# Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

```Kaleidoscope, Wittgenstein
```
```

Dear Mark,

thank you for your two questions.

1)      Kaleidoscope

The term “kaleidoscope” is used to signify a complex thing that gives
different pictures. The toy appears to produce an unlimited number of
different pictures to the casual user. In fact, there is a maximal number
of different pictures that can be produced, although this may not be
immediately evident to every child.

The term kaleidoscope was used to draw your attention to the manifold
pictures that natural numbers generate when – as a collection – reordered.
The diversity of pictures is indeed truly impressive. One may naively
assume that there is an endless number of variations that can appear. This
is but a subjective impression. In fact, if we deal with a limited number
of distinguishable objects – which we, for convenience’s sake, enumerate -,
there can appear only a limited number of different arrangements among
these.

How to generate cycles of expressions of (a,b) is as follows:

a)       Maximal numbers of elements in the kaleidoscope

We know that the optimal size – for information transmission purposes – for
a collection is 136 elements, of which around 66 carry significant symbols.
Therefore, we know also that no more than about 15 describing dimensions
can be utilised to exhaustively describe a collection of that many
elements. (Collections with more than 140 elements cannot be described
consistently at all.)  Please see: www.oeis.org/A242615.
<http://www.oeis.org/A242615.%20%20%20%0d>

b)      Generating the sorted collection of arguments (a,b)

We generate (a,b) by setting up two loops:

begin outer loop

a:1,16;  /* why 16: see above */

write value a;

begin inner loop;

b: a,16 ;

write value b;

end inner loop;

end outer loop. /* This gives us a table with 136 rows and 2 columns */

Then we sort the collection two times, once on (a,b), once on (b,a). We
note the sequential number of each of the elements in both of the sorting
orders. These we use to generate the cycles we are interested in (which we
later compare to other cycles, from other reorders, as we build a more
advanced version of the kaleidoscope). We see in this example cycles that
appear during reorders from <sequential position resulting from a sorting
operation where first sorting argument: a, second sorting argument: b> into
<sequential position resulting from a sorting operation where first sorting
argument: b, second sorting argument: a>. This classical introductory
example and deictic definition is published in www.oeis.org/A235647.

Please use this basic version of the kaleidoscope. One can add columns.

2)      Wittgenstein

Sitting in a snowy place and the Winter Olympics taking place right now,
let me offer you my view of what Wittgenstein did in a parable about ski
racing.

Philosophers are skiing athletes. Wittgenstein is a mediocre skier but a
gifted mechanic. He introduces the concept of ski lifts to the sporting
society. The ski lifts are a great invention and further the practice of
skiing immensely.

His co-athletes tell him, full of rightful indignation, that inventing,
describing and operating a ski lift is not a sporting achievement, and
falls definitely not under the term “skiing”. His results as an athlete are
Zero.  He should be ashamed to try to tout a ski lift as a result of
skiing.

Wittgenstein, full of remorse, recants, agrees that ski lifts have nothing
to do with the sport of skiing, and later in his life makes some irrelevant
efforts of excellence in the sport *sensu stricto.*

Offering this audience of FIS participants:

a) a kaleidoscope which is exactly defined and delivers breath-taking
pictures,

b) an epistemological tool which generates undisputable facts about how
<when, where, what and how much> are interdependent; these facts are of a
numeric nature and root in a kind of arithmetic, so much simple, that there
is a button on the screen of Excel for average users, enabling them to
execute the procedure;

this suggestion is outside of the subjects the scientists in FIS are
researching, like using a ski lift is outside of sport.

Accounting is not science. Forensic accounting makes life easier if one
likes precision and exactitude. If one is interested in how place, number,
amount translate into each other, here is a tool to study the question.
There is an accounting link connecting the concepts mentioned above. It is
multi-faceted and needs familiarisation – just like a kaleidoscope. This
kaleidoscope is made of numbers. Please risk the effort and take a look at
it. If your accountant says: this is worth looking into, it is usually
reasonable to actually dedicate some thought to the approach.

2018-02-12 10:46 GMT+01:00 Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com>:

> Dear Karl,
>
> Do you really mean this?:
> "As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure *that* we
> all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is
> to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*. As the kaleidoscope
> produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one can be
> expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe the
> same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts of
> perception."
>
> I don't object to "looking at a kaleidoscope", but looking at the *same*
> kaleidoscope? How could we know? How is a kaleidoscope communicated?
