You're welcome! Am 12.02.2018 16:33 schrieb "Mark Johnson" <johnsonm...@gmail.com>:
> Dear Karl, > > You've communicated *your* kaleidoscope rather wonderfully. Thank you! > > I shall look into it... > > Best wishes, > > Mark > ------------------------------ > From: Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> > Sent: 12/02/2018 14:36 > To: Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com> > Cc: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on thecateogry theory > > Kaleidoscope, Wittgenstein > > > > Dear Mark, > > > > thank you for your two questions. > > 1) Kaleidoscope > > The term “kaleidoscope” is used to signify a complex thing that gives > different pictures. The toy appears to produce an unlimited number of > different pictures to the casual user. In fact, there is a maximal number > of different pictures that can be produced, although this may not be > immediately evident to every child. > > The term kaleidoscope was used to draw your attention to the manifold > pictures that natural numbers generate when – as a collection – reordered. > The diversity of pictures is indeed truly impressive. One may naively > assume that there is an endless number of variations that can appear. This > is but a subjective impression. In fact, if we deal with a limited number > of distinguishable objects – which we, for convenience’s sake, enumerate -, > there can appear only a limited number of different arrangements among > these. > > How to generate cycles of expressions of (a,b) is as follows: > > a) Maximal numbers of elements in the kaleidoscope > > We know that the optimal size – for information transmission purposes – > for a collection is 136 elements, of which around 66 carry significant > symbols. Therefore, we know also that no more than about 15 describing > dimensions can be utilised to exhaustively describe a collection of that > many elements. (Collections with more than 140 elements cannot be described > consistently at all.) Please see: www.oeis.org/A242615. > <http://www.oeis.org/A242615.%20%20%20%0d> > > > > b) Generating the sorted collection of arguments (a,b) > > We generate (a,b) by setting up two loops: > > begin outer loop > > a:1,16; /* why 16: see above */ > > write value a; > > begin inner loop; > > b: a,16 ; > > write value b; > > end inner loop; > > end outer loop. /* This gives us a table with 136 rows and 2 columns */ > > Then we sort the collection two times, once on (a,b), once on (b,a). We > note the sequential number of each of the elements in both of the sorting > orders. These we use to generate the cycles we are interested in (which we > later compare to other cycles, from other reorders, as we build a more > advanced version of the kaleidoscope). We see in this example cycles that > appear during reorders from <sequential position resulting from a sorting > operation where first sorting argument: a, second sorting argument: b> into > <sequential position resulting from a sorting operation where first sorting > argument: b, second sorting argument: a>. This classical introductory > example and deictic definition is published in www.oeis.org/A235647. > > Please use this basic version of the kaleidoscope. One can add columns. > > 2) Wittgenstein > > Sitting in a snowy place and the Winter Olympics taking place right now, > let me offer you my view of what Wittgenstein did in a parable about ski > racing. > > Philosophers are skiing athletes. Wittgenstein is a mediocre skier but a > gifted mechanic. He introduces the concept of ski lifts to the sporting > society. The ski lifts are a great invention and further the practice of > skiing immensely. > > His co-athletes tell him, full of rightful indignation, that inventing, > describing and operating a ski lift is not a sporting achievement, and > falls definitely not under the term “skiing”. His results as an athlete are > Zero. He should be ashamed to try to tout a ski lift as a result of > skiing. > > Wittgenstein, full of remorse, recants, agrees that ski lifts have nothing > to do with the sport of skiing, and later in his life makes some irrelevant > efforts of excellence in the sport *sensu stricto.* > > > > Offering this audience of FIS participants: > > a) a kaleidoscope which is exactly defined and delivers breath-taking > pictures, > > b) an epistemological tool which generates undisputable facts about how > <when, where, what and how much> are interdependent; these facts are of a > numeric nature and root in a kind of arithmetic, so much simple, that there > is a button on the screen of Excel for average users, enabling them to > execute the procedure; > > this suggestion is outside of the subjects the scientists in FIS are > researching, like using a ski lift is outside of sport. > > Accounting is not science. Forensic accounting makes life easier if one > likes precision and exactitude. If one is interested in how place, number, > amount translate into each other, here is a tool to study the question. > There is an accounting link connecting the concepts mentioned above. It is > multi-faceted and needs familiarisation – just like a kaleidoscope. This > kaleidoscope is made of numbers. Please risk the effort and take a look at > it. If your accountant says: this is worth looking into, it is usually > reasonable to actually dedicate some thought to the approach. > > > > > > > > > 2018-02-12 10:46 GMT+01:00 Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com>: > >> Dear Karl, >> >> Do you really mean this?: >> "As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure *that* we >> all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is >> to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*. As the >> kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one >> can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe >> the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the >> facts of perception." >> >> I don't object to "looking at a kaleidoscope", but looking at the *same* >> kaleidoscope? How could we know? How is a kaleidoscope communicated? >> >> Early Wittgenstein belonged to a philosophical tradition which was >> consumed by the idea of categories. In the Tractatus he sees (I think >> rightly) that the problems of philosophy result from confusion in language >> - but his approach is to "clarify" the categories and logic of language - >> which doesn't work. His later work is I think characterised by the insight >> that categories result from processes of conversation in ordinary language. >> >> In cybernetics, we would say that the process that maintains a >> distinction is a transduction. If "my kaleidescope" and "your kaleidescope" >> are distinctions you and I make, then they result from transduction >> processes in me and you. If I was to say my kaleidescope is the same as >> yours, would I not have to know that my transduction process works in the >> same way as yours? Of course, I could just *say* it's the same without >> worrying about the details! >> >> Transduction is a complicated affair. Wittgenstein said (Philosophical >> Investigations?... not sure) that if you saw a person performing a >> mathematical operation, you couldn't know exactly how they were thinking or >> if it was the same as your own thinking. Two sets of transducers may >> produce the same result but be fundamentally different underneath. >> >> If I say that my kaleidescope is the same as your kaleidescope then I >> have created a new category of "the same kaleidescope". What's that but a >> new transduction? But is my "same" the same as your "same"...? >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Mark >> >> >> >> >> On 10 February 2018 at 18:36, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Using the logical language to understand Nature >>> >>> >>> >>> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms >>> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome >>> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful >>> when creating great works. >>> >>> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical >>> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. >>> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. >>> >>> >>> >>> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by >>> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he >>> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that >>> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on >>> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is >>> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway >>> self-evident and cannot be otherwise. >>> >>> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation >>> of the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate >>> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It >>> is true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a >>> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only >>> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. >>> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an >>> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an >>> archaeologist can not be surprised >>> >> > [The entire original message is not included.] >
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