Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time

2008-12-31 Thread Hal Finney
. If we are forced to attribute consciousness to sequences of events which occur purely by luck, then causality can't play a significant role. This is the rather surprising conclusion which I reached from these musings on Boltzmann Brains. Hal Finney

Re: against UD+ASSA, part 1

2007-09-26 Thread Hal Finney
Wei Dai writes: I promised to summarize why I moved away from the philosophical position that Hal Finney calls UD+ASSA. Here's part 1, where I argue against ASSA. Part 2 will cover UD. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose your brain has been destructively scanned and uploaded

Re: Conscious States vs. Conscious Computations

2007-09-26 Thread Hal Finney
data strings have their meaning implicitly within themselves, because there is no reasonable-length program that can interpret them as anything else. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

New Scientist: Parallel universes make quantum sense

2007-09-24 Thread Hal Finney
it's possible they might get somewhere. But at this point it looks like the resistance is too strong. Rather than string theory making the multiverse respectable as we might hope, it seems likely that the multiverse will kill string theory. Hal Finney

Re: The physical world is real

2007-09-24 Thread Hal Finney
measure. In the UDASSA model that I prefer, OM measure is essentially the sum of the measures of all programs that output that OM. If two universes instantiate it, both contribute measure to it (as do Boltzmann brains, demons with boxes, Matrixes and other simulators, etc.). Hal Finney

Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe

2007-09-20 Thread Hal Finney
[By the way, I notice that I do not receive my own postings back in email, which makes my archive incomplete. Does anyone know if there is a way to configure the mailing list reflector to give me back my own messages?] Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2007 at 12:10:33PM -0700, Hal Finney

Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe

2007-09-20 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: On 20/09/2007, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our

Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe

2007-09-19 Thread Hal Finney
[I want to first note for the benefit of readers that I am Hal Finney and no relation to Hal Ruhl - it can be confusing having two Hal's on the list!] Rolf Nelson writes: UDASSA (if I'm interpreting it right, Hal?) says: 1. The measure of programs that produce OM (I am experiencing A, and I

Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe

2007-09-16 Thread Hal Finney
Rolf writes: World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-03 Thread Hal Finney
Part of what I wanted to get at in my thought experiment is the bafflement and confusion an AI should feel when exposed to human ideas about consciousness. Various people here have proffered their own ideas, and we might assume that the AI would read these suggestions, along with many other

How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-02 Thread Hal Finney
Various projects exist today aiming at building a true Artificial Intelligence. Sometimes these researchers use the term AGI, Artificial General Intelligence, to distinguish their projects from mainstream AI which tends to focus on specific tasks. A conference on such projects will be held next

Re: Boltzmann brains

2007-06-01 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On 01/06/07, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The reference to Susskind is a paper we discussed here back in Aug 2002, Disturbing Implications of a Cosmological Constant, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0208013 . The authors argued

Re: Boltzmann brains

2007-05-31 Thread Hal Finney
of the universe. A measure concept related to information might therefore reduce the measure of such brains to insignificance. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-06 Thread Hal Finney
computationalism would say that consciousness depends on the results of counterfactual tests done in other branches or worlds of the multiverse. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-05 Thread Hal Finney
. Any mapping which could specify such an entity will be enormous and will not contribute meaningfully to the measure of such entities. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-02 Thread Hal Finney
is an illusion and is not real. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-28 Thread Hal Finney
in that regard, though. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-27 Thread Hal Finney
Saibal Mitra writes: From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation, it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions. The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for systematic exploration. Our

Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Hal Finney
of hand-waving we sometimes get away with around here, explaining why bunnies can't fly), the anthropic universe is not physics. It is philosophy, and physicists want nothing to do with it. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-21 Thread Hal Finney
it is an important issue to get right and to be clear about. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-29 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Hal Finney writes: What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller program would suffice

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-28 Thread Hal Finney
Lee Corbin writes: Stathis writes Hal Finney in his recent thread on teleportation thought experiments disagrees with the above view. He suggests that it is possible for a subject to apparently undergo successful teleportation, in that the individual walking out of the receiving

Re: Fermi Paradox and measure

2006-06-27 Thread Hal Finney
numerous observers, then that would contradict the theory in this form. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list

RE: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-22 Thread Hal Finney
of evolutionary constraints. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-22 Thread Hal Finney
Bruno raises a lot of good points, but I will just focus on a couple of them. The first notion that I am using in this analysis is the assumption that a first-person stream of consciousness exists as a Platonic object. My aim is then to estimate the measure of such objects. I don't know

