Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-27 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 26, 12:22 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 On Feb 24, 11:13 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

  Of course. They are the particular sense of epistemology which 'seems
  like' the opposite of 'seems like'. Phenomena are reduced to their
  wireframe invariance - a skeleton which seems as if it 'simply is'
  because it represents the most common overlap and discards all nuanced
  underlap.

 Didn;t understand that.

Maybe thy this way. Black and white are the two colors that don't seem
like colors. They are the skeleton of color. You can see how you can
easily find black and white by mixing colors, but you can't create
color if all you have is black and white. Comp is black and white.
Sense is all color, including black and white.

Craig

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-25 Thread 1Z


On Feb 24, 11:13 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 Of course. They are the particular sense of epistemology which 'seems
 like' the opposite of 'seems like'. Phenomena are reduced to their
 wireframe invariance - a skeleton which seems as if it 'simply is'
 because it represents the most common overlap and discards all nuanced
 underlap.

Didn;t understand that.

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-24 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 24, 7:52 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that
consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.

   Every phenomenon is exceptional.

  Not in the sense that they are disconnected from all other processes
  of the universe.

 The so called disconnect just amounts to some entities being
 conscious and others not. But every entity has properties that
 some other entities don't.

That isn't what he means. The disconnects are about how there is
nothing we can see that accounts for any empirical difference between
matter which is part of a living organism and matter that isn't. There
is no 'entity' at all.












Why is such an 'arising' assumed?

 and how we can assume that it isn't
  universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

   But it isn;t at all pbvious that
   we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
   than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
   all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

  That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do 
  understand
  about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as 
  some
  special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.

 That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
 consc.
 around. And he didn;t mention physics.

He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is
referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the
natural universe.

   Whatever. It might be better to take as your text the writings of a
   notable
   panpsychist (Whitehead, Strawson, Chalmers) as your text, rather than
   Random Internet
   Dude.

  I was mainly posting the quotes. I was not expecting to have to defend
  the casual Tumblr comments of Random Internet Dude. Not that they
  aren't decent. I find them generally agreeable.

 $0.02 + $0.02 = $0.04









   And don’t get me started
on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me 
one
“emergent property” that is independent of the conscious 
observer
coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

   The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
   For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
   trivially demonstrable.

  Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
  conscious observer.

 Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

The ontology of emergence is epistemological.

   Says who?

  What does emergence mean? It means it's something that *we* don't
  expect to see based on *what we think that we know* about the
  underlying causes and conditions of the emergence.

 Fine. Then reduction and deteminism are epistemological too.

Of course. They are the particular sense of epistemology which 'seems
like' the opposite of 'seems like'. Phenomena are reduced to their
wireframe invariance - a skeleton which seems as if it 'simply is'
because it represents the most common overlap and discards all nuanced
underlap.

Here, take a look at this. Trying to make it as simple and direct as I
can:

http://s33light.org/post/18174218821

http://s33light.org/post/18187162394

Craig

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 22, 1:10 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 Could a rock have consciousness? Good answer from someone on 
 Quora:http://www.quora.com/Could-a-rock-have-consciousness

     Yes, obviously.

     Why obviously?

     Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
 of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
 reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.

DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
where or what the disconnect is? But it isn;t at all pbvious that
we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

And don’t get me started
 on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
 “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
 coming to the conclusion it is emergent.


The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
trivially demonstrable.

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 9:34 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

      Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
  of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
  reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.

 DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
 other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
 where or what the disconnect is?

It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal.
Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us
that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that
actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties. He is asking what
thing could make consc special and how we can assume that it isn't
universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

 But it isn;t at all pbvious that
 we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
 than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
 all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.


 And don’t get me started
  on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
  “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
  coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

 The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
 For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
 trivially demonstrable.

Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
conscious observer.

Craig

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 3:50 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 9:34 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



       Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
   of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
   reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.

  DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
  other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
  where or what the disconnect is?

 It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal.
 Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us
 that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that
 actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties.

That's a bit misleading. No atom has ferromagnetic properties,
such properties can only exist in bulk (they are emergent in
of the umpteen senses of the word). The elcetromagnetic properites
of atoms are  more
akin to panPROTOexperientialism..

 He is asking what
 thing could make consc special

What special? He doesn't have a ny evidence
that cosnc is special beyond our inability to understand
it in material terms.

and how we can assume that it isn't
 universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

  But it isn;t at all pbvious that
  we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
  than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
  all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

 That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
 about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
 special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.

That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
consc.
around. And he didn;t mention physics.

  And don’t get me started
   on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
   “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
   coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

  The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
  For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
  trivially demonstrable.

 Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
 conscious observer.

Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 2:45 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

    Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.

   DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
   other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
   where or what the disconnect is?

  It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal.
  Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us
  that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that
  actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties.

