Russell Standish writes (quoting SP):
Whatifwejustsaythatthereisnomoretothesupervenienceofthe mentalonthephysicalthanthereistothesupervenienceofa parabolaonthetrajectoryofaprojectileundergravity?The projectiledoesn't"create"theparabola,whichexistsinPlatoniain
Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP):
Whatyouseemtobesuggestingisthatnotallcomputationsareequivalent: somegiverisetomind,whileothers,apparentlysimilar,donot.Isn't thissimilartothereasoningofpeoplewhosaythatacomputercould neverbeconsciousbecauseevenifitexactlyemulatedahumanbrain,itis
Jesse Mazer writes:
Anyway,withouttyingmyargumenttocloselytoChalmers'beliefs,whatI meantwhenItalkedabout"psychophysicallaws"wasjustarulefordeciding whenacopyofaparticularcomputationhasbeeninstantiatedphysically, witheachinstantiationcontributingtothetotalmeasureofthat
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent:
some give rise to mind, while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't
this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a computer could
never be conscious because even if it exactly
x and logix
101.
John
- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 8:43
PM
Subject: RE: Re: Bruno's argument
John Mikes writes (quoting SP):
youwrote:(excerpt):
...Thesimple
Bruno Marchal writes:
Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non
John Mikes writes (quoting SP):
youwrote:(excerpt): ...Thesimplestexplanationthatcomestomindisthatabrainorcomputer caninteractwithitsenvironment,anditisonlythosecomputationswhich interactwiththeirenvironmentofwhichwecanbeaware.Arockmaybe
Bruno Marchal writes:
ThecitedarticlearatheremotionalcriticismofChalmer'sideas. Ah?OK,surelyyouknowabetterresume?
Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html
Quoting:
Then Chalmers proceeds to present his own theory of consciousness, that he calls "naturalistic dualism" (but
Thanks for digging out that summary. I met Chalmers in January this
year on a trip to Canberra, but I wasn't completely sure what his
position was.
Fromthis summary, his position actually sounds very close to that
which I argue in Theory of Nothing, however I attach a label to it:
Emergence. The
Quentin Anciaux writes:
That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your
consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your
consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain,
you *can* point to the computer.
When you mean computer, do you
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
Itseemstometriviallyobviousthatanysufficientlycomplex physicalsystemimplementsanyfinitecomputation,justasany sufficientlylargeblockofmarblecontainseverymarblestatueofa givensize.Thedifferencebetweenrandomnoise(orablockof
11 matches
Mail list logo
