[bruno]
> Thanks for the link. I disagree, or just misunderstand perhaps, some
> point you are making there, but it could be also premature to tackle
> them right now. i am "problem driven" and my favorite problem is
> really the mind body problem.
[uv]
I like the mind body problem too
[bruno]
>T
Le 11-nov.-05, à 20:42, GottferDamnt a écrit :
Hi,
Bruno Marchal a écrit :
I have also a problem with the expression "staying in the same
branche": you always split or differentiate on 2^aleph_0 branches. Do
you mean branches looking the same from the first person perspective?
Yes, I mean
Le 11-nov.-05, à 20:59, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Le Vendredi 11 Novembre 2005 15:24, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
I have also a problem with the expression "staying in the same
branche": you always split or differentiate on 2^aleph_0 branches. Do
you mean branches looking the same from the first p
Le 12-nov.-05, à 07:46, Kim Jones a écrit :
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem CAN be understood without reference to
the numbers. Something tells me Bruno's comp theory can as well. He
does remarkably well with his English but his acronyms make me cringe
with fright...
Well thanks for the Engl
Le 12-nov.-05, à 14:53, uv a écrit :
[bruno]
Now, the "real" important things to grasp for
making clear the way I use modal logic, consists in understanding
the theorem of Solovay. Have you heard about it? It generalizes
in some way
the theorem of Godel and the theorem of Lob. it makes preci
Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Yes, I mean looking the same event (a finished ensemble of instants)
forever from the first person perspective. Nevertheless I think the
probability, that a possible event happens, increase with the course
of time. On an infinite time (a point of view of an immortal
On Sat, Nov 12, 2005 at 04:37:54PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > There are a lot of ways that can
> >be done, possibly with very different parameters. (e.g. like in
> >Parfit's conjectures, which involved identity in even very
> >specific examples like say a long spell in prison). Something like
Temporal recurrance requires a finite set of states, or an upper bound
on the information contained with observer moments. In the sorts of
plenitudes considered here, there is no such upper bound - OMs can
contain aribitrarily large amounts of information.
If we we really did live in Jorge's libra
On Fri, Nov 11, 2005 at 10:50:23PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> To me it's very simple, and I've already laid it out in just a few words
> below, and in more words in different ways in my previous posts on this
> thread.
> Russell, you've even said in your Why Occam's Razor paper that the
Bruno wrote on Saturday, November 12, 2005 3:37 PM
> Indeed the link with quantum suicide and comp suicide are in my
> older paper "Informatique théorique et philosophie de l'esprit,
> Toulouse 1988". Also explained in my 1991 paper "Mechanism
> and personal identity".
>
So you say that that is y
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