On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 10:52 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Jason Resch > > Since 1p has the property of perspective, > and no two people can be at the same place at the > same time, But could there be two places that are identical to each other which contain the same first person perspectives? Jason > 3p has multiple perspectives. > > That is the only multiworld theory that I can > believe in. > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/24/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Jason Resch > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-22, 14:56:13 > Subject: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > >> In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the" > future 1p view. > > > > Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. > > Then as I said,? there is no such thing as "the" future 1p view, there is > only "a" future 1p view. > > > > >The 1-view of the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. > > Please note the use of the word "and". > > > > > that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly admit having been > wrong. > > > > Yes, the Moscow Man would say it was wrong if he thought (as no doubt many > would) that only he is the Helsinki Man and the Washington Man is just some > kind of fake; however I believe the Moscow Man is NOT right about the > nature of the Washington man and there is no reason to think the Moscow Man > is any sort of final authority on the Washington Man. > > > > >> the one that sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington > Man is the one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it? > What more is there to know? > > ? > > The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, > > > > In the above I gave the precise technique for determining which city will > be seen by who. What more do you want to know about it? What more is there > to know? > > > >> the Helsinki man will see both cities. > > > > In the 3p view, that's correct, > > > And as John Clark has said over and over, if something seems identical in > the 3p view it is certainly identical in the 1p view, although the reverse > is not necessarily true. > > You are misapplying this rule.? This rule is most often comes up in > philosophy of mind, where it is usually agreed that two brains in the same > physical state will possess the same minds and the same consciousness.? > That is not what is at issue here and it is not being disputed by anyone. > > Your error is that you are generalizing this rule beyond its domain and > you wrongly conclude it means there can never be any experimental outcome > regardless of whether it is analyzed and observed by an external third > person, or experienced first-hand through the first-person.? This is > plainly wrong, as Bruno pointed out in the quantum suicide experiment, or > even just Schrodinger's cat from the cat's perspective. > > Once you see this is true, perhaps then you will finally try to put > yourself into the shoes of the H-man, and perhaps then you will make some > progress. > ? > > > > ?> but fail to answer the question asked. > > Bruno Marchal does not understand the question asked so it's not > surprising that John Clark is unable to give a answer that satisfies Bruno > Marchal. > > > > Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died. > > > If many worlds is correct then from the 3p quantum view everything happens > and the very meaning of probability becomes fuzzy. And by the way I think > that is the major reason that the many world's interpretation is not more > popular than it is. > > > Deutsch et al. have solved the probability problem.? As Tegmark commented: > "The critique of many worlds is shifting from 'it makes no sense and I hate > it' to simply 'I hate it'." > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.