Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

ote: > > Dear Jerry, list, > > What does Peirce mean by > “entertain a metaphysical theory that they are all hypostatically the same > ego”? > > Does he mean me and you? Jon and Gary? Edwina and kirsti? John and Jeff? > > Thanks, > Jerry > > &

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

List: > On Sep 13, 2018, at 10:33 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > But > everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory > of pure mathematics. How can one describe a “feeling” in pure mathematical terms? I will answer my own question. Simply quote W.O Quine: “To be is to be a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

John: The origin of the six “bullets” listed below is unclear. Are these your personal evaluations of CSP texts? I ask because it appears to me that # 2 is simply false. The chemical alphabet is finite. Cheers Jerry > > On Thu 13/09/18 10:03 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

John: > On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and narrow" > and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory > of self-controlled or deliberate thought". > Hmmm… Does this really help? How does a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

List: The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep perusal. In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings. Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. Mathematics alone is not even logic. In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that illuminated

Semiotics and Identity, CP 6.339 Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?)

List, Jon, Francesco: > On Sep 11, 2018, at 8:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > He also wrote later that the three different forms of thought--corresponding > to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained by positing three > different "modes of metaphysical being." > > CSP: You will

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Francesco, List: Welcome to the List, Francesco! Your posts are refreshingly original. Is it possible that the following assertion is a consequence of modern notions of set theory and symbolic logic rather than the state of logical thought in the latter part of the 19 th Century? > the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

List, Jeff: > On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to > Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential > graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

John, Kirsti, List (This is a technical post wrt to the role of possibility and actuality in the exact abductive logic of organic mathematics.) I would just add an extremely important fact about the relationship between possibility and actuality in the chemical sciences. In the modern era, the

[PEIRCE-L] Open Questions on the Meaning of CP 5.376?

List, Gene, Gary R. Gary F, Stephen: > Gene quoted Peirce: > "But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not > stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and > living doubt, and without this all discussion [is?] idle" (CP 5.376). > Gary

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

List, Helmut: > On Aug 3, 2018, at 4:26 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > List, > I think this topic is semiotically very relevant, and shows the connection > between semiotics and systems theory, with us as systems. I am puzzled by this association. What is the nature of the connection? > I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

List: In my opinion, John’s example are clear and meaningful. In my opinion, any informed professional could be insulted by the lame excuses contained in the comment below. John’s remarks have meaning for all contributors, including myself. The remarks should be taken seriously even by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

List: > On Jul 28, 2018, at 8:23 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > 4. The notion that “normative” is somehow related to morals/ethics is > problematic. I withdraw this assertion. JLRC - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

List, John, Auke, Gary R., A remarkably intersting array of remarks related to the remarkable remark of CSP. :-) The following notes may be relevant to at least some readers of this note. 1. To me, the critical word in CSP’s phrase was “represent”. In my view, the notion of representation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

ble characterization of > logic" > > Best, > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > > >> On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 5:55 PM,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

Auke Please explain the relationship between your suggestion and my comment. Thanks Jerry Sent from my iPad > On Jul 27, 2018, at 3:31 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > > Jerry, > > Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. > > Best, > > Auke van

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

List: > On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity > of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody > qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 7

List: This citation is not complete nonsense. “Precision” is a word related to measurement. The issue at a deeper level was resolved by Tarski in the 1930s. Every logical language requires a meta-language. CSP was challenged by the relative lexical fields of math, physics, and chemistry. IMHO

Re: Sowa belief system structures was Re: [PEIRCE-L] No need to distinguish Alpha and Beta graphs,

. Applications of irregular mathematics and synductive logic to the emergence of life, to reproduction of an individual organism, to genomic medicine and to the origins of consciousness are in progress. Jerry LR Chandler McLean, VA Revised June 20, 2009 > On Jul 13, 2018, at 6:19

Sowa belief system structures was Re: [PEIRCE-L] No need to distinguish Alpha and Beta graphs,

are extensions of informed numbers and lexical fields. I changed the name of the thread to bookmark the topic. Cheers Jerry > On Jul 13, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 7/13/2018 5:30 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> In your belief system, is the conceptualization of CSP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] No need to distinguish Alpha and Beta graphs

List, John: > On Jul 13, 2018, at 3:31 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I don't believe that there is any reason to distinguish Peirce's > Alpha graphs (propositional logic) from his Beta graphs (FOL). The objective of this post is to clarify a single technical point. In your belief system, is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs and Propositions (was Peirce's late classification of signs) and adjunctions.

List, John: The fresh link works fine. Thank You! > On Jul 11, 2018, at 3:05 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > >> Are you altering the meaning of the texts of CSP? >> Can you relate your existential graphs to 3.420-3.421? > > I'm interpreting what he wrote about EGs in terms of his > algebraic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs and Propositions (was Peirce's late classification of signs) and adjunctions.

