Fw: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason, I should have that if those two people can shake hands, they cannot be identical. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 08:27:06 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism Hi Jason Resch There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds unless you are me. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. ?hen their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch Could those two people see and talk to one another ? Could they shake hands ? Then their memories of that event would be different. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-25, 09:37:35 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share the same soul (at least for a moment)? Jason On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and to him everybody must be different (have an individual monad= soul = identity= memory, etc. etc. etc. ). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark ?rote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal ?rote: >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" future >> 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is only "a" future 1p view. >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word "and". > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is >> the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What >> more is there to know? ? > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. > In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ?> but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: "The critique of many worlds is shifting fro
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch There is and cannot be two identical uploaded minds unless you are me. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 15:32:08 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 2:17 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/24/2012 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason If you had two 'brains in vat' you could arrange for the same external signals to them, e.g. from a camera at a particular location, and thus have 'the same' visual perspective.? But I expect that their *perceptions* will still be quite different and you could do as well by just having them stand close together or look at the same TV screen. Put two identical uploaded minds each in the same deterministic simulation. ?hen their perceptions should be identical. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Roger, I appreciate your claim that all monads must be distinct and unique because that is the basis of my string consciousness theory. However, I have never read of leibniz saying that. So could you supply a link to him saying so? Richard On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Jason Resch > > Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. > The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and > to him everybody must be different (have an > individual monad= soul = identity= memory, > etc. etc. etc. ). > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/25/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Jason Resch > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 > Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> Hi Jason Resch >> >> Since 1p has the property of perspective, >> and no two people can be at the same place at the >> same time, > > > But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain > the same first person perspectives? > > Jason > � >> >> 3p has multiple perspectives. >> >> That is the only multiworld theory that I can >> believe in. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/24/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Jason Resch >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 >> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote: >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote: >> >> >> >> >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" >> >> future 1p view. >> >> >> >> Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. >> >> Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is >> only "a" future 1p view. >> >> >> >> >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. >> >> Please note the use of the word "and". >> >> >> >> > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been >> > wrong. >> >> >> >> Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many >> would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some >> kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature >> of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any >> sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> >> >> >> >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington >> >> Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about >> >> it? >> >> What more is there to know? >> >> ? >> > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, >> >> >> >> In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will >> be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there >> to know? >> >> >> >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. >> >> >> > In the 3p view, that's correct, >> >> >> And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in >> the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse >> is not necessarily true. >> >> You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in >> philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same >> physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That >> is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. >> >> Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and >> you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome >> regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third >> person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly >> wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just >> Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. >> >> Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put >> yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Well if two people have the same mind and identity, then might they share the same soul (at least for a moment)? Jason On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Jason Resch > > Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. > The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and > to him everybody must be different (have an > individual monad= soul = identity= memory, > etc. etc. etc. ). > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/25/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Jason Resch > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 > *Subject:* Re: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Jason Resch >> >> Since 1p has the property of perspective, >> and no two people can be at the same place at the >> same time, > > > But could there be two places that are identical to each other which > contain the same first person perspectives? > > Jason > � > >> 3p has multiple perspectives. >> >> That is the only multiworld theory that I can >> believe in. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/24/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Jason Resch >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 >> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote: >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote: >> >> >> >> >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" >> future 1p view. >> >> >> >> Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. >> >> Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is >> only "a" future 1p view. >> >> >> >> >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. >> >> Please note the use of the word "and". >> >> >> >> > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been >> wrong. >> >> >> >> Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt >> many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just >> some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the >> nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man >> is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> >> >> >> >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington >> Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? >> What more is there to know? >> >> ? >> > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, >> >> >> >> In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will >> be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there >> to know? >> >> >> >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. >> >> >> > In the 3p view, that's correct, >> >> >> And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in >> the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse >> is not necessarily true. >> >> You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in >> philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same >> physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? >> That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. >> >> Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and >> you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome >> regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third >> person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is >> plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or >> even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. >> >> Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put >> yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some >> progress. >> ? >> >> >> >> ?> but fail to answer the question asked. >> >> Bruno Marchal does not understand the q
Re: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and to him everybody must be different (have an individual monad= soul = identity= memory, etc. etc. etc. ). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason ? 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark ?rote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal ?rote: >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" future >> 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is only "a" future 1p view. >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word "and". > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is >> the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What >> more is there to know? ? > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. > In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ?> but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'." Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to ev