 That's a bit misleading. No atom has ferromagnetic properties,
 such properties can only exist in bulk (they are emergent in
 of the umpteen senses of the word). The elcetromagnetic properites
 of atoms are  more
 akin to panPROTOexperientialism..

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-molecule_magnet

I think it's a bit misleading to distinguish ferromagnetism from
electromagnetism. I wouldn't even call it emergent, it's more of a
special case. Just as human consciousness is a special case of
awareness. I'm ok with panprotoexperientialism though. We can't really
know one way or another at what point the proto is dropped and have no
particular reason to assume that there is no experience that
corresponds to atoms, so it seems safer to assume that that awareness
is 100% primitive instead of 100-x% primitive arbitrarily.


  He is asking what
  thing could make consc special

 What special? He doesn't have a ny evidence
 that cosnc is special beyond our inability to understand
 it in material terms.

He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that
consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.
Why is such an 'arising' assumed?


 and how we can assume that it isn't
  universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

   But it isn;t at all pbvious that
   we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
   than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
   all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

  That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
  about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
  special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.

 That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
 consc.
 around. And he didn;t mention physics.

He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is
referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the
natural universe.


   And don’t get me started
on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
“emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

   The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
   For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
   trivially demonstrable.

  Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
  conscious observer.

 Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

The ontology of emergence is epistemological.

Craig

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 8:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Feb 23, 2:45 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:











     Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
 of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
 reality are “conscious” while others aren’t.

DIsconnects exist. Some things are magnetic and others not. And many
other examples. What's special about consc? That we don;t understand
where or what the disconnect is?

   It doesn't make consc special, but he is saying it makes it universal.
   Magnetism is a good example. In our naive perception it seems to us
   that some things are magnetic and others not, but we know that
   actually all atoms have electromagnetic properties.

  That's a bit misleading. No atom has ferromagnetic properties,
  such properties can only exist in bulk (they are emergent in
  of the umpteen senses of the word). The elcetromagnetic properites
  of atoms are  more
  akin to panPROTOexperientialism..

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-molecule_magnet

 I think it's a bit misleading to distinguish ferromagnetism from
 electromagnetism. I wouldn't even call it emergent, it's more of a
 special case. Just as human consciousness is a special case of
 awareness. I'm ok with panprotoexperientialism though. We can't really
 know one way or another at what point the proto is dropped and have no
 particular reason to assume that there is no experience that
 corresponds to atoms, so it seems safer to assume that that awareness
 is 100% primitive instead of 100-x% primitive arbitrarily.



   He is asking what
   thing could make consc special

  What special? He doesn't have a ny evidence
  that cosnc is special beyond our inability to understand
  it in material terms.

 He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that
 consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.

Every phenomenon is exceptional.

 Why is such an 'arising' assumed?











  and how we can assume that it isn't
   universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

But it isn;t at all pbvious that
we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

   That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
   about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
   special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.

  That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
  consc.
  around. And he didn;t mention physics.

 He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is
 referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the
 natural universe.

Whatever. It might be better to take as your text the writings of a
notable
panpsychist (Whitehead, Strawson, Chalmers) as your text, rather than
Random Internet
Dude.

And don’t get me started
 on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
 “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
 coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
trivially demonstrable.

   Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
   conscious observer.

  Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

 The ontology of emergence is epistemological.

Says who?

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Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread John Mikes
Dear Craig,
 my first step was to join Quora but it asked for my password what I denied
to disclose to Facebook and other 'social' networks as well (staying
private).
In the quoted excerpt were wise thoughts (time-scale etc.) but it did not
address my main point: whatever we THINK about that 'thing' (rather: about
that process) Ccness stems from Within our past human experience (maybe
replenished to the present level). In my agnostic views there is more to
such a universal relation than whatever we CAN know as of today.
So with a proper definition: a rock, or an idea, can have Ccness, once we
imagine as 'rock' something more reliable than our ever-growing partial
knowledge about the 'world' (beyond the model formed from our already
achieved informational explanations).
Then I subscribe to the 'obviously'.

Those (and other) genius physicists quoted in your post owe us the
explanation how to connect the partial human explanatory thoughts to the
working technology based on the same. Although IMO our technology is ALMOST
good, there are surprising mishaps occurring in all fields we have.

So how would you connect the rock with Ccness? your examples (e.g.
magnetism etc.) are also physically imagined phenomena, measured by
instruments constructed for measuring such imagined phenomena.

