Roger,

I appreciate your claim that all monads must be distinct and unique
because that is the basis of my string consciousness theory. However,
I have never read of leibniz saying that. So could you supply a link
to him saying so?
Richard

On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Jason Resch
>
> Not in my opinion, but that's just my opinion.
> The reason being that I am a Leibnizian, and
> to him everybody must be different (have an
> individual monad= soul = identity= memory,
> etc. etc. etc. ).
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/25/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Jason Resch
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-24, 11:13:17
> Subject: Re: Re: Against Mechanism
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Jason Resch
>>
>> Since 1p has the property of perspective,
>> and no two people can be at the same place at the
>> same time,
>
>
> But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain
> the same first person perspectives?
>
> Jason
> �
>>
>> 3p has multiple perspectives.
>>
>> That is the only multiworld theory that I can
>> believe in.
>>
>>
>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
>> 12/24/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Jason Resch
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13
>> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark 爓rote:
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal 爓rote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the"
>> >> future 1p view.
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view.
>>
>> Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is
>> only "a" future 1p view.
>>
>>
>>
>> >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man.
>>
>> Please note the use of the word "and".
>>
>>
>>
>> > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been
>> > wrong.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many
>> would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some
>> kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the nature
>> of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man is any
>> sort of final authority on the Washington Man.
>>
>>
>>
>> >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington
>> >> Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about 
>> >> it?
>> >> What more is there to know?
>>
>> ?
>> > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied,
>>
>>
>>
>> In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will
>> be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there
>> to know?
>>
>>
>> >> the Helsinki man will see both cities.
>>
>>
>> > In the 3p view, that's correct,
>>
>>
>> And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in
>> the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse
>> is not necessarily true.
>>
>> You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in
>> philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same
>> physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? That
>> is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone.
>>
>> Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and
>> you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome
>> regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third
>> person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is plainly
>> wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or even just
>> Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective.
>>
>> Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put
>> yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some
>> progress.
>> ?
>>
>>
>>
>> ?> but fail to answer the question asked.
>>
>> Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not
>> surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno
>> Marchal.
>>
>>
>> > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.
>>
>>
>> If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens
>> and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think
>> that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more
>> popular than it is.
>>
>>
>> Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented:
>> "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate
>> it' to simply 'I hate it'."
>>
>> Jason
>>
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