On 28 April 2015 at 10:44, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 28 April 2015 at 05:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/27/2015 2:34 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
That all relies too much on the assumption that comp
On 27 Apr 2015, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes.
On 28 Apr 2015, at 03:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true
At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in Bruno's
argument is premised on the truth of the comp thesis, summarised in the
claim that
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That means, of
course, that we make mistakes, we are misled by imprecise interpretations
of
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
I can define my own consciousness, at least to a level that is sufficient
for me to operate successfully in the world. If my brain and body functions
can be taken over by a general-purpose computer, then that computer
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Apr 2015, at 02:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was Turing
emulable (at some substitution level). Which seems to suggest that
consciousness (usually associated with brain function) is Turing
emulable.
Using an
On 28 April 2015 at 05:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/27/2015 2:34 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true
At the risk of pointing out the stunningly
David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That
means, of course, that
On 4/27/2015 2:34 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
That all relies too much on the assumption that comp is true
At the risk of pointing out the stunningly obvious, *everything* in Bruno's
On 27 Apr 2015, at 13:07, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That
means, of course, that we make
On 27 Apr 2015, at 08:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Apr 2015, at 02:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was
Turing emulable (at some substitution level). Which seems to
suggest that consciousness (usually associated
On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That
On 27 April 2015 at 19:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/27/2015 4:07 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or useful
rules-of-thumb, that are good enough
On 26 Apr 2015, at 00:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/25/2015 2:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Apr 2015, at 02:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/24/2015 3:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-24 22:33 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems
On 25 Apr 2015, at 02:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/24/2015 3:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-24 22:33 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was
Turing emulable (at some
On 24 Apr 2015, at 02:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 24 April 2015 at 09:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp
argument.
Obviously if we've
On 23 Apr 2015, at 23:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument.
Obviously if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be
relevant, however, if we are still talking about comp then the
question of
On 4/25/2015 2:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Apr 2015, at 02:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/24/2015 3:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-24 22:33 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems
2015-04-24 2:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
LizR wrote:
On 24 April 2015 at 09:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:
meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument.
On 4/24/2015 3:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-24 22:33 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was Turing
emulable
(at some
2015-04-24 22:33 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was Turing
emulable (at some substitution level). Which seems to suggest that
consciousness (usually associated with brain
On 24 April 2015 at 12:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
LizR wrote:
I think you'll find that consciousness isn't computable /if you assume
all the consequences of comp/. But once you've assumed all that, you've
already had to throw out materialism, including brains, so the
On 4/24/2015 5:25 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
That seems odd to me. The starting point was that the brain was Turing
emulable (at
some substitution level). Which seems to suggest that consciousness (usually
associated with brain function) is Turing emulable. If you find at the end
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:52 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously if we've
moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however, if we are still
talking about comp then the question of importance is whether a brain is Turing emulable
at
Stathis:
I am an idealist enough (and an agnostic) to confess to lots and lots of so
far undetected functions (maybe even components -- outside our 'material'
--concept) that contribute to the functioning of a human 'brain'(?) as
developed into by now. Scanning goes for known items, composing is
On Friday, April 24, 2015, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Stathis:
I am an idealist enough (and an agnostic) to confess to lots and lots of
so far undetected functions (maybe even components -- outside our
'material' --concept) that contribute to the functioning of a human
'brain'(?)
On 24 April 2015 at 10:03, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:52 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
No, phlogiston was a serious scientific theory. It required careful
experimentation to demonstrate that the theory did not really fit the
On 24 April 2015 at 09:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument.
Obviously if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant,
however, if we are still talking about comp then the
LizR wrote:
On 24 April 2015 at 09:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument.
Obviously if we've moved onto something else then comp may not
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 14:32, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb
On 23 April 2015 at 16:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/22/2015 10:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR
Short of bringing the brain down to absolute zero, im not sure that
stopping all brain processes is physically meaningful. we could talk about
stopping all action potentials. I think you might see short term memory
loss with this but you can probably reboot.
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce
On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:; wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:;
wrote:
I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
brain
processes stop
On 4/22/2015 11:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:; wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:;
wrote:
I doubt that. Is the point
On 23 April 2015 at 14:32, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
processes stop under anaesthesia.
