Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, List: HR: A sign (1) cannot determine an interpretant (3). On the contrary, the sign not only *can*, but *always does* determine the interpretant. One more time ... CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and *determines the interpretant* *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907; bold added) This is an analysis of what happens in an individual *event of semiosis* as prescinded from the real and continuous process. What I call Peirce's "rule of determination"--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)--applies specifically within the logical order of the various trichotomies for *sign classification*. His 1903 taxonomy has three of them--for the nature of the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), its relation with its object (iconic/indexical/symbolic), and its relation with its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). A qualisign can determine nothing but an icon, which can determine nothing but a rheme; and an argument can be determined by nothing but a symbol, which can be determined by nothing but a legisign. The upshot is that there are only ten classes of signs, not 27 as would be the case if all combinations were possible. That said, Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) have much broader application than these "categorical modes," including phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating that yields one sign with two objects and three interpretants. HR: Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. This is also true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant--its actual effect on that individual interpreter--along with the sign being analyzed. Hence, the *same *sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants for different interpreters who have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper > in the internet wrote: > "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, > in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and > in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a > factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)" > > So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the > relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but > sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from > its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, > that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think. > > Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but > modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, > as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition. > Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" > belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the > difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. > Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, > as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) > cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the > interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, > that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist > alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper in the internet wrote: "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)" So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think. Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition. Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway,
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of th
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general&quo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina > On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the > representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, > and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you > try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is > the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is > semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of > "Gestalt" (overall figure)? > > Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that > would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody > agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would > mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being > (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think > so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to > triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, > composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward > determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the > interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. > Mind, of course, includes 3ns. > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr > Von: "Helmut Raulien" > An: "Edwina Taborsky" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Edwina, list, > > ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the > "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled > away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware > of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of > new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is > transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not > transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And > the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the > sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it > part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this > memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen > to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that > the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? > Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different > objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? > > Best, Helmut > > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part of the dynamical object then is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina > On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that > the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow > situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it > serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the > representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow > situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of > noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. > Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for > me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to > handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is > not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is > hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An > object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, > but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know > the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows > who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can > categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the > interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of > determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new > sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the > now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the > object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the > sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part > is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the > interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see > the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we > construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is > an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The > material part of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is > spatially defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical > object can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the > immediate object, i guess. > > Best, Helmut > > > Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr > Von: "Edwina Taborsky" > An: "Helmut Raulien" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the > Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad > or only a new Representamen? > > My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, > contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when > nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the > cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] > contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, > remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. > > That is, this interpretant would a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, List: HR: The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and *the interpretant changes the object*, which is some sort of determination too. According to Peirce, the bolded part is incorrect. CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. Hence, the object determines the interpretant through the mediation of the sign while being unaffected by that interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 9:20 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, > that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow > situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter > it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is > the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow > situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of > noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. > Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide > for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How > to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it > is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, > it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real > object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual > interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be > hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, > nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of > determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the > sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, > which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the > interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old > interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks > like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger > context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) > commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with > the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower > commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, > and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more > examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic > interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part > of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is spatially > defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical object > can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the > immediate object, i guess. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is spatially defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical object can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the immediate object, i guess. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad or only a new Representamen? My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content. And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site. But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of O-R-I…..and even DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand for…. We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and degenerate categorical modes. That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]? BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 3-3 without an external ‘assi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
List: It was amusing to read theses historic responses to an issue that faded away in most of the philosophical community and almost all the scientific community. Edwinia broaches on current (and meaningful) aspects of the stipulations of cognitive forms to objects of the external world. > On Jan 7, 2024, at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of > the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this > site. > > But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of > O-R-I…..and even > DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters > stand for…. > > We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, > It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a > Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other > than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) > The clarity of human capacities to deal with the external world is what is at stake. During the lifespan of CSP, the scientific methodologies were in the early state of development. The relationships between matter, attributes, and cognitive consequences were in the early stages of development. Subsequent to CSP’s writings, it became crystal clear that “three” was a minimum number for meditating about the assignment of a name to a natural object. In the scientific world today, the meaning of a sign can be assigned to hundreds, thousands of contributing factors. With precision! Thus, the value of this discussion is problematic. Far more important, in my judgment, is the designation of the terms “Possible” and "Necessitant.” These terms have morphed into logical symbols essential to formal logics that assign meanings to observations about objects based on the collections of signs emanating from natural forms. The emerged methodology creates one:one correspondence between cognitive forms (icons?) and external forms. [This methodology emerged from the mathematics of graph theory and the chemical table of elements.] My purpose in drafting this note is to point to a specific challenge that opens the gap between scientific writing and philosophical writings such as this set of exchanges. In my understanding of the communications gaps, the languages of the sciences have developed the capacity of cognitive creativity that uses abstract mathematics and logic and observations to associate specific forms for the identity of abstracts objects, mathematical, chemical, genetic, etc. This cognitive capacity has generated unbounded numbers of signs and interpretations of signs, symbols and behaviors. Such capacities are of little interest to other disciplines. In the absence of boundary-forming terms that constrain meanings of signs, forms, and behaviors, the conversations endlessly wonder, such as this series of posts illustrates without ever getting to the essential fact. That is, nature can produce endless varieties of signs and human languages can produce endless classifications of natural signs. Cheers Jerry A personal note to Robert: Thank you for your recent remark. However, the interpretation of my post on aphantasia in terms of category theory was wide, very wide from the mark. You may wish to consider that the necessary reasons why and how philosophers of matter and material causality developed the language of chemistry and molecular biology and hence the mathematics of life. More precisely, the critical hinges are the connects between permutation groups and space groups. Cheers JLRC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad or only a new Representamen? My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content. And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site. But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of O-R-I…..and even DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand for…. We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and degenerate categorical modes. That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]? BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 3-3 without an external ‘assistance from another sign input]. So- the universe is a complex system. Edwina > On Jan 7, 2024, at 8:56 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Cecile, List, > > I think, the interconnection towards other signs takes place where the > interpretant serves as a new sign. Especially, if the commens (e.g. the > conversation) is not a closed one, like between two people, but includes some > publishing (like in this conversation), then the conceptual dynamical object > (the concept´s intension) is changed. Or with an energetic interpretant, then > even the physical properties of a material object can be changed. For any > sign in any other commens for which the change of object may play a role, the > interpretant can serve as a new sign, which, in relation with the object, > causes a new interpretant, which again may serve as a new sign in the > original semiosis (the spiral). > > Best, Helmut > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon: Yes! Absolutely! Your explanation of the quasi-sign makes much more sense! Thank you! Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 22:28:13 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile: CC: Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) ... Indeed, a sign is "triadic" in the specific sense that something can only serve as a sign within the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating between its object and interpretant; and whatever serves as a sign within one such relation might also serve as the interpretant of a previous sign in another such relation, or as the object of a subsequent sign in yet another such relation. In my view, all these designations are artifacts of analysis, entia rationis that we prescind from the real and continuous process of semiosis--the entire universe as one immense sign, a vast argument that is constantly "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). BQ_BEGIN CC: Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? BQ_END On the contrary, in that passage, Peirce is actually contrasting a "sign" that triadically produces an interpretant with a "quasi-sign" that dyadically produces an effect of some kind. In other words, he is suggesting that "sign" be reserved for the first correlate of a genuine triadic relation and "quasi-sign" be employed instead for the first correlate of a degenerate triadic relation, i.e., one that is reducible to its dyadic input and output relations. His example of the latter is a Jacquard loom, "which used punched cards to control the weaving of the cloth so that intricate patterns could be obtained automatically" (EP 2:547n15). As he says elsewhere ... BQ_BEGIN CSP: Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but ... will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs. (EP 2:257, 1903) BQ_END Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt | www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt ] / [ http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt | twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ] On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:56 PM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Jon, Edwina, John, List, Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation BQ_END _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PE
