Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Craig Weinberg Where today is Regressivism and Dystopianism ? Or maybe that was just an ironic comment. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/31/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-31, 08:43:41 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:57:54 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Progressivism is another word for Utopianism. Their utopias sound good but as of yet have never worked, or worked for long. Has Regressivism and Dystopianism fared much better? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/VYEIpZZfmq8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:45:16 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > > Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, > which seem to be alive but are not actually so. > > Exactly. I don't call them zombies though, because zombie implies a negative affirmation of life. They are puppets. They have no pretensions to being alive, that is our conceit - a Pinocchio fallacy. When we act on the assumptions of that fallacy, we have been warned about the two possibilities: Frankenstein or HAL (Golem or demon). Frankenstein is the embodiment of physicalism or material functionalism, the functional inversion of body as re-animated corpse. HAL is the embodiment of computationalism or digital functionalism, the functional inversion of mind as disembodied self. Both are the result of our confusion in trying to internalize externalized appearances. We wind up with the false images - an outsiders view of interiority. It's a category error. Cart before the horse. I agree with Brent as far as an empirical approach to consciousness (robots building models from environmental test results) is superior to a rational approach (front loading logical models to be adapted to fit real environments) but both ultimately fail to locate awareness of any kind. There is awareness in a robot or computer, but it is the awareness of inanimate matter (which is what makes us able to script and control it in the first place). We exist on that level too - we are matter also, but the particular matter that we are has a different history which gives it the capacity to send and receive on a much broader spectrum of sense than just the inorganic spectrum. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/zevWLAq0pYgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona What I say about what I see is a separate problem. How I interpret what I see is peculiar to me, is indeterminate to you. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 12:02:39 Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I must believe so. It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very sophisticated ways. I agree with you that robots are zombies, but some day, like in the novels of Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand you for saying so. ;) Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep statements of faith: Are you a person? a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don't exist?. A The conclusions are very very different depending of which of these possible alternatives we choose. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory. It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy. Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc). 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I must believe so. It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very sophisticated ways. I agree with you that robots are zombies, but some day, like in the novels of Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand you for saying so. ;) Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep statements of faith: Are you a person? a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don´t exist?. A The conclusions are very very different depending of which of these possible alternatives we choose. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when > hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive > perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. > > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This > is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and > game theory. > > It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is > impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is >> simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it >> is experience. >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >>Craig: >> >> I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality >> exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical >> laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. >> I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy >> of the naturalistic fallacy. >> >> Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich >> it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an >> exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be >> considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore >> unexistent, if there were no moral beings. >> >> 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg >> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. >>> >>> >>> What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream >>> whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be >>> intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think >>> you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about >>> consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking >>> consciousness only. >>> >>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. >>> >>> In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider >>> themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. >>> They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on >>> the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more >>> awkward position than the other, etc). >>> >>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King > On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > I agree. > Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: > Cs = subject + object > The subject is always first person indeterminate. > Being indeterminate, it is not computable. > QED > > Hi Roger, > > It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not > restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) > while the object is possibly singular. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd ha
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona What functionality ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:41:42 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary sorry: What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY POSSIBL to create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Alberto G. Corona That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay,
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona If I can perceive, I simply know that I can. The problem only enters when I tell you what I perceived. There faith matters, you can trust my word or not. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:40:43 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive".. >From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. For example, consider: "I see the cat."Here: I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective states and all experiences. However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a publicly accessible statement. All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective. Any statement is then objective. Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. Hi Albert, Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be." in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you. That's why this uniqueness is not essential But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this! This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exi
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry, kill and eat"), can still perceive perfectly well enough, or else he would starve. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game theory. It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy. Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only. This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen. In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than the other, etc). 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Hi Roger, It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of ari
Re: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona Seeming to be aware is not the same as actually being aware, just as seeming to be alive is not the same as actually being alive. And my view is that comp, since it must operate in (objective) code, can only create entities that might seem to be alive, not actually be alive. Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, which seem to be alive but are not actually so. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59 Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it's functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona Awareness = I see X. or I am X. or some similar statement. There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above c
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Before you can have a computer, you need some kind of i/o. I think this is what comp ignores. It is my hypotheses that 'input' is afferent phenomenology and 'output' is efferent participation in all cases, however i/o does not automatically carry the full spectrum of possible phenomenological qualities. That was the point of my saying "These words do not 'refer' to themselves", because they are only words to us. The other layers of sense which are involved do not speak English - they speak tcp/ip, or machine language, or voltage flux, but there are no words there other than the ones which we infer through our fully human, English speaking range of sensitivity. Craig On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:16:09 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > Awareness = I see X. > or I am X. > or some similar statement. > > There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Roger, > I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a > inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the > consequences of this inner computation. > > 锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say > that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between > mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way > when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> 锟斤拷 >> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >> way to hook it to my brain. >> 锟斤拷 >> 锟斤拷 >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> Hi: >> >> Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >> 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do >> things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time >> status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called >> "interpreters". >> >> 锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation >> that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said >> that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We >> humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. >> The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a >> metacomputation. >> >> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >> We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not >> exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be >> fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can >> not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical >> facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness >> of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. >> >> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman >> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. >> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of >> diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That >> same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a >> constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem). >> >> >> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >> will nor in any other existential question. >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> 锟斤拷 >>> I agree. >>> 锟斤拷 >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> 锟斤拷 >>> Cs = subject + object >>> 锟斤拷 >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable. >>> 锟斤拷 >>> QED >>> 锟斤拷 >>> 锟斤拷 >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it´s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > Awareness = I see X. > or I am X. > or some similar statement. > > There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > - Receiving the following content - > *From:* Alberto G. Corona > *Receiver:* everything-list > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Roger, > I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a > inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the > consequences of this inner computation. > > like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that > this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and > matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in > the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >> way to hook it to my brain. >>Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> Hi: >> >> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things >> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This >> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". >> >> The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that >> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the >> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage >> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the >> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. >> >> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed >> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to >> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware >> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the >> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means >> of an adquired metacomputation. >> >> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman >> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. >> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of >> diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same >> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive >> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). >> >> >> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >> will nor in any other existential question. >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough >> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> I agree. >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> Cs = subject + object >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> QED >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >>> s l u ,u s >>> >>> >>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>> >>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>> >>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>> >>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indete
Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi Alberto G. Corona Awareness = I see X. or I am X. or some similar statement. There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation. like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Alberto G. Corona What sort of an output would the computer give me ? It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no way to hook it to my brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: Cs = subject + object The subject is always first person indeterminate. Being indeterminate, it is not computable. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/29/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary This sentence does not speak English. These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. s l u ,u s If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative. The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have i