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system instantiates a computation. However I

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
to mental state measure and we avoid the paradox without any need for ad hoc rules. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list

RE: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Hal Finney writes: I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
. But if there is no way in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. The MWI doesn't change that. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed

RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?, which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any

Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Reasons and Persons

2006-05-30 Thread Hal Finney
, and be non-functional. But if you change its shape, it won't be the same neuron in terms of its functional behavior. If you brought neurons over from Napoleon's brain but altered them in the process to match your own neurons physically and functionally, then you would never stop being yourself. Hal

Re: Ascension (was Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example)

2006-05-30 Thread Hal Finney
, these programs take no inputs, while functions should have at least one input variable. What do you understand a dovetailer to be, in the context of computable functions? Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed

Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

2006-05-19 Thread Hal Finney
, let me live P1000(1000) years. That's a number so big that from our perspective it seems like it's practically infinite. But of course from the infinite perspective it seems like it's practically zero. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message

Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Hal Finney
would argue strongly against us living in such a universe. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com

Re:why can't we erase information?

2006-04-10 Thread Hal Finney
. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Indeterminism

2006-03-26 Thread Hal Finney
consciousness ought to be a pretty big red flag that we should not be making facile assumptions about who has it and who doesn't! (Or, if you say that we can in fact define consciousness, tell me how to know which AI programs have it, and which don't?) Hal Finney

Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-17 Thread Hal Finney
yesterday we are able to eventually verify predictions of this model in terms of physical observations, we would have achieved a unification of physics and philosophy far deeper than has ever been accomplished before. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received

Re: Numbers

2006-03-16 Thread Hal Finney
objects exist and physical existence is just a subset of the mathematical, could be the model that provides the simplest explanation for our observations. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Multiverse concepts in string theory

2006-02-13 Thread Hal Finney
that it is time for physics to explore alternative ideas. The hostile NY Times book review is just one example. Hal Finney

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-03 Thread Hal Finney
? Consciousness is hard to test for; would there be purely functional limitations that you could predict? Hal Finney

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-11-01 Thread Hal Finney
= observable things + unobservable things and equivalently the multiverse = this universe + unobservable things Are you saying that you don't agree that the anthropic principle applied to an ensemble of instances has greater explanatory power than when applied to a single instance? Hal Finney

Re: Let There Be Something

2005-10-28 Thread Hal Finney
of generalized Occam's Razor, we will have a very good explanation of the universe we see. Hal Finney

Re: Quantum theory of measurement

2005-10-12 Thread Hal Finney
measurement. Hal Finney

RE: Quantum theory of measurement

2005-10-12 Thread Hal Finney
into getting the wrong idea about the physics. Hal Finney

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

2005-09-05 Thread Hal Finney
mind to be uploaded into a computer, but who would insist that the computer must be physical! A mere potential or abstractly existing computer would not be good enough. I suspect that such views would not be particularly rare among computationalists. Hal Finney

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

2005-09-03 Thread Hal Finney
of comp (aka Yes Doctor) + CT + AR. Then you could make it clear when you are just talking about computationalism, and when you are including the additional concepts. Hal Finney

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-30 Thread Hal Finney
is *incompatible* with QM. This is the contradiction that he sees. I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he was referring to above. Hal Finney

Re: Book preview: Theory of Nothing

2005-08-29 Thread Hal Finney
, self-awareness, and consciousness for example. Hal Finney

Re: Maudlin's Machine and the UDist

2005-08-08 Thread Hal Finney
can play, but the basic ideas are present. Hal Finney

Re: Maudlin's Machine and the UDist

2005-08-08 Thread Hal Finney
supervene on physicality. Hal Finney

Re: OMs are events

2005-08-05 Thread Hal Finney
system is completely captured by the modal logics G and G*. Well, you lost me on that one! Hal Finney

Re: OMs are events

2005-08-04 Thread Hal Finney
. It seems to be an interesting intermediate case. My tentative opinion is that it does make sense to ascribe Platonic existence to such things but I am interested to hear other people's thoughts. Hal Finney

Re: OMs are events

2005-08-04 Thread Hal Finney
Brent Meeker wrote (he always forgets to forward to the list): Hal Finney wrote: I'd be curious to know whether you think that Platonic existence could include a notion of time. I think timelessness is a defining characteristic of Platonic existence. I use scare quotes because I'm

