Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Terrence W. DEACON]

To claim that:

"without a language, no communication would be possible"

one must be using the term "language" in a highly metaphoric sense.

Is scent marking a language?
Music?
Sexual displays, like a peacock's tail?
How about a smile or frown?
Is the pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees a language?
Was the evolution of language in humans just more of the same, not
something distinct from a dog's bark?
When a person is depressed, their way of walking often communicates
this fact to others; so is this slight modification of posture part of
a language?
If I get the hiccups after eating is this part of a language that
communicates my indigestion?

Is this usage of the term 'language' simply referring to the necessity
of a shared medium of communication? Is it possible to develop a
general theory of information by simply failing to make distinctions?

— Terry




On 2/12/18, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> Hi FISers,
>
>
> (1) I think language and communication cannot be separated, since without a
> language, no communication would be possible (see Figure 1).
>
>
>
>f
>g
>  Sender --->  Message
> >  Receiver
>   |
>^
>   |
> |
>   |
> |
>
> |_|
>
> h
>
> “Language and communication are both irreducibly triadic; i.e., the three
> nodes and three edges are essential for communication, given a language or
> code understood by both the sender and receiver.”   f =  encoding; g =
> decoding; h = information flow.
>
> Figure 1.  A diagrammatic representation of the irreducibly triadic nature
> of communication and language.
>
>
>
>
> (2) I think it may be justified and useful to distinguish between
> anthropomorphic language metaphor (ALM) and non-athropomorphic language
> metaphor (NLM).  I agree with many of the members of this list that we
> should not apply ALM to biology uncritically, since such an approch to
> biology may lead to  unjustifiable anthropomorphisms.
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus) and the anthropocentric theory of
> creatiion.
>
>
> (3) Table 1 below may represent one possible example of NLM.  Although the
> linguistic terms such as letters, words, sentences, etc. are used in this
> table, they  are matrially/ontologically  different from their molecular
> coutner parts; e.g., letters are  different from nucleotides, protein
> domians , etc.,and  words are different from genes, proteins, etc., but
> there are unmistakable common formal features among them.
>
> Table 1.  The formal and material aspects of the cell language (Cellese).
>
> \  Material Aspect
> \(Function)
> \
> \
> \
>  \
> \
> Formal Aspect \
>(Function) \
>   \
>
> DNA Language
> (DNese;
> Information transmission in time)
>
> RNA Language
> (RNese;
> Information transmission in space, from DNA to proteins)
>
> Protein Language
> (Proteinese;
> Energy transduction
> from chemical to mechanical; i.e., conformon production)
>
> Chemical Language
> (Moleculese;
> Source of free energy)
>
> Letters*
> (To build)
>
> 4n nucleotides
> n = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .
> Exons (?)
>
>
>
> Protein domains
>
> Partial chemical reactions
>
> Words
> (To denote)
>
> Genes
>
>
>
> Proteins
>
> Full chemical reactions
>
> Sentences
> (To decide)
>
> cis-Genes (?)**
>
>
>
> Metabolic pathways
>
> Chemical gradients
>
> Texts
> (To reason/compute)
>
> trans-Genes (?)**
>
>
>
> ‘Hypermetabolic pathways’
>
> Chemical waves (?)
>
>
> *I recently proposed that there are n (with n = 1 ~103?) genetic alphabets,
> each containing 4^n letters and each letter in turn consisting of n
> nucleotides.  In this view, the 64 codons are the so-called 3rd-order
> letters , not words as widely assumed.
> **cis-Genes are here defined as those genes covalently linked to each other
> and hence being in the same chromosome, whereas trans-genes are defined as
> those genes that are located in different chromos
>
> (4)  The terms, DNese, RNese, and proteinese were coined by a young American
> biochemist from Mexico City whom I met at the International Workshop on the
> Linguistics of Biology and the Biology of Language held in Cuernavaca,
> Mexico, in 1998, where I had presented the cell language ('cellese') theory,
> prior to the young biochemist’s lecture  which followed mine the next day.
> In his lecture, he surprised me by announcing these neologisms, which I did
> not quite know how to justify.   But it took almost 20 years for me to
> finally realize the utility of these terms for entirely different reasons, I
> 

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[mihir chakraborty]

Dear Friends,

i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?

mihir

On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> Because ... All words are already numbered
> We have published large monograph named
> “Natural Language Addressing”
> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
> we enter not letters but their codes.
> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> It really works!!!
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Karl Javorszky
> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> To: Stanley N Salthe
> Cc: fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
> the cateogry theory
>
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>
>
>
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”,
> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because
> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> works.
>
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>
>
>
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
> so long.
>
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial
> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a
> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in
> a semantic fashion.
>
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein
> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy
> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or
> otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely
> number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid
> sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied,
> then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what
> they stand.
>
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only
> noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old
> dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
> one executes by routine.
>
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
> readiness One into priority readiness Two.
>
> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connec

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on thecateogry theory

[Karl Javorszky]

You're welcome!

