Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are
both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at
least somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
individual *humans
*are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in English, the type "homo"
as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead,
they are the *dynamical objects* of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with
> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is
> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the
> idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
>
> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like the
> general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or
> holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the
> level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also the
> type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and there
> can be other levels intermediate between those two!).
>
> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’
> (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the
> three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we
> use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is
> the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is
> there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy of signs? The
> universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s *signs*
> all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to refer to
> several specific levels of generality at once.
>
> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
> <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology and history
> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the
> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in
> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading up to a
> discussion of the “categories.”
>
> Gary f.
>
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