Re: OMs are events

2005-08-01 Thread Hal Finney
Quentin Anciaux writes: Le Lundi 01 Août 2005 05:32, Hal Finney a écrit : I am generally of the school that considers that calculations can be treated as abstract or formal objects, that they can exist without a physical computer existing to run them. I completely agree with that... but I

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Hal Finney
strange that if consciousness is, in the metaphysical sense, so easy that it's omnipresent, then why do so few systems actually exhibit it? Hal Finney

Re: OMs are events

2005-07-31 Thread Hal Finney
simulations can do it (with proper input); universe simulations can do it (using a subset of their output). Hal Finney

Re: OMs are events

2005-07-31 Thread Hal Finney
that all these arguments are only persuasive and indicative and certainly do not amount to a proof. Nevertheless it is my hope that by pursuing these ideas we can construct testable propositions which, if verified, will add weight to the possibility that this is the nature of reality. Hal Finney

Reality in the multiverse

2005-07-28 Thread Hal Finney
. Otherwise he has to say that all programs exist which happen to include an information pattern corresponding to him, the observer who is making this claim. That's not a very compelling theoretical model. Hal Finney

UD, ASSA, QTI and DA

2005-07-28 Thread Hal Finney
is not necessarily an argument against this variant of the QTI, and may in fact be considered evidence in favor of a long or even immortal life span. Hal Finney [1] Near the end of http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m6905.html

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-25 Thread Hal Finney
Boolean circuit and finding the smallest efficient description. Maybe finding the smallest Boolean circuit is in NP; it's not obvious to me but it's been a while since I've studied this stuff. But even if we could find such a circuit I'm doubtful that all the rest of Aaronson's scenario follows. Hal

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-25 Thread Hal Finney
Brent Meeker wrote: [Hal Finney wrote:] When you observe evidence and construct your models, you need some basis for choosing one model over another. In general, you can create an infinite number of possible models to match any finite amount of evidence. It's even worse when you

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-24 Thread Hal Finney
. I don't think this works, for the reasons I have just explained. Mathematics and logic are more than models of reality. They are pre-existent and guide us in evaluating the many possible models of reality which exist. Hal Finney

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-24 Thread Hal Finney
Forwarded on behalf of Brent Meeker: On 24-Jul-05, you wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Here's my $0.02. We can only base our knowledge on our experience and we don't experience *reality*, we just have certain experiences and we create a model that describes them and predicts them. Using

Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-23 Thread Hal Finney
to life but each is in its own universe, so we can't see the result. But they are all just as real as our own. In fact one of the equations might even be our own universe but we can't easily tell just by looking at it. Hal Finney

Re: is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-22 Thread Hal Finney
turn out to be easier to solve than the general case. Hal Finney

UDist and measure of observers

2005-07-22 Thread Hal Finney
measure and making predictions. Hal Finney

Re: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a dimension

2005-07-21 Thread Hal Finney
George Levy writes: Hal Finney wrote: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/dimensions.html , specifically http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/dimensions.pdf . Wouldn't it be true that in the manyworld, every quantum branchings that is decoupled from other quantum branchings would in effect

RE: The Time Deniers and the idea of time as a dimension

2005-07-19 Thread Hal Finney
. Translating this into a flow of time view seems quite challenging and suggests that that viewpoint may not be as flexible in terms of deep understanding of the notion of time. Hal Finney

Re: is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-15 Thread Hal Finney
HPO, if it is nevertheless able to solve every problem we give it, it's probably worth the money! Hal Finney

RE: is induction unformalizable?

2005-07-14 Thread Hal Finney
of our existence to be successful. Hal Finney

Re: The Time Deniers

2005-07-14 Thread Hal Finney
Russell Standish writes: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:20:27PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: =20 Right, that is one of the big selling points of the Tegmark and Schmidhuber concept, that the Big Bang apparently can be described in very low-information terms. Tegmark even has a paper arguing

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-13 Thread Hal Finney
, and all the ones that we would identify as observers fall into that category. Hal Finney

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-13 Thread Hal Finney
; in one the photon is absorbed and in the other the photon continues in the 20 degree polarization state. Or you can run time backwards and get the photon to be in the 40 degree state. I don't think the MWI helps much with this. Hal Finney