>
> Early Wittgenstein belonged to a philosophical tradition which was
> consumed by the idea of categories. In the Tractatus he sees (I think
> rightly) that the problems of philosophy result from confusion in language
> - but his approach is to "clarify" the categories and logic of language -
> which doesn't work. His later work is I think characterised by the insight
> that categories result from processes of conversation in ordinary language.
>
> In cybernetics, we would say that the process that maintains a distinction
> is a transduction. If "my kaleidescope" and "your kaleidescope" are
> distinctions you and I make, then they result from transduction processes
> in me and you. If I was to say my kaleidescope is the same as yours, would
> I not have to know that my transduction process works in the same way as
> yours? Of course, I could just *say* it's the same without worrying about
> the details!
>
> Transduction is a complicated affair. Wittgenstein said (Philosophical
> Investigations?... not sure) that if you saw a person performing a
> mathematical operation, you couldn't know exactly how they were thinking or
> if it was the same as your own thinking. Two sets of transducers may
> produce the same result but be fundamentally different underneath.
>
> If I say that my kaleidescope is the same as your kaleidescope then I have
> created a new category of "the same kaleidescope". What's that but a new
> transduction? But is my "same" the same as your "same"...?
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Mark
>
>
>
>
> On 10 February 2018 at 18:36, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>>
>>
>>
>> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
>> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome
>> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful
>> when creating great works.
>>
>> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
>> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
>> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>>
>>
>>
>> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
>> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
>> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
>> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
>> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
>> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
>> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>>
>> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
>> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
>> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It
>> is true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
>> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
>> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
>> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
>> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
>> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
>> surprised about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of
>> the finding so long.
>>
>> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
>> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
>> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
>> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a
>> combinatorial problem. This is also the reason why he says that his
>> philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing
>> whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.
>>
>> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that
>> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that
>> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical
>> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside
>> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a
>> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern
>> numbers are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and
>> figure out later for what they stand.
>>
>> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The
>> only noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to
>> that old dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the
>> covering layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the
>> nose not too high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple
>> operations that one executes by routine.
>>
>> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
>> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
>> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
>> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
>>
>> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
>> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
>> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
>> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
>> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other.
>> Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the
>> corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of
>> being associated with.
>>
>> Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place,
>> relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact,
>> chemical valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is
>> of secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is
>> to make sure *that* we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the
>> same one. The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the *same
>> picture*. As the kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a
>> challenge that one can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed
>> that we all observe the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing
>> how to name the facts of perception.
>>
>> The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to
>> process that what we wish to discuss.  The present task is to realise
>> that one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it
>> clearly. The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited
>> to look at the picture.
>>
>> Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the
>> left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on
>> Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because
>> on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place
>> of this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup
>> would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a
>> plane with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards
>> understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts,
>> while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the
>> mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and periodicities.
>>
>>
>>
>> We all know that the DNA is a *sequence*. Then, if one wants to
>> understand how the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that
>> one has to deal with *sequences*, whether one likes the topic or not. As
>> there can be nothing philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA
>> works, the only subject that needs investigation is, why one has such a
>> reticence to deal with places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last
>> becoming last and first, etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on
>> how the interplay between mixtures and sequences actually works and what
>> this interplay produces; maybe this door opens from a well-barricaded
>> corridor within the cellar of the sub-conscious, hidden among some
>> skeletons of {to have sunken low, defeats of self-esteem, to have been
>> downgraded, to be among the last, to be a low-ranking individual, etc.}.
>> One of the techniques of influencing people with low self-esteem is to
>> encourage them to find the discipline in which they are really good. In how
>> many ways can a person be classified and how many of these ranking results
>> are contradictory? Is the concept of cognitive dissonance linked to the
>> similarity of two orders? Number theory should jump onto the subject of
>> intermediate states between two differing permutations, as it is intimately
>> connected with the subject of how DNA functions. Which names fit best the
>> patterns we observe while doing manifold re-orderings is presently of a
>> secondary importance. Of primary importance is presently to observe, what
>> happens if a *sequence* is turned into a different *sequence*. After
>> all, we deal with *sequences*, don’t we.
>>
>>
>> 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu>:
>>
>>> Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights
>>> hierarchically, as:
>>>
>>> In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in
>>> other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus
>>> (using the compositional hierarchy):
>>>
>>>         [information [language [signal]]]
>>>
>>> Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
>>> understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.
