Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, but those numbers are not extended in space, so they have no physical size. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/31/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-31, 08:20:44 Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On 31 Dec 2012, at 14:05, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal and Brian, > > "Bigness" can only limit physical entities (those extended in space), > but is irrelevant with regard to nonphysical or mental entities, > as these are not extended in space. ? Is is not natural to say that 10^100 is bigger than 0? And 2^Aleph_0 bigger than Aleph_0? Bruno > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/31/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > - Receiving the following content - > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-30, 08:57:29 > Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses > > > > > On 29 Dec 2012, at 20:51, Brian Tenneson wrote: > > > > > > > > Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere > tried that without to much success, except rediscovering > Grothendieck topoi). > > > I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all > mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all > categories will do. > > > > Except that it is too big, and eventually lawvere extract the topi > from this, which model well, not the mathematical reality, but the > mathematician itself. > > > Also, we have already discuss this, but the embedding notion does > not seem the right think to study, compared to emulation, at least > with the comp hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > But if you assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough, and it is > better to keep the infinities and categories into the universal > machine's mind tools. > > > Enough for what, in what sense? > > > > Enough for a basic ontology (and notion of existence) to explain all > the different sort of existence, notably of persons, consciousness, > matter appearances, etc. See my papers, as I pretend that with comp > we have no choice in those matter, except for pedagogical variants > and practice. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical > structures can be embedded would give us an object that, in a sense, > contains all structures. If one follows Tegmark's idea that ME=PE, > then a definition for universe just might be a mathematical object > (which by ME=PE is a physical object) that contains, in a sense, all > mathematical objects (i.e., all physical objects). > > > I think that this is deeply flawed. We cannot identify the physical > and the mathematical. We might try theory on the physical, or on the > mental, or on the mathematical, which might suggest relation between > those thing, but I doubt any non trivial theory would identify them, > unless enlarging the sense of the words like mental, physical. > > > > Isn't it simpler to assume there is only one type of existence? > > > It seems to me part of the data that this is not the case. My pain > in a leg has a type of existence different from a quark. The game of > bridge as a different type of existence than the moon material > constitution. > Then for machine, once we distinguish their different points of view > (intuoitively like in UDA) or formally like in AUDA, we get many > different sort of existence. > The ontic one is the simpler ExP(x), but we have also []ExP(x), > []Ex[]P(x), []<>P(x), []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. All this in 8 different > modal logics extracted from self-reference. > > > > > > > What are the actual flaws of a mathematical universe? > > > Too big. It is a metaphor. > > > > > > > A physical system can be mathematically encoded by its corresponding > set of world lines. This encoding is an isomorphism. A very simple > example of what I mean is the nearly parabolic path taken by a > projectile. The set of world lines would be some subset of R^4 or > R^n if it turns out that n != 4. I am aware that indeterminacy due > to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle kicks in here so we may never > "know" which subset of R^n a physical system is isomorphic to but by > a pigeonhole principle, the physical system must be isomorphic to > some subset of R^n, several in fact. > > > > May be. But I am driven by the mind-body problem, and what you show > above is mathematical physics. With comp, by UDA, we have to extract > the belief in such physical idea by ultimately explaining them in > term probabilities on computations (that the result I invite you to > study and criticize). > > > > > > > > > > With computationalism, the coupling consciousness/physical is a > phenomenon, person perceptible through numbers relations when they > (the persons) bet on their relative self-consistenc
Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Bruno Marchal and Brian, "Bigness" can only limit physical entities (those extended in space), but is irrelevant with regard to nonphysical or mental entities, as these are not extended in space. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/31/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-30, 08:57:29 Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On 29 Dec 2012, at 20:51, Brian Tenneson wrote: Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere tried that without to much success, except rediscovering Grothendieck topoi). I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all categories will do. Except that it is too big, and eventually lawvere extract the topi from this, which model well, not the mathematical reality, but the mathematician itself. Also, we have already discuss this, but the embedding notion does not seem the right think to study, compared to emulation, at least with the comp hypothesis. But if you assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough, and it is better to keep the infinities and categories into the universal machine's mind tools. Enough for what, in what sense? Enough for a basic ontology (and notion of existence) to explain all the different sort of existence, notably of persons, consciousness, matter appearances, etc. See my papers, as I pretend that with comp we have no choice in those matter, except for pedagogical variants and practice. To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical structures can be embedded would give us an object that, in a sense, contains all structures. If one follows Tegmark's idea that ME=PE, then a definition for universe just might be a mathematical object (which by ME=PE is a physical object) that contains, in a sense, all mathematical objects (i.e., all physical objects). I think that this is deeply flawed. We cannot identify the physical and the mathematical. We might try theory on the physical, or on the mental, or on the mathematical, which might suggest relation between those thing, but I doubt any non trivial theory would identify them, unless enlarging the sense of the words like mental, physical. Isn't it simpler to assume there is only one type of existence? It seems to me part of the data that this is not the case. My pain in a leg has a type of existence different from a quark. The game of bridge as a different type of existence than the moon material constitution. Then for machine, once we distinguish their different points of view (intuoitively like in UDA) or formally like in AUDA, we get many different sort of existence. The ontic one is the simpler ExP(x), but we have also []ExP(x), []Ex[]P(x), []<>P(x), []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. All this in 8 different modal logics extracted from self-reference. What are the actual flaws of a mathematical universe? Too big. It is a metaphor. A physical system can be mathematically encoded by its corresponding set of world lines. This encoding is an isomorphism. A very simple example of what I mean is the nearly parabolic path taken by a projectile. The set of world lines would be some subset of R^4 or R^n if it turns out that n != 4. I am aware that indeterminacy due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle kicks in here so we may never "know" which subset of R^n a physical system is isomorphic to but by a pigeonhole principle, the physical system must be isomorphic to some subset of R^n, several in fact. May be. But I am driven by the mind-body problem, and what you show above is mathematical physics. With comp, by UDA, we have to extract the belief in such physical idea by ultimately explaining them in term probabilities on computations (that the result I invite you to study and criticize). With computationalism, the coupling consciousness/physical is a phenomenon, person perceptible through numbers relations when they (the persons) bet on their relative self-consistency. This explains the appearance of the physical, without going out of the arithmetical. It works thanks to Church thesis and the closure of the comp everything (UD*, sigma_1 completeness). How are you defining consciousness here? I can't define it. I just hope you know what I mean. Basically something true but non provable about yourself, and, by comp, invariant for some local digital substitution. It's not super clear to me that the cocompletion of the category of all structures C exists though since C is not a small category and thus Yoneda's lemma doesn't apply. I would have to fine-tune the argument to work in the case of the category C I have in mind. The n-categories might be interesting, but we
Re: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Roger, On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 9:46 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy > > Pragmatism is does not provide truth in, say a Platonic or Aristotelian > sense. > It only provides truth as pragmatists define truth: namely that if A > causes B, > B is the truth of A. This is the same as scientific truth or experimental > truth. > > > I don't think that pragmatists like Dewey, which is how I'd frame "pragmatism" semantically, would agree with that. Whenever the word pops up, I raise an eyebrow: "Let's be pragmatic here..." used for argument's sake, I do not take to be a valid move, unless the party making the statement specifies some context they are referring to + some degree of congruence with the same. Without that, I find it usually nonsense, referring to some unspecified universe that is inflated to "absolute reality which necessitates x". And everybody knows cui bono with x. And if Christian rhetoric makes such a pragmatic move, say republicans for denying healthcare to poor, my question is naturally: "Your universe is based on that book, that you guys use to ceremonially inaugurate presidents, instantiate judicial laws, make statements in courts etc. Why is your policy in direct contradiction with Jesus teachings, á la love thy neighbor, help the poor and so on?" I have yet to hear a convincing answer to that one. But I'm patient (unless I sense they're ripping me off) with such things. Platonistically pragmatic Guitar Cowboy > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/26/2012 > "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan > Frome", by Edith Wharton > - Receiving the following content - > From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-26, 12:53:21 > Subject: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses > > > > > On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 4:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true > necessarily physically true ? > This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic > truth > the same ?" ?MHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. > > > > > Dear Roger, > > What's wrong with: > > Theory always works (in some mind, no matter truth) and pragmatism can be > used to justify or conceal discrimination, violence, false problems and > examples like US style conservative rhetoric that pretends to be Christian, > with its elements of compassion, love thy neighbor, share your wealth, > anti-materialism etc. but in fact is pushing for policies that deny health > to weak/poor, consolidate power and horde wealth, and promote the myth of > people as isolated Islands, defending only their own interests, implying > some Citizen Kane ideal, that everybody should aspire to? > > It's a rather transparent trick for this rhetoric to mask its > anti-Christian individualism with the Christian cloak of truth, faith, > piety, charity, and probity; while "pragmatically" reasoning to themselves > that it's advantageous to pose with the moral authority of ruling Christian > dogma + liberty of individual, freedom from tyrannical forces. For this > reason, this form of "Christian-conservative rhetoric" is not an expression > of liberty; it's more an instrument of control to stop people from entering > political process via distraction and shared moral indignation at "what's > wrong". > > I do not buy anymore "left vs. right" as ecology and energy problems make > resource management much more complex and freedom/monitoring of internet > activity enters the picture to which both Adam Smith and Marx/Engels were > mute... but I do know that, if anything, Jesus was a socialist or communist. > > Hence, the above mentioned nonsense of rhetoric framing conservative > Christians as guardians of faith, piety, probity, and charity, while they > horde their wealth and complain about higher taxes is merely noise to me. > People parrots. Single function machine. Of course it "works", as you say, > as anything does when you allow this kind of blatant contradiction. But it > still is bs. > > Ironically, the "atheist left" fights for Christian (New Testament) > ideals... damn heathens! So the heathens will be judged, for doing Jesus' > work without believing in him; and the "right" will be judged for > pretending to believe in him, but for pragmatism sake they do devil's job ? > la "I am God, my wealth, myself and I won't share or show solidarity with > people in need, because it's their fault in
Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Bruno Marchal By that I meant that what is theoretically true does not mean that it will happen as theorized. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan Frome", by Edith Wharton - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 14:06:43 Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On 26 Dec 2012, at 16:17, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true > necessarily physically true ? I cannot even understand what that could mean. I don't think that any mathematical truth is ever physically true. It is a category error (a point where I agree with Bill) I don't think there is a general notion of "mathematical truth", nor do I think there is a primitive notion of "physical truth". Assuming comp, we do have, by a sort of miracle, a rather clear notion of truth: arithmetical truth. It is quasi definable, and everybody seems to agree on the elementary base (except sunday philosophers). Assuming comp, and assuming there is no logical flaw in UDA, we can bet on truth = arithmetical truth, and then derive, in the UDA way, and using the canonical self-reference logic, the witnessing of the existence of a rich psychology, and theology, including physics and cosmogonies. But physics is described as the theory predicting result of observation, and observation is described by the interaction of a universal machine relatively to its most probable universal neighborhood. Given that the basic reality is arithmetic, it is not astonishing that the physical has mathematical aspect. It is even normal, here, that the psychological and theological hide their mathematical aspect, as they are not completely available to us from our perspective. > This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and > pragmatic truth > the same ?" The truth that your government tries to hide to you: 1 + 1 = 2. The pragmatic truth: 1 + 1 = 2 + taxes. > IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. Which reminds me what Charles said on the FOR, or FOAR, list: In theory, practice and theory fit well. In practice, they don't. The problem is that, in practice, we have only theories, and when you say 'what works works,' you are just betting on your oldest theories which have never been disconfirmed by experience (like the ground can support me). (Of course, "you" are (1p) betting from your ultimate ineffable undoubtable (but hidden from the public) conscious lever). So we can only propose, publicly, but even to ourselves on any matter, theories, and we can only live the "pragmatic", which is itself the result of billions years, if not much longer complex universal machine histories in arithmetic. And we can only measure the imbalance between what we live and what we theorize (even theorizing on what we have theorized unconsciously in some possible past). Keep in mind this theory protects the person from any reductionism, and is eventually far closer to Plato, Plotinus, and