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-12 Thread Hal Finney
. For an informational object, a sufficiently precise description is equivalent to the object itself, in my view. And I am considering an ontology where everything is an informational object. Hal Finney

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-12 Thread Hal Finney
Jesse Mazer writes: Hal Finney wrote: I imagine that multiple universes could exist, a la Schmidhuber's ensemble or Tegmark's level 4 multiverse. Time does not play a special role in the descriptions of these universes. Doesn't Schmidhuber consider only universes that are the results

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-11 Thread Hal Finney
process and rule to answer this kind of question. Hal Finney

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-10 Thread Hal Finney
, but where time doesn't really exist (in some sense), where there is no actual causality? I have trouble with this idea, but I'd be interested to hear from those who think that such a distinction exists. Hal Finney

UD + ASSA

2005-07-10 Thread Hal Finney
then connect its definition of measure to subjective experience using the concept that higher measure states are more likely to be experienced. This is the basic principle from which we attempt to make our predictions and explanations. Hal Finney

Re: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Hal Finney
of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? Hal Finney

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-22 Thread Hal Finney
the button reduces the measure of my enjoyment of the food. Hal Finney

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-22 Thread Hal Finney
involving copies, otherwise you are led into paradox and confusion. Hal Finney

RE: Copies Count

2005-06-22 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Hal Finney writes: Suppose you will again be simultaneously teleported to Washington and Moscow. This time you will have just one copy waking up in each. Then you will expect 50-50 odds. But suppose that after one hour, the copy in Moscow gets switched

Re: death

2005-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 20-juin-05, =E0 18:16, Hal Finney a =E9crit : That's true, from the pure OM perspective death doesn't make sense because OMs are timeless. I was trying to phrase things in terms of the observer model in my reply to Stathis. An OM wants to preserve the measure

Re: Torture yet again

2005-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
where they can be copied. Hal Finney

Re: Measure, Doomsday argument

2005-06-21 Thread Hal Finney
the cortex, hence probably with lower information content. Of course there are a lot more people than other reasonably large-brained animals, so perhaps our sheer numbers cancel any penalty due to our larger and more-complex brains. Hal Finney

RE: Copies Count

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
, then it seems like it should apply to changes in time as well as space. Hal Finney

Re: death

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
. This is what increasing measure means to your genes. If people lived in a regime where increasing measure were possible, I believe they would come to adopt similar views, and for the same reason our genes did. Hal Finney

RE: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
more ambitious. Hal Finney

RE: Copies Count

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
that pleasant events happen on the high measure days and unpleasant ones happen on the low measure days. It's an interesting concept in any case. I need to think about it more, but I'd be interested to hear your views. Hal Finney

Re: death

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 19-juin-05, =E0 15:52, Hal Finney a =E9crit : I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not reduce my measure. But if the measure is absolute and is bearing on the OMs, and if that=20 is only determined by their (absolute) Kolmogorov

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
between the two situations. Hal Finney

Re: Measure, Doomsday argument

2005-06-20 Thread Hal Finney
the DA is consistent with the fact that we don't live in a magical universe, but it implies some mathematical properties of the nature of computation which we are not yet in a position to verify. Hal Finney

Re: death

2005-06-19 Thread Hal Finney
measure, so that is death, death on a scale that has never been seen before in the universe. (Compensated by birth on a scale that has never been seen before... So morally maybe it's not that bad. Still it's jerking people around to an amazing degree.) Hal Finney

Re: Time travel in multiple universes

2005-06-19 Thread Hal Finney
back and forth, tweaking here, changing there, taking a long time just to set up a small patch of space-time in its output tape. This is another way to think of where and when the alternatives for paradox free time travel could be considered and rejected. Hal Finney

Re: death

2005-06-18 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Hal Finney writes: God creates someone with memories of a past life, lets him live for a day, then instantly and painlessly kills him. What would you say that he experiences? Would he notice his birth and death? I would generally apply the same answers

Re: copy method important?

2005-06-18 Thread Hal Finney
. In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would not be affected by these considerations. Hal Finney

Re: copy method important?

2005-06-18 Thread Hal Finney
Will (or at least behavior that is, in principle, unpredictable) does exist. Right, well, for many people, being at the mercy of unpredictable and uncontrollable randomness may be free but it's hardly willful. Hal Finney

RE: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-17 Thread Hal Finney
happend before you were born, you wouldn't be around to consider these questions. I think this is similar to the reasoning in the SIA. Hal Finney

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