Gary F, JAS, List,

The points made about types and tokens are interesting.


Consider an inductive argument.


  1.  Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
  2.  Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
  3.  Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
  4.  Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before age 100.


In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.


What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a class--Greek 
philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier, Peirce points out, 
takes many individuals and treats them as a collection. We can, for the 
purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of the EG, treat that 
collection as an individual having the character of an existing group.


What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable that" 
and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't restrict 
the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include possible living 
Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should we say about "most 
Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or group of particular 
individuals? How about a group that includes future Greek philosophers not yet 
born?


We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways. This 
is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers employed in 
natural languages.


My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical 
tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If our 
aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the terms and 
propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the validity of 
the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to sort out the 
relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in the inductive 
reasoning.


This kind of concern, I believe, should be controlling when it comes to better 
understanding the classification of different kinds of signs in a theory of 
speculative grammar as types or tokens.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 3:23 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> 
wrote:
Jon, list,
JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!).
Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which 
Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type 
(Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? 
I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather 
not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once.
By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow<https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> 
dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a 
Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” 
of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs 
here<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading up to a 
discussion of the “categories.”
Gary f.
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