Hi Alberto G. Corona
What I say about what I see is a separate problem.
How I interpret what I see is peculiar to me, is indeterminate to you.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 12:02:39
Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
You said that you perceive. Now you mean that you reflect on yourself. And I
must believe so.
It is theoretically possible to do a robot that do so as well in very
sophisticated ways.
I agree with you that robots are zombies, but some day, like in the novels of
Stanislav Lem, they may adquire political rights and perhaps they could demand
you for saying so. ;)
Note that all the time, like in any normal conversation we are obviating deep
statements of faith:
Are you a person? a robot? an Lutheran robot? . An atheist robot that is
trying to persuade us that intelligent robots don't exist?. A....
The conclusions are very very different depending of which of these possible
alternatives we choose.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
A grizzly bear, which seemingly has no moral code (other than "when hungry,
kill and eat"), can still perceive
perfectly well enough, or else he would starve.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:26:29
Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
It appears that subjectivity, has everithing to do with morality. This is not
only evident for any religious person, but also for mathematics and game
theory.
It appears that without moral individuality, social collaboration is
impossible, except for clones. I exposed the reasoning here.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the
private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Craig:
I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no
matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an
extended account of this somewhere else in this list.
I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of
the naturalistic fallacy.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it
appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of
morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality
effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no
moral beings.
2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory
because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it
needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole
ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent
and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making
some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should
not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of
ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to
other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come
to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this
probably will never happen.
In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves
both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the
same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is
not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than
the other, etc).
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to
being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is
possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that
form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can
and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of
meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno
includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents,
Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the
completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others)
are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed
it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the
sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't
have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I
do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a
dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic
logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It
is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of
programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question
of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed
at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion
of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread.
Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an
acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from
quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of
sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared
sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be
construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to
encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either
physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct
participation?
Craig
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Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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