Am 12.02.2018 16:33 schrieb "Mark Johnson" :

> Dear Karl,
>
> You've communicated *your* kaleidoscope rather wonderfully. Thank you!
>
> I shall look into it...
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Mark
> --
> From: Karl Javorszky 
> Sent: ‎12/‎02/‎2018 14:36
> To: Mark Johnson 
> Cc: fis 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on thecateogry theory
>
> Kaleidoscope, Wittgenstein
>
>
>
> Dear Mark,
>
>
>
> thank you for your two questions.
>
> 1)  Kaleidoscope
>
> The term “kaleidoscope” is used to signify a complex thing that gives
> different pictures. The toy appears to produce an unlimited number of
> different pictures to the casual user. In fact, there is a maximal number
> of different pictures that can be produced, although this may not be
> immediately evident to every child.
>
> The term kaleidoscope was used to draw your attention to the manifold
> pictures that natural numbers generate when – as a collection – reordered.
> The diversity of pictures is indeed truly impressive. One may naively
> assume that there is an endless number of variations that can appear. This
> is but a subjective impression. In fact, if we deal with a limited number
> of distinguishable objects – which we, for convenience’s sake, enumerate -,
> there can appear only a limited number of different arrangements among
> these.
>
> How to generate cycles of expressions of (a,b) is as follows:
>
> a)   Maximal numbers of elements in the kaleidoscope
>
> We know that the optimal size – for information transmission purposes –
> for a collection is 136 elements, of which around 66 carry significant
> symbols. Therefore, we know also that no more than about 15 describing
> dimensions can be utilised to exhaustively describe a collection of that
> many elements. (Collections with more than 140 elements cannot be described
> consistently at all.)  Please see: www.oeis.org/A242615.
> 
>
>
>
> b)  Generating the sorted collection of arguments (a,b)
>
> We generate (a,b) by setting up two loops:
>
> begin outer loop
>
>  a:1,16;  /* why 16: see above */
>
> write value a;
>
> begin inner loop;
>
> b: a,16 ;
>
> write value b;
>
> end inner loop;
>
> end outer loop. /* This gives us a table with 136 rows and 2 columns */
>
> Then we sort the collection two times, once on (a,b), once on (b,a). We
> note the sequential number of each of the elements in both of the sorting
> orders. These we use to generate the cycles we are interested in (which we
> later compare to other cycles, from other reorders, as we build a more
> advanced version of the kaleidoscope). We see in this example cycles that
> appear during reorders from  operation where first sorting argument: a, second sorting argument: b> into
>  argument: b, second sorting argument: a>. This classical introductory
> example and deictic definition is published in www.oeis.org/A235647.
>
> Please use this basic version of the kaleidoscope. One can add columns.
>
> 2)  Wittgenstein
>
> Sitting in a snowy place and the Winter Olympics taking place right now,
> let me offer you my view of what Wittgenstein did in a parable about ski
> racing.
>
> Philosophers are skiing athletes. Wittgenstein is a mediocre skier but a
> gifted mechanic. He introduces the concept of ski lifts to the sporting
> society. The ski lifts are a great invention and further the practice of
> skiing immensely.
>
> His co-athletes tell him, full of rightful indignation, that inventing,
> describing and operating a ski lift is not a sporting achievement, and
> falls definitely not under the term “skiing”. His results as an athlete are
> Zero.  He should be ashamed to try to tout a ski lift as a result of
> skiing.
>
> Wittgenstein, full of remorse, recants, agrees that ski lifts have nothing
> to do with the sport of skiing, and later in his life makes some irrelevant
> efforts of excellence in the sport *sensu stricto.*
>
>
>
> Offering this audience of FIS participants:
>
> a) a kaleidoscope which is exactly defined and delivers breath-taking
> pictures,
>
> b) an epistemological tool which generates undisputable facts about how
>  are interdependent; these facts are of a
> numeric nature and root in a kind of arithmetic, so much simple, that there
> is a button on the screen of Excel for average users, enabling them to
> execute the procedure;
>
> this suggestion is outside of the subjects the scientists in FIS are
> researching, like using a ski lift is outside of sport.
>
> Accounting is not science. Forensic accounting makes life easier if one
> likes precision and exactitude. If one is interested in how place, number,
> amount translate into each other, here is a tool to study the question.
> There is an accounting link connecting the concepts mentioned above. It is
> multi-faceted and needs familiarisation – just like a kaleidoscope. This
> kaleidoscope is made of numbers. Please ris

