.
Saibal
- Original Message -
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 08:49 AM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
>
> "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > I
Hal Finney writes:
> The problem is that there seems to be no basis for judging the validity
> of this kind of analysis. Do we die every instant? Do we survive sleep
> but not being frozen? Do we live on in our copies? Does our identity
> extend to all conscious entities? There are so many q
Bruno raises a lot of good points, but I will just focus on a couple
of them.
The first notion that I am using in this analysis is the assumption that a
first-person stream of consciousness exists as a Platonic object. My aim
is then to estimate the measure of such objects. I don't know whether
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> OK, I think I'm clear on what you're saying now. But suppose I argue
> that I will not survive the next hour, because the matter making up my
> synapses will have turned over in this time. To an outside observer the
> person taking my place would
Hal,
Here I agree with everything you say. Functionalism presupposes
computationalism, but computationalism makes computationalism false.
exit functionnalism. Even maudlin makes the confusion. I repeat that
both thought experiments and Godel's incompleteness show that if we are
machine then w
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:49, Hal Finney a écrit (to Saibal Mitra):
snip
> and further, since
> the UD generates all minds, it means that all minds have equal measure.
Never underestimate the "basic fundamental stupidity" of the UD. The UD
execution is very redundant and the measure will be relati
Le 20-juin-06, à 08:47, Hal Finney a écrit :
>
> I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
> on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA.
I guess you mean your UDist here.
> I am working on
> some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn
Hal Finney writes:
> > Yes, but every theoretical scientist hopes ultimately to be vindicated> > by the experimentalists. I'm now not sure what you mean by the second> > sentence in the above quote. What would you expect to find if (classical,> > destructive) teleportation of a subject in Bruss
On Wed, Jun 21, 2006 at 10:31:16AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
> > equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
> > inequivalent, then that instantiation
Hi Hal,
Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way
> in principle to tell whet
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
> equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
> inequivalent, then that instantiation no longer "instantiates" the
> person. The person continues to exist, as
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> > I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that
> > I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that
> > teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).
> >
Hal Finney writes:
> I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that> I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that> teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).> This was not the starting point of the analysis, but the con
"Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
> simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
> complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
> work. If you know for ce
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 11:11:15PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> I am mostly referring to the philosophical literature on the problems of
> what counts as an instantiation, as well as responses considered here
> and elsewhere. One online paper is Chalmers' "Does a Rock Implement
> Every Finite-
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> > I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis
> > is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system
> > instantiates a computation. Howe
Hal Finney wrote:
> I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
> on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on
> some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
> this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the
[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 06:35 PM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
>
> Bruno writes:
> > Hal,
> >
> > It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical
universe,=20
> > and then use it to reintroduce a notion of
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> The starting point was the framework I have described previously, which
> can be stated very simply as that the measure of an information pattern
> comes from the universal distribution of Kolmogorov. I then applied this
> analysi
Bruno writes:
> Hal,
>
> It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical universe,=20
> and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so that=20
> you can bet you will be the one "annihilated" in Brussels.
I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusi
Hal,
It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical universe,
and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so that
you can bet you will be the one "annihilated" in Brussels.
You agree that this is just equivalent of negating the comp hypothesis.
You would not u
quot; between different instantiations is determined by their information content, like the relationship between different elements in a set.
Stathis Papaioannou
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA> Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 23:47:26 -0700>
I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on
some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA
rather than the ASSA,
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