Jon A.S., Gary F, List, JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR). GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906) JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. GR: This follows from the above. JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary. GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus': The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often produce different classifications for genera. Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token." JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those signs (emphasis added, GR). GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two. JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation: CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910) Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too). At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token." Best. Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of > speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is > a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that > only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and > species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality > that are at least somewhat arbitrary. > > Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where > they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual > *instances > is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, > individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in > English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as > a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those > signs. > > Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is > simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why > the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with >> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is >> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the >> idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens … >> >> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like the >> general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or >> holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the >> level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the >> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also >> the type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and >> there can be other levels intermediate between those two!). >> >> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ >> (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the >> three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we >> use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is >> the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is >> there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy of signs? >> The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s >> *signs* all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to refer >> to several specific levels of generality at once. >> >> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow >> <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology and history >> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the >> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in >> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here >> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading up to a >> discussion of the “categories.” >> >> Gary f. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
