On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:45:16 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > > Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, > which seem to be alive but are not actually so. > > Exactly. I don't call them zombies though, because zombie implies a negative affirmation of life. They are puppets. They have no pretensions to being alive, that is our conceit - a Pinocchio fallacy. When we act on the assumptions of that fallacy, we have been warned about the two possibilities:
Frankenstein or HAL (Golem or demon). Frankenstein is the embodiment of physicalism or material functionalism, the functional inversion of body as re-animated corpse. HAL is the embodiment of computationalism or digital functionalism, the functional inversion of mind as disembodied self. Both are the result of our confusion in trying to internalize externalized appearances. We wind up with the false images - an outsiders view of interiority. It's a category error. Cart before the horse. I agree with Brent as far as an empirical approach to consciousness (robots building models from environmental test results) is superior to a rational approach (front loading logical models to be adapted to fit real environments) but both ultimately fail to locate awareness of any kind. There is awareness in a robot or computer, but it is the awareness of inanimate matter (which is what makes us able to script and control it in the first place). We exist on that level too - we are matter also, but the particular matter that we are has a different history which gives it the capacity to send and receive on a much broader spectrum of sense than just the inorganic spectrum. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/zevWLAq0pYgJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