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on thecateogry theory

[Mark Johnson]

Dear Karl,

You've communicated *your* kaleidoscope rather wonderfully. Thank you!

I shall look into it...

Best wishes,

Mark

-Original Message-
From: "Karl Javorszky" 
Sent: ‎12/‎02/‎2018 14:36
To: "Mark Johnson" 
Cc: "fis" 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on 
thecateogry theory

Kaleidoscope, Wittgenstein
 
Dear Mark,
 
thank you for your two questions. 
1)  Kaleidoscope
The term “kaleidoscope” is used to signify a complex thing that gives different 
pictures. The toy appears to produce an unlimited number of different pictures 
to the casual user. In fact, there is a maximal number of different pictures 
that can be produced, although this may not be immediately evident to every 
child.
The term kaleidoscope was used to draw your attention to the manifold pictures 
that natural numbers generate when – as a collection – reordered. The diversity 
of pictures is indeed truly impressive. One may naively assume that there is an 
endless number of variations that can appear. This is but a subjective 
impression. In fact, if we deal with a limited number of distinguishable 
objects – which we, for convenience’s sake, enumerate -, there can appear only 
a limited number of different arrangements among these. 
How to generate cycles of expressions of (a,b) is as follows:
a)   Maximal numbers of elements in the kaleidoscope
We know that the optimal size – for information transmission purposes – for a 
collection is 136 elements, of which around 66 carry significant symbols. 
Therefore, we know also that no more than about 15 describing dimensions can be 
utilised to exhaustively describe a collection of that many elements. 
(Collections with more than 140 elements cannot be described consistently at 
all.)  Please see: www.oeis.org/A242615.   
 
b)  Generating the sorted collection of arguments (a,b)
We generate (a,b) by setting up two loops: 
begin outer loop
 a:1,16;  /* why 16: see above */
write value a;
begin inner loop; 
b: a,16 ;
write value b;
end inner loop; 
end outer loop. /* This gives us a table with 136 rows and 2 columns */
Then we sort the collection two times, once on (a,b), once on (b,a). We note 
the sequential number of each of the elements in both of the sorting orders. 
These we use to generate the cycles we are interested in (which we later 
compare to other cycles, from other reorders, as we build a more advanced 
version of the kaleidoscope). We see in this example cycles that appear during 
reorders from  into . This classical introductory example and deictic 
definition is published in www.oeis.org/A235647. 
Please use this basic version of the kaleidoscope. One can add columns.
2)  Wittgenstein
Sitting in a snowy place and the Winter Olympics taking place right now, let me 
offer you my view of what Wittgenstein did in a parable about ski racing.
Philosophers are skiing athletes. Wittgenstein is a mediocre skier but a gifted 
mechanic. He introduces the concept of ski lifts to the sporting society. The 
ski lifts are a great invention and further the practice of skiing immensely. 
His co-athletes tell him, full of rightful indignation, that inventing, 
describing and operating a ski lift is not a sporting achievement, and falls 
definitely not under the term “skiing”. His results as an athlete are Zero.  He 
should be ashamed to try to tout a ski lift as a result of skiing. 
Wittgenstein, full of remorse, recants, agrees that ski lifts have nothing to 
do with the sport of skiing, and later in his life makes some irrelevant 
efforts of excellence in the sport sensu stricto.
 
Offering this audience of FIS participants:
a) a kaleidoscope which is exactly defined and delivers breath-taking pictures, 
b) an epistemological tool which generates undisputable facts about how  are interdependent; these facts are of a numeric 
nature and root in a kind of arithmetic, so much simple, that there is a button 
on the screen of Excel for average users, enabling them to execute the 
procedure;
this suggestion is outside of the subjects the scientists in FIS are 
researching, like using a ski lift is outside of sport. 
Accounting is not science. Forensic accounting makes life easier if one likes 
precision and exactitude. If one is interested in how place, number, amount 
translate into each other, here is a tool to study the question. There is an 
accounting link connecting the concepts mentioned above. It is multi-faceted 
and needs familiarisation – just like a kaleidoscope. This kaleidoscope is made 
of numbers. Please risk the effort and take a look at it. If your accountant 
says: this is worth looking into, it is usually reasonable to actually dedicate 
some thought to the approach. 
 
