Roger, I appreciate your claim that all monads must be distinct and unique because that is the basis of my string consciousness theory. However, I have never read of leibniz saying that. So could you supply a link to him saying so? Richard
On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Jason Resch > > Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion. > The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and > to him everybody must be different (have an > individual monad= soul = identity= memory, > etc. etc. etc. ). > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] > 12/25/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Jason Resch > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17 > Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Jason Resch >> >> Since 1p has the property of perspective, >> and no two people can be at the same place at the >> same time, > > > But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain > the same first person perspectives? > > Jason > � >> >> 3p has multiple perspectives. >> >> That is the only multiworld theory that I can >> believe in. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] >> 12/24/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Jason Resch >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 >> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote: >> >> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote: >> >> >> >> >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" >> >> future 1p view. >> >> >> >> Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. >> >> Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is >> only "a" future 1p view. >> >> >> >> >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. >> >> Please note the use of the word "and". >> >> >> >> > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been >> > wrong. >> >> >> >> Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many >> would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some >> kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature >> of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any >> sort of final authority on the Washington Man. >> >> >> >> >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington >> >> Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about >> >> it? >> >> What more is there to know? >> >> ? >> > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, >> >> >> >> In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will >> be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there >> to know? >> >> >> >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. >> >> >> > In the 3p view, that's correct, >> >> >> And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in >> the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse >> is not necessarily true. >> >> You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in >> philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same >> physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That >> is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. >> >> Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and >> you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome >> regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third >> person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly >> wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just >> Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. >> >> Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put >> yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some >> progress. >> ? >> >> >> >> ?> but fail to answer the question asked. >> >> Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not >> surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno >> Marchal. >> >> >> > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. >> >> >> If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens >> and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think >> that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more >> popular than it is. >> >> >> Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: >> "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate >> it' to simply 'I hate it'." >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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