After the Tibetan wisdom (matter is derived from mind) you wrote:

*   On this, I think Bruno, Stephen, and I agree. Where I disagree with
   comp is that I see the stuff of the mind as not just numberstuff, but
   sense. *
Then you postulate
 * How I think it works is through a multisense realism*
**
and we try to 'realize' - A - realism (ONE sense)  over historical
fantasies.
A multi sense symmetry is beyond us, even a detailed Hilbert space
explanation is more than the average mind can follow. I accept the I
dunno, but I cannot accept hints how it 'might' (or should) be since we
don't know a better way. I wonder about your 'multisense realism. Bruno
applies his arithmetical realism, others their faith-based one, but ONE.
Nobody is schizophrenic enough to think in multiple realism. So I deem your
postulate a wishful idea without practical content for us, humans, today.

Your text is beautifully written in a style out of the world. I am not up
to it.
I believe there is much more to the world than our capabilities of today
may cover or absorb. So I turn humble and agnostic (better than ignorant).

JM

On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 8:10 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 Could a rock have consciousness? Good answer from someone on Quora:
 http://www.quora.com/Could-a-rock-have-consciousness

 Yes, obviously.

Why obviously?

Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made
 of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of
 reality are “conscious” while others aren’t. And don’t get me started
 on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
 “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
 coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

Secondly, as physicists are now starting to realize (or realise if
 you’re English/Australian):

Let’s start with Prof. Freeman Dyson:

“Quantum mechanics makes matter even in the smallest pieces into
 an
active agent, and I think that is something very fundamental.
 Every
particle in the universe is an active agent making choices between
random processes.”2

“…consciousness is not just a passive epiphenomenon carried along
 by the chemical events in our brains, but is an active agent forcing
 the molecular complexes to make choices between one quantum state and
 another. In
other words, mind is already inherent in every electron.”3

Physicist Sir Arthur Eddington

“Physics is the study of the structure of consciousness. The
 “stuff” of the world is mindstuff.”

and

“It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the
 view that the substratum of everything is of mental character.”

Physicist Prof. Richard Conn Henry

“In what is known as a “Renninger type experiment,” the wave
 function is collapsed simply by a human mind seeing nothing. No
 irreversible act of amplification involving the photon has taken place—
 yet the decision is irreversibly made. The universe is entirely
 mental.”

Prof. Amit Goswami

“we have a new integrative paradigm of science, based not on
 the primacy of matter as the old science, but on the primacy of
 consciousness. Consciousness is the ground of all being…”1


Then of course, we have been reminded by sages throughout history
 of this basic element:

All phenomena are projections in the mind.
—The Third Karmapa

Matter is derived from mind, not mind from matter.
—The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation

The list goes on.

 On this, I think Bruno, Stephen, and I agree. Where I disagree with
 comp is that I see the stuff of the mind as not just numberstuff, but
 sense. Not only no 

Re: Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 23, 4:00 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:


  He isn't saying it's special, he is asking why should we think that
  consciousness arises as some exceptional phenomenon in the universe.

 Every phenomenon is exceptional.

Not in the sense that they are disconnected from all other processes
of the universe.










  Why is such an 'arising' assumed?

   and how we can assume that it isn't
universal in some sense if we can't point to what that might be.

 But it isn;t at all pbvious that
 we don't understand consc should imply panexperientialism rather
 than dualism or physicalism or a dozen other options. Almost
 all the philosophy of mind starts with we don't understand consc

That's not what he is saying. His point is that what we do understand
about physics makes it obvious that consc cannot be understood as some
special case that is disconnected from the rest of the universe.

   That isn't obvious, since there are plenty of physcialists about
   consc.
   around. And he didn;t mention physics.

  He didn't mention physics but when he talks about 'disconnects' he is
  referring to any theoretical discontinuity between consc and the
  natural universe.

 Whatever. It might be better to take as your text the writings of a
 notable
 panpsychist (Whitehead, Strawson, Chalmers) as your text, rather than
 Random Internet
 Dude.


I was mainly posting the quotes. I was not expecting to have to defend
the casual Tumblr comments of Random Internet Dude. Not that they
aren't decent. I find them generally agreeable.

 And don’t get me started
  on the nonsense superstition of “emergent properties” — show me one
  “emergent property” that is independent of the conscious observer
  coming to the conclusion it is emergent.

 The problem with emergence is that is defined so many ways.
 For some values of emergent, emergent properties are
 trivially demonstrable.

Demonstrable = compels the conclusion that it is emergent to a
conscious observer.

   Epistemologically dependent =/= ontologically dependent.

  The ontology of emergence is epistemological.

 Says who?

What does emergence mean? It means it's something that *we* don't
expect to see based on *what we think that we know* about the
underlying causes and conditions of the emergence. Emergence has no
ontology, that's the point, it is not a chemical reaction that
transforms one thing or another, it is our perception alone that
compels us to consider it one thing rather than a microcosm of related
things. In 'reality' we are to see that there is no eye of the
hurricane, it's just an emergent property of the meteorology.

Craig

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