 
 




2018-02-12 10:46 GMT+01:00 Mark Johnson :

Dear Karl,


Do you really mean this?:
"As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure that we all 
look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is to make 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Karl Javorszky]

Kaleidoscope, Wittgenstein



Dear Mark,



thank you for your two questions.

1)  Kaleidoscope

The term “kaleidoscope” is used to signify a complex thing that gives
different pictures. The toy appears to produce an unlimited number of
different pictures to the casual user. In fact, there is a maximal number
of different pictures that can be produced, although this may not be
immediately evident to every child.

The term kaleidoscope was used to draw your attention to the manifold
pictures that natural numbers generate when – as a collection – reordered.
The diversity of pictures is indeed truly impressive. One may naively
assume that there is an endless number of variations that can appear. This
is but a subjective impression. In fact, if we deal with a limited number
of distinguishable objects – which we, for convenience’s sake, enumerate -,
there can appear only a limited number of different arrangements among
these.

How to generate cycles of expressions of (a,b) is as follows:

a)   Maximal numbers of elements in the kaleidoscope

We know that the optimal size – for information transmission purposes – for
a collection is 136 elements, of which around 66 carry significant symbols.
Therefore, we know also that no more than about 15 describing dimensions
can be utilised to exhaustively describe a collection of that many
elements. (Collections with more than 140 elements cannot be described
consistently at all.)  Please see: www.oeis.org/A242615.




b)  Generating the sorted collection of arguments (a,b)

We generate (a,b) by setting up two loops:

begin outer loop

 a:1,16;  /* why 16: see above */

write value a;

begin inner loop;

b: a,16 ;

write value b;

end inner loop;

end outer loop. /* This gives us a table with 136 rows and 2 columns */

Then we sort the collection two times, once on (a,b), once on (b,a). We
note the sequential number of each of the elements in both of the sorting
orders. These we use to generate the cycles we are interested in (which we
later compare to other cycles, from other reorders, as we build a more
advanced version of the kaleidoscope). We see in this example cycles that
appear during reorders from  into
. This classical introductory
example and deictic definition is published in www.oeis.org/A235647.

Please use this basic version of the kaleidoscope. One can add columns.

2)  Wittgenstein

Sitting in a snowy place and the Winter Olympics taking place right now,
let me offer you my view of what Wittgenstein did in a parable about ski
racing.

Philosophers are skiing athletes. Wittgenstein is a mediocre skier but a
gifted mechanic. He introduces the concept of ski lifts to the sporting
society. The ski lifts are a great invention and further the practice of
skiing immensely.

His co-athletes tell him, full of rightful indignation, that inventing,
describing and operating a ski lift is not a sporting achievement, and
falls definitely not under the term “skiing”. His results as an athlete are
Zero.  He should be ashamed to try to tout a ski lift as a result of
skiing.

Wittgenstein, full of remorse, recants, agrees that ski lifts have nothing
to do with the sport of skiing, and later in his life makes some irrelevant
efforts of excellence in the sport *sensu stricto.*



Offering this audience of FIS participants:

a) a kaleidoscope which is exactly defined and delivers breath-taking
pictures,

b) an epistemological tool which generates undisputable facts about how
 are interdependent; these facts are of a
numeric nature and root in a kind of arithmetic, so much simple, that there
is a button on the screen of Excel for average users, enabling them to
execute the procedure;

this suggestion is outside of the subjects the scientists in FIS are
researching, like using a ski lift is outside of sport.

Accounting is not science. Forensic accounting makes life easier if one
likes precision and exactitude. If one is interested in how place, number,
amount translate into each other, here is a tool to study the question.
There is an accounting link connecting the concepts mentioned above. It is
multi-faceted and needs familiarisation – just like a kaleidoscope. This
kaleidoscope is made of numbers. Please risk the effort and take a look at
it. If your accountant says: this is worth looking into, it is usually
reasonable to actually dedicate some thought to the approach.