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile I think the spiral is an interesting image of the dynamic nature of the semiosic process - The reality of semiosis is as a transformative process, where energy/matter is constantly being transformed into another form of energy/matter, via the mediating Representamen - In other words - it’s not a static ‘OK- I’ve got the meaning’ state’; It’s dynamic and transformative. I’ve understood this process as a function : f(x)=y. Or…R(O)=I. The point is, to acknowledge the transformative actions of the mediative Representamen within the triadic process. My question to you, however, is how do you introduce, as an image, in this spiral, the fact that other triads are affecting each other. That is. If you take one triad, with the Y form of O I \/ | R Excuse my sloppy image above, I’m useless at computer drawings...but you get the triadic relations…Well, my point is that you can have another triad connecting to the O, and another connecting with the I and the R….. That is, you can have this Y form….and the Object Relation could be, in another triad, the Interpretant. The Interpretant could be moving into becoming another R in another triad. How does one show this complexity? In my view, it’s the dynamic processing and the complexity that is the basis of Peircean semiosis. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 5:04 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > I appreciate your clarifying comments and I am thankful also for the > enriching references that have been shared. Interesting though it might be to > distinguish the sign as a representamen (or first correlate of a triadic > relation) from the (quasi-)sign (or Sign) as a triadic relation (that > includes a first, a second, and a third correlate without whose triadic > relation there is no sign), it is useful to me to be able to draw a graphical > representation of the sign, and then of the semiosis, i.e. the continuum of > signs. I have been using the Y diagram since my doctoral dissertation > (http://tinyurl.com/Semiotraductologie) and little by little over the years > the Y turned into a spiral. Here are the five steps that stand out (I'm also > sending them in an attached document in case the diagrams don't come across > well in the email): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would love to hear what you think about this graphical representation of > the triadic sign as a spiral. Please let me know! > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Edwina Taborsky" <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> > À: "Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela" <mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>> > Cc: "Peirce-L" mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 21:24:59 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the > wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into > a dead end. > > The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the > triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 > 8.305] functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the > Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t > exist except as a triad. > > Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into > Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. > And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or > sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist > as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this > representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. > > Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories. > See an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc. > > ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, > the Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909]. > > But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms. > > Edwina > > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the > term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic > sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce > mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile: CC: Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) ... Indeed, a sign is "triadic" in the specific sense that something can only *serve *as a sign *within *the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating between its object and interpretant; and whatever serves as a *sign *within one such relation might also serve as the *interpretant *of a previous sign in another such relation, or as the *object *of a subsequent sign in yet another such relation. In my view, all these designations are artifacts of analysis, *entia rationis* that we prescind from the real and continuous process of semiosis--the entire universe as one immense sign, a vast argument that is constantly "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). CC: Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? On the contrary, in that passage, Peirce is actually contrasting a "sign" that *triadically *produces an interpretant with a "quasi-sign" that *dyadically *produces an effect of some kind. In other words, he is suggesting that "sign" be reserved for the first correlate of a *genuine *triadic relation and "quasi-sign" be employed instead for the first correlate of a *degenerate *triadic relation, i.e., one that is *reducible *to its dyadic input and output relations. His example of the latter is a Jacquard loom, "which used punched cards to control the weaving of the cloth so that intricate patterns could be obtained automatically" (EP 2:547n15). As he says elsewhere ... CSP: Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but ... will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs. (EP 2:257, 1903) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:56 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of > the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation > “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). > Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a > Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the > arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that > "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of > words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it > seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the > interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a > Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " > > Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the > representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of > the representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into a dead end. The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 8.305] functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t exist except as a triad. Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories. See an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc. ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, the Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909]. But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the > term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic > sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce > mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP > 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character > of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the > interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, > of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] > convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a > "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a > "quasi-sign.“ " > > Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the > representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > À: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 20:36:50 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually > have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the > triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Not if we want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign" after > a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he never > used "sign" for the triadic relation, only for its first correlate. Again, > the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) > "mediating." > > For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one > "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he > ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of > this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of > an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the > scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela > mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>> > wrote: >> Jon, Edwina, List, >> >> Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to >> consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, >> referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the >> representamen to the object for the interpretant? >> >> Best regards, >> >> Cécile >> >> Cécile Cosculluela >> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation >> >> De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> >> À: "
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - yes, I think you could come to such a conclusion. That’s why I always use ‘representamen’ to refer to the mediative process. And I capitalize the term of Sign when I refer to the triad. I think it’s important to recognize that the triad is functionally irreducible; That is, the Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant isn’t made up of three separately existing entities - which is why I don’t think one can come up with a graph of ‘an object’ or ‘a sign’ or ‘an interpretant’. >There are no such separate entities. As Peirce said [8.305] “I shall define a Sign and show its triadic form”. That seems to me, fairly straightforward - that the Sign has a triadic form!. So- yes, when referring to the triad, you can use the term of Sign! Then he breaks down this triadic form into parts, “A sign has two objects, its object as it is represented and its object in itself’ 8.333. My understanding of this - is that the Triadic Sign - functions within the relationships of ’two objects correlated to it. Then - Peirce continues: “It has also three interpretants” [ibid]..and these are also part of that whole functional triad of the Sign. And Peirce does refer just to that mediating relation, the representamen/sign which he refers to “as it is in itself” [8334. That is - just that single relation without the interaction with the object[s] and interpretant[s]. “A Sign, or Representmen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, Called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant…” EP 2:272. “A respresentamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object, and to another correlate, its interpretant” 1901 MS[R]1147”A sign is an object capable of determining in a mind a cognition of an object, called the object of the sign. A sign is a species under the genus representamen. A representamen is an object A, in such a triadic relation to an objet B, for an objet C’…1903 MS[R]792:2 “Every sign is in a triad relation to an object and to an interpretant” 1904 MS[R]L107 My point again, is that the mediating relation [called the sign, the representamen] doesn’t exist per se on its own but within a triadic function of Object-sign/representamen- Interpretant. We can analytically explore the categorical nature of this mediative relation [ as a Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign] but again - it doesn’t exist on its own but only within the full triad, which can also be considered as a Sign….because it functions only within relationships! Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:23 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, List, > > Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to > consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, > referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > À: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a > triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" > (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > > No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) > correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) > mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. > As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper > (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), > "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. > However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were > synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the > triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). > > This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name > "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase > letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" > at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with > the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon, Edwina, John, List, Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 20:36:50 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Not if we want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign" after a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he never used "sign" for the triadic relation, only for its first correlate. Again, the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating." For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). Regards, Jon On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Jon, Edwina, List, Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" < [ mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com | jonalanschm...@gmail.com ] > À: "Peirce-L" < [ mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu | peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ] > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: BQ_BEGIN CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). BQ_END No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( [ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics ] ), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "objec
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Not if we want to be consistent with *Peirce's *usage of the term "sign" after a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he *never *used "sign" for the triadic relation, *only *for its first correlate. Again, the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating." For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). Regards, Jon On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, List, > > Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate > to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, > referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > ---------- > *De: *"Jon Alan Schmidt" > *À: *"Peirce-L" > *Envoyé: *Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 > *Objet: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign > is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the > symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > > > No, again, the sign is *not *a triadic relation--it is the first > (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of representing or (more > generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and > interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), > "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. > However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were > synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the > triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). > > This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name > "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase > letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name > "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and > one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the > branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where > the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the > perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are > equivalent. > > [image: image.png] > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < > cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, >> >> Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the >> oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it >> represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a >> triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP >> 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to >> represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the >> sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or >> examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a >> representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually >> no graphical representations of the sign i
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon, In discussing Peirce's writings, it's important to point out differences and developments in his writings over time. But if Peirce didn't say something explicitly, it's important to avoid putting words in his mouth. The following comment you quoted does not cite any statement by Peirce that mentioned "a triadic relation of semiosis": "As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455)." I'm not saying that this statement is wrong. But as far as I know, I seriously doubt that Peirce would draw an EG that contained four distinct entities: Sign, Object, Interpretant, and Mediating. If you wish to draw that diagram, you have a right to do so. But If Peirce never drew an EG in that form, then nobody has a right to claim that it is something Peirce might have done. I wouldn't deny you the right to draw that diagram, as long as you admit that it is your diagram, not Peirce's. I would say the same about Ogden and Richards's meaning triangle. It is certainly not a diagram that Peirce drew or might have drawn. It is also totally different from any existential graph. But the relationships that O & R described must be interpreted in the terms that they used. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" = Cécile, List: CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent. [image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela wrote: Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... Warm regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon, Edwina, List, Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( [ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics ] ), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt | www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt ] / [ http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt | twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ] On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... Warm regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation BQ_END _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). No, again, the sign is *not *a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent. [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, > > Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the > oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it > represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a > triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP > 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to > represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the > sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or > examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a > representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually > no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, > since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the > sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean > scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by > Peirce? > > Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... > > Warm regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - I won’t presume to provide a ‘general consensus’ of how other Peircean scholars view the graphical representation of the sign; I’ll speak only for myself. My view - as based within Peirce’s writings - is that there is no such thing as a separate ’sign-in-itself’, or a separate object-in-itself- or an ‘interpretant in itself’. Therefore one cannot even ask for an image of any one of these correlates/relations ‘in themselves’….since they don’t exist. That is also why I prefer to refer to the mediate sign in the triad [Object-Sign-Interpretant] instead as the Representamen [a term also used by Peirce for this relation] - to avoid confusion with the term used for the FULL TRIAD [Sign]. The Sign, as used by Peirce, refers to the triadic set of three relations which operate as one unit; as a function, so to speak. As he writes, the sign is” “anything which determines something else [its interpretant] to refer to an object to which itself refers [ its object] in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infnitum’ "2.303. Or “As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. “ [1906; EP 2.544 [notes].] In the above, we can see that Price’s definition of the Sign is always as an active function, a triadic function. None of the three relations exist 'per se’, by themselves for that would be to deny the action. Peirce himself used the image of a Y to show this triad as a ‘graph with three tails’. [1.346-347] Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, > > Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the > oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it > represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a > triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP > 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to > represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the > sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or > examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a > representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually > no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, > since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign > with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would > you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on > the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? > > Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... > > Warm regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation  > > De: "Edwina Taborsky" > À: "Edwina Taborsky" > Cc: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 16:15:34 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cecile > Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image > of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, > which is always a triad, > > “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is > an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an > interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a > relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” > 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three > interpretants’. 8.333. > > “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and > refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and > the mind” 3.359-60 > > Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but > it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three > correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a > closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y > shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. > > Edwina > > On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Cecile > > Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three > correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a > good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. &
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation , it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... Warm regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Edwina Taborsky" À: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 16:15:34 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cecile Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, which is always a triad, “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three interpretants’. 8.333. “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and the mind” 3.359-60 Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. Edwina On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina BQ_BEGIN BQ_BEGIN Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, which is always a triad, “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three interpretants’. 8.333. “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and the mind” 3.359-60 Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Cecile > > Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three > correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a > good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. > > As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations > and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting > three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. > > And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key > factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new > Signs. > > Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, > with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one > may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from > it” > > The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of > three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction > with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact > about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. > > And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations > are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph > of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. > > Edwina >> >>> Dear Peirce-Listers, >>> >>> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical >>> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his >>> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. >>> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by >>> Peirce would be most helpful. >>> >>> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! >>> >>> Best regards, >>> >>> Cécile >>> >>> Cécile Cosculluela >>> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >>> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >>> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >>> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
I agree with Edwina's comments. And I would add that it's important to ask what do you mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". Do you mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign. Or do you mean examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types? Since anything perceptible can be a mark, there are an infinity of possibilities, some of which Peirce mentioned. The same is true of tokens and types. For examples, flip the pages of CP, EP, the Logic Notebook, and various MSS that may be accessible. Suggestion: Find some drawings by Peirce in any of those sources, send copies or citations to Peirce L, and ask for opinions about them. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina > >> Dear Peirce-Listers, >> >> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical >> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his >> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. >> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by >> Peirce would be most helpful. >> >> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! >> >> Best regards, >> >> Cécile >> >> Cécile Cosculluela >> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: I am not aware of any graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. You asked a similar question on the List a few years ago, and as I said back then ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00280.html), some scholars *mistakenly *point to the Existential Graphs with three tails in CP 1.347, or the inverted Y for a triad in CP 4.310, or the triangle for a triplet in CP 7.426. However, Peirce does not describe *any* of these as diagrams of a *sign*, which is neither a triadic relation nor a triad nor a triplet--it is the first (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of *representing *or (more generally) *mediating*. As such, it corresponds to one of the three lines of identity in CP 1.347, while its object and interpretant correspond to the other two. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 3:45 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Dear Peirce-Listers, > > I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical > representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his > papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. > Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by > Peirce would be most helpful. > > Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
