
> OK, each time the button is pushed and two new worlds created, which are
> identical in their records up to the current writing and in one world 0 is
> added to the tape and in the other 1 is added to the tape.  I understand
> that is not consistent with observation.  And that there is no mechanism
> described in Everett's evolution to deviate from this.  That's why I said
> that in order to get the Born rule there must be many-worlds before the
> experiment which are then divided, possibly unevenly, to produce the Born
> rule.
>

OK. You agree then that Everett is a train wreck. I wish you luck in
getting unequal numbers of worlds from unitary evolution via the
Schrodinger equation. It is fairly clear that this is impossible. So you
abandon unitarity, and undermine the whole reason detere of MWI.

  But I suppose we can pass over this noting that for large enough N it is
>> highly probable, though not certain.
>>
>> He's right that the citizens of different branches of the multiverse will
>> infer different values of p from their experiments.  But isn't it also true
>> that most of them will infer a value close to the true value.
>>
>
> Close to the true value? Have you not grasped the point that in the red
> button case, there is no  "true v