2018-02-12 10:46 GMT+01:00 Mark Johnson :

> Dear Karl,
>
> Do you really mean this?:
> "As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure *that* we
> all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is
> to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*. As the kaleidoscope
> produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one can be
> expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe the
> same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts of
> perception."

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear Javier and Dear Stan,

 

Javier:

1. I very much agree with you as follows:

“I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. Information can 
only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) that draws a 
distinction.”

A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information can 
exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists.

I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science.

 

2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and 
communication is:

Language is a tool of communication about information.

Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that all 
(Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study should be 
the subdisciplines of Human Informatics.

 

==

Dear Xueshan,

Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one 
really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in the 
thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the crucial 
point is to distinguish between language and communication. Language is for us 
humans the main communication medium, though not the only one. We tend to 
describe other communication media in society and nature by mapping the 
language-like characteristics they have. This has been useful and sucessful so 
far. But pushing the language metaphor too far is showing its analytical 
limits. I think we need to think of a transdisciplinary theory of communication 
media. On the other hand, I agree with you that we need to check the uses of 
the concepts of signal and information. I think that only signals can be 
transmitted, not information. Information can only be gained by an observer (a 
self-referential system) that draws a distinction.  

Best,

Javier

==

Stan:

According to Peirce, language is only one of the systematic signs. Here we 
consider sign, signal, symbol as the same thing. So, more precisely in my 
opinion:

{signal {information}},   or   {substrate {signal {information}}}

But not

{language {signal {information}}}

If you remember, in our previous discussions, I much appreciate the 

The hierarchy idea is very important to our study which is initially introduced 
by Pedro, Nikhil and you.

===

Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, as:

In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other 
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the 
compositional hierarchy):

[information [language [signal]]]

Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be understood or 
construed by way of linguistic constructs. 

(Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, where:

[sign [information [...]]] ) 

Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

{language {signal {information}}}

Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, so 
that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information (informing) 
only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.

STAN

 

Best wishes to all,

Xueshan

===

El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan" mailto:y...@pku.edu.cn> > escribió:

Dear Colleagues,

I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana recommended, 
and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination with Sung's 
comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human language, I have 
the following learning feelings to share with everyone:

In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple 
languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and interspecies 
cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various biological 
activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such as AI-2, it is 
a general language that bacteria use for intergenera signaling.

I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept 
information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times, so 
we have to review the history and application of “information” and “signal” in 
biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the relationship 
between language, signal, and information.

The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be 
traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and 
endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of 
Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then, 
the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.

As for 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Mark Johnson]

Dear Karl,

Do you really mean this?:
"As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure *that* we
all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is
to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*. As the kaleidoscope
produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one can be
expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe the
same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts of
perception."

I don't object to "looking at a kaleidoscope", but looking at the *same*
kaleidoscope? How could we know? How is a kaleidoscope communicated?

Early Wittgenstein belonged to a philosophical tradition which was consumed
by the idea of categories. In the Tractatus he sees (I think rightly) that
the problems of philosophy result from confusion in language - but his
approach is to "clarify" the categories and logic of language - which
doesn't work. His later work is I think characterised by the insight that
categories result from processes of conversation in ordinary language.

In cybernetics, we would say that the process that maintains a distinction
is a transduction. If "my kaleidescope" and "your kaleidescope" are
distinctions you and I make, then they result from transduction processes
in me and you. If I was to say my kaleidescope is the same as yours, would
I not have to know that my transduction process works in the same way as
yours? Of course, I could just *say* it's the same without worrying about
the details!

Transduction is a complicated affair. Wittgenstein said (Philosophical
Investigations?... not sure) that if you saw a person performing a
mathematical operation, you couldn't know exactly how they were thinking or
if it was the same as your own thinking. Two sets of transducers may
produce the same result but be fundamentally different underneath.

If I say that my kaleidescope is the same as your kaleidescope then I have
created a new category of "the same kaleidescope". What's that but a new
transduction? But is my "same" the same as your "same"...?

Best wishes,

Mark




On 10 February 2018 at 18:36, Karl Javorszky 
wrote:

> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>
>
>
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome
> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful
> when creating great works.
>
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>
>
>
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It
> is true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
> surprised about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of
> the finding so long.
>
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a
> combinatorial problem. This is also the reason why he says that his
> philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing
> whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.
>
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that
> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that
> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical
> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside
> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a
> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern
> numbers are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and
> figure out later for what they stand.
>
> This is the situation as per today. There is no