Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
Hi Jenny, >A service of thanksgiving for the life of James Anthony Higgo will be held >in Haileybury College Chapel, Hertford, on Tuesday 19th September at 4.00 >pm. Refreshments afterwards. This universe will be a duller place >without him. I will be there. Is it Tuesday 18th or Wednesday 19th September? Compassion, Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> Dear George:
>
> Upon further reflection I am of the opinion that the antipodal nature of
> the Everything and the Nothing in my set of ideas may impose a small amount
> of information into each sufficient to hold the two antipodal truths:
>
> Pole #1: Nothing? => true.
> Pole #2: Everything? => true.
>
> I believe that Russell Standish once expressed the idea the Nothing held
> one bit of information.
Yes, although I don't necessarily hold that idea any more. It was just
a woolly way of saying that perhaps the Nothing had even more
information than the Everything.
Cheers
>
> From here the way to no information is to alternate between the two poles
> as I have proposed for other stability reasons. Thus the E/N system in
> total has no net information.
>
> This seems an interesting notion.
>
> Hal
>
>
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hal Ruhl wrote
>Pole #1: Nothing? => true.
>Pole #2: Everything? => true.
My best understanding of that is
Nothing? = False ("false -> true" is a propositional tautology)
Everything? = true ("true -> true" is a propositional tautology).
You *do* have a communication problem. I'm sure that you are trying
to say something more subtil than propositional tautologies, but you
have to find a way to share with others a minimal amount of meaning
for your words.
Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hi George, I hope my last post was not to rude. You see, now's my turn to feel guilty. Also I was not completely honest ... I guess I'm afraid that (re)abording the technical part of my thesis could interfere with the writting of the paper I told Russell about. I'm very nervous with that writting. Yet I am going through, and the more it advances the more easy it will be for me handle the interference ... Explaining the UDA on the list is easy compared with saying a little more that generality on G and G*. You know G is for Godel, and I have not yet solved the problem of how to begin an explanation on Godel by mail on the list. (I hesitate between three different and conflicting ways to do that). I have also found that that everything-silence was a little weird. I think that it is unique in the story of the list. At some moment I have interpreted that like if people were beginning to be overbored by my approach. This happens to me too, sometimes! I guess that's normal, nothing to worry about. Just gives me some days before I decide how to proceed. In any case I appreciate very much your interest, and I will try to do my best. Sincerely, Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Dear George: Upon further reflection I am of the opinion that the antipodal nature of the Everything and the Nothing in my set of ideas may impose a small amount of information into each sufficient to hold the two antipodal truths: Pole #1: Nothing? => true. Pole #2: Everything? => true. I believe that Russell Standish once expressed the idea the Nothing held one bit of information. From here the way to no information is to alternate between the two poles as I have proposed for other stability reasons. Thus the E/N system in total has no net information. This seems an interesting notion. Hal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
George Levy wrote: > ...I thought I had killed the group. You never take a rest, aren't you? >I am still waiting for Bruno's explanation of G*. And you expect the same from the other. I see ... Actually I am very glad you say that. Soon, I will do. In the meantime you can: -either participate to the FOR list, there are plenty materialist many-worlder looking for enlightment ... -or revise propositional logic ... -or try to explain the step 6 of the UDA to those who have still a problem there ... -or just take some rest! Bruno PS I think your constancy of measure from first person perspective is just comp or QM "immortality".
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Dear George: 1) By "alter ego" I mean something on the order of "constant companion" which is a meaning in my dictionary. 2) By "know" I mean does the system contain a resolution to a particular meaningful question. The Nothing contains no information so it "knows" only itself: Nothing? => true. 3) I mean stability in the engineering sense. It is the only other relevant question I can see and the Nothing must resolve it. It is a meaningful question for the Nothing. Since it has no information the question of stability can be addressed only experimentally by a perturbation to the Nothing. The smallest and perhaps only available perturbation the Nothing can experience is to become the other manifestation of no information - the Everything. When this takes place it replaces the Nothing absolutely. The Nothing is not a stable state. However, the Everything has similar "properties": Everything? => true. Stability? => testable only. The smallest and perhaps only perturbation to the Everything is to become the Nothing. This replaces the Everything absolutely. The Everything is not a stable state. etc. etc. etc. Each time the Everything is manifest it must in some way be a "different" Everything or a selection will have been made resulting in non zero information in the Nothing/Everything system. This seems possible based on the idea of meta pattern - geometry - rather than an ensemble of bit strings. 5) The two "constant companions" are "antipodal" expressions of no information: Pole #1: Nothing? => true. Pole #2: Everything? => true. Regardless of the eventual usefulness of these ideas I really do not see how they are so hard to follow. Hal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hal Ruhl wrote: > > My point is that the Nothing is unstable. It does not know this - it can > only test it. I can't even begin to give you a meaningful answer. We are talking a totally different language. How can "Nothing" know? How can it test it? > Since it has no information it is also unaware of the > possibility of an Everything. How can "Nothing" be aware? or unaware? > The Everything is also unstable Everything is unstable? No way. It already contains all unstable and stable states. You don't make any sense. > but in its > case it is unaware of the possibility of the Nothing. The difference > between the two is this antipodal lack of information. > Antipodal??? They both have zero information. This is hardly antipodal! > > The smallest perturbation away from either that could establish an answer > to the stability question is to become its alter ego. Alter ego EGO how about ID? or SUPEREGO?? This makes no sense to me. [SNIP] Sorry Hal. You have to be more objective in your choice of words. I just can't follow you. I think you went through this with Bruno for the same reasons. I avoided the whole discussion then because I couldn't follow you. George
Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
I am extremely saddened to hear of the passing of one of our companions. Hal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Dear George: At 8/15/01, you wrote: >The Nothing is the converse of the Everything (Plenitude). Nothing is like >a black >screen. Everything is like a white screen. What they have in common is zero >information. I prefer to think in terms of the Everything axiom than in >terms of >the Nothing axiom. The reason is that other conditions you may decide to >bring in, >act as constraints that restrict the range of the universe you live in and >it's >easier to restrict the Everything than to build on the Nothing. This >approach is in >fact partially validated in quantum physics in which any phenomenon which >is not >expressly forbidden is compulsory. My point is that the Nothing is unstable. It does not know this - it can only test it. Since it has no information it is also unaware of the possibility of an Everything. The Everything is also unstable but in its case it is unaware of the possibility of the Nothing. The difference between the two is this antipodal lack of information. The smallest perturbation away from either that could establish an answer to the stability question is to become its alter ego. Thus an oscillation results which is also unstable since it can have no history - no information. A given manifestation of the Everything is not in my view a white screen but an expression of no information that consists of a meta pattern of all possible patterns. States of universes are isomorphic links to sections of this meta pattern. Each oscillation must produce a new meta pattern or a selected Everything - non zero information - would result. Isomorphic shifts to acceptable [consistent?] sections of the new meta pattern are the transitions between successive states of universes. >Now this being said, starting with the Everything axiom (or Plenitude >axiom) is OK >but not sufficient. You are ignoring the anthropic constraint. If you >factor in >this constraint you'll find that the only systems which are acceptable are >those >with a complexity equal or greater than arithmetic. Otherwise, conscious >thought is >not possible. IMO this is the wrong way to parse the thing. Nearly random strings may be considered very complex, but can also be considered to contain little dynamically useable information. They are merely descriptive of a particular state of a structure. IMO the correct parsing for SAS friendliness is in terms of degree of randomness with highly random universes and highly ordered universes both being SAS unfriendly. Arithmetic may be too random to be a functional part of the rules of a SAS friendly universe. All that is necessary to support SAS [the anthropic constraint?] is sufficiently non random rules for the selection of acceptable successor isomorphic links to sections of the succession of meta patterns > > > > While this must lead to an all universes concurrently system - again no > > information - there can be no answer as to why we find ourselves in this > > one based on a distribution of types because there can be no such > distribution. > > > >I am puzzled by the whole concept of distribution when the number of items is >infinite. As Jacques Mallah has pointed out that the methods of limits >should take >care of that. I am still not satisfied. IMO, when the number of items is >infinite, >their ordering seems to be an important issue in defining the >distribution. Yet how >is this ordering defined without resorting to distribution? IMO trying to find non uniform distributions within the Everything is equivalent to saying it contains information. An equal frequency for all patterns - one of each - within a given meta pattern is a uniform distribution of an infinite number of patterns IMO equivalent to the ensemble of all possible bit strings [no information in the ensemble] except for a geometry - the current meta pattern itself. This geometry represents no information because it has no basis for comparison - previous and future meta patterns are not accessible. Hal
Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
This news is all the more poignant, given this exchange between James and
Rainer Plaga:
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m162.html (also m160.html)
only in that instance, they were discussing the possibility that
Rainer would crash on the way to visit James.
Spooky, innit.
As with others on this list, I will miss James.
Cheers
Wei Dai wrote:
>
> - Forwarded message from Jenny Higgo -
>
> Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 06:09:44 -0700
> From: Jenny Higgo
> To: Hal Ruhl, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
> X-Diagnostic: Not on the accept list
>
> James Higgo was killed in an air accident on 22nd July. He would be very sorry not
>to receive this e-mail. Still, if his many worlds theory is correct, perhaps he has
>received it another.
> Best wishes,
> Jenny Higgo (James' mother)
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
I am deeply shocked by that terrible news. I know most of you know how James was an everything pillar, and how much we appreciate his short and accurate posts. I got the chance to meet James in Brussels the 22 june and I was so happy with the idea to meet him again. He shows me the beginning of a promising book he was working on. James will perhaps finish it somewhere, but that will not help us. We will miss him a lot. My deepest thought for all who loved him. Bruno >- Forwarded message from Jenny Higgo - > >Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 06:09:44 -0700 >From: Jenny Higgo >To: Hal Ruhl, [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ... >X-Diagnostic: Not on the accept list > >James Higgo was killed in an air accident on 22nd July. He would be very >sorry not to receive this e-mail. Still, if his many worlds theory is >correct, perhaps he has received it another. >Best wishes, >Jenny Higgo (James' mother) > >> Dear George: >> >> Just a quick comment since I happened to read the end first. >> >> At 6/3/01, you wrote: >> >> >h... I thought that was a trick question. An axiomatic system cannot >> >be both >> >complete and consistent. Therefore there can't be a program for it. We go >> >back on how >> >you implement both G and G*. >> > >> > >> >George(s) >> >> As far as I know that is not true. I understand it to be that some >> axiomatic systems are both complete and consistent. >> >> Godel deals with systems at the complexity of arithmetic and above. >> >> Chaitin puts an upper limit on the complexity of a proof in any axiomatic >> system. >> >> IMO the everything is sufficiently low in complexity - no information at >> all - that it is both >> complete and consistent, thus it can not answer any question including that >> of its own stability. So also with its [in my model] oscillatory alter ego >> - The Nothing. >> >> Since at its heart I feel that Bruno's approach and mine are linked - >> though at the moment I can not follow the majority of his explanation - >> There is only one axiom => Nothing. >> >> While this must lead to an all universes concurrently system - again no >> information - there can be no answer as to why we find ourselves in this >> one based on a distribution of types because there can be no such >distribution. >> >> The one we are in works to support SAS because large events are almost but >> not quite deterministic. On the small event end of the spectrum I expect >> that the curve hangs a bit - our universe's true noise content - before >> rolling off to almost no one bit events. >> >> Hal >> >> >> > >- End forwarded message -
Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
Wei Dai wrote: > - Forwarded message from Jenny Higgo - > > Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 06:09:44 -0700 > From: Jenny Higgo > To: Hal Ruhl, [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ... > X-Diagnostic: Not on the accept list > > James Higgo was killed in an air accident on 22nd July. This comes as a shock. James was one of the long time member of this group. His opinion was always original. It is at times like this that I hope that all our theories about multiuniverses are in fact correct. We shall miss him. George
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hal, thanks for restarting our discussion. After my last inane post of July 12th on adding the singunal/plenal concept to language to deal with I-plural, I thought I had killed the group. Hal Ruhl wrote: > Dear George: > > Just a quick comment since I happened to read the end first. > > At 6/3/01, you wrote: > > >h... I thought that was a trick question. An axiomatic system cannot > >be both > >complete and consistent. Therefore there can't be a program for it. We go > >back on how > >you implement both G and G*. > > > > > >George(s) > > As far as I know that is not true. I understand it to be that some > axiomatic systems are both complete and consistent. > > Godel deals with systems at the complexity of arithmetic and above. > OK. I was thinking of systems with a complexity of arithmetic and above. I'll explain the reason below. > > Chaitin puts an upper limit on the complexity of a proof in any axiomatic > system. > > IMO the everything is sufficiently low in complexity - no information at > all - that it is both > complete and consistent, thus it can not answer any question including that > of its own stability. So also with its [in my model] oscillatory alter ego > - The Nothing. > > Since at its heart I feel that Bruno's approach and mine are linked - > though at the moment I can not follow the majority of his explanation - > There is only one axiom => Nothing. The Nothing is the converse of the Everything (Plenitude). Nothing is like a black screen. Everything is like a white screen. What they have in common is zero information. I prefer to think in terms of the Everything axiom than in terms of the Nothing axiom. The reason is that other conditions you may decide to bring in, act as constraints that restrict the range of the universe you live in and it's easier to restrict the Everything than to build on the Nothing. This approach is in fact partially validated in quantum physics in which any phenomenon which is not expressly forbidden is compulsory. Now this being said, starting with the Everything axiom (or Plenitude axiom) is OK but not sufficient. You are ignoring the anthropic constraint. If you factor in this constraint you'll find that the only systems which are acceptable are those with a complexity equal or greater than arithmetic. Otherwise, conscious thought is not possible. > > While this must lead to an all universes concurrently system - again no > information - there can be no answer as to why we find ourselves in this > one based on a distribution of types because there can be no such distribution. > I am puzzled by the whole concept of distribution when the number of items is infinite. As Jacques Mallah has pointed out that the methods of limits should take care of that. I am still not satisfied. IMO, when the number of items is infinite, their ordering seems to be an important issue in defining the distribution. Yet how is this ordering defined without resorting to distribution? George PS. I am still waiting for Bruno's explanation of G*.
Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ...
- Forwarded message from Jenny Higgo - Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 06:09:44 -0700 From: Jenny Higgo To: Hal Ruhl, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Consistency? Programs for G, G*, ... X-Diagnostic: Not on the accept list James Higgo was killed in an air accident on 22nd July. He would be very sorry not to receive this e-mail. Still, if his many worlds theory is correct, perhaps he has received it another. Best wishes, Jenny Higgo (James' mother) > Dear George: > > Just a quick comment since I happened to read the end first. > > At 6/3/01, you wrote: > > >h... I thought that was a trick question. An axiomatic system cannot > >be both > >complete and consistent. Therefore there can't be a program for it. We go > >back on how > >you implement both G and G*. > > > > > >George(s) > > As far as I know that is not true. I understand it to be that some > axiomatic systems are both complete and consistent. > > Godel deals with systems at the complexity of arithmetic and above. > > Chaitin puts an upper limit on the complexity of a proof in any axiomatic > system. > > IMO the everything is sufficiently low in complexity - no information at > all - that it is both > complete and consistent, thus it can not answer any question including that > of its own stability. So also with its [in my model] oscillatory alter ego > - The Nothing. > > Since at its heart I feel that Bruno's approach and mine are linked - > though at the moment I can not follow the majority of his explanation - > There is only one axiom => Nothing. > > While this must lead to an all universes concurrently system - again no > information - there can be no answer as to why we find ourselves in this > one based on a distribution of types because there can be no such distribution. > > The one we are in works to support SAS because large events are almost but > not quite deterministic. On the small event end of the spectrum I expect > that the curve hangs a bit - our universe's true noise content - before > rolling off to almost no one bit events. > > Hal > > > - End forwarded message -
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Dear George: At 6/3/01, you wrote: > My intuition is that it is precisely >indeterminacy that is responsible for consciousness. I agree. In my case I think this is required to isolate SAS from their future. I see consciousness as an observation of a transition by a subsystem of a universe that has a distribution of future states that is less random than the distribution of future states for the rest of the universe it is a part of. Such sub systems should spontaneously arise in any universe but will not endure in all universes. Transitions are driven by the need to avoid a selected everything - no information - and the everything's inability to determine its own stability which causes it to oscillate with the Nothing. Hal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Dear George: Just a quick comment since I happened to read the end first. At 6/3/01, you wrote: >h... I thought that was a trick question. An axiomatic system cannot >be both >complete and consistent. Therefore there can't be a program for it. We go >back on how >you implement both G and G*. > > >George(s) As far as I know that is not true. I understand it to be that some axiomatic systems are both complete and consistent. Godel deals with systems at the complexity of arithmetic and above. Chaitin puts an upper limit on the complexity of a proof in any axiomatic system. IMO the everything is sufficiently low in complexity - no information at all - that it is both complete and consistent, thus it can not answer any question including that of its own stability. So also with its [in my model] oscillatory alter ego - The Nothing. Since at its heart I feel that Bruno's approach and mine are linked - though at the moment I can not follow the majority of his explanation - There is only one axiom => Nothing. While this must lead to an all universes concurrently system - again no information - there can be no answer as to why we find ourselves in this one based on a distribution of types because there can be no such distribution. The one we are in works to support SAS because large events are almost but not quite deterministic. On the small event end of the spectrum I expect that the curve hangs a bit - our universe's true noise content - before rolling off to almost no one bit events. Hal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Saibal wrote: >I must have misunderstood the concept of ``doppelbrothersisters´´. I meant >that identical copies should be identified. I have nothing against that identification, but I guess you agree we should stop the identification when the neighborhoods differs so that the copies begin to diverge. I mean identical copies embedded in identical comp histories can perhaps be identified. We need some prudence because a literal identification could alter the "correct" relative probabilities. Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...+ White Rabbits
Marchal wrote: Do you think the dream and awake state are symmetrical? I am not sure. It seems to me that in the dream state you can realise you are dreaming, but that in the "awake" state you can never realise you are awake. "awakenings" go from more relative inconsistencies to less relative inconsistencies. (To be awake is akin to <>t, to be dreaming is akin to []f, at least in a first approximation.) Bruno Dream and awake state are in principle symmetrical. Here are four points to cover all bases: 1) Knowing you are dreaming: A lucid dream is a dream in which you know you are dreaming 2) Knowing the Plenitude: Someone who believes 100% in quantum immortality leads a life akin to lucid dreaming. (Also valid if you replace quantum immortality by God or Heavens). 3) Not knowing you are dreaming: In some cases you are dreaming but do not know it. For example, a nightmare would not be a nightmare if you knew you were dreaming. 4) Not knowing the Plenitude: Someone who does not believe in quantum immortality (like most of us) takes his life so seriously that when it turns for the worst it become a "nightmare." Belief in quantum immortality eliminates the "seriousness" of bad experiences. Yes I do think there is a symmetry between dreaming and being awake. The critical issue is BELIEF: whether you believe you are dreaming or not and this affects the CONSISTENCY of what you are observing. Same goes for the "real" world. There may be a difference only in the "quality of the rendering" just like the difference between a black and white silent movie and a 3D full color holographic audio visual display. One could also imagine a super being for whom dreams would be in full 3D color. So in principle I don't see any difference. I just want to clarify the idea of "shared" dreams. I think we must relate this idea to the concept of "objective reality" that is the sharing of a common "frame of reference" between different observers.
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...+ White Rabbits
Levy wrote: >Marchal wrote > >> >GL:Ok. Physics is pattern of laws perceived by the consciousness observing >> >the plenitude. The consistency filter that restricts consciousness is the >> >same filter that restrict the world that consciousness observes. This is >> >why the world is understandable and this is why there are no white rabbits. >> >White rabbits are not consistent. >> >>BM: Unfortunately I don't think this is true. The problem with the white >> rabbits is that there are consistent! For exemple we can dream of >> white rabbits. > >This is too simplistic. >It could be that we differ because of semantics or maybe because of confusion >with regard the frame of reference. Let's explore the issue with some thought >experiments. > >1) Let's consider dreams that I've had. I have dreamt many times of flying >(white rabbits? to be determined). In those dreams, I strongly believe that >flying is a natural ability that I have and I wonder why sometimes in the so >call real world I cannot fly. Everything in the dream world seems to be >consistent and I can fly. Flying, from the dream world perspective is not a >white rabbit. In fact the so called real world seems to be false and not >having >the ability to fly IS a white rabbit! I'm afraid I don't think dreams are thought experiment (unless you take TE in the trivial sense of any mind experience). I think dreams are definitely real experiences. Funny, bizare, delightfull or frightening, I write my nocturnal dreams since 1976 and the first application of G and G* (and Z and Z*) was on the dream state (including the relation with Descartes' Cogito). It is true that in some