Hi m.a., hi Colin,
On 06 Mar 2009, at 05:07, m.a. wrote:
> Bruno,
>I've often wondered why neither Dr. Deutsch nor Alan
> Forrester has commented on your theory of UDA and AUDA. I certainly
> would be interested in their views. A theory that has execised some
> of the best minds
2009/3/6 Jack Mallah wrote:
>> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
>> shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one
>> version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created
>> elsewhere in the morning. The u
At 07:31 AM 3/6/2009, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>2009/3/6 Jack Mallah wrote:
>
> >> If you're not worried about the fair trade,
> then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried
> about the unfair trade either. In the fair
> trade, one version of you A disappears
> overnight, and a new versio
Hi Colin,
the problem is that while the _ideal_ of science is rationality, it is
not yet fully institutionalized (can it ever be?) and people still
harbor a lot of irrationality personally (scientists often have the
strangest beliefs outside their speciality
(http://www.overcomingbias.com/200
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/3/6 Jack Mallah wrote:
>
>>> If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
>>> shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one
>>> version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is
>>> crea
> Which "I"? Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?
> Brent
The psychological continuer - the one who remembers having pressed the
button but with +5 dollars on his account.
@Stathis: would you really do this (press the button, also in the
absoute measure scenario
Bruno,
>> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
>> numbers in the first place
>
> But that would violate the comp assumption.
No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.
>> - that is
Hi Bruno,
>> With COMP it is not so clear.
>
> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the
> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
> instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
Please bear in mind that I have not
Hi Kim, hi John, hi People,
Kim provided me with an excellent answer to my preceding post (out-of-
line though). And John told me he was impatient to see "my definition"
of the natural numbers (and some other numbers) in term of sets. So I
make a try. Nothing is important here for the sequel
Dear Bruno, this is my reply to your "SeventhStep-2" post.
Still not clear; Axiom 1 says I is 'a' number, - OK.
Axiom 2 sais "x" which I understand is general for "any" number. So xI is
not different from II. The example: (say) I is 2, x=3, xI=32 and your 'II'
is not 'a' number, but two numbers (
> No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
> function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is
> conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't
> understand what that means.
I agree that a lot of people don't unders
On 06/03/2009, at 11:24 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> - Neither physicists nor logicians really knows about the mind-body
> problem. So it is easy to make someone interested in consciousness
> looking crazy: just say: this guy is interested on consciousness
> (with a grin).
>
> Why does som
2009/3/7 Brent Meeker :
>> I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
>> every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
>> the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
>
> Which "I"? Aren't you concerned that you would pre
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