Before you can have a computer, you need some kind of i/o. I think this is 
what comp ignores. It is my hypotheses that 'input' is afferent 
phenomenology and 'output' is efferent participation in all cases, however 
i/o does not automatically carry the full spectrum of possible 
phenomenological qualities.

That was the point of my saying "These words do not 'refer' to themselves", 
because they are only words to us. The other layers of sense which are 
involved do not speak English - they speak tcp/ip, or machine language, or 
voltage flux, but there are no words there other than the ones which we 
infer through our fully human, English speaking range of sensitivity.

Craig

On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 11:16:09 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Alberto G. Corona 
>  
> Awareness = I see X.
>  or I am X. 
> or some similar statement.
>  
> There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:>
> 8/29/2012 
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
> *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>
>  Roger, 
> I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a 
> inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the 
> consequences of this inner computation.
>
> 锟斤拷锟斤拷like in the case of any relation of brain and mind,锟斤拷I do not say 
> that this IS 锟斤拷the experience of awareness, but given the duality between 
> mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way 
> when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness
>
> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>> 
>
>>  Hi Alberto G. Corona 
>> 锟斤拷
>> What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
>> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
>> way to hook it to my brain.
>>  锟斤拷
>> 锟斤拷
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>
>> 8/29/2012 
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
>> everything could function."
>>
>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <javascript:> 
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
>> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>>
>>   Hi:
>>
>> Awareness can 锟斤拷be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 
>> 锟斤拷computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do 
>> things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time 
>> status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called 
>> "interpreters". 
>>
>>  锟斤拷The lack of 锟斤拷understanding, of this capability of metacomputation 
>> that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why 锟斤拷it is said 
>> that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. 锟斤拷We 
>> humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. 
>> The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a 
>> metacomputation. 
>>
>> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our 
>> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. 
>> We can not know 锟斤拷our deep thinking structures because they are not 
>> exposed as metacomputations. When we use锟斤拷metaphorically锟斤拷the verb "to be 
>> fired" 锟斤拷to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can 
>> not be aware of it. 锟斤拷Only after research that assimilate mathematical 
>> facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness 
>> of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
>>
>> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman 
>> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. 
>> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process 锟斤拷of 
>> diagonalization by G锟斤拷del 锟斤拷makes the Hilbert program impossible, That 
>> same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a 
>> constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G锟斤拷del theorem). 
>>
>>
>> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free 
>> will nor in any other existential question.
>>
>> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
>>
>>>  Hi Craig Weinberg 
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> I agree.
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> Cs = subject + object
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>>> Being indeterminate,锟斤拷it is not computable.
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> QED
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> 锟斤拷
>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:>
>>> 8/29/2012 
>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
>>> everything could function."
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> 
>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>>
>>>   This sentence does not speak English.
>>>
>>> These words do not 锟斤拷refer锟斤拷 to themselves.
>>>
>>> s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷l u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷,u锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 锟斤拷s锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷
>>>  
>>>
>>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help 
>>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
>>>
>>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as 
>>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. 
>>>
>>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless 
>>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation 
>>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular 
>>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>>
>>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of 
>>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non 
>>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only 
>>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is 
>>> that G锟斤拷del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, 
>>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic 
>>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself 
>>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough 
>>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is 
>>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end 
>>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume 
>>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic 
>>> logic.
>>>  
>>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of 
>>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or 
>>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary 
>>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place 
>>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>>
>>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to 
>>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative 
>>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another 
>>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure 
>>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not 
>>> follow from quanta.
>>>
>>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method 
>>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining 
>>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would 
>>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between 
>>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial 
>>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the 
>>> entropy of the totality.
>>>
>>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from 
>>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, 
>>> for direct participation?
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
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