dreams you can do experiment, though. >In the dream world, the rule of physics seem to be different and allow >flying. >My belief system appears to conform to those physical laws and I do not >find any contradiction. Flying is OK in the dream world! Indeed. >The resolution of the paradox is simple. The frames of reference are >different. >What appears to be a white rabbit in one frame is not in another! Do you think the dream and awake state are symmetrical? I am not sure. It seems to me that in the dream state you can realise you are dreaming, but that in the "awake" state you can never realise you are awake. "awakenings" go from more relative inconsistencies to less relative inconsistencies. (To be awake is akin to <>t, to be dreaming is akin to []f, at least in a first approximation.) >Now, is the dream world frame of reference consistent? As far as I >tested it it was. I did not do much testing. You do what is called "lucid dreams". Dreams in which you are aware you are dreaming (or dream with narration including sentences like "I dream" for a more positivistic definition). With training you can test more and more. The ninethteen century is full of big dreamers who test consistencies of their dreams. Their works, although quite systematic, has been a little hidden by Freud attempt to interpret dreams. (Frederic van Eeden, La marquis Hervey de St. Denys) etc. Oh OK, I see on your more recent post that you practice and know about lucid dream. I have coined the term "contralucid dreams" for the dream in which you assert yourself "I am NOT dreaming". They are the royal road toward metaphysical doubts. Do you know the experimental verification of lucide dreams by Hearne and those by Laberge. During the dream your muscle are disconnected in some way, except the ocular muscles, so during a lucid dream you can communicate with people in the sleep laboratory. > >2) Here is an example in which a kind of dream state Uncertainty Principle >seems >to preserve consistency. Latter (I am super-buzy) I will tell you my dream n° 423 (23 february 1983) which illustrates very well that "consistency preservation" point. >I dream sometimes of seeing shapes and color ( these >are a form of phospenes produced by the brain in the dream state.) These >phospenes begin as relatively simple geometric patterns but then, as I enter >deeper into the dream state, they evolve into wonderful geometrical >shapes, or >animals or people etc... They are so beautiful that I try to stop them form >changing, to be able to analyze them in detail. A soon as I attempt to >focus on >them, they disappear. I can't perform any kind of consistency analysis on >them. Mmhh...Those images are probably hypnagogical images. Tibetan Buddist have studied them quite in deep. A tibetan test for knowing if you are dreaming or in a hypnagogical state is trying looking at your hands. Normally during hypnagogical imagery you should not be able to see your hands. EEG are different too. Unfortunately I get hypnagogical images only one time until now, so I have not been able to test my hands. >3) Here is another dream which illustrates how the discovery of an >inconsistency >brings the dream to an end. It is not necessary to wake up at this moment, but OK you know that. >I sometimes dream of o
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Bruno wrote: > Saibal wrote: > > >The Great Programmer can presumably compute certain correlations between > >our obserations of what we think is a star and the state of the observed > >system itself. As I see it the Great Programmer outputs descriptions, > >including descriptions of an astronomer observing a star. Why can't the > >Great Programmer check the description of the astronomer of a star against > >his own description? > > You are putting to much in "the great programmer". The UD (at least) > is only a "rather stupid" program which > just generates and run all possible programs (in all computer language > including quantum computers, etc.). If you personalise it so as to use > expression like "his own description" then you should define it so that > a term like "his" is well defined. Ok. but I still maintain that, at least in principle, you should be able to compute correlations because that´s ultimately what physics is all about. > > >What I meant was that the observer should have an exactly identical copy in > >a universe in which stars do exist. So the observer can't tell if stars do > >or don't exist, but it doesn't matter because he is exactly identical to an > >observer observing a real star. > > What does that change for the personal (relative) point of view. I > don't understand. It doesn´t, but the observer could claim that with high probability he is in the universe with real stars because he has observed stars. > > > In your example you should replace Moscow by a virtual reality > >representation of Moscow. One copy of you travels to the real Moscow, the > >other copy is a digital version of you that is sent to the cyber-version > >Moscow. Suppose that we didn't tell you that we would make a digital copy > >of you. In that case your digital copy would think he is in ``real´´ Moscow. > > But even if the "material" copy go to Washington, the virtual copy > will believe he is in the "real" Moscow. I'm not sure I understand you. > Once the copies are made they are as independent as me and you. Isn'it? Why would the copies be independent? Two identical copies in two identical environments will continue to behave identically. Now if one of the two environments is changed but the copy living there can't in principle notice (his world is replaced by a virtual world, stars visible to him are not simulated in detail, he could only notice this if he manages to travel to one), he will still behave identically. > > >Yes but shouldn't all the ``doppelbrothersisters´´ be identified? > > How? and Why? If you do that please identify myself with any amoeba, > planaria, ... yourself and any living creature from the multiverse. I must have misunderstood the concept of ``doppelbrothersisters´´. I meant that identical copies should be identified Saibal
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...+ White Rabbits
Marchal wrote > >Ok. Physics is pattern of laws perceived by the consciousness observing > >the plenitude. The consistency filter that restricts consciousness is the > >same filter that restrict the world that consciousness observes. This is > >why the world is understandable and this is why there are no white rabbits. > >White rabbits are not consistent. > > Unfortunately I don't think this is true. The problem with the white > rabbits is that there are consistent! For exemple we can dream of > white rabbits. This is too simplistic. It could be that we differ because of semantics or maybe because of confusion with regard the frame of reference. Let's explore the issue with some thought experiments. 1) Let's consider dreams that I've had. I have dreamt many times of flying (white rabbits? to be determined). In those dreams, I strongly believe that flying is a natural ability that I have and I wonder why sometimes in the so call real world I cannot fly. Everything in the dream world seems to be consistent and I can fly. Flying, from the dream world perspective is not a white rabbit. In fact the so called real world seems to be false and not having the ability to fly IS a white rabbit! In the dream world, the rule of physics seem to be different and allow flying. My belief system appears to conform to those physical laws and I do not find any contradiction. Flying is OK in the dream world! The resolution of the paradox is simple. The frames of reference are different. What appears to be a white rabbit in one frame is not in another! Now, is the dream world frame of reference consistent? As far as I tested it it was. I did not do much testing. 2) Here is an example in which a kind of dream state Uncertainty Principle seems to preserve consistency. I dream sometimes of seeing shapes and color ( these are a form of phospenes produced by the brain in the dream state.) These phospenes begin as relatively simple geometric patterns but then, as I enter deeper into the dream state, they evolve into wonderful geometrical shapes, or animals or people etc... They are so beautiful that I try to stop them form changing, to be able to analyze them in detail. A soon as I attempt to focus on them, they disappear. I can't perform any kind of consistency analysis on them. 3) Here is another dream which illustrates how the discovery of an inconsistency brings the dream to an end. I sometimes dream of out of body experiences Are they real or not? Being a amateur physicist -even in my dreams - I want to know if these experiences are "real". So I give myself a test: to find out what is the arrangement of certain objects in another room. When I tried that I came up blank. I just couldn't do it. So, in the dream, I realized that these out of body experiences were not real and that I was dreaming. This realization, effectively, put an end to the dream - even though I continued dreaming, I knew it was a fake. To summarize: White rabbits are inconsistent by definition. The issue is "inconsistent with respect which frame of reference?" If we dream of a real world white rabbit (inconsistency as seen from the real world point of view) then it may be perfectly consistent in the dream world. If it is consistent in the dream world, no problem. No paradox in the dream world. No paradox in the real world.. If we dream of a dream world white rabbit (inconsistency as seen from the dream world point of view), then we realize the dream world is a fake and we wake up. No more dream world. No more paradox. We can resolve the white rabbit paradox if we take relativity seriously. George
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hi George, >Your effort to clarify your position is admirable and I hope other >everythingers are following your explanation. You are still too >technical for my taste, and I may simply have to give up on >understanding your position at a critical and constructive >level rather than just at a spectator level. I will try to be less technical in the future. >I agree fully with your UDA. To summarixe: Basically the perception >of consciousness as seen from the first person is continuous, >independently of interruptions in time, >separation in space, (virtual) implementation level, and number of >branchings (and number of fusings or mergings... my addition). Yes. Just to be clear: those fusing and splitting cannot change the nature of the experiences but of course can change the degree of possibility/probability of those experiences. >Yes. Because of UDA, consciousness doesn't seems to be tied down >to one particular "Schmidhuberian universe." In fact the environment >where consciousness operates seems to be the whole plenitude and I agree >with you when you expressed reluctance in talking about a "universe." We >are in the plenitude but our senses can only perceive a thin slice of it. >More precisely, for each one of us, "I-plural" am in the >plenitude, but "I-plural" can perceive only a thin slice of it. Each "I" >has a different perspective. Yes. >Yes. consistency in the (virtual) linkage that connects the present >state with all immediate future states (consistent extensions) is the >filter that defines consciousness from non consciousness. A corollary is >that non-consistent extentions are not conscious. The measure problem >is how to quantify the relative number of >(future) extensions having different attributes. Exactly. >Let's use English. []<>t: prove not consistent? Here is a set of english translations (where []p means "I prove p"). []t I prove my favorite tautology []f I prove FALSE, I prove a contradiction, I am inconsistent <>t = -[]-t = -[]f = I don't prove FALSE, I am consistent [][]t I prove that I prove t []<>t I prove that I am consistent Strictly speaking []p is not "I prove p", but "I *can* prove p" or "it is provable by me that p". You can always interchange: -[]- with <> -[] with <>- -<> with []- -<>- with [] Exercice: Convince yourself that -[][][][][][][][][][][]p is the same as <><><><><><><><><><><>-p >Ok. Physics is pattern of laws perceived by the consciousness observing >the plenitude. The consistency filter that restricts consciousness is the >same filter that restrict the world that consciousness observes. This is >why the world is understandable and this is why there are no white rabbits. >White rabbits are not consistent. Unfortunately I don't think this is true. The problem with the white rabbits is that there are consistent! For exemple we can dream of white rabbits. Later, when I will explain Godel's result we will see the consistency of inconsistency Oh well, I can explain it now: As I said the first theorem in the "psychology of machine" is Godel's second incompleteness theorem. I recall it first in english: If I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent. Now "I am consistent" is the same as "I cannot prove f" (f = FALSE), or "I cannot prove -t". OK. in modal notation the second theorem of Godel can be written: (-[]-t) -> (-[]-[]-t) or <>t -> -[]<>t (cf <> = -[]-) You can read -[]A as "I cannot prove A". This is the same as "-A is consistent" (because if -A were not consistent it would mean that from -A you can get f, and A would be provable by reduction ad absurdum). So the unprovability of consistency entails the consistency of the provability of the false, that is the consistency of inconsistency. Don't confuse inconsistency -<>t(-[]-t) and the consistency of inconsistency <>-<>t. (-[]<>t) It is important because that is why consistent machines can be wrong, or can be dreaming or ... can (without losing consistency) see White Rabbits. The only thing we can hope to show is that white rabbit are relatively rare. >I am not very familiar with the concept of G*. No problem. I will make a special post on G and G*. >The movies "The Matrix" and "Tron" also deserve a mention I agree with "Tron". Concerning Matrix I would just mention that it describe a non computationalist civilisation. The virtual world is still the product of biological neurons. The people have still a organic body ... It just describes shared biological dreams. I will discussed your other comments later. Thanks, Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Hi George, Hi Brent, Hi Saibal, Hi All, George, thanks for your encouraging statements. I'm glad you agree fully with the UDA. I will take my time to answer your post. It looks like the only thing I must still explain is Godel theorem. That is really where G and G* comes from. (Godel, Lob and perhaps Solovay). I will try to explain that in english being the less technical possible. I realise also that in the archive the symbols [] and [o] look to similar ... Brent, you can guess two reasons why "I don't believe in S5". The Kripke semantics for S5 is ... Leibniz semantics, with a trivial accessibility relation (equivalence relation). The other reason is that in my dialog with the sound machine (the lobian machine) S5 never appears ... (I agree this is a partial argument). Saibal wrote: >The Great Programmer can presumably compute certain correlations between >our obserations of what we think is a star and the state of the observed >system itself. As I see it the Great Programmer outputs descriptions, >including descriptions of an astronomer observing a star. Why can't the >Great Programmer check the description of the astronomer of a star against >his own description? You are putting to much in "the great programmer". The UD (at least) is only a "rather stupid" program which just generates and run all possible programs (in all computer language including quantum computers, etc.). If you personalise it so as to use expression like "his own description" then you should define it so that a term like "his" is well defined. >What I meant was that the observer should have an exactly identical copy in >a universe in which stars do exist. So the observer can't tell if stars do >or don't exist, but it doesn't matter because he is exactly identical to an >observer observing a real star. What does that change for the personal (relative) point of view. I don't understand. > In your example you should replace Moscow by a virtual reality >representation of Moscow. One copy of you travels to the real Moscow, the >other copy is a digital version of you that is sent to the cyber-version >Moscow. Suppose that we didn't tell you that we would make a digital copy >of you. In that case your digital copy would think he is in ``real´´ Moscow. But even if the "material" copy go to Washington, the virtual copy will believe he is in the "real" Moscow. I'm not sure I understand you. Once the copies are made they are as independent as me and you. Isn'it? >Yes but shouldn't all the ``doppelbrothersisters´´ be identified? How? and Why? If you do that please identify myself with any amoeba, planaria, ... yourself and any living creature from the multiverse. Bruno PS Thanks to Wei for the 60kb.
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Wei Dai wrote: > I've changed the max submission size to 60 KB. Thanks Wei George
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
I've changed the max submission size to 60 KB. - Forwarded message from George Levy - Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2001 22:24:23 -0700 From: George Levy To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ... X-Diagnostic: Diverted & unprocessed X-Diagnostic: Submission size exceeds 4 bytes Hi Bruno, Your effort to clarify your position is admirable and I hope other everythingers are following your explanation. You are still too technical for my taste, and I may simply have to give up on understanding your position at a critical and constructive level rather than just at a spectator level. > > A version of the UDA can be found in the archive at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html > I agree fully with your UDA. To summarixe: Basically the perception of consciousness as seen from the first person is continuous, independently of interruptions in time, separation in space, (virtual) implementation level, and number of branchings (and number of fusings or mergings... my addition). > The UDA illustrates also the incompleteness of Schmidhuberian-like TOE approach, Yes. Because of UDA, consciousness doesn't seems to be tied down to one particular "Schmidhuberian universe." In fact the environment where consciousness operates seems to be the whole plenitude and I agree with you when you expressed reluctance in talking about a "universe." We are in the plenitude but our senses can only perceive a thin slice of it. More precisely, for each one of us, "I-plural" am in the plenitude, but "I-plural" can perceive only a thin slice of it. Each "I" has a different perspective. > The UDA shows that whatever you do, the next "conscious" event has a > probability uniquely determined by the set of all your consistent extensions > in the UD* (= accessed by the UD). It is a special and precise version > of the measure problem recurrently discussed on this list. > It is apparently not so precise because the "measure" is not > defined (through the UDA). Yes. consistency in the (virtual) linkage that connects the present state with all immediate future states (consistent extensions) is the filter that defines consciousness from non consciousness. A corollary is that non-consistent extentions are not conscious. The measure problem is how to quantify the relative number of (future) extensions having different attributes. > But the "rigorous" result remains: you don't need to know the measure for > understanding 1) that comp reduces physics into the *search* of that unique > measure, and 2) that this search must be made only through the > machine's psychology. Ok. Physics is pattern of laws perceived by the consciousness observing the plenitude. The consistency filter that restricts consciousness is the same filter that restrict the world that consciousness observes. This is why the world is understandable and this is why there are no white rabbits. White rabbits are not consistent. > > Nevertheless I search to isolate that measure, and I do that by the interview > of the machine through G (going to the "meta" level as says Georges) and > its angel/truth theory (through G*). See below definitions and programs. > I am not very familiar with the concept of G*. > > For understanding the UDA (and the reversal psycho/physico), > people need only a passive amount of computer science and > elementary comp philosophy. I like also to mention Daniel Galouye Sc Fi book > "Simulacron 3", and the > more recent "permutation city" by Greg Egan. The movies "The Matrix" and "Tron" also deserve a mention > > > >Let's see if we can summarize your position in simple terms. > > Mmh ... let us try. But before I would like to say that the modal > mathematics really simplify the matter because the needed self-reference > makes you walk on the counter-intuitive border of consistency. But you > are surely right in insisting to make things simpler, in some way. >From what you have taught us, modal logic provides the relativistic vehicle needed that allows each consciousness to exist on its own terms. Consistency and consistent extentions are only defined in term of the consciousnes that they themselves define. > >1) What are the axioms and rules of inference supporting your system. This > >answer > >should be answerable in a few lines. Please don't mention Kripke, Leibnitz or > >anyone else. Do not give any reference. State your system from the ground up. > I am sorry to say you failed that question. You did mention names. But is was a trick question. Clearly, a precisely defined set of axioms and rules of inference would have turned consciouness and the world into a Schmidhuber type of mechanistic desert inca
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Wei Dai wrote: >Please note there is a 40 KB size limit on messages. If you have something >longer please put it up on a web site and post a link to it. I had to >truncate the following post in order for it to go through. > >- Forwarded message from Marchal - > >Date: Mon, 28 May 2001 08:31:12 -0700 >Subject: Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ... >From: Marchal >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >X-Diagnostic: Diverted & unprocessed >X-Diagnostic: Submission size exceeds 4 bytes Sorry. I will put the lisp programs for G and G* on my web page ASAP. Or more precisely I will put it ASAIRMP (As soon as I remember my password ;-). Bruno
Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...
Please note there is a 40 KB size limit on messages. If you have something longer please put it up on a web site and post a link to it. I had to truncate the following post in order for it to go through. - Forwarded message from Marchal - Date: Mon, 28 May 2001 08:31:12 -0700 Subject: Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ... From: Marchal To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> X-Diagnostic: Diverted & unprocessed X-Diagnostic: Submission size exceeds 4 bytes Hi Levy, I hope you have take some rest because this is a long reply :-) Still too technical without doubt, but read it carefully: perhaps it will help us to make some back and forth between on one hand the intuitive and informal (but rigorous with comp) UDA and, on the other hand its formal and counter-intuitive translation in arithmetic through G and G*. Sometimes I recall things, not for you, but for others. >Your expose in a "nutshell" is far too technical to convince me... >unfortunately I believe I would have to obtain a post grad education >in logic to appreciate your position as you state it. Post grad ? Well, perhaps ..., these days ... :-) >Yet I believe that what you are saying sounds >valid. So even though I would like to give you the prize, I'm >afraid, I'm not qualified. Damned! (but I appreciate the honesty). >However, all is not lost. I believe that your position can be >stated much more simply without having to review all of >modern logic theory. Thanks for that optimistic statement. Now, when I eliminate all the "modern logic theory" ..., well, only the UDA remains. The role of "Modern Logic" is just to give tools to tranlate UDA in the language of a sound machine (or arithmetic). I recall what's UDA for the (possible) others. The UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument), is a thought experiment showing that the computationalist hypothesis implies a reversal between physics and (machine) psychology. The UD is a program which generates and executes all computer programs, and the UDA shows my "immediately next futur" is determined by the set of all my consistent extension emulated by the UD (or belonging to UD* as I say sometimes). The reversal occurs at both the ontological level and at the epistemological level: -Ontologically: UDA shows matter emerges on consciousness (roughly speaking: it is actually the belief in matter which emerges and interferes) -Epistemologically: Physics becomes a branch of the psychology of machine (with psychology taken in the large sense of science of consciousness, you can call that theology if you prefer. For my purpose the (double) theory of mind will be given by G and G*, see below). A version of the UDA can be found in the archive at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html The UDA illustrates also the incompleteness of Schmidhuberian-like TOE approach, and more generally it gives a clue on the extreme non triviality of the mind/body problem (even) with the computational hypothesis. (Some materialist believes that comp *is* the solution of the mind-body problem, alas for them, materialism is not even compatible with mechanism. This can be derived from UDA + OCCAM, or directly from the Movie Graph Argument, or from Maudlin's paper. Ref in my thesis at http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal). The UDA shows that whatever you do, the next "conscious" event has a probability uniquely determined by the set of all your consistent extensions in the UD* (= accessed by the UD). It is a special and precise version of the measure problem recurrently discussed on this list. It is apparently not so precise because the "measure" is not defined (through the UDA). But the "rigorous" result remains: you don't need to know the measure for understanding 1) that comp reduces physics into the *search* of that unique measure, and 2) that this search must be made only through the machine's psychology. Nevertheless I search to isolate that measure, and I do that by the interview of the machine through G (going to the "meta" level as says Georges) and its angel/truth theory (through G*). See below definitions and programs. For understanding the UDA (and the reversal psycho/physico), people need only a passive amount of computer science and elementary comp philosophy. The best (IMO) book is, still today, "Mind's I" edited by Hofstadter and Dennett, even if both Dennett and Hofstadter seem to close their eyes where I insist maintaining them wide open; in particular both Dennett and Hofstadter fail to see the comp indeterminacy, although they both proposed some versions of the duplication experiment.). I like also to mention Daniel Galouye Sc Fi book "Simulacron 3", and the more recent "permutation city" by Greg Egan. Of course UDA stretches a lot such similar thought experiences. >It m