perhaps Descartes and Leibniz than to Aristotle, Metaphysical Naturalism, Physicalism, Weak Materialism, which is unfortunately often presented as the rationalist position. Today, we have theories and facts which makes Plato more rational than Aristotle, imo, for the big picture. And then the Church Turing thesis, or Emil Post law, rehabilitates the more Pythagorean form of (Neo)Platonism. If you don't like Number, you can use Word instead. The primitive ontology needs only to be Turing complete, equivalently, capable of proving all true sigma_1 sentences, as I am sure you and everybody can. That will already contains the computation involving more rich observers, not only sigma_1 complete, but L?ian, which means that they can know that they are Turing universal, and that they can get the "frightening" consequences (no prevention against crashing, looping, dreaming, hallucinating, etc. DBf, in G*. The physical becomes the border of the number's observability (= bettable prediction for measurement) ability. Arithmetic is an Indra net of universal entities not only reflecting each others, but interacting in all possible ways. Universal numbers can put masks and stop recognizing themselves, getting sleepy for awhile. This often makes shit happens more than usually and this can grow up to awaken them, momentarily, sometimes only relatively, etc. Bruno > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/26/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 > Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses > > > > > On 25 Dec 2012, at 15:34, Roger Clough wrote: > > > Hi Brian Tenneson > > Tegmark has many many good id
Re: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy Pragmatism is does not provide truth in, say a Platonic or Aristotelian sense. It only provides truth as pragmatists define truth: namely that if A causes B, B is the truth of A. This is the same as scientific truth or experimental truth. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan Frome", by Edith Wharton - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 12:53:21 Subject: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 4:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true necessarily physically true ? This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic truth the same ?" ?MHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. Dear Roger, What's wrong with: Theory always works (in some mind, no matter truth) and pragmatism can be used to justify or conceal discrimination, violence, false problems and examples like US style conservative rhetoric that pretends to be Christian, with its elements of compassion, love thy neighbor, share your wealth, anti-materialism etc. but in fact is pushing for policies that deny health to weak/poor, consolidate power and horde wealth, and promote the myth of people as isolated Islands, defending only their own interests, implying some Citizen Kane ideal, that everybody should aspire to? It's a rather transparent trick for this rhetoric to mask its anti-Christian individualism with the Christian cloak of truth, faith, piety, charity, and probity; while "pragmatically" reasoning to themselves that it's advantageous to pose with the moral authority of ruling Christian dogma + liberty of individual, freedom from tyrannical forces. For this reason, this form of "Christian-conservative rhetoric" is not an expression of liberty; it's more an instrument of control to stop people from entering political process via distraction and shared moral indignation at "what's wrong". I do not buy anymore "left vs. right" as ecology and energy problems make resource management much more complex and freedom/monitoring of internet activity enters the picture to which both Adam Smith and Marx/Engels were mute... but I do know that, if anything, Jesus was a socialist or communist. Hence, the above mentioned nonsense of rhetoric framing conservative Christians as guardians of faith, piety, probity, and charity, while they horde their wealth and complain about higher taxes is merely noise to me. People parrots. Single function machine. Of course it "works", as you say, as anything does when you allow this kind of blatant contradiction. But it still is bs. Ironically, the "atheist left" fights for Christian (New Testament) ideals... damn heathens! So the heathens will be judged, for doing Jesus' work without believing in him; and the "right" will be judged for pretending to believe in him, but for pragmatism sake they do devil's job ? la "I am God, my wealth, myself and I won't share or show solidarity with people in need, because it's their fault in my final judgement of them, even though only God can judge, for practical reason because I cannot see him, I will judge them when I vote." This disparity, the blatant fundamental contradiction in both camps, is quite hilarious I must admit, even though it's stupid how many have to suffer because of policy decisions based on this charade, and how much cash is wasted in keeping these narratives alive. Pragmatism has a coarser bs filter than arithmetic truth, anywhere in the multiverse I'd guess. PGC ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to e
Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 4:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true > necessarily physically true ? > This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic > truth > the same ?" IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. > > > Dear Roger, What's wrong with: Theory always works (in some mind, no matter truth) and pragmatism can be used to justify or conceal discrimination, violence, false problems and examples like US style conservative rhetoric that pretends to be Christian, with its elements of compassion, love thy neighbor, share your wealth, anti-materialism etc. but in fact is pushing for policies that deny health to weak/poor, consolidate power and horde wealth, and promote the myth of people as isolated Islands, defending only their own interests, implying some Citizen Kane ideal, that everybody should aspire to? It's a rather transparent trick for this rhetoric to mask its anti-Christian individualism with the Christian cloak of truth, faith, piety, charity, and probity; while "pragmatically" reasoning to themselves that it's advantageous to pose with the moral authority of ruling Christian dogma + liberty of individual, freedom from tyrannical forces. For this reason, this form of "Christian-conservative rhetoric" is not an expression of liberty; it's more an instrument of control to stop people from entering political process via distraction and shared moral indignation at "what's wrong". I do not buy anymore "left vs. right" as ecology and energy problems make resource management much more complex and freedom/monitoring of internet activity enters the picture to which both Adam Smith and Marx/Engels were mute... but I do know that, if anything, Jesus was a socialist or communist. Hence, the above mentioned nonsense of rhetoric framing conservative Christians as guardians of faith, piety, probity, and charity, while they horde their wealth and complain about higher taxes is merely noise to me. People parrots. Single function machine. Of course it "works", as you say, as anything does when you allow this kind of blatant contradiction. But it still is bs. Ironically, the "atheist left" fights for Christian (New Testament) ideals... damn heathens! So the heathens will be judged, for doing Jesus' work without believing in him; and the "right" will be judged for pretending to believe in him, but for pragmatism sake they do devil's job á la "I am God, my wealth, myself and I won't share or show solidarity with people in need, because it's their fault in my final judgement of them, even though only God can judge, for practical reason because I cannot see him, I will judge them when I vote." This disparity, the blatant fundamental contradiction in both camps, is quite hilarious I must admit, even though it's stupid how many have to suffer because of policy decisions based on this charade, and how much cash is wasted in keeping these narratives alive. Pragmatism has a coarser bs filter than arithmetic truth, anywhere in the multiverse I'd guess. PGC > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/26/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 > Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
Hi Bruno Marchal It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true necessarily physically true ? This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic truth the same ?" IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On 25 Dec 2012, at 15:34, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Brian Tenneson Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in multiverses, which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe. Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head: 1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless complication, and the universe (or its Creator) does not do needless things, because IMHO the universe is purposeful. I disagree. The multiverse is just the literal reading of the SWE. To get 1 universe from the SWE you need to add a complication in the form of a collapse or a reduction principle. Occam asks us to chose the simpler theory, not the simpler ontology. Note that with comp we get both. The theory is the laws of + and *, and the ontology is the standard model of arithmetic: (N, +, *). But then in the 1p plural and singular we get the many dreams from which multiverses or quasi-multiverses emerge. 2) "Purposeful" meaning that Aristotle's end causes are needed for a final collapse, as they are for life, which is not mechanistic. 3) As in life/mind/consciousness/intelligence, which are also purposeful. 4) In order for there to be multiple universes, there would have to be multiple platonic Ones. But there can only be one One. Not really. The ONE is "known" to let the multiple emanates from "him/her/it". The one remains one, but from inside and/or machine's epistemology you get the many internal views. 5) Multiverses are mechanistic and so in spacetime, but consciouss life and all that other good stuff are outside of spacetime. Would the minds of multiverses be mashed together ? And all particular lifes would have to terminate at the same time. 6) There is no non-Boltzmann physics which is required for a final collapse. Time has to begin to travel backwards as things reorganize, in which case the final collapse should be a reflection of the initial creation. That would be cool. 7) But each universes being differemnt, they would not be expected to all terminate at the same time. 8) One might conjecture also that the presence of life, consciousness and intelligence (which are all individual, personal, subjective) are not mechanical and so cannot be part of a multiverse. It's each man for himself. Along these lines, because of natural selection and different worlds not being all the same, evolution would not occur in parallel. 9) Besides, there are alternate possibilities for a quantum wave collapse. I have not yet find one, and besides, this would contradict the comp hypothesis. 10) In a related matter, one of the multiverse sites cited William James as a proponent. Because of his pragmatism, his multiverses arise because there is no fixed general in pragmatism for each particular. There are as many generals (additional universes) as you can think of. These obviously would not be parallel. Parallel worlds are not really parallel. It is only a manner of speaking. The "real" structure is still unknown and is plausibly rather complex. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/25/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Brian Tenneson Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-24, 13:11:46 Subject: Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all ? What do you think of Tegmark's version of a mathematical Platoia? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/6WzRUmWbHY0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You rec
Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
ROGER: Hi Brian Tenneson BRIAN: At least in the video (skip to 43:14), Tegmark estimates that our doppelgangers are 2^10^118 meters away which probably puts it past the range of direct testing and, consequently, makes it not falsifiable. ROGER: Things not falsifiable need not be true. And things that are true need not be falsifiable if they are not always true (such as Popper is alive-- I think he died). His criteria do not hold water. BRIAN: Regarding (4), I think the disparity between you and Tegmark can be explained by having different definitions of universe and multiverse. Of course, if you have a metauniverse, then you'd have a metametauniverse, ad infinitum. There is only one "totality of all that exists" and I bet that if you were to explain what you mean by the One to him, he would agree that there is only one One. When he uses an aphorism like "multiverse" he may as well be saying "poly mega galaxy cluster" or some such. In other words I don't think Tegmark believes in multiple Ones. In his mathematical universe paper and ultimate ensemble paper, he posits that there is only one type of existence which would simplify things (a la Occam's razor). Instead of there being mathematical and physical existence, there is an identification between the two so they are seen to be one in the same. This merges the spaces "mathematical objects" with "physical objects". He argues this in those papers (though to me sometimes it seems to be merely a plausibility argument). ROGER: Tegmark is wrong there. According to Descartes, there are TWO types of existence, physical and mental. He defined physical existence as whatever is present in spacetime (that has extension in space). Mental existence has no extension in space. The One and indeed mathematics itself are not extended in space, and so are not physical. They exist in a completely different way (as Mind). They have no physical borders or location so that one cannot be sure if one has the physical "Totality". The rest that you discuss below then has meaning only to a materialist. Materialists don't follow Descartes so that IMHO their philosophy is bad science, it is a cult. BRIAN: Now if ME=PE, then one natural question is which mathematical structure is "the totality of all that exists" isomorphic to? In other words, what is the One? What is the universe? Or to abuse language a bit, what is the multiverse? This is a question that I've been thinking about for a while now and I'm really not sure. The current idea is to take the category of all mathematical structures C (which is large, unfortunately), and embed that into a category of functors defined on that category (a la Yoneda's lemma), in such a way that every mathematical structure is embedded within that category of functors (called a "cocompletion" of C), a sort of "presheaf" category. To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical structures can be embedded would give us an object that, in a sense, contains all structures. If one follows Tegmark's idea that ME=PE, then a definition for universe just might be a mathematical object (which by ME=PE is a physical object) that contains, in a sense, all mathematical objects (i.e., all physical objects). It's not super clear to me that the cocompletion of the category of all structures C exists though since C is not a small category and thus Yoneda's lemma doesn't apply. I would have to fine-tune the argument to work in the case of the category C I have in mind. If the cocompletion of C is the One, that which all mathematical structures can be embedded, then the parallel universe question would be a matter of logic and category theory; it would depend on how you defined "the visible universe" and "parallel" universe. On Tuesday, December 25, 2012 6:34:45 AM UTC-8, rclough wrote: Hi Brian Tenneson Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in multiverses, which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe. Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head: 1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless complication, and the universe (or its Creator) does not do needless things, because IMHO the universe is purposeful. 2) "Purposeful" meaning that Aristotle's end causes are needed for a final collapse, as they are for life, which is not mechanistic. 3) As in life/mind/consciousness/intelligence, which are also purposeful. 4) In order for there to be multiple universes, there would have to be multiple platonic Ones. But there can only be one One. 5) Multiverses are mechanistic and so in spacetime, but consciouss life and all that other good stuff are outside of spacetime. Would the minds of multiverses be mashed together ? And all particular lifes would have to terminate at the same time. 6) There is no non-Boltzmann physics which is required for a final collapse. Time has to begin to travel backwards as things reo
