On 26.05.2012 21:06 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 16:48, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
In my view, it would be nicer to treat such a question
historically. Your positi
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> But "a => Ba" is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke
> semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for
> example you have already prove it), so a, like any theorem, will be
> true in all worlds, so a wi
On May 26, 1:42 pm, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, May 26, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I nominate does not 'happen for a reason'
>
> Then what you nominate is as random as it is idiotic. Idiots do things for
> no reason, smart people do things for reasons.
How does being an idiot allow you to
On 27 May 2012, at 00:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2012 9:35 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent wrote:
1. Presumably those true things would not be 'real'. Only provable
things would be true of reality.
Just to be clear, I didn't write 1. above. But I did write 2. below.
Ah OK. Sorry. I have
On 27 May 2012, at 01:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2012 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2012, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2012 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Mar 2012, at 06:18, meekerdb wrote (two month agao):
On 3/1/2012 7:37 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Excerpt: "
"Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard
Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens"-Evgenii
Rudnyi
I conjecture that the discrete nonphysical particles of compactified space,
the so-called Calabi-Yau Manifolds of string theory, have perceptual
pro
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But "a => Ba" is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke
semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for
example you have already prove it), so a, like any
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But "a => Ba" is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke
semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for
example you have already prove it), so a, like any
On 27 May 2012, at 09:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.05.2012 21:06 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 16:48, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
In my view, it would be nicer
On Sun, May 27, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Now you claim not to understand either words will or free? How could you
> know whether it's circular or not when you claim not to understand either
> term? When that power to decide is taken away by a cage, what has been
> lost? How do you know what
On May 27, 1:44 pm, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, May 27, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Now you claim not to understand either words will or free? How could you
> > know whether it's circular or not when you claim not to understand either
> > term? When that power to decide is taken away by a c
On 5/27/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As Bruno said, "Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It
is quite independent of "true of reality". Which is why I'm highly suspicious of
ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms
On 27.05.2012 07:50 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and
dualism and interestingly enough he finds many common features
between reductionism and dualism. For example, the image in th
On 5/27/2012 4:07 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 27.05.2012 07:50 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and
dualism and interestingly enough he finds many common features
between reduction
On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the mind/consciousness of the
observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull" but ranging out to
the farthest place where something is percieved. It seems to me that im
Thanks, Brent and Bruno. You are kind to respond.
The point I wanted to approach (far approach, indeed) is that whatever we
derive (mentally) about Nature comes from our human mind, be it binary or
not. And: it is not BINDING (restricting?) upon Nature, there may be more
we cannot even imagine wit
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 06:20:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote:
> >I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why
> >should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing?
>
> I realize my previous answer might be
On May 26, 11:57 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans
> and below there are a couple of comments to the book.
>
> The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on the
> Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomena
On May 27, 5:45 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
>
> > This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the
> > mind/consciousness of the
> > observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull" but
> > ranging out to
> > the farth
Hello!
Just watched this google presentation done by a software engineer that
has done lots of reading on QM and QIT. He practically says that
entanglement is akin to measurement and he presents a experiment (not
undertaken yet and that involves some kind of quantum erasement using
polarisation fi
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