On Fri, Sep 29, 2006 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> > I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent,
>
>
> ? ? ?
> I guess you are using the word "interpretation" in some non standard
> way.
> It would hel
Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit :
> I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent,
? ? ?
I guess you are using the word "interpretation" in some non standard
way.
It would help us, and you, if you could work on a glossary.
> but
> perhaps there is not much d
On Tue, Sep 26, 2006 at 04:10:32PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Hi Russell,
>
> I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the
> subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book.
> Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you
Hi Russell,
I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the
subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book.
Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you
have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your
most b
Le 14-sept.-06, à 00:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
> That the experience of time is necessarily experienced by all conscious
> points of view is to my knowledge not even addressed by other
> philosophers. Even Bruno seems to skirt the issue,
? (I think that consciousness is needed for *all*
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Periklis Akritidis writes:
>
>
>>Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever
>>behind...
>>
>>
>>>from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course). Even
>>>in my scheme where
>>>there is just a possibility of death some
Periklis Akritidis writes:
> Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever
> behind...
>
> > from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course).
> > Even in my scheme where
> > there is just a possibility of death some calculations I have done suggest
David Nyman wrote:
> Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a
> Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but
> now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the
> last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presuma
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> This is the most immediate response of people to the QTI idea: even if it's
> true,
> what do I care if other versions of me survive in the multiverse if I'm going
> to die?
According to QTI you are not going to die in any universe because there
are no dead ends in
Le 15-sept.-06, à 14:35, Periklis Akritidis a écrit :
>
> QTI apparently implies a very efficient machine to compute the solution
> to any well defined problem. Suppose you want to factor a large number.
> The machine simply generates some random numbers using thermal noise,
> computes their pro
Periklis Akritidis writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening
> > than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier
> > said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong
> >
Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a
Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but
now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the
last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presumably make
winners of *all* i
Periklis Akritidis wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening
> > than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier
> > said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening
> than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier
> said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong
> poison which you keep in your pocket. Y
Periklis Akritidis writes:
> QTI apparently implies a very efficient machine to compute the solution
> to any well defined problem. Suppose you want to factor a large number.
> The machine simply generates some random numbers using thermal noise,
> computes their product, compares it with the num
QTI apparently implies a very efficient machine to compute the solution
to any well defined problem. Suppose you want to factor a large number.
The machine simply generates some random numbers using thermal noise,
computes their product, compares it with the number to factor, and in
case they do n
Tom Caylor writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Tom Caylor writes:
> >
> > > After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
> > > thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
> > > for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
> > thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
> > for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
> > recognize myself, or that I cou
Tom Caylor writes:
> After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
> thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
> for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
> recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my
Johnathan Corgan writes:
> David Nyman wrote:
>
> [re: QTI]
> > This has obvious
> > implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
> > more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
> > outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 02:56:30PM -, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately
> > convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a
> > presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypothe
Russell Standish wrote:
> If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately
> convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a
> presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses.
'Fraid I don't have a theorem! However, as to 'moderately convincing
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 07:40:06AM -, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Why do we need to assume TIME as an ordering process for 'successive'
> moments under the RSSA assumption? Isn't it the case that, under the
> ASSA assumption, 1st-person experience would continue to appear
> 'time-like' (because of
Russell Standish wrote:
> > 2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples
> > will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence
> > 1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for
> > 'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 12:52:25PM -, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Hi Russell
>
> I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
> iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
> approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
> h
After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my
original self, and so for a
. etc.
Saibal
- Original Message -
From: "Johnathan Corgan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 7:43 PM
Subject: Re: Russell's book
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>
> [re: QTI]
> > This has obvious
> > implications for retire
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>>These questions may reduce to something like, "Is there a lower limit to
>>>the amplitude of the SWE?"
>>>
>>>If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
>>>its absolute value?
>>
>>I think it is not and there is a l
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Everett who originated the MWI thought about QTI. Although he never
> explicitly said
> he believed it, he led a very unhealthy life style smoking, drinking, eating
> to
> excees, never exercising and he died young, of a heart attack IIRC. So some
> of his
> acquaint
Brent Meeker wrote:
>> These questions may reduce to something like, "Is there a lower limit to
>> the amplitude of the SWE?"
>>
>> If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
>> its absolute value?
>
> I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which cross ter
(This is the original post that seems somehow to have gone missing)
Hi Russell
I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
had me b
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> QTI makes a big twist on this by removing from the numerator *and*
> denominator those outcomes where consciousness ceases.
Precisely. And this is what should bias one's choices in the case that
one is prepared to bet on the validity of QTI.
> Not sure what the questio
David Nyman wrote:
> So long as there seemed
> to be some plausible (even if very small) number of 'escape routes'
> then it might be worth a punt.
>From a 'yes doctor' bet point of view, this introduces the idea of
relative expectation of different future outcomes, an idea hashed out
here many
David Nyman wrote:
> Johnathan Corgan wrote:
>
>
>>If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long
>>time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only
>>applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly "shedding"
>>branches where I did indeed die
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
>
> [re: QTI]
>
>>This has obvious
>>implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
>>more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
>>outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
>>fr
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or
> not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential
> underlying MWI explanation.
Yes, the question of cul-de-sacs is indeed interesting. However, it
seems to me that they need
David Nyman wrote:
> Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if
> this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone
> actually acts on these beliefs.
It's not overly personal; I brought it up in fact.
But personally, no, I don't act on these beliefs b
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
> If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long
> time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only
> applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly "shedding"
> branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial
David Nyman wrote:
[re: QTI]
> This has obvious
> implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
> more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
> outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
> from the 1st-person pov we are like
Hi Russell
I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur:
1) QTI - I must say un
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