Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:38, Brent Meeker wrote: > Talk about consciousness will seem as quaint > as talk about the elan vital does now. Then you are led to eliminativism of consciousness. This makes MEC+MAT trivially coherent. The price is big: consciousness does no more exist, like the "elan vital". MEC becomes vacuoulsy true: I say yes to the doctor, without even meaning it. But it seems to me that consciousness is not like the "elan vital". I do make the, admittedly non sharable, experience of consciousness all the time, so it seems to me that such a move consists in negating the data. If the idea of keeping the notion of primitive matter, which I recall is really an hypothesis, is so demanding that I have to abandon the idea that I am conscious, I will abandon the hypothetical notion of primitive matter instead. But you make my point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 20, 2008, at 3:33 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? > > I'm sort of the opposite of you on this issue. You don't like to use > the term "logically possible", while I don't like to use the term > "nomologically impossible". I don't see the relevance of nomological > possibility to any philosophical question I'm interested in. For > anything that's nomologically impossible, I can just imagine a > cellular automaton or some other computational or mathematical > "physics" in which that thing is nomologically possible. And then I > can just imagine physically instantiating that universe on one of our > real computers. And then all of my philosophical questions still apply. > > I can certainly imagine objections to that viewpoint. But life is > short. My point was that, since you already agreed that it's > nomologically possible for a random robot to outwardly behave like a > conscious person for some indefinite period of time, we can sidestep > the (probably interesting) discussion we might have about nomological > vs. logical possibility in this case. > >> Does a random number generator have computational functionality just >> in case it >> (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But >> referring the >> concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, >> makes a >> difference in Bruno's question. > > I think that Dennett explicitly refers to computational capacities > when talking about consciousness (and zombies), and I follow him. But > Dennett's point is that computational capacity is always, in > principle, observed behavior - or, at least, behavior that can be > observed. In the case of Lucky Alice, if you had the right tools, you > could examine the neurons and see - based on how they were behaving! - > that they were not causally connected to each other. (The fact that a > neuron is being triggered by a cosmic ray rather than by a neighboring > neuron is an observable part of its behavior.) That observed behavior > would allow you to conclude that this brain does not have the > computational capacity to compute the answers to a math test, or to > compute the trajectory of a ball. > >> I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots >> brain worked. >> If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the >> behavior, as in >> Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense >> (I think >> there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's >> list of >> first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. >> accidental behavior, I'd say not. > > I agree. But why do you say you're puzzled about how to answer Bruno's > question about Lucky Alice? I think you just answered it - for you, > Lucky Alice wouldn't be conscious. (Or do you think that Lucky Alice > is different than a robot with a random-number-generator in its head? > I don't.) I think Alice is different. She has the capacity to be conscious. This is potentially, temporarily interrupted by some mysterious failure of gates (or neurons) in her brain - but wait, these failures are serendipitously canceled out by a burst of cosmic rays, so they all get the same input/output as if nothing had happened. So, functionally, it's as if the gates didn't fail at all. This functionality is beyond external behavior; it includes forming memories, paying attention, etc. Of course we may say it is not causally related to Alice's environment, but this depends on a certain theory of causality, a physical theory. If the cosmic rays exactly replace all the gate functions to maintain the same causal chains then from an informational perspective we might say the rays were caused by the relations to her environment. Brent Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 20, 2008, at 3:33 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? I'm sort of the opposite of you on this issue. You don't like to use the term "logically possible", while I don't like to use the term "nomologically impossible". I don't see the relevance of nomological possibility to any philosophical question I'm interested in. For anything that's nomologically impossible, I can just imagine a cellular automaton or some other computational or mathematical "physics" in which that thing is nomologically possible. And then I can just imagine physically instantiating that universe on one of our real computers. And then all of my philosophical questions still apply. I can certainly imagine objections to that viewpoint. But life is short. My point was that, since you already agreed that it's nomologically possible for a random robot to outwardly behave like a conscious person for some indefinite period of time, we can sidestep the (probably interesting) discussion we might have about nomological vs. logical possibility in this case. > Does a random number generator have computational functionality just > in case it > (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But > referring the > concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, > makes a > difference in Bruno's question. I think that Dennett explicitly refers to computational capacities when talking about consciousness (and zombies), and I follow him. But Dennett's point is that computational capacity is always, in principle, observed behavior - or, at least, behavior that can be observed. In the case of Lucky Alice, if you had the right tools, you could examine the neurons and see - based on how they were behaving! - that they were not causally connected to each other. (The fact that a neuron is being triggered by a cosmic ray rather than by a neighboring neuron is an observable part of its behavior.) That observed behavior would allow you to conclude that this brain does not have the computational capacity to compute the answers to a math test, or to compute the trajectory of a ball. > I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots > brain worked. > If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the > behavior, as in > Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense > (I think > there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's > list of > first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. > accidental behavior, I'd say not. I agree. But why do you say you're puzzled about how to answer Bruno's question about Lucky Alice? I think you just answered it - for you, Lucky Alice wouldn't be conscious. (Or do you think that Lucky Alice is different than a robot with a random-number-generator in its head? I don't.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:38 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> I think you really you mean nomologically possible. > > I mean logically possible, but I'm happy to change it to > "nomologically possible" for the purposes of this conversation. Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? > >> I think Dennett changes the question by referring to >> neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be >> replaced by >> hardware? > > No, he definitely argues that wetware can replaced by hardware, as > long as the hardware retains the computational functionality of the > wetware. But that's the catch. Computational functionality is a capacity, not a fact. Does a random number generator have computational functionality just in case it (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But referring the concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, makes a difference in Bruno's question. > >> In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I >> say no, >> because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a >> conscious >> person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet >> have no inner >> experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as >> to improbable >> - not impossible. > > I agree. But if you accept that it's nomologically possible for a > robot with a random-number-generator in its head to outwardly behave > like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period > of time, then your theory of consciousness, one way or another, has to > answer the question of whether or not this unlikely robot is > conscious. Now, maybe your answer is "The question is misguided in > that case, and here's why..." But that's a significant burden. I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots brain worked. If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the behavior, as in Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense (I think there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's list of first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. accidental behavior, I'd say not. Observing the robot for some period of time, in some circumstances can provide strong evidence against the "accidental" hypothesis, but it cannot rule it out completely. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:38 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > I think you really you mean nomologically possible. I mean logically possible, but I'm happy to change it to "nomologically possible" for the purposes of this conversation. > I think Dennett changes the question by referring to > neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be > replaced by > hardware? No, he definitely argues that wetware can replaced by hardware, as long as the hardware retains the computational functionality of the wetware. > In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I > say no, > because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a > conscious > person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet > have no inner > experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as > to improbable > - not impossible. I agree. But if you accept that it's nomologically possible for a robot with a random-number-generator in its head to outwardly behave like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, then your theory of consciousness, one way or another, has to answer the question of whether or not this unlikely robot is conscious. Now, maybe your answer is "The question is misguided in that case, and here's why..." But that's a significant burden. