I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it´s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > Awareness = I see X. > or I am X. > or some similar statement. > > There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 > *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Roger, > I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a > inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the > consequences of this inner computation. > > like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that > this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and > matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in > the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > >> Hi Alberto G. Corona >> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >> way to hook it to my brain. >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]> >> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> Hi: >> >> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things >> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This >> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". >> >> The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that >> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the >> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage >> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the >> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. >> >> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed >> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to >> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware >> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the >> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means >> of an adquired metacomputation. >> >> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman >> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. >> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of >> diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same >> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive >> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). >> >> >> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >> will nor in any other existential question. >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> >> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> I agree. >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> Cs = subject + object >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> QED >>> Roger Clough, [email protected] >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >>> s l u ,u s >>> >>> >>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>> >>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>> >>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>> >>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non >>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only >>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is >>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, >>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic >>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself >>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough >>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is >>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end >>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume >>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic >>> logic. >>> >>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of >>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or >>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary >>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place >>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all. >>> >>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to >>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative >>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another >>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure >>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not >>> follow from quanta. >>> >>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method >>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining >>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would >>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between >>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial >>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the >>> entropy of the totality. >>> >>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from >>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, >>> for direct participation? >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/OP7M4cmbaCIJ. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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