>>>
>>> (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
>>> where:
>>>
>>>         [sign [information [...]]] )
>>>
>>> Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):
>>>
>>>         {language {signal {information}}}
>>>
>>> Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic
>>> formations, so that, even though it is an extremely broad category,
>>> information (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed
>>> transformations.
>>>
>>> STAN
>>>
>>> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear Colleagues,
>>>>
>>>> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
>>>> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
>>>> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
>>>> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>>>>
>>>> multiple languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
>>>> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
>>>> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
>>>> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
>>>> signaling.
>>>>
>>>> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
>>>> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
>>>> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
>>>> “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
>>>> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and
>>>> information.
>>>>
>>>> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can
>>>> be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
>>>> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
>>>> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in
>>>> *Nature,
>>>> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since
>>>> then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and
>>>> biochemistry.
>>>>
>>>> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
>>>> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
>>>> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
>>>> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
>>>> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
>>>> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
>>>> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
>>>> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
>>>> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>>>>
>>>> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
>>>> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
>>>> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
>>>> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
>>>> information.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>>>>
>>>> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-d
>>>> aniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e640
>>>> 57ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>>>>
>>>> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*
>>>> )
>>>>
>>>> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-int
>>>> elligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>>>>
>>>> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best wishes,
>>>>
>>>> Xueshan
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.uni
>>>> zar.es] *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
>>>> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W.
>>>> DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
>>>> *Cc:* Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es>
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information
>>>> based on the cateogry theory
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife
>>>> that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can
>>>> kill?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> All the best.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sung
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
>>>> *To:* Terrence W. DEACON
>>>> *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information
>>>> based on the cateogry theory
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>>>>
>>>> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of
>>>> information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e
>>>> seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si
>>>> ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non
>>>> significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un
>>>> Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra
>>>> macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal
>>>> caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di
>>>> informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario
>>>> che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo
>>>> di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
>>>> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
>>>> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
>>>> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
>>>> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
>>>> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
>>>> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
>>>> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
>>>> semiotica della significazione.
>>>>
>>>> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10.
>>>> Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della
>>>> scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza
>>>> dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997).
>>>> Nello mio stesso libro si trovano:
>>>>
>>>> - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
>>>> colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
>>>> significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
>>>>
>>>> - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
>>>> neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
>>>> epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
>>>>
>>>> Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
>>>> scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
>>>> mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande
>>>> del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
>>>>
>>>> Un saluto affettuoso.
>>>>
>>>> Francecso
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>:
>>>>
>>>> Dear FISers,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model
>>>> for building a general theory of information.
>>>>
>>>> Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim
>>>> that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be
>>>>
>>>> I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and
>>>> evolution of the human language capacity.
>>>>
>>>> And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.
>>>>
>>>> Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary
>>>> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary
>>>> thinking.
>>>>
>>>> Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing
>>>> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic
>>>> thinking as well.
>>>>
>>>> So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I
>>>> append the following excerpt from the book.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for
>>>> analyzing other
>>>>
>>>> species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other
>>>> form of communication as
>>>>
>>>> exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent
>>>> case. No analytic method
>>>>
>>>> could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as
>>>> long as animals have
>>>>
>>>> interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around
>>>> at least as long as frogs
>>>>
>>>> have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic
>>>> communication was an afterthought,
>>>>
>>>> so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an
>>>> ancient and well-established
>>>>
>>>> mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model
>>>> against which to assess
>>>>
>>>> other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule,
>>>> and a quite anomalous
>>>>
>>>> exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with
>>>> respect to the extent they possess or
>>>>
>>>> lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the
>>>> types of hair on different mammals
>>>>
>>>> with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is
>>>> an understandable
>>>>
>>>> anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might
>>>> see more typical wings
>>>>
>>>> and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced
>>>> adaptations—but it does more to
>>>>
>>>> obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so
>>>> should be analyzed as an
>>>>
>>>> exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.
>>>>
>>>> This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a
>>>> vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.
>>>>
>>>> So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental
>>>> precursors.
>>>>
>>>> And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw
>>>> insight from this more familiar realm.
>>>>
>>>> I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that
>>>> assumes what it endeavors to explain.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regards to all, Terry
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero <
>>>> javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I
>>>> am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am
>>>> afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it
>>>> I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it
>>>> comes:
>>>>
>>>> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in
>>>> which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many
>>>> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of
>>>> the distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D.
