Re: Russell's book + UD*/strings
Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit : I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent, ? ? ? I guess you are using the word interpretation in some non standard way. It would help us, and you, if you could work on a glossary. but perhaps there is not much difference between interpretation and theory. Would you say There is a red flower is a theory, or merely an interpretation of an image? It could be a theory, ... then if you interpret the word red by the adjective green with its usual meaning, and the word flower by inhabitant of the planet mars, then the interpretation of there is a red flower is a correct theory with respect to realities where there are green inhabitant on Mars, and incorrect in the realities where there are no green inhabitant on Mars. In that sense there is a red flower can be seen as a theory. I assume here that there is is borrowed from a classical logic in the background. If it were possible to view the entire Nothing, ? it would be an inconsistent interpretation. However it is not so possible, and indeed it may be true that it is impossible to have an inconsistent interpretation (I do not assert this however). I think it would be helpful to use the standard meaning of those term, or at least, to define them precisely if you use them in some other sense. Indeed - however we do have a difference in emphasis. Yours is towards more formal models, but with obscure modeling relations, My emphasis is on machine which are formal by construction, and the obscure modeling relation are old and new theorems in mathematical logic. It is just applied mathematics. The modelling relations are strange and mysterious, but this is just because Godel and Lob theorems are somehow themselves strange and mysterious. But is this 1-3 distinction implicit within your statement of COMP? I'm not sure that it is. I think it is, and the following quote makes me thing you believe this too, at least in the quantum framework, when you say: Collapse is conceived of as a physical process, and as such is problematic. Nonphysical collapse is just the 1 POV of the Multiverse. That's all I'm talking about. It is not new, it underlies all of Chapter 2 of my book, and also of Why Occams Razor. Perhaps I'm guilty of assuming it without explicitly stating it, but by way of challenge can you give me a piece of knowledge that doesn't come in the form of a string? Knowledge comes from third person finite strings, with a measure determined by *some* infinite strings (the non halting immaterial computations) generating them. It is certainly hard, given we live on the opposite sides of a digital world - a record of a telephone conversation we have will be a a string of bits, as will any emails we use, any my book left my hands in the form of a string of bits and so on. OK, but that are finite strings conceived and manipulated (by your computer and your brain with some high level comp assumption) as numbers. Most test editor manipulate a structure of finite strings together with a concatenation or substitution structure. Again this is infinitely richer that your set of all infinite strings. I use the usual one (excluded middle), and I don't use any infinity axiom that I'm aware of. Now I am very confused. I thought you were assuming infinite strings. A glossary would really help, I am not sure you are not changing the meaning of your term from paragraph to paragraph. Yes - I appreciate the ontological difference. I would say that only Nothing exists (in ontological meaning). Strings and sets of strings only exist in the same sense that the number 1 exists. This contradict the definition of Nothing you gave us. I could elaborate a lot about the vagueness of the notion of finding something in the UD* (the infinite complete running of the UD). I could ask finding by who?, from inside? from the terrestrial (verifiable) view or the divine one (true but non verifiable)?, from which x-person point of view? Etc. Given that the UD cannot not dovetail on all the reals, there is a sense in saying all the infinite strings are generated, but this gives a noisy background first person machine have to live with. The UD is not equivalent with all infinite strings, the UD* is a static given of all computations. Those computations can be represented by very peculiar finite and infinite strings together with a non trivial structure inherited from computer science/number theory. About the only difference I see is that the measure might be different... And that *is* the key issue, I think. I more or less always assumed this. Either COMP is more specialised (you can derive some my postulates from COMP, and others are compatible with it), or COMP is the only way of deriving these same postulates, or COMP in some way contradicts these postulates. As you admit yourself there is a lot of work to get enough precision in
Re: Russell's book + UD*/strings
On Fri, Sep 29, 2006 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit : I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent, ? ? ? I guess you are using the word interpretation in some non standard way. It would help us, and you, if you could work on a glossary. Interpretation of something means meaning an observer attaches to something. Is this nonstandard? I wouldn't have thought so. Indeed - however we do have a difference in emphasis. Yours is towards more formal models, but with obscure modeling relations, My emphasis is on machine which are formal by construction, and the obscure modeling relation are old and new theorems in mathematical logic. It is just applied mathematics. The modelling relations are strange and mysterious, but this is just because Godel and Lob theorems are somehow themselves strange and mysterious. But so are your postulates, for example the Theatetus notion of knowledge is far from obvious. I can follow the logic as a formal system, but I struggle to make sense of it (interpret it). But is this 1-3 distinction implicit within your statement of COMP? I'm not sure that it is. I think it is, and the following quote makes me thing you believe this too, at least in the quantum framework, when you say: Collapse is conceived of as a physical process, and as such is problematic. Nonphysical collapse is just the 1 POV of the Multiverse. That's all I'm talking about. But I have an explicit 1-3 distinction in the format of my PROJECTION postulate, and that quoted statement is taken in that context. Obviously I have no objection to the 1-3 distinction, but I failed to see how it follows explicitly from AR+CT+YD, or even from I am a machine (in the Turing sense). It is not new, it underlies all of Chapter 2 of my book, and also of Why Occams Razor. Perhaps I'm guilty of assuming it without explicitly stating it, but by way of challenge can you give me a piece of knowledge that doesn't come in the form of a string? Knowledge comes from third person finite strings, with a measure determined by *some* infinite strings (the non halting immaterial computations) generating them. But finite strings are just sets of infinite strings. It is certainly hard, given we live on the opposite sides of a digital world - a record of a telephone conversation we have will be a a string of bits, as will any emails we use, any my book left my hands in the form of a string of bits and so on. OK, but that are finite strings conceived and manipulated (by your computer and your brain with some high level comp assumption) as numbers. Most test editor manipulate a structure of finite strings together