When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
embryo is
I mean you're not asking if the suspension maintained your personality or
your memories or what youe favorite food is. At this point we are assuming
all these things are preserved. Yours is not a question of technical
difficultly What you are instead asking is, will the conscious entity
before and
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
processes stop under anaesthesia.
When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
embryo is usually completely normal. If
On 4/22/2015 10:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:; wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:;
wrote:
I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof
Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously
if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however,
if we are still talking about comp then
On 23 April 2015 at 21:30, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrote:
Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...
That doesn't worry me in itself, but it does mean that things that aren't
actually relevant to comp may appear to some to be valid arguments against
it. Personally, I'm interested
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously
if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however,
if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance is
whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:; wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett
I'll roll one out
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 21:30, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','do.infinit...@gmail.com'); wrote:
Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...
That doesn't worry me in itself, but it
On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes should say
yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve damaging the 1000
neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their function
Yes, I know it hasn't been done, but i think most people would agree that c
elegans could be scanned or that a small neuroprothesis is possible, which
is enough of a foothold to say uploading thought experiments are relevant
to human experience.
Of course none of this is deeply relevant to comp.
On 4/22/2015 3:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net'); wrote:
On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica). I don't see that a gap
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
consciousness (assuming you could produce a working replica). I don't see
that a gap is particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
If comp is correct,
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica). I don't see that a gap is
particularly
On Thursday, April 23, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net'); wrote:
On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor,
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
consciousness
(assuming you could
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
consciousness
(assuming
On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain
On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
(assuming you could produce
On 4/22/2015 9:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics
than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
physics than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates.
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes
should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would
involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that
would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling
1000
On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
physics than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's
notion of theology,
On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:26, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion
of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a
brain prothesis that would simulate a their
On 21 April 2015 at 08:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
On 21 April 2015 at 09:25, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and
Right, this is one coherent non-arbitrary view. It's basically what Parfit
put forward in Reason's and Persons.
Kolak's is the other view. Property changes do not destroy identity ever.
Either view says teleportation is the same as ordinary survival.
On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, Stathis
On 21 April 2015 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because
it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
explaining combustion
On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 08:43:09AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
him for explaining
On 20 April 2015 at 21:44, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete example
with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The train
lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an observer
outside the
On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules
No one cares who inherits the farm. Subjective expectation is the crux of
personal identity. You can't tell me that whether i wake up in Moscow
depends on whether or not a reconstruction event happened at Helsinki
faster than signals can travel between the two.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is
uhhh... rather difficult.
The scanning event is taken as a single point in space-time. Mobility is
irrelevant. If you create duplicates,
I have to say that the point under discussion SHOULD be the nature of
subjective experience, surely? That is, why do we feel as though we have
continuity? (And does the answer to that preclude duplicators etc?)
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
sigh... Parfit does away with personal identity, replacing it with
psychological connectedness relation R. Past and future selves are not
identical to you, but are new persons that are like you to a high degree.
Your relationship to your past and future selves are much like your
relationship to
Dennis Ochei wrote:
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete
example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The
train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is immobile.
Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh... rather
difficult.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original and
2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?
Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
Dennis Ochei wrote:
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.
Or suppose I
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to
the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it
Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says
that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a
teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the
CCT doesn't have to entail physical continuity. The standard CCT seems to
first use psychological similarty and in the case of ties physical
continuity, but you could also imagine a purely paychological or purely
physical CCT. My problem with CCT is that the rules for ties are ad hoc
legal
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use
the
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).
and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate
reconstruction
Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the
same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at
t+epsilon and
Right, mobility is irrelevant. I mispoke.
On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh...
rather
Russell Standish wrote:
There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad
Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.
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You received this message because you
Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.
Combustion is the everyday concept and
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even
coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without
reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a
convenient fiction.
I don't think
to 100% accurate,
to start off at least. Identity over time is the real issue.
-Original Message-
From: Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, Apr 20, 2015 5:11 am
Subject: Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?
Closest continuer
I think his problem is that you are using an impoverished definition of
personal identity, the same way an incompatibilist would be annoyed at the
compatibilist redefinition of free will. I have to admit that as an
incompatibilist i am annoyed by this move, but in your case i am not bothered
No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest continuer
or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more psychologically
like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher fraction of the molecules I
was made of when I was 5.
Or suppose I get into a matter
On 20 Apr 2015, at 13:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it
On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because
it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use
the everyday notion
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