>>>> Baecker and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group
>>>> that what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But
>>>> the concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has
>>>> many sources and types of information.
>>>> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set
>>>> of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a
>>>> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements.
>>>> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by
>>>> RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate
>>>> cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a
>>>> specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or
>>>> a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or
>>>> discourse.
>>>> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as
>>>> information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of
>>>> its own kind.
>>>> According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It
>>>> can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that
>>>> a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A
>>>> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
>>>> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic
>>>> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions.
>>>> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information.
>>>> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to
>>>> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us
>>>> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking
>>>> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social
>>>> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction
>>>> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message
>>>> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the
>>>> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to
>>>> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the
>>>> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and
>>>> what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is
>>>> being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special
>>>> place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable
>>>> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You
>>>> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in
>>>> her room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And  imagination
>>>> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral
>>>> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and
>>>> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by
>>>> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what
>>>> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
>>>> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition
>>>> that it could also work for natural sciences.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> JJ
>>>>
>>>> El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>
>>>> escribió:
>>>>
>>>> Hi  FISers,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions
>>>> and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many
>>>> different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the
>>>> framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological,
>>>> linguistic, etc.
>>>>
>>>> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction
>>>> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though
>>>> it too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be
>>>> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less
>>>> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the
>>>> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative
>>>> analyses/properties of information."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic
>>>> metaphor in defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor has
>>>> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique
>>>> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of
>>>> functions (see the last column in *Table 1*.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied
>>>> theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging
>>>> to the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically
>>>> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of *Table
>>>> 1*.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Table 1.*  The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic
>>>> Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language
>>>> theory, and linguistics.
>>>>
>>>> *Category Theory*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *   f            g*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *   A -----> B ------>
>>>> C    |                           ^    |                            |
>>>> |______________|*
>>>> *   h*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Deacon’s theory of information*
>>>>
>>>> *Shannon’s*
>>>>
>>>> *Theory of*
>>>>
>>>> *information*
>>>>
>>>> *Peirce’s theory of signs*
>>>>
>>>> *Cell language theory*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Human language(Function)*
>>>>
>>>> A
>>>>
>>>> *Intrinsic *information
>>>>
>>>> Source
>>>>
>>>> Object
>>>>
>>>> Nucleotides*/
>>>> Amion acids
>>>>
>>>> Letters
>>>> (Building blocks)
>>>>
>>>> B
>>>>
>>>> *Referential *information
>>>>
>>>> Message
>>>>
>>>> Sign
>>>>
>>>> Proteins
>>>>
>>>> Words
>>>> (Denotation)
>>>>
>>>> C
>>>>
>>>> *Normative *information
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Interpretant
>>>>
>>>> Metabolomes
>>>> (Totality of cell metabolism)
>>>>
>>>> Systems of words
>>>> (Decision making & Reasoning)
>>>>
>>>> f
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> Encoding
>>>>
>>>> Sign production
>>>>
>>>> Physical laws
>>>>
>>>> Second articulation
>>>>
>>>> g
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> Decoding
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Evoutionary selection
>>>>
>>>> First and Third articulation
>>>>
>>>> h
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> Information flow
>>>>
>>>> Information flow
>>>>
>>>> Inheritance
>>>>
>>>> Grounding/
>>>>
>>>> Habit
>>>>
>>>> *Scale*
>>>>
>>>> *Micro-Macro?*
>>>>
>>>> *Macro*
>>>>
>>>> *Macro*
>>>>
>>>> *Micro*
>>>>
>>>> *Macro*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides.
>>>> According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n
>>>> genetic alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in
>>>> turn consisting of n nucleotides.  In this view, the classical genetic
>>>> alphabet is just one example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1.
>>>> When n = 3, for example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet
>>>> with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the
>>>> familiar codon table.  Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely
>>>> thought (including myself until recently) but letters!  It then follows
>>>> that proteins are words and  metabolic pathways are sentences.
>>>> Finally, the transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as
>>>> "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by
>>>> me more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent
>>>> arguement/reasoning/computing.  What is most exciting is the recent
>>>> discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of
>>>> mRNA levels in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic
>>>> pathways" underlying breast cancer before and after drug
>>>> treatment (manuscript under review).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sung
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>>>> University of California, Berkeley
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>
>
> --
> Dr. Mark William Johnson
> Institute of Learning and Teaching
> Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
> University of Liverpool
>
> Phone: 07786 064505
> Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
> Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com
>
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