Re: Re: A test for solipsism
SNIP Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? -- Onward! Stephen Hi Stephan, That sounds like autism to me. Roger -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Bruno Marchal You say No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with. If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means. He could not know anything. So he could never behave as a real person would unless the response was instinctual. Note that you may be right, you could never know if you married a zombie, but that does not follow from the p-zombie definition. The definition is an absurdity. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-20, 10:11:25 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain. And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of that, your whole life. (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing finer discrimination than human. I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts. Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to some theory. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
WHOEVER: Hi Bruno and Roger, What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? BRUNO: Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even if that human is solipsist, even a very special sort of solipsist like the one you describe. Bruno ROGER: Previously I deduced that a p-zombie (or any zombie without a brain) would be an absurdity (not be able, as required, to act as a real person) because any being without a brain could not know anything. It would not know what to do in any event -- and as far as conversing with it, it could not understand language. You'd also find it bumping into walls. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to some theory. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: RE: RE: A test for solipsism
Hi William R. Buckley Thank you for reminding me that materialists do believe that there is a mind identical to or in some fashion related to the brain. Since I see no possibility that one substance (mind) can act on another substance (brain), I don't take their concept of mind seriously, but I have remember that many (most) people believe in the materialist view of mind. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 08:42:36 Subject: RE: RE: A test for solipsism Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is an assumption you make. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. If it does not reply, it's a zombie. Another assumption. In this case, you can talk to me and I will refuse to reply. That make me a zombie? But just to be certain, if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, such as 1) what color are your eyes ? 2) What color are my eyes ? 3) What is your mother's name ? 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 5) What color is a plenget ? 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 7) What is your birth date? 8) Where were you born? 9) How tall am I ? 10) Am I taller than you are ? 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you answer to all questions. Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough. wrb etc. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 Subject: RE: A test for solipsism Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, even if that conversation is with an illusion. For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM To: everything-list Subject: A test for solipsism Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Roger Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them. A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With no problems. http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/ 2012/10/20 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind also can recall past sensations of red to compare it with and give it a name red, which a real person can identify as eg a red traffic light and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing the fact that red and green lights are in different positions). That would be a test of zombieness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to some theory. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list
Re: Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Russell Standish Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 17:48:57 Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies (zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: RE: A test for solipsism
Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. If it does not reply, it's a zombie. But just to be certain, if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, such as 1) what color are your eyes ? 2) What color are my eyes ? 3) What is your mother's name ? 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 5) What color is a plenget ? 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 7) What is your birth date? 8) Where were you born? 9) How tall am I ? 10) Am I taller than you are ? 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? etc. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 Subject: RE: A test for solipsism Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, even if that conversation is with an illusion. For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM To: everything-list Subject: A test for solipsism Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more
RE: RE: A test for solipsism
Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is an assumption you make. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. If it does not reply, it's a zombie. Another assumption. In this case, you can talk to me and I will refuse to reply. That make me a zombie? But just to be certain, if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, such as 1) what color are your eyes ? 2) What color are my eyes ? 3) What is your mother's name ? 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 5) What color is a plenget ? 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 7) What is your birth date? 8) Where were you born? 9) How tall am I ? 10) Am I taller than you are ? 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you answer to all questions. Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough. wrb etc. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 Subject: RE: A test for solipsism Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, even if that conversation is with an illusion. For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM To: everything-list Subject: A test for solipsism Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-10-18, 13:26:16 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that it had a mind? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies (zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