List, John: These questions arose from JAS’s earlier posts; my earlier response was to Jon's assertions about the nature of medads (nothings). As to your current post, I hardly endorse your style of : > When I interpret Peirce's writings on any topic in science, > math, or logic, I look at his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List, Gary > On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > [[ I do not, for my part, regard the usages of language as forming a > satisfactory basis for logical doctrine. Logic, for me, is the study of the > essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: > On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > [[ Nothing can be more preposterous than to base that grammatica speculativa > which forms the first part of logic upon the usages of language. ] Harvard > Lecture 6 (Turrisi p. 235)] A very strange abuse of the history of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List, Gary: > On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > [ I, therefore, take a position quite similar to that of the English > logicians, beginning with Scotus himself, in regarding this introductory part > of logic as nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs Role of Inquiry?

> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:18 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Jerry, > > It seems you were only able to find one quote from Peirce on the subject; > here are a few more. > Gary: You are correct. I am not a CSP scholar so no further search was made. Indeed, as my work on the logic of life

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs (lexical fields)

ww.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Thu, Jul 5, 2018 at 4:43 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > JAS, List >> On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailt

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

JAS, List > On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > According as the number of blanks in a rheme is 0, 1, 2, 3, etc., it may be > termed a medad (from {méden}, nothing), monad, dyad, triad, etc., rheme. (CP > 2.272, EP 2:299; 1903) > > The first sentence requires at least one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List, Stephen > On Jul 5, 2018, at 2:59 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > One good reason for semiotics is its transcending of language. Are you placing the cart before the horse? Historically, the opposite appears to be the case. The very constrained meaning of any sign motivates the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: It may be of interest to some to look at the meaning of speculative grammar from two other views, Commens quote and the Modistae. IN particular, the concept of the “mirror” is critical to the art of scientific representations / representamens. > On Jul 5, 2018, at 9:30 AM,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

n to the notion of meaning / rules of interpretation that are intrinsic to human communication. > and logic/semeiotic is aims for the deeper and more universal structural > principles that he called “speculative grammar.” > The adjective “speculative” is appended to the word “grammar”. Ch

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: > On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > In your other post, you wrote, “A Rheme not only must have at least one blank > empty, but also at least one blank filled; it must have either breadth or > depth, just not both.” I don’t know where you get this idea … A rheme

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: > On Jul 4, 2018, at 12:27 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > [[ If we take any proposition, say > > A sinner kills a saint > > and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a blank form of > proposition, the blanks being such that if every one of them is filled with a > proper

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

> On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis > that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, > and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

about the real objects of those two general terms. > > Can you give an example of a process of involvement? > > Gary f. > > From: Jerry LR Chandler > Sent: 29-Jun-18 09:45 > > Gary F >> On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Gary F > On Jun 29, 2018, at 6:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover > by analysis. Really? Is this because of the origins of the two terms? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

eferred term. > > I see no reason whatsoever to infer that Peirce was "abandoning realism and > approaching sophism." On the contrary, his realism became more and more > "extreme" (his characterization) over time. > > Regards, > > Jon S. >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

JAS, List: Thank for clarifying the change of views of CSP wrt meaning of representamen and sign. >From my scientific perspective, this substitution of the word sign for the >word represent amen appears to be a major change in his world view toward the >meaning of scientific symbol systems

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

John, List: > On Jun 5, 2018, at 5:05 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Thanks. But I thought of another answer to the question about > thesis/antithesis/synthesis: > > The synthesis is always metaphysical -- transcendental, as Kant > called it, or a kind of Thirdness, as Peirce would say. > > B I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

List, John: > On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > >> JLRC Wrote: >> he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) >> specification of the breadth and depth of information. > JFS responded: > Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

this profoundly deep logical distinction, amazingly, the sciences of physics and chemistry are Siamese twins, symbolically conjoined by the facts of life and the realism of matter. > On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 5/23/2018 2:14 PM, Jerry LR

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

of the breadth and depth of information. > On May 22, 2018, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. Copula? Or >> predicate? >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

List, John Thanks for these IMPORTANT historical references! > On May 19, 2018, at 10:44 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a > significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics. > They're in the 1880

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

Matt: > On May 17, 2018, at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God > the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we > know, the same as the relation of force to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and Musement

John, List: > On Apr 17, 2018, at 5:04 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 4/17/2018 4:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> I was referring to music, not merely a collection of notes. > > I certainly agree that the same notes played by Jascha Heifetz &g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and Musement

John: > On Apr 16, 2018, at 4:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > JLRC >> [Music notation] is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic >> ambiguity of the two temporal reference systems in the notation. > > The only vagueness in music notation (when written carefully) is >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

Stephen, John: > On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose. This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much. Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post here)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

John F, Steven,List > On Apr 14, 2018, at 3:19 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: >> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking its >> meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

List, Jeff > On Apr 5, 2018, at 5:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > At various points, he steps back from the examination of our common > experience and tries to provide a more exact logical analysis of the > relations involved, focusing on three kinds of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants Degeneracy?