with a concatenation or substitution structure. Again this is infinitely richer that your set of all infinite strings. No - sets have subsets, and all finite strings can be found as a subset of the set of all infinite strings. I use the usual one (excluded middle), and I don't use any infinity axiom that I'm aware of. Now I am very confused. I thought you were assuming infinite strings. A glossary would really help, I am not sure you are not changing the meaning of your term from paragraph to paragraph. You introduced the term infinity axiom. If by a infinity axiom you mean the existence of infinite strings, or the existence of infinite sets, then yes I have an infinity axiom. Yes - I appreciate the ontological difference. I would say that only Nothing exists (in ontological meaning). Strings and sets of strings only exist in the same sense that the number 1 exists. This contradict the definition of Nothing you gave us. The set of all strings is a model of the Nothing (or equivalently the Everything). It is meant to be the ultimate model, capturing all that is possible to know about it. About the only difference I see is that the measure might be different... And that *is* the key issue, I think. I more or less always assumed this. Either COMP is more specialised (you can derive some my postulates from COMP, and others are compatible with it), or COMP is the only way of deriving these same postulates, or COMP in some way contradicts these postulates. As you admit yourself there is a lot of work to get enough precision in your approach to compare it with the consequence of the computationalist hypothesis. As I do have a lot of work to compare the comp-physics with the experimental physics. Yes - in that respect, my work ties more closely to physics. However, there is a distinct difference between my string ensemble and Schmidhuber's speed prior one, particularly with respect to randomness. Sometimes I define strong comp by saying yes to the doctor, and weak comp by accpetoing your child marry someone who has say yes to the doctor. Surely you have an opinion on that, no? To be quite frank,
Russell's book + UD*/strings
Hi Russell, I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book. Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your most basic assumption, but I see we share a big amount of the philosophy. I am already glad you did take into account 1/5 of my earlier remarks, I wish you at least five next editions ;-). To be honest I don't think you really get the comp idea, and it is a good think your work does not really rely on it. Now I will not hide the pleasure I have when seeing the 8 hypostases (even the sixteen one!) sum up through their modal logic in table 71 page 129. I will neither repeat my olds comments nor make new one, but hope our future discussion will give opportunities to clarify the possible misunderstandings and relationship between our approaches. I let you know that I will be very busy from now until end of october, so that I will be more slow for the comments' replies (or more grave for the spelling mistakes if that is possible). == Russell wrote On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 03:23:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-sept.-06, ˆ 07:01, Russell Standish a Žcrit : Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite string of symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing. You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all formula as theorems. But a theory which contains all formulas as theorems is inconsistent. I am afraid you confuse some object level (the strings) and theory-level (the theorems about the strings). Actually, I was wondering if you were making this confusion, owing to the ontological status you give mathematical statements. The Nothing, if interpreted in its entirety, This can make sense only if you tell us how to interpret a string or how you interpret the Nothing, I mean formally. From this I infer that your nothing is an informal theory of infinite strings. Also I give only ontological status to object in the scope of an arithmetical existential statement. For example I do believe in the existence of prime numbers. must be inconsistent, of course. Only a theory can be inconsistent. But I don't see a theory. Our reasoning about it need not be, and certainly I would be grateful for anyone pointing out inconsistencies in my writing. That is why I would insist to be as clear as possible so that the inconsistencies are more easy to find. Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, like strings. I'm not that informal. What I talk about are mathematical objects, and one can use mathematical reasoning. The formal/informal distinguo has nothing to do with the mathematical/non-mathematical distinguo. Nor with rigorous/non-rigorous. 100 % of mathematics, including mathematical logic is informal. Now, logicians studied formal theories or machines because it is what they are studying. But they prove things about formal systems in an informal way like any scientist. In some context formal and informal are relative. Of course a description of a formal system looks formal, but we reason *about* those formal systems. Now, if your strings are all there is, I wait for an explanation of what those strings does formally, but I am not asking to formalize your reasoning in your string-language, unless for illustrative purpose in case you want to illustrate how a string interprets something. Like we can explain how a brain or more simply how a turing machine can interpret some data. To be sure, given that your strings are infinite I have no clue how the strings can interpret things. I should note that the PROJECTION postulate is implicit in your UDA when you come to speak of the 1-3 distinction. I don't think it can be derived explicitly from the three legs of COMP. I'm afraid your are confusing the UDA, which is an informal (but rigorous) argument showing that IF I am digitalisable machine, then physics or the laws of Nature emerge and are derivable from number theory, and the translation of UDA in arithmetic, alias the interview of a universal chatty machine. The UDA is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes explicitly consciousness (or folk psychology or grandma psychology as I use those terms in the SANE paper) and a primitive physical universe. With this, the 1-3 distinction follows from the fact that if am copied at the correct level, the two copies cannot know the existence of each other and their personal discourse will differentiate. This is an illusion of projection like the wave packet *reduction* is an illusion
Re: Russell's book + UD*/strings
