Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an
*individual *organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels
of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
'genus':

The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
. The standards for genus
classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often
produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
"ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
the two.

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
quotation:

CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding
what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled (the principle
of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the
standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context of semeiotic
grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type',
'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the
principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

Best.

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>
> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
> *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

Peirce writes, "What is reality? Perhaps there isn’t any such thing at all.
As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working
hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing
anything" (NEM 4:343, 1898). Hence, the only way to "verify" that there is
a dynamical object "outside the sign" is no different from the only way to
"verify" any other retroductive hypothesis--by deductively explicating its
necessary consequences, and then inductively evaluating whether those
predictions are borne out by additional observations and experiments. If
so, then the hypothesis is corroborated, although it can never be
"verified" with absolute certainty. If not, then the hypothesis is
falsified.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 11:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for that explanation, Jon.
>
> Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby,
> Peirce posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the
> sign" (EP 2: 480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify"
> this? Again, I'm mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his
> semeiotic as not corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along
> these lines?). The point is that if we take experience (conscious or
> somatic) to be a series of signs comprised of impressions from immediate
> objects, and immediate objects as one side of dual relationship in which
> dynamic objects (the object as it exists beyond the immediacy of the sign)
> comprise the other side, what uses do people think we can make of the
> dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been rebuffed many times over,
> but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the two objects) I am
> always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in itself (with the
> distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can experience
> the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's noumena
> and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).
>
> Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his
> theory as much as possible, adding parts when needed.
>
> Jack
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key
> principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)
>
> Jack, List:
>
> There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean
> perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries
> are somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance
> with the purpose of a particular analysis.
>
> I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects
> (immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final),
> which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative
> science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical
> interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual
> (quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or
> methodeutic), the third branch of the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic.
>
> Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because
> within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is
> itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered
> sign token with the same tones can have different dynamical
> interpretants--the one sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered
> sign to any particular (quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is
> constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.
>
> As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that
> "*speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. *For
> the *general *distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the
> final interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary,
> the perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (*Peirce's
> Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, p. 327). However, he also
> points out that in Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the
> divisions based on perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both
> associated with the *dynamical* interpretant--its nature and its relation
> to the sign, respectively.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term
> "token" is more properly applied to the physical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, JAS, List,


The points made about types and tokens are interesting.


Consider an inductive argument.


  1.  Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
  2.  Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
  3.  Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
  4.  Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before age 100.


In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.


What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a class--Greek 
philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier, Peirce points out, 
takes many individuals and treats them as a collection. We can, for the 
purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of the EG, treat that 
collection as an individual having the character of an existing group.


What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable that" 
and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't restrict 
the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include possible living 
Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should we say about "most 
Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or group of particular 
individuals? How about a group that includes future Greek philosophers not yet 
born?


We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways. This 
is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers employed in 
natural languages.


My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical 
tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If our 
aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the terms and 
propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the validity of 
the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to sort out the 
relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in the inductive 
reasoning.


This kind of concern, I believe, should be controlling when it comes to better 
understanding the classification of different kinds of signs in a theory of 
speculative grammar as types or tokens.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 3:23 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> 
wrote:
Jon, list,
JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!).
Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are
both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at
least somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
individual *humans
*are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in English, the type "homo"
as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead,
they are the *dynamical objects* of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with
> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is
> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the
> idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
>
> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like the
> general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or
> holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the
> level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also the
> type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and there
> can be other levels intermediate between those two!).
>
> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’
> (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the
> three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we
> use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is
> the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is
> there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy of signs? The
> universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s *signs*
> all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to refer to
> several specific levels of generality at once.
>
> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
>  dealing with the etymology and history
> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the
> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in
> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here
> , in a passage leading up to a
> discussion of the “categories.”
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, List,

Thanks for that explanation, Jon.

Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce 
posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the sign" (EP 2: 
480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify" this? Again, I'm 
mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his semeiotic as not 
corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along these lines?). The 
point is that if we take experience (conscious or somatic) to be a series of 
signs comprised of impressions from immediate objects, and immediate objects as 
one side of dual relationship in which dynamic objects (the object as it exists 
beyond the immediacy of the sign) comprise the other side, what uses do people 
think we can make of the dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been 
rebuffed many times over, but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the 
two objects) I am always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in 
itself (with the distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can 
experience the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's 
noumena and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).

Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his theory 
as much as possible, adding parts when needed.

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key 
principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

Jack, List:

There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean 
perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries are 
somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance with the 
purpose of a particular analysis.

I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects 
(immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), 
which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative 
science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical 
interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual 
(quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or methodeutic), 
the third branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic.

Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because 
within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is 
itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered sign 
token with the same tones can have different dynamical interpretants--the one 
sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any particular 
(quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is constituted by connecting 
the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.

As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that 
"speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. For the 
general distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the final 
interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary, the 
perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (Peirce's Speculative 
Grammar: Logic as Semiotics, p. 327). However, he also points out that in 
Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the divisions based on 
perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both associated with the 
dynamical interpretant--its nature and its relation to the sign, respectively.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
Jon, List,
One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant?
JAS: I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" 
when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is 
a sign token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be 
capable of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of 
conforming to a type that has an 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, list,

JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …

GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!). 

Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which 
Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type 
(Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? 
I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather 
not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once.

By the way, some years ago I did   a slideshow 
dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a 
Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” 
of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs  
 here, in a passage leading up to a 
discussion of the “categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 3-Nov-21 13:18
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative 
semeiotic for interpreting texts)

 

Gary F., List:

 

I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens as 
two different signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term here) of the 
same sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with 
Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is 
either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea 
that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens, which can (and 
often do) have different tones. In other words, a sign involves types, which 
involve tokens, which involve tones.

 

After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of 
such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states that every 
individual utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same representamen" 
even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in different languages; 
and that the same is true of every individual instance of a certain diagram, 
picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as every individual weathercock (CP 
5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says that its individual 
embodiments are existents governed by the general type, such that each of them 
conforms to that type (CP 8.313, 1905).

 

One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant? I am 
inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" when it 
is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is a sign 
token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be capable of 
determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of conforming to a 
type that has an immediate (internal) interpretant.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  


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