List: > On Mar 24, 2018, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > 1905 | Letters to Mario Calderoni | MS [R] L67:32-33 > …that Secundanity which consists in one man’s having a stature of 6 feet and > another man’s having a stature of 5 feet is a degenerate Secundanity, since > each would be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon: > On Mar 24, 2018, at 11:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > As I said before, our projects are different because our aims are different. Can you explain your “aims”? Since it may not be obvious, this member of this board has the aim of understanding the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

List: > On Mar 23, 2018, at 6:20 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > The degenerate notions elude me. Me, too. This term has a crisp meaning in physics/chemistry terminology. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

List: I concur with John Sowa’s post and his observations on the need for intellectual honesty. Cheers Jerry > On Mar 22, 2018, at 8:38 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List: Thanks to Jon for his meaningful scholarship on this term. Whose problem (definition of quasi-mind”) is this? Edwinia’s? Jon’s? or is merely another example of the qualities of CSP’s mental states? Cheers jerry > On Feb 19, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The concept of system is just a human abstraction

List, John, Stephen: A few technical comment from a chemist may be helpful here because the semiotics of chemical sciences developed a forma logic for relationships among all chemical elements. The logical formalism is virtually complete but minor enhancements are necessary from time to time

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, List: > On Feb 2, 2018, at 4:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be Existents > (2ns). In your opinion do you also believe that none of this example of semiosis that are 2ns? > As such, it should not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

List: > On Feb 2, 2018, at 10:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our > analyses of the semiosis involves > The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself. > The Immediate Object (IO) is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Stephen, List > On Feb 1, 2018, at 9:29 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Semiotics seems to me almost a meta thing. Why? Are you really considering the vast range of signs that are used by various disciplines that contribute to the non-monotonic course of lives? > A

A Radical hypothesis (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

List: > On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Gary F., List: > > GF: This ["Immediate Object"] being a Peircean term, i.e. one invented and > defined by Peirce, I feel obligated to make my usage of it conform to his as > much as possible. > >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

> On Jan 29, 2018, at 4:12 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have > Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be > called (Partial) signs, I am not familiar with the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

> On Jan 29, 2018, at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that, > according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects" I heartily concur! In my view, immediate objects are necessarily prior to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

List: > On Jan 29, 2018, at 9:08 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its > Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is > common to her mind and mine,—not the character of it, but the identity of it.

Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

3), the development of the atomic numbers and mathematical valence theory (quantum chemistry), it is now clear why his approaches reached mysterious boundaries. John S., BTW, note that he wrote a “History of Chemistry” before he read his brother’s book on Logic. (W1:2, 1847, 1850 entries.) Ch

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic (was Nativity scenes

John: In For a six-page review of these issues with references, > see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf > . You wrote: Peirce considered three universes: actualities, possibilities, and the necessitated. He subdivided each universe in four ways to define

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

-of-Compassion. > > It's a similar false analogy as in the common logical fallacy of: > > All cats are animals > All dogs are animals > Therefore, all dogs are cats. > > > Edwina > > > > On Thu 28/12/17 1:47 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

Peter, List: Is it possible that what is missing from this philosophical discussion is simple human compassion? The Holy Family were destitute in a foreign land. in parallel sentence structure for the image (icon) without regard to the facts not stated of the two images, The refuges are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.9

List: A brief comment on this sentence. > On Dec 27, 2017, at 6:23 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet ∴ > you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. What is the distinction that CSP is referring to

Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

List, Helmut: > On Dec 22, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but > there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are > their parts (given that I may use the term

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

List, John: Comments inserted within text: > On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but >> in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis

Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

List, John: > On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jerry, > > Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing. > But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day. > I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples >

Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

List, John: The issue of chirality is a critical issue in scientific philosophy. The logic of chirality is vastly more perplex than the simple logic of mathematics or physics because it is necessary to invoke the logic of multiple scientific symbol systems in a coherent manner such that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

List: > On Dec 18, 2017, at 7:58 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and > Hegel in attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which > they found at hand, already worked out.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's Influence and Legacy (was Categories vs. Elements)

List, Edwinia: > On Dec 9, 2017, at 10:02 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My own view is that language is a biological necessity in our species since > the fact that we do not store our knowledge genetically but socially means > that we must develop a symbolic referential

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary R, List: > On Nov 26, 2017, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I have no idea where this peculiar comment (GF appearing "to avoid the basic > logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from other > interpreters of CSP writings) might mean,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

List, Gary, Kirsti: Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to avoid the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other interpreters of CSP writings. By your usage, Roberts appears to use the term “spot” ambiguously. (p.114-115) (CSP, 2003) “Let a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13