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Jason Resch > > Since 1p has the property of perspective, > and no two people can be at the same place at the > same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason > 3p has multiple perspectives. > > That is the only multiworld theory that I can > believe in. > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/24/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Jason Resch > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 > Subject: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" > future 1p view. > > > > Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. > > Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is > only "a" future 1p view. > > > > >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. > > Please note the use of the word "and". > > > > > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been > wrong. > > > > Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many > would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some > kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the > nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man > is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. > > > > >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington > Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? > What more is there to know? > > ? > > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, > > > > In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will > be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there > to know? > > > >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. > > > > In the 3p view, that's correct, > > > And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in > the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse > is not necessarily true. > > You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in > philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same > physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? > That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. > > Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and > you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome > regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third > person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is > plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or > even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. > > Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put > yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some > progress. > ? > > > > ?> but fail to answer the question asked. > > Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not > surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno > Marchal. > > > > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. > > > If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens > and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think > that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more > popular than it is. > > > Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: > "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate > it' to simply 'I hate it'." > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, v
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch Since 1p has the property of perspective, and no two people can be at the same place at the same time, 3p has multiple perspectives. That is the only multiworld theory that I can believe in. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" future >> 1p view. Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is only "a" future 1p view. >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. Please note the use of the word "and". > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been > wrong. Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is >> the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? What >> more is there to know? ? > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there to know? >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. > In the 3p view, that's correct, And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse is not necessarily true. You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some progress. ? ?> but fail to answer the question asked. Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno Marchal. > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more popular than it is. Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate it' to simply 'I hate it'." Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi meekerdb I missed the thought experiment, but IMHO thought is an intentioned expression of some kind. Intentioned means that there is a living self to do the intentioning. Then one might think of thinking as a paste board on which one can paste and manipulate representations of the thoughts in the form of symbols, signs or icons. This is what Peirce's semiotics is like. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-30, 13:37:46 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/30/2012 4:42 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch ? What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought is not. That's what Bruno's trying to explain with his thought-experiment.? "Comp" implies that if physics is deterministic then human thought is too, but "you" is indeterminate (as John Clark insists at length). If physics is not deterministic then neither is human thought, but it may be approximately so by statistics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 Roger Clough wrote: > >Physics is deterministic, > I said it before I'll say it again, it's astonishing how many people expect to make deep philosophical discoveries while remaining totally ignorant about what science has accomplished since the year 1900, if not 1800. > > human thought is not. > So your thoughts happen for no reason whatsoever and are thus random and chaotic. That may actually explain a lot. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch What does physics (and multiple world theory) have to do with emulating human thinking ? Physics is deterministic, human thought is not. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-01, 17:19:07 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the >> experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do >> you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is; > Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a > universal dovetailer, It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. In physics experiments not involving self duplications which "you" is involved is obvious, and it can be proven to be correct by observing that when "you" predicts what "you" will see using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous must have been assigned correctly. Physics is all about predicting observations. ? Let's say an experimenter creates a new kind of particle using an accelerator that has never before existed in the history of the universe, and wants to measure its half-life. ?ow let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almost identical standard models that exist in string theory, the half-life is 1 us. ?ut in 1 out of those 1,000, the half life is 10 us. If you are the experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half life? ?t is not implied by the laws of physics because there are many laws of physics. ?ntil the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in stone. ?his is a main point of Bruno's result: physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder, the laws of physics depend on the distribution of observers similar to your current state of mind throughout its infinite manifestations in reality. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Bruno, I think that one contention of comp is that imagination plays no role in discovery. But what is covered has to be imagined at least in part to begin with. That argues against comp fairly strongly. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Jason Resch My apologies if I step on toes here, I'm just relying on experience, but avoiding answering questions, together with changing the subject, seem to be the hallmarks of liberalism. It's uncanny. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 14:45:10 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 11:59 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2012/11/8 John Clark >> >> On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 Jason Resch wrote: >> >> it is still not clear who "you" refers to and that is why pronouns >> should not be used. If "you" refers to the Helsinki man then "you" will >> experience no city at all because according to Bruno Marchal's thought >> experiment the Helsinki man is destroyed. >>> >>> >>> >>> > This contradicts the time you agreed that one can survive via >>> > duplication. >> >> >> But it's Bruno's thought experiment and Bruno is the one who said the >> Helsinki man is no more, John Clark is just trying to figure out who the >> hell "you" is. When Bruno says "the Helsinki man is destroyed" John Clark >> interprets that to mean that survival has continued and nobody has died but >> nobody is experiencing Helsinki anymore either; If Bruno means something >> else by "the Helsinki man is destroyed" let him speak up now and clear >> things up. >> >> John K Clark > > > > John Clark is just talking ? la Alain Delon and obviously doesn't want to > debate. This thread is sterile as almost any thread invoking marvelous John > Clark thoughts. > > Quentin > Yes I find it hard to debate John when he only answers only some of the questions I pose to him and deletes the other questions from his reply. This is why I suspect he is not seriously trying to advance his or our understanding. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi Stephen P. King Good. That is another way to define objective (public). Whereas 1p is personal and always private. If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 10:35:20 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/5/2012 10:11 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi meekerdb > > The dilemma is that 1p is subjective and hence solipsistic, but when spoken > about it is > objective (3p, 2p; he, or you). > > And as far as dualisms go, the only important one is subjective/objective. Hi Roger, Think of a 3p as a 'confirm-able' agreement or synchrony between a pair of 1p's. > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 11/5/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: meekerdb > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-04, 22:07:22 > Subject: Re: Against Mechanism > > > On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But > with the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate. > > It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain - which is John's complaint > about pronouns. So which 1p is indeterminate. > > Brent > -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Against Mechanism
Hi meekerdb The dilemma is that 1p is subjective and hence solipsistic, but when spoken about it is objective (3p, 2p; he, or you). And as far as dualisms go, the only important one is subjective/objective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 22:07:22 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But with the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate. It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain - which is John's complaint about pronouns. So which 1p is indeterminate. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
