Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments --"The union of the units unites the unity"

List: The issue of the meaning of the term "representamen" is critical from a wider perspective. In the 1860's, CSP formed the triad: Thing - representation - form. (W1:257, see also W1:472-473) Thus, mental forms can be a consequence of the choice of representations of the antecedent

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark - see my comments below - and Happy Thanksgiving. - Original Message - From: "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com> To: "PEIRCE-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 5:35 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 25, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > Is it possible that, by "habit", Peirce was trying to "philosophize" (or > abstract the 'thirdness" out of) the phenomenon of biological evolution know > to the late 19th century ? He’s definitely influenced by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark, Edwina, lists, You wrote: ". . . from what I can tell habits are just habits - a common term he applies to both the regular (112515-1) phenomena of everyday life as well as fundamental ontology. If you’re aware of a place where he makes a clear distinction in his use of the term I’d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

A few comments then I’ll have to go silent for a while - I’m hoping others chime in on my questions although perhaps they are just unanswerable with Peirce’s corpus. > On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 'Pure feeling' isn't simply the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Check out the ten signs 2.256. > > Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , > which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in > a mode of Secondness

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark, Edwina, lists, You wrote: ". . . everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most certainly a sign; it can be, (112515-1) all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness." It seems to me that this statement would be true for those experiences

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

-- From: g...@gnusystems.ca To: 'PEIRCE-L' Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Edwina, Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is sayi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark, Edwina, lists, You wrote: "Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about is acquiring(112515-1) habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark - See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 12:41 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Gary F, Edwina, Frances, lists, I am am not a Peircean expert, but this much I have learned from my limited readings of Peirce: (i) The sign is an irreducibly triadic relation among object, representamen (also called 'sign' by Peirce, apparently for convenience, since 'sign' is much shorter than

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark - mode is a synonym for category. > > Check out the ten signs 2.256. > > Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , > which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Gary, Jeff, list, I see that the thread count got to 100, so I suppose this is why the thread (in my email account, anyway) seems to have moved over to the one started by Jeff (accidentally?) awhile ago. I would have thought a new 100 count would have started rather than the mail move to a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

<mailto:cl...@lextek.com> ; 'PEIRCE-L' <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 6:45 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at leas

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Frances to Edwina and others--- (This topic threads away from the current subject.) It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such representamen

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Edwina, Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce is saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most > certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness. Not sure what you mean by “mode of firstness” here. If

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

t evolved as continuent things or existent objects to become and behave as signs to signers. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Tