Jon, list, JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels intermediate between those two!). Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type (Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once. By the way, some years ago I did <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> a slideshow dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29> here, in a passage leading up to a discussion of the “categories.” Gary f. From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 3-Nov-21 13:18 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts) Gary F., List: I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens as two different signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term here) of the same sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens, which can (and often do) have different tones. In other words, a sign involves types, which involve tokens, which involve tones. After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states that every individual utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same representamen" even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in different languages; and that the same is true of every individual instance of a certain diagram, picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as every individual weathercock (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says that its individual embodiments are existents governed by the general type, such that each of them conforms to that type (CP 8.313, 1905). One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term "token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant? I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is a sign token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be capable of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of conforming to a type that has an immediate (internal) interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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