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 19, 2008, at 1:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I >> don't believe in >> zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of >> water will >> freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is >> possible. > > I take this to mean that you're uncomfortable with thought experiments > which revolve around logically possible but exceedingly unlikely > events. I think you really you mean nomologically possible. I'm not uncomfortable with them, I just maintain a little skepticism. For one thing what is nomologically possible or impossible is often reassessed. Less than a century ago the experimental results Elizer, Vaidman, Zeilenger, et al, on delayed choice, non-interaction measurement, and other QM phenomena would all have been dismissed in advance as "logically" impossible. >I think that's understandable, but ultimately, I'm on the > philosopher's side. It really is logically possible - although > exceedingly unlikely - for a random-number-generator to cause a robot > to walk around, talk to people, etc. It really is logically possible > for a computer program to use a random-number-generator to generate a > lattice of changing bits that "follows" Conway's Life rule. Mechanism > and materialism needs to answer questions about these scenarios, > regardless of how unlikely they are. I don't disagree with that. My puzzlement about how to answer Bruno's question comes from the ambiguity as to what we mean by a philosophical zombie. Do we mean its outward actions are the same as a conscious person? For how long? Under what circumstances? I can easily make a robot that acts just like a sleeping person. I think Dennett changes the question by referring to neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be replaced by hardware? In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I say no, because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet have no inner experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as to improbable - not impossible. In other words if I were constructing a robot that had to act as a conscious person would over a long period of time in a wide variety of circumstances, I would have to build into the robot some kind of inner attention module that selected what was important to remember, compressed into short representation, linked it to other memories. And this would be an inner narrative. Similary for the other "inner" processes. I don't know if that's really what it takes to build a conscious robot, but I'm pretty sure it's something like that. And I think once we understand how to do this, we'll stop worrying about "the hard problem of consciousness". Instead we'll talk about how efficient the inner narration module is or the memory confabulation module or the visual imagination module. Talk about consciousness will seem as quaint as talk about the elan vital does now. Brent > > -- Kory > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On 20 Nov 2008, at 00:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so >> that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a >> zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense >> of >> Kory and Dennett. >> Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. > > I think I can... > > Instead of correcting the brain, the cosmic beams trigger output > neurons in a sequence that makes Alice write the right answers. That > is to say, the information content of the beams is no longer a > representation of an area of Alice's brain, but a representation of > the answers to the exam. An outside observer cannot distinguish one > case from the other. In the first she is Alice, in the second she is a > zombie. Right. I guess you see that such a zombie is an accidental zombie. We will have to come back later on this "accidental" part. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:43, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:06, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >>> Bruno, >>> If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon). >>> I also agree completely and am curious to see where this is going. >>> Please continue! >> >> >> Thanks Telmo, thanks also to Gordon. >> >> I will try to send MGA 2 asap. But this asks me some time. >> Meanwhile I >> suggest a little exercise, which, by the way, finishes the proof of >> "MECH + MAT implies false", for those who thinks that there is no >> (conceivable) zombies. (they think that "exists zombie" *is* false). >> >> Exercise (mat+mec implies zombie exists or are conceivable): >> >> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so >> that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a >> zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense >> of >> Kory and Dennett. >> Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. >> >> Bruno > > As I understand it a philosophical zombie is someone who looks and > acts just > like a conscious person but isn't conscious, i.e. has no "inner > narrative". No inner narrative, no inner image, no inner souvenir, no inner sensation, no qualia, no subject, no first person notions at all. OK. > > Time and circumstance play a part in this. As Bruno pointed out a > cardboard > cutout of a person's photograph could be a zombie for a moment. I > assume the > point of the exam is that an exam is long enough in duration and > complex enough > that it rules out the accidental, cutout zombie. Well, given that it is a thought experiment, the resources are free, and I can make the cosmic lucky explosion as lucky as you need for making Alice apparently alive, and with COMP+MAT, indeed alive. All its neurons break down all the time, and, because she is so lucky, an event which occurred 10 billions years before, send to her, at all right moment and place (and thus this is certainly NOT random) the lucky ray plumber who fixes momentarily the problem by trigging the other neurons to which it was supposed to send the infos (for example). Keeping comp and mat, making her unconscious here would be equivalent to give Alice's neurons a sort of physical prescience. > But then Alice has her normal > behavior restored by a cosmic ray shower that is just as improbable > as the > accidental zombie, i.e. she is, for the duration of the shower, an > accidental > zombie. Well, with