List: > On Nov 23, 2017, at 12:42 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jerry, > >>> If Peirce had intended any further meaning, he would have >>> mentioned it explicitly. >> Really? > > They're not conjectures. They're observations based on studying > Peirce's writings. If you claim

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

List: g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52: > List, Mary, > Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with > either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth > comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13

List, John > On Nov 22, 2017, at 2:28 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > >> >> The term “trust” is remote from the logic of symbolic substitutions. > > If Peirce had intended any further meaning, he would have > mentioned it explicitly. Really? > > There is no notion of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13

List: > On Nov 21, 2017, at 9:42 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 11/21/2017 4:08 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> CSP’s strange insistence on the logical perplexity of repeating words in >> sentences (or on sheets of assertion) has long puzzled

[PEIRCE-L] Is Life Logical?

of the Perplexity of Natural Sorts and Kinds. Jerry LR Chandler, Ph.D., Research Professor, Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, George Mason University. Fairfax, VA USA Email address: jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com Is life logical? Here, I propose a categorical approach to numeric combinations

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

List, John In response to your narrative, I think that formal mathematic logic is stronger than mere analogy. Cheers Jerry Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 25, 2017, at 5:04 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree. By the way, using > the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

List, John: > On Oct 20, 2017, at 4:44 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > On 10/20/2017 3:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> My feeling is that CSP’s remarks are now out of date in the sense that many >> forms of mathematical reasoning are used in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

trictness." > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > >> On Oct 20, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

presenting a contingent (and > uncertain) situation in such a way that a deterministic analysis will > adequately capture the actual behavior. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

asoning. (CP 5.147-148, EP 2:206, 1903) > > Peirce essentially defined the mathematical realm as encompassing all > circumstances in which necessary reasoning can be done. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Gary: > On Oct 20, 2017, at 12:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Gary F., Mike, List, > > Should we expand the claim about mathematical objects? Gary F says: "That > includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible > without

Is chemistry at the foundation of pragmatism? was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

List: For CSP, What are the roles of chemical predicates in establishing the factual basis for existence and reality? > On Oct 20, 2017, at 10:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry relate except to the >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

List: > On Oct 18, 2017, at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Kirsti, >> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they >> become actual. > > In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues: 'real', > 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I

Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

List, John: Comments on “technical” aspects of Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) are inserted. > On Oct 12, 2017, at 3:15 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jerry and Kirstima, > > Jerry >> the issue of the "Law of the Excluded Middle” is a red herring to me. > > Kirstima >> LEM

LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

List , John: I wrote: "Because it violates the common sense of the meaning of natural language terms in the premise.” John, your introducing the issue of the "Law of the Excluded Middle” is a red herring to me. Let me add a word or two to clarify my intent. My concern is rather esoteric

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

List, John: > On Oct 10, 2017, at 1:17 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction implies > everything. Everything? While this assertion is widely repeated in the literature, I think it is highly problematic. Because it violates the

[PEIRCE-L] "Naming Logics" A Challenge to Mathematicians and Scientists and Logicians.

List: One deep issue regarding CSP’s works is the relevance of his writings to today’s world and the decaying intellectual climate that is often exemplified in today’s writings in the philosophical and mathematical communities. At least one group of logicians is facing these issues head-on, as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretations of the Meaning of Pragmatisism (edited)

www.signs-in-time.de . Though what I have just written here > will only appear in the next chapter I have not yet written. > Best, > Helmut > > 25. September 2017 um 21:44 Uhr > "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com> > wrote: > > [PEIRCE-L] R

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Interpretations of the Meaning of Pragmatisism (edited)

(The composition of this message was interrupted by events and was inadvertently sent prematurely. Several edits widen the scope of the message and contain additional concepts.) > On Sep 25, 2017, at 12:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com> > wrote: > >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

> On Sep 25, 2017, at 11:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > since you originally defined Peirce's style as possibly a 'hubris style, a > bragging style, a sophist style'. Edwinia: Your assertion is not true. Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click

[PEIRCE-L] Interpretations of the Meaning of Pragmatisism

List: I have been pursing the emanative causality CP2.230 (1910) that stands behind the subjective meanings of the putative logical terms of “quail-sign, sin-sign and legi-signs”. As most readers know, these terms were coined by CSP as the origins of his logical of synthesis of propositions

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

> On Sep 25, 2017, at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I consider that the initial quotation was simply Peirce's general > Introduction to his anticipated analysis, explaining that he was going to > explore fallacious logic, using a key example. I don't think that one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

List, Gary: Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream. It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to communicate with others. This

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences

Tommi, List: Your post bring to the front (at least for me) a central problem of philosophy, especially of synthetic philosophy in contrast to retrospective philosophy. EP 2:372. > On Aug 28, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: > > > CP 1.232 "Now if we are to

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