On Tue, Sep 26, 2006 at 04:10:32PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Russell, I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book. Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your most basic assumption, but I see we share a big amount of the philosophy. I am already glad you did take into account 1/5 of my earlier remarks, I wish you at least five next editions ;-). That's a bit like the old chinese curse - I wish you live in interesting times! To be honest I don't think you really get the comp idea, and it is a good think your work does not really rely on it. It is true that my work is an independent line of work, but probably related. I am interested in the connections, however. Now I will not hide the pleasure I have when seeing the 8 hypostases (even the sixteen one!) sum up through their modal logic in table 71 page 129. I will neither repeat my olds comments nor make new one, but hope our future discussion will give opportunities to clarify the possible misunderstandings and relationship between our approaches. Indeed. I let you know that I will be very busy from now until end of october, so that I will be more slow for the comments' replies (or more grave for the spelling mistakes if that is possible). == This can make sense only if you tell us how to interpret a string or how you interpret the Nothing, I mean formally. Interpretation is by an observer. Formally, the observer is a map from a string to an integer. To understand why the observer is such a formal object requires informal modelling talk, obviously. From this I infer that your nothing is an informal theory of infinite strings. It is a mixture of both. The formal part is not so interesting, but necessary to get some interesting conclusions. Also I give only ontological status to object in the scope of an arithmetical existential statement. For example I do believe in the existence of prime numbers. Whereas I think the whole notion of existence is highly dubious. :) must be inconsistent, of course. Only a theory can be inconsistent. But I don't see a theory. I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent, but perhaps there is not much difference between interpretation and theory. Would you say There is a red flower is a theory, or merely an interpretation of an image? If it were possible to view the entire Nothing, it would be an inconsistent interpretation. However it is not so possible, and indeed it may be true that it is impossible to have an inconsistent interpretation (I do not assert this however). Our reasoning about it need not be, and certainly I would be grateful for anyone pointing out inconsistencies in my writing. That is why I would insist to be as clear as possible so that the inconsistencies are more easy to find. Indeed - however we do have a difference in emphasis. Yours is towards more formal models, but with obscure modeling relations, whereas I prefer to spend more effort on the modeling relation than with the formal content (the formal content of my ideas are small, no doubt why you are disappointed!) In that respect, I am more the physicist, and you the mathematician. :) Perhaps the exchange is unfair because I react as a professional logician, and you try to convey something informally. But I think that at some point, in our difficult subject, we need to be entirely clear on what we assume or not especially if you are using formal objects, like strings. I'm not that informal. What I talk about are mathematical objects, and one can use mathematical reasoning. The formal/informal distinguo has nothing to do with the mathematical/non-mathematical distinguo. Nor with rigorous/non-rigorous. 100 % of mathematics, including mathematical logic is informal. Now, logicians studied formal theories or machines because it is what they are studying. But they prove things about formal systems in an informal way like any scientist. Well, yes - we probably are using the word formal differently then. For me, a formal system is a mathematical system with the modelling relation thrown away. Triangles without trangular shaped paddocks for example. In some context formal and informal are relative. Of course a description of a formal system looks formal, but we reason *about* those formal systems. Now, if your strings are all there is, I wait for an explanation of what those strings does formally, but I am not asking to formalize your reasoning in your string-language, unless for illustrative purpose in case you want to illustrate how a string interprets something. Like we can explain how a brain or more simply how a turing machine can interpret some data.
Re: Russell's book
Le 14-sept.-06, à 00:52, Russell Standish a écrit : That the experience of time is necessarily experienced by all conscious points of view is to my knowledge not even addressed by other philosophers. Even Bruno seems to skirt the issue, ? (I think that consciousness is needed for *all* experience, not just experience of time). although there is an appearance of temporality with the S4Grz logic. Yes, the S4Grz (and actually the S4Grz1, but also the X* and X1*) can be seen as first person or subjective time logic, and they are close to Brouwer's theory of time/consciousness, which has a long story from Heracliteus, StAugustin, Bergson, Brouwer, etc. Except that most of those philosopher, perhaps like David and George, makes such a first person time primitive. With comp, the experience of Space is more problematic. So I've simply made a conjecture that experience of time is necessary for consciousness, and tried to dilute the strength of that conjecture as far as possible. I do think that subjective time is inseparable from consciousness, or at least from mundane consciousness ( as opposed to some ecstatic high level form of experience sometimes described by mystics as being beyond time). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Russell's book
Periklis Akritidis writes: Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever behind... from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course). Even in my scheme where there is just a possibility of death some calculations I have done suggest that if you could demonstrate that your success rate after many bets was better than chance to a statistically significant extent, your chance of dying would also have to be statistically significant. It's as if the multiverse is conspiring against us to prevent us from proving its existence! No, it should be easy to make yourself experience a universe in which you have convinced others using the ability to solve any number of very difficult problems in case the machine worked, or just by being 2000 years old. But after you do manage to convince everybody, you would shortly find yourself in a very lonely universe, so I guess that even if you could prove QTI it would be in your best interest to keep it a secret. QTI predicts that you will survive from a 1st person POV only. If there is a 2000 y.o. man in the world discovered today that would therefore not be evidence for the theory: it is no more likely to happen if QTI is true than if it is false, from a 3rd person POV. There is one situation in which you could prove it to other people, by linking them to your own fate so that they see things from a similar 1st person POV. This is likely to happen practically if QTI is true even if you don't deliberately set it up that way. Your survival to extreme old ageis much more likely to happen because an anti-ageing technology mind uploading, for example, are discovered in your lifeltime than as a result of some biological fluke. Perhaps you are already reaping the benefits of this effect, as life expectancies are greater now than they used to be in previous centuries. Perhaps the entire history of the universe, with evolution of life on Earth, culminating in your birth, is just an incredibly unlikely coincidence selected out by your consciousness so that you can continue living. QTI can thus be seen as a restatement of the Anthropic Principle. