I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that  it´s functionality is
computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of
awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>
> Awareness = I see X.
>  or I am X.
> or some similar statement.
>
> There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/29/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
> *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>
>  Roger,
> I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a
> inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the
> consequences of this inner computation.
>
>  like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that
> this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and
> matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in
> the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness
>
> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>
>>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>>  What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
>> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
>> way to hook it to my brain.
>>    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/29/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>>  ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
>> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>>
>>   Hi:
>>
>> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially)
>> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things
>> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This
>> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
>>
>>  The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that
>> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the
>> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage
>> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the
>> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
>>
>> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our
>> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs.
>> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed
>> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to
>> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware
>> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the
>> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means
>> of an adquired metacomputation.
>>
>> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman
>> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition.
>> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of
>> diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same
>> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive
>> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
>>
>>
>> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free
>> will nor in any other existential question.
>>
>> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>>
>>>  Hi Craig Weinberg
>>>  I agree.
>>>  Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>>  Cs = subject + object
>>>  The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>>>  QED
>>>   Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>> 8/29/2012
>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>>> everything could function."
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>>
>>>   This sentence does not speak English.
>>>
>>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>>>
>>> s l u ,u s
>>>
>>>
>>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
>>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
>>>
>>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
>>> ascertaining the origin of awareness.
>>>
>>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
>>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation
>>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular
>>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>>
>>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of
>>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non
>>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only
>>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is
>>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion,
>>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic
>>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself
>>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough
>>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is
>>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end
>>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
>>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic
>>> logic.
>>>
>>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
>>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or
>>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary
>>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place
>>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>>
>>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
>>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative
>>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another
>>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure
>>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
>>> follow from quanta.
>>>
>>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method
>>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining
>>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would
>>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between
>>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial
>>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
>>> entropy of the totality.
>>>
>>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from
>>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences,
>>> for direct participation?
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
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