Telmo solution of the "MGA 1bis exercise", where only the motor output neuron are fixed and where no internal neuron is fixed (almost all neurons), with MEC + MAT, Alice has no working brain at all, is only a lucky puppet, and she has to be a zombie. But in the original problem, all neurons are fixed, and then I would say Alice is not a zombie (if not, you give a magical physical prescience to the neurons). But now, you are right, that in both case, the luck can only be accidental. If, in the same thought experience, keeping the exact same "no lucky cosmic explosion, but giving now a phone call to the teacher or to Alice, so that she moves 1mm away of the position she had in the previous version, she will miss the lucky rays, most probably some will go through in wrong places and most probably she will miss the exams, and perhaps even die. So you are right, in Telmo's solution of" MGA 1bis exercise" she is an accidental zombie. But in the original MGA 1, she should remain conscious (with MECH and MAT), even if accidentally so. > > > So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. Hope it is clear for every one now? > In general I don't believe in > zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of > water will > freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is > possible. OK. Accidental zombie are possible, but are very unlikely (but wait for MGA 2 for a lessening of this statement). Accidental consciousness (like in MGA 1, with MECH+MAT) is possible also, and is as much unlikely (same remark). Of course, as unlikeley as possible, nobody can test if someone else is "really conscious" or is a accidental zombie, because for any series of test you can imagine, you can conceive a sufficiently lucky cosmic explosion. > > It seems similar to the question, could I have gotten in my car and > driven to > the store, bought something, and driven back and yet not be > conscious of it. > It's highly unlikely, yet people apparently have done such things. (I think here something different occurs, concerning intensity of attention with respect to different conscious streams, but it is out- of-topic, I think). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 19, 2008, at 1:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I > don't believe in > zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of > water will > freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is > possible. I take this to mean that you're uncomfortable with thought experiments which revolve around logically possible but exceedingly unlikely events. I think that's understandable, but ultimately, I'm on the philosopher's side. It really is logically possible - although exceedingly unlikely - for a random-number-generator to cause a robot to walk around, talk to people, etc. It really is logically possible for a computer program to use a random-number-generator to generate a lattice of changing bits that "follows" Conway's Life rule. Mechanism and materialism needs to answer questions about these scenarios, regardless of how unlikely they are. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so > that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a > zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense of > Kory and Dennett. > Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. I think I can... Instead of correcting the brain, the cosmic beams trigger output neurons in a sequence that makes Alice write the right answers. That is to say, the information content of the beams is no longer a representation of an area of Alice's brain, but a representation of the answers to the exam. An outside observer cannot distinguish one case from the other. In the first she is Alice, in the second she is a zombie. Telmo. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:06, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > >> Bruno, >> >>> If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon). >> I also agree completely and am curious to see where this is going. >> Please continue! > > > Thanks Telmo, thanks also to Gordon. > > I will try to send MGA 2 asap. But this asks me some time. Meanwhile I > suggest a little exercise, which, by the way, finishes the proof of > "MECH + MAT implies false", for those who thinks that there is no > (conceivable) zombies. (they think that "exists zombie" *is* false). > > Exercise (mat+mec implies zombie exists or are conceivable): > > Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so > that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a > zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense of > Kory and Dennett. > Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. > > Bruno As I understand it a philosophical zombie is someone who looks and acts just like a conscious person but isn't conscious, i.e. has no "inner narrative". Time and circumstance play a part in this. As Bruno pointed out a cardboard cutout of a person's photograph could be a zombie for a moment. I assume the point of the exam is that an exam is long enough in duration and complex enough that it rules out the accidental, cutout zombie. But then Alice has her normal behavior restored by a cosmic ray shower that is just as improbable as the accidental zombie, i.e. she is, for the duration of the shower, an accidental zombie. So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I don't believe in zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of water will freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is possible. It seems similar to the question, could I have gotten in my car and driven to the store, bought something, and driven back and yet not be conscious of it. It's highly unlikely, yet people apparently have done such things. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