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Periklis Akritidis writes: Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever behind... from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course). Even in my scheme where there is just a possibility of death some calculations I have done suggest that if you could demonstrate that your success rate after many bets was better than chance to a statistically significant extent, your chance of dying would also have to be statistically significant. It's as if the multiverse is conspiring against us to prevent us from proving its existence! No, it should be easy to make yourself experience a universe in which you have convinced others using the ability to solve any number of very difficult problems in case the machine worked, or just by being 2000 years old. But after you do manage to convince everybody, you would shortly find yourself in a very lonely universe, so I guess that even if you could prove QTI it would be in your best interest to keep it a secret. QTI predicts that you will survive from a 1st person POV only. If there is a 2000 y.o. man in the world discovered today that would therefore not be evidence for the theory: it is no more likely to happen if QTI is true than if it is false, from a 3rd person POV. There is one situation in which you could prove it to other people, by linking them to your own fate so that they see things from a similar 1st person POV. This is likely to happen practically if QTI is true even if you don't deliberately set it up that way. Your survival to extreme old ageis much more likely to happen because an anti-ageing technology mind uploading, for example, are discovered in your lifeltime than as a result of some biological fluke. Isn't it even more likely to be due to their discovery in previous generations. Is there an AP explanation for why we don't see very old people now. Perhaps you are already reaping the benefits of this effect, as life expectancies are greater now than they used to be in previous centuries. Not really. Medicine, sanitation, and security have greatly increased life expectancy at birth, but they haven't done very much for extending the maximum age. In the meantime a lot of people have (apparently) died. Perhaps the entire history of the universe, with evolution of life on Earth, culminating in your birth, is just an incredibly unlikely coincidence selected out by your consciousness so that you can continue living. QTI can thus be seen as a restatement of the Anthropic Principle. Brent Meeker What doesn't kill me only postpones the inevitable. --- Nietzsche's older brother --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: This is the most immediate response of people to the QTI idea: even if it's true, what do I care if other versions of me survive in the multiverse if I'm going to die? According to QTI you are not going to die in any universe because there are no dead ends in the branching. The problem is, you can arbitrarily divide up the moments of your life and say that, for example, you were alive from 2:50 PM to 2:51 PM, then suddenly vanished from the universe (i.e. you were instantly and painlessly killed), then a perfect copy of you suddenly appeared at 2:51 PM and lived another minute. What would you notice if this happened? Would you worry about dying? I put it to you that this is precisely I wouldn't mind being in the branch that experiences an uninterrupted stream of consciousness, but I worry that instances of me in the branches where I am supposed to commit suicide would be biased towards not doing it, given enough time to think about it. As for the factoring machine, it simply wouldn't work. You would experience just the miraculous escape after the gun shot without having a solution to the computationally hard problem. You would still end up dead in most worlds from a third person POV though, wouldn't you? That seems the main impediment to actually conducting a QS-type experiment (aside Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever behind... from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course). Even in my scheme where there is just a possibility of death some calculations I have done suggest that if you could demonstrate that your success rate after many bets was better than chance to a statistically significant extent, your chance of dying would also have to be statistically significant. It's as if the multiverse is conspiring against us to prevent us from proving its existence! No, it should be easy to make yourself experience a universe in which you have convinced others using the ability to solve any number of very difficult problems in case the machine worked, or just by being 2000 years old. But after you do manage to convince everybody, you would shortly find yourself in a very lonely universe, so I guess that even if you could prove QTI it would be in your best interest to keep it a secret. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote: Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presumably make winners of *all* its members (makes you wonder about about a conservation principle for money). There's still an incentive to bump the others off to speed the process, however, even though they would still end up as beneficiaries themselves on other branches. Rationally, they should draw lots, with a single winner being the only one who doesn't commit suicide (this should of course be automated). I doubt this method would be any more popular with the authorities though. That is reasonable. Even if they accept QTI, they would still have to manage the resulting social mess in their POVs. What about the possibility to end up through QTI in a universe of eternal pain? If the outcome depends on your state of mind at the time of death (death from other's POVs of course), we may have Quantum Heaven and Hell theories:) David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Russell's book
Tom Caylor writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my original self, and so for all practical purposes wouldn't I be another person? How do I know this hasn't happened already? If it has, what difference does it make? Isn't it true that the only realities that matter are the ones that make any difference to my reality? (almost a tautology) The only guarantee fom QTI is that you will experience a next moment: that there exists an observer moment in the universe which considers your present moment to be its predecessor. And this guarantee of a next experience is based on what? It's based on every possible event, including every possible mental state that you or I could experience, actually occurring somewhere in the multiverse. If there is no multiverse, or only a limited multiverse, then there is no guarantee. Also, if an observer moment can consider, this must be a very special observer moment. I don't understand observer moments to be anything magical. They are just arbitrarily small units of experience. We could say there is just one non-branching reality and talk of observer seconds: if you have one second of experience today, and your brain is snap-frozen so that your next observer second occurs when it is thawed out in a thousand years from now, then (technical limitations aside) you would have experienced a continuous two seconds of consciousness despite the intervening gap. Computers do this sort of thing all the time, time-sharing computations or spreading them across a network. From the computations' point of view it's all seamless, unless you actually include data informing it that it has been chopped up into pieces. This leads to difficulties with partial memory loss, which are not unique to QTI but might actually occur in real life. For example, if you are in a car crash and end up in a vegetative state, this is usually taken as being effectively the same as ending up dead. If you wake up after the accident mentally intact except you have forgotten what you had for breakfast that morning then you have survived in much the same way you would have if you had never had the accident. If you consider that the world splits and there are only these two outcomes, or if you consider a teleportation experiment in which you are reconstituted in these two states at separate receiving stations, the conclusion seems straightforward enough: you will survive the ordeal having lost only your memory of what you had for breakfast. Now, consider a situation where there are 10 possible outcomes, or 10 possible teleportation destinations, ranging from #1 vegetative state (or headless corpse) to #10 intact except for memory of breakfast. In this scheme, #8 might be intact except you have forgotten 10% of what you have done in the past year, while #3 might be you have forgotten everything except what you learned before the age of two years. What is your expectation of survival in this situation? Stathis Papaiaonnou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Russell's book
