Hi Bruno Marchal  

It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true necessarily 
physically true ? 
This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic truth 
the same ?"  IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works.   


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/26/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 
Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses 




On 25 Dec 2012, at 15:34, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi Brian Tenneson  

Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in multiverses, 
which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe.   

Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head: 

1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless complication, 
and the universe (or its Creator) does not do needless things, 
because IMHO the universe is purposeful.  


I disagree. The multiverse is just the literal reading of the SWE. To get 1 
universe from the SWE you need to add a complication in the form of a collapse 
or a reduction principle. Occam asks us to chose the simpler theory, not the 
simpler ontology. 
Note that with comp we get both. The theory is the laws of + and *, and the 
ontology is the standard model of arithmetic: (N, +, *).  
But then in the 1p plural and singular we get the many dreams from which 
multiverses or quasi-multiverses emerge. 











2) "Purposeful" meaning that Aristotle's end causes are needed for a  
final collapse, as they are for life, which is not mechanistic.  

3) As in life/mind/consciousness/intelligence, which  are also purposeful.  

4) In order for there to be multiple universes, there would 
have to be multiple platonic Ones. But there can only be one One. 




Not really. The ONE is "known" to let the multiple emanates from "him/her/it".  
The one remains one, but from inside and/or machine's epistemology you get the 
many internal views. 







5) Multiverses are mechanistic and so in spacetime, but consciouss life  
and all that other good stuff are outside of spacetime.  Would the  
minds of multiverses be mashed together ?  And all particular lifes  
would have to terminate at the same time. 

6) There is no non-Boltzmann physics which is required for a final collapse. 
Time has to begin to travel backwards as things reorganize, 
in which case the final collapse should be a reflection of the initial 
creation.  
That would be cool. 

7) But each universes being differemnt, they would not be expected to 
all terminate at the same time. 

8) One might conjecture also that the presence of life, consciousness and 
intelligence (which are all individual, personal, subjective) are not 
mechanical and so cannot be part of a multiverse. It's each man 
for himself.  Along these lines, because of natural selection and 
different worlds not being all the same, evolution would not occur 
in parallel.  

9) Besides, there are alternate possibilities for a quantum wave collapse.  


I have not yet find one, and besides, this would contradict the comp 
hypothesis. 







10) In a related matter, one of the multiverse sites cited William James 
as a proponent. Because of his pragmatism, his multiverses arise 
because there is no fixed general in pragmatism for each particular. 
There are as many generals (additional universes) as you can think of. 
These obviously would not be parallel. 


Parallel worlds are not really parallel. It is only a manner of speaking.  
The "real" structure is still unknown and is plausibly rather complex. 


Bruno 







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/25/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Brian Tenneson  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-24, 13:11:46 
Subject: Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all ? 


What do you think of Tegmark's version of a mathematical Platoia? 



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