Ben, Garys, list,
seems i took some things down the wrong pipe (see my post to Gary).
There is not much in what you say that I'd disagree with. But there is
still the truth-problem, but maybe this is just a problem of labeling.
For me truth has no little errorbars, but i'm apodictic here
Thread:
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14169
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14177
JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14179
On to the third section of NP Chapter 3:
Here we come to the intension (depth), i.e. the definition, of the dicisign —
first in the definition of “proposition” (from “Kaina Stoicheia”) as “a sign
which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” Separately from
what? From the rest
Stefan
Would it not be an act aiming toward truth and beauty to stop using the
word pragmatism entirely when seeking to articulate CP's thought and
instead say pragmaticism even if in doing so one has to explain why?
*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 5:52
Jon, I do see the point of your posting these links to earlier discussions
of Kaina Stoicheia. That history is worth looking at, though not urgently
so. What I don't see the point of is your posting an excerpt from it without
any commentary. Unless you're saying that the link leads to the
Stephen,
in germany we have a saying I am not more papal than the pope. There
are times of loose thinking/speaking and there are times of strict
thinking/speaking. When the setting is right people will understand you
even if use the wrong words.
Best
Stefan
Am 26.09.14 13:24, schrieb
Thread:
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14169
HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14177
JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14179
Stefan, all,
Thanks for this note of clarification which really does help distinguish
the several varieties of constructivism (the three types you outlined) as
well as why your initial response was so strong ( [imagine some opining
that ] pragmatism is the american merchants philosophy which is
Stefan, all,
I think that there's much to be said for your suggestion of our jettisoning
'truth' and replacing it with 'knowledge', at least in science. There are,
I believe, strong hints of this notion in Peirce as well, for example, here:
When our logic shall have paid its *devoirs* to
Beauty and truth are teleological terms and valuable as objectives that
continuity heads toward and fallibility clouds.
*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
wrote:
Stefan, all,
I think that there's much to be
Previous:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14340
To continue ...
Fortran in those days was totally stone knives and bear skins when it came to
graphical or even symbol string (they called it hollerith) processing. That
plus trying to get a monolithic mainframe to
Clark, list,
I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal
cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler
ones for me since I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add a
clarification of the idea of formal causation. A thing's form is its
formal
Gary F., lists,
This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the
next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at
the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked
Thank you, Stephen, for you answer and your invitation, sorry for the delay. I hope to come to NY some time more or less soon. I am not sure now, if my attempt of reducing the categories to (time, space, continuum) is ok. I have often followed a path, and later realized, that it was misleading.
Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350
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