Periklis Akritidis writes: QTI apparently implies a very efficient machine to compute the solution to any well defined problem. Suppose you want to factor a large number. The machine simply generates some random numbers using thermal noise, computes their product, compares it with the number to factor, and in case they do not match triggers a gun pointing to your head. Every time you use the machine, you would find yourself experiencing a universe where the machine either gave you the right answer or you miraculously escaped death, perhaps with injuries. It may take some tuning to make the machine robustly lethal so you can get the right answer most of the time and avoid injuries. This doesn't just give you immortality, but it also solves your financial problems so you don't have to speculate on financial planning. Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong poison which you keep in your pocket. You place your bet all the while repeating, if I lose I'll kill myself. You're not crazy and you probably won't kill yourself if you lose, but if it's a perfectly fair game, the non-zero chance that you *might* kill yourself (because you say it to yourself and because you have the means) should, over many bets, swing the odds in your favour in the universes in which you survive. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong poison which you keep in your pocket. You place your bet all the while repeating, if I lose I'll kill myself. You're not crazy and you probably won't kill yourself if you lose, but if it's a perfectly fair game, the non-zero chance that you *might* kill yourself (because you say it to yourself and because you have the means) should, over many bets, swing the odds in your favour in the universes in which you survive. Then merely the small probability of commiting suicide in an unfavourable universe because of psychological reasons would swing the odds towards being in a favourable one. In addition, weak persons, likely to commit suicide under harsh conditions, would have higher probability of experiencing favourable histories. However, you would not want to experience the suicide part. Otherwise, what would any instance of you gain from actually doing it? Why would it care for other instances of you reaping the benefits? Itself would still suffer death. It might as well avoid all risk taking confort in the idea that other instances are using the QTI money-making scheme or are just being lucky. For the idea to make sense, it is key to avoid experiencing anything after the dice are thrown. In the factoring scheme you need some time to check the solution, so you would end up checking the solution and by the time you find that you have a wrong answer it is too late, bang and, if QTI holds, miraculous escape. For the scheme to work, the solution being wrong must be equivallent to you not existing. With original QTI and death that is already the case. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Periklis Akritidis wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong poison which you keep in your pocket. You place your bet all the while repeating, if I lose I'll kill myself. You're not crazy and you probably won't kill yourself if you lose, but if it's a perfectly fair game, the non-zero chance that you *might* kill yourself (because you say it to yourself and because you have the means) should, over many bets, swing the odds in your favour in the universes in which you survive. Then merely the small probability of commiting suicide in an unfavourable universe because of psychological reasons would swing the odds towards being in a favourable one. In addition, weak persons, likely to commit suicide under harsh conditions, would have higher probability of experiencing favourable histories. However, you would not want to experience the suicide part. Otherwise, what would any instance of you gain from actually doing it? Why would it care for other instances of you reaping the benefits? Itself would still suffer death. It might as well avoid all risk taking confort in the idea that other instances are using the QTI money-making scheme or are just being lucky. For the idea to make sense, it is key to avoid experiencing anything after the dice are thrown. In unfavourable branches that is. In the factoring scheme you need some time to check the solution, so you would end up checking the solution and by the time you find that you have a wrong answer it is too late, bang and, if QTI holds, miraculous escape. For the scheme to work, the solution being wrong must be equivallent to you not existing. With original QTI and death that is already the case. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presumably make winners of *all* its members (makes you wonder about about a conservation principle for money). There's still an incentive to bump the others off to speed the process, however, even though they would still end up as beneficiaries themselves on other branches. Rationally, they should draw lots, with a single winner being the only one who doesn't commit suicide (this should of course be automated). I doubt this method would be any more popular with the authorities though. David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 02:56:30PM -, David Nyman wrote: Russell Standish wrote: If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses. 'Fraid I don't have a theorem! However, as to 'moderately convincing arguments', I think the problem with thinking coherently about temporal experience seems to be with mentally flip-flopping between structural and implicitly dynamic mental models of 'time'. I had an exchange with Barbour about this because I was convinced that he just introduced 'time' back into his static Platonia by what I called 'sleight of intuition' - i.e. the implicit temporality of our language. He didn't disagree, but just felt he wanted to de-emphasise this aspect within his project of taking the static function maximally seriously. However, I'm not so certain about the intuition now. It seems plausible that the content of 1st-person experience is represented structurally within time capsules - including those aspects that would appear as 'in relation to' the content of other capsules. This by itself would yield a 'picture' of time from the pov of any capsule (i.e. 'time' as information, and particularly as defined by information 'horizons') if only we could account for the experience of dynamism. Here I'm much less clear, but I have a sort of 'intuition pump'. It seems to me that we must consider who or what is the 'experiencer'. For dynamism one needs contrast, and such contrast is to be found between the 0-person 'pov' of the multiverse and individual 1st-person capsules. So if the multiverse is the experiencer, the dynamism of time may emerge simply from the global/ local contrast of its 0-person/ 1st-person povs. Clear as mud. David If you note in sect. 9.2 of my book, I am quite clear that time must emerge from a timeless underlying reality somehow - whether by Barbour's time capsules, or by some completely different mechanism, I don't think is all that pertinent. That the experience of time is necessarily experienced by all conscious points of view is to my knowledge not even addressed by other philosophers. Even Bruno seems to skirt the issue, although there is an appearance of temporality with the S4Grz logic. So I've simply made a conjecture that experience of time is necessary for consciousness, and tried to dilute the strength of that conjecture as far as possible. Hopefully some bright spark will either prove the conjecture (in some form), or even more interestingly disprove it. But I won't hold my breath. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan writes: David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. Don't forget the Omega Point possibility, which sees you vapourised today but resurrected in simulation in the far future. Or perhaps at the moment of detonation it will be revealed to you that you are already living in a simulation, and the disaster is averted at the last moment by the programmers. It doesn't matter whether you are currently in the simulation or in the real world since the only thing that matters is where your *next moment* comes from. Your stream of consciousness would be the same if all the separate moments of your life were completely disconnected and mixed up in time, space or across separate real and simulated universes. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about an aside, it wasn't always so. Apparently, in the early years of Christianity the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of California. What possible continuations exist in this situation? In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? A very interesting question. If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? Don't discount force of habit and social conditioning. Christians believe that when they die they will go to heaven, so logically they should be pleased, or at least only minimally upset, at the prospect of an asteroid instantly and painlessly wiping out all life on Earth. However, all but the craziest Christians would hope that such a thing does not happen, and essentially live their lives as if death is a bad thing for them and the people they care about. Maybe it's just a question of faith, as the September 11 terrorists did not have such qualms. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my original self, and so for all practical purposes wouldn't I be another person? How do I know this hasn't happened already? If it has, what difference does it make? Isn't it true that the only realities that matter are the ones that make any difference to my reality? (almost a tautology) The only guarantee fom QTI is that you will experience a next moment: that there exists an observer moment in the universe which considers your present moment to be its predecessor. And this guarantee of a next experience is based on what? Also, if an observer moment can consider, this must be a very special observer moment. This leads to difficulties with partial memory loss, which are not unique to QTI but might actually occur in real life. For example, if you are in a car crash and end up in a vegetative state, this is usually taken as being effectively the same as ending up dead. If you wake up after the accident mentally intact except you have forgotten what you had for breakfast that morning then you have survived in much the same way you would have if you had never had the accident. If you consider that the world splits and there are only these two outcomes, or if you consider a teleportation experiment in which you are reconstituted in these two states at separate receiving stations, the conclusion seems straightforward enough: you will survive the ordeal having lost only your memory of what you had for breakfast. Now, consider a situation where there are 10 possible outcomes, or 10 possible teleportation destinations, ranging from #1 vegetative state (or headless corpse) to #10 intact except for memory of breakfast. In this scheme, #8 might be intact except you have forgotten 10% of what you have done in the past year, while #3 might be you have forgotten everything except what you learned before the age of two years. What is your expectation of survival in this situation? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Russell Standish wrote: 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that of the multiverse can't we simply treat all 1st-person experience as the 'absolute sampling' of all povs compresently? David I've lost you here. Maybe you need to expand a bit. Why do we need to assume TIME as an ordering process for 'successive' moments under the RSSA assumption? Isn't it the case that, under the ASSA assumption, 1st-person experience would continue to appear 'time-like' (because of its 'relative' internal structure within each 'time capsule') without the need for a TIME postulate (i.e. Barbour's position)? David On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 12:52:25PM -, David Nyman wrote: Hi Russell I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur: 1) QTI - I must say until reading your remarks (e.g. re pension plans) the possible personal consequences of QTI hadn't really struck me. If QTI is true, there is a fundamental assymetry between the 1st and 3rd-person povs vis-a-vis personal longevity (at least the longevity of consciousness), and this seems to imply that one should take seriously the prospect of being around in some form far longer than generally assumed from a purely 3rd-person perspective. This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? I mentioned two examples in my book - retirement savings planning - I will be looking wherever possible for lifetime pension options. Of course from a QTI perspective, the value of these are limited by the estimated lifetime of the superannuation company. The second example is my attitude to euthanasia has changed. Beyond that, I suppose I no longer fear death. What I do fear is incapacitation, and so I weigh my risks of bodily damage in any action against the risks to personal liberty etc. by inaction. It probably does not change the decision matrix very much at all, however I can't see suicide bombing as a useful strategy under QTI. 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that of the multiverse can't we simply treat all 1st-person experience as the 'absolute sampling' of all povs compresently? David I've lost you here. Maybe you need to expand a bit. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 07:40:06AM -, David Nyman wrote: Why do we need to assume TIME as an ordering process for 'successive' moments under the RSSA assumption? Isn't it the case that, under the ASSA assumption, 1st-person experience would continue to appear 'time-like' (because of its 'relative' internal structure within each 'time capsule') without the need for a TIME postulate (i.e. Barbour's position)? David If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses. I haven't read Barbour's work, but from everything I've read about it, his approach simply skirts the issue without facing it head on. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Russell Standish wrote: If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses. 'Fraid I don't have a theorem! However, as to 'moderately convincing arguments', I think the problem with thinking coherently about temporal experience seems to be with mentally flip-flopping between structural and implicitly dynamic mental models of 'time'. I had an exchange with Barbour about this because I was convinced that he just introduced 'time' back into his static Platonia by what I called 'sleight of intuition' - i.e. the implicit temporality of our language. He didn't disagree, but just felt he wanted to de-emphasise this aspect within his project of taking the static function maximally seriously. However, I'm not so certain about the intuition now. It seems plausible that the content of 1st-person experience is represented structurally within time capsules - including those aspects that would appear as 'in relation to' the content of other capsules. This by itself would yield a 'picture' of time from the pov of any capsule (i.e. 'time' as information, and particularly as defined by information 'horizons') if only we could account for the experience of dynamism. Here I'm much less clear, but I have a sort of 'intuition pump'. It seems to me that we must consider who or what is the 'experiencer'. For dynamism one needs contrast, and such contrast is to be found between the 0-person 'pov' of the multiverse and individual 1st-person capsules. So if the multiverse is the experiencer, the dynamism of time may emerge simply from the global/ local contrast of its 0-person/ 1st-person povs. Clear as mud. David On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 07:40:06AM -, David Nyman wrote: Why do we need to assume TIME as an ordering process for 'successive' moments under the RSSA assumption? Isn't it the case that, under the ASSA assumption, 1st-person experience would continue to appear 'time-like' (because of its 'relative' internal structure within each 'time capsule') without the need for a TIME postulate (i.e. Barbour's position)? David If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses. I haven't read Barbour's work, but from everything I've read about it, his approach simply skirts the issue without facing it head on. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Russell's book
Hi Russell I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur: 1) QTI - I must say until reading your remarks (e.g. re pension plans) the possible personal consequences of QTI hadn't really struck me. If QTI is true, there is a fundamental assymetry between the 1st and 3rd-person povs vis-a-vis personal longevity (at least the longevity of consciousness), and this seems to imply that one should take seriously the prospect of being around in some form far longer than generally assumed from a purely 3rd-person perspective. This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that of the multiverse can't we simply treat all 1st-person experience as the 'absolute sampling' of all povs compresently? David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of California. What possible continuations exist in this situation? In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? A very interesting question. If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan wrote: If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone actually acts on these beliefs. David David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of California. What possible continuations exist in this situation? In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? A very interesting question. If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote: Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone actually acts on these beliefs. It's not overly personal; I brought it up in fact. But personally, no, I don't act on these beliefs because they are not mine. That is, I've not established to my satisfaction that QTI is correct. However, I do have an intense interest and must admit I want it to be true. Alas, I may only find out when I look around and wonder why I'm the only 150 year old person :-) It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential underlying MWI explanation. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan wrote: It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential underlying MWI explanation. Yes, the question of cul-de-sacs is indeed interesting. However, it seems to me that they need only exist in a relative sense for it still to be worthwhile to make a 'bet' (in the spirit of 'yes doctor') - hence my point about avoiding 'insane' risks - perhaps like nuclear blasts (incidentally this is strongly reminiscent of the 'infinite improbability drive' for Douglas Adams fans). So long as there seemed to be some plausible (even if very small) number of 'escape routes' then it might be worth a punt. Your speculation re extremely small measure is interesting in this context. Personally, I would expect some sort of consciousness to survive in a non-zero branch, but in what company? David David Nyman wrote: Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone actually acts on these beliefs. It's not overly personal; I brought it up in fact. But personally, no, I don't act on these beliefs because they are not mine. That is, I've not established to my satisfaction that QTI is correct. However, I do have an intense interest and must admit I want it to be true. Alas, I may only find out when I look around and wonder why I'm the only 150 year old person :-) It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential underlying MWI explanation. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan wrote: David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which cross terms in the density matrix must be strictly (not just FAPP) zero. The Planck scale provides a lower bound on fundamental physical values. So it makes sense to me that treating probability measures as a continuum is no more than a convenient approximation. But I have no idea how to make that precise and testable. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan wrote: QTI makes a big twist on this by removing from the numerator *and* denominator those outcomes where consciousness ceases. Precisely. And this is what should bias one's choices in the case that one is prepared to bet on the validity of QTI. Not sure what the question is. Do you mean, what would things be like afterward? Would it be worth it? Yes, because this should also be taken into account before 'betting' (at least in certain near-cul-de-sac circumstances). Any thoughts? David David Nyman wrote: So long as there seemed to be some plausible (even if very small) number of 'escape routes' then it might be worth a punt. From a 'yes doctor' bet point of view, this introduces the idea of relative expectation of different future outcomes, an idea hashed out here many many times. Personally I think it's rational to base one's current actions on the probability of expected outcome*value (maximum utility theory). And I also think subjective probability should equate to proportion of measure. (Others disagree with this way of measuring future expectation.) QTI makes a big twist on this by removing from the numerator *and* denominator those outcomes where consciousness ceases. Your speculation re extremely small measure is interesting in this context. Personally, I would expect some sort of consciousness to survive in a non-zero branch, but in what company? Not sure what the question is. Do you mean, what would things be like afterward? Would it be worth it? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
(This is the original post that seems somehow to have gone missing) Hi Russell I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur: 1) QTI - I must say until reading your remarks (e.g. re pension plans) the possible personal consequences of QTI hadn't really struck me. If QTI is true, there is a fundamental assymetry between the 1st and 3rd-person povs vis-a-vis personal longevity (at least the longevity of consciousness), and this seems to imply that one should take seriously the prospect of being around in some form far longer than generally assumed from a purely 3rd-person perspective. This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that of the multiverse can't we simply treat all 1st-person experience as the 'absolute sampling' of all povs compresently? David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Brent Meeker wrote: Everett who originated the MWI thought about QTI. Although he never explicitly said he believed it, he led a very unhealthy life style smoking, drinking, eating to excees, never exercising and he died young, of a heart attack IIRC. So some of his acquaintences have speculated that he did really believe in QTI. Well, that's not quite rational--what is the quality of life (utility) that succeeds surviving a heart attack? If QTI is true, and I'm going to live a very long time, it would not only motivate me to plan for the long term, but also to be much more careful about my health--I'll be living in this body for much longer than ~73 years! -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Johnathan Corgan wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which cross terms in the density matrix must be strictly (not just FAPP) zero. The Planck scale provides a lower bound on fundamental physical values. So it makes sense to me that treating probability measures as a continuum is no more than a convenient approximation. But I have no idea how to make that precise and testable. Having measure ultimately having a fixed lower limit would I think be fatal to QTI. But, consider the following: At every successive moment our measure is decreasing, possibly by a very large fraction, depending on how you count it. Every moment we branch into only one of a huge number of possibilities. A moment here is on the order a Planck time unit. First, it may not be such a large factor. All nearby trajectories in configuration space constructively interfere to produce quasi-classical evolution in certain bases. So if we are essentially classical and I think we are (c.f. Tegmark's paper on the brain) then we are not decreasing in measure by MWI splitting on a Planckian or even millisecond time scale. The evolution of our world is mostly deterministic. Second, if there is a lower limit on the interference terms in the SE of the universe, then the density matrix gets diagonalized. Then the MWI goes away. QM is, as Omnes' says, a probabilistic theory and it predicts probabilities. Probabilities mean something happens and other things don't. So we don't risk vanishing. The fact that our probability seems to become vanishingly small is only a artifact of what we take as the domain of possibilities and it is no different than our improbability pre-QM. But undoubtedly there are mathematical difficulties with assuming a lower bound on probabilities. All our mathematics and theory has been built around continuous variables for the very good reason that it seems overwhelmingly difficult to do physics in discrete variables - just look at how messy numerical solution of partial differential equations is compared to the equations themselves. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
I think I can prove that QTI as intepreted in this list is false, I'll post the proof in a new thread. The only version of QTI that makes sense to me is this: All possible states exist out there in the multiverse. The observer moments are timeless objects so, in a certain sense, QTI is true. But then you must consider surviving with memory loss. E.g., if I'm diagnosed with a terminal illness, then there is still a branch in which I haven't been diagnosed with that illness. If I'm 100 years old, then I still have copies that are only 20 years old etc. etc. Saibal - Original Message - From: Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 7:43 PM Subject: Re: Russell's book David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of California. What possible continuations exist in this situation? In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? A very interesting question. If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my original self, and so for all practical purposes wouldn't I be another person? How do I know this hasn't happened already? If it has, what difference does it make? Isn't it true that the only realities that matter are the ones that make any difference to my reality? (almost a tautology) Johnathan Corgan wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which cross terms in the density matrix must be strictly (not just FAPP) zero. The Planck scale provides a lower bound on fundamental physical values. So it makes sense to me that treating probability measures as a continuum is no more than a convenient approximation. But I have no idea how to make that precise and testable. Having measure ultimately having a fixed lower limit would I think be fatal to QTI. But, consider the following: At every successive moment our measure is decreasing, possibly by a very large fraction, depending on how you count it. Every moment we branch into only one of a huge number of possibilities. A moment here is on the order a Planck time unit. So does this mean we run the risk of suddenly ceasing to exist, if our measure decreases past a lower limit simple due to the evolution of the SWE? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 12:52:25PM -, David Nyman wrote: Hi Russell I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur: 1) QTI - I must say until reading your remarks (e.g. re pension plans) the possible personal consequences of QTI hadn't really struck me. If QTI is true, there is a fundamental assymetry between the 1st and 3rd-person povs vis-a-vis personal longevity (at least the longevity of consciousness), and this seems to imply that one should take seriously the prospect of being around in some form far longer than generally assumed from a purely 3rd-person perspective. This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? I mentioned two examples in my book - retirement savings planning - I will be looking wherever possible for lifetime pension options. Of course from a QTI perspective, the value of these are limited by the estimated lifetime of the superannuation company. The second example is my attitude to euthanasia has changed. Beyond that, I suppose I no longer fear death. What I do fear is incapacitation, and so I weigh my risks of bodily damage in any action against the risks to personal liberty etc. by inaction. It probably does not change the decision matrix very much at all, however I can't see suicide bombing as a useful strategy under QTI. 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that of the multiverse can't we simply treat all 1st-person experience as the 'absolute sampling' of all povs compresently? David I've lost you here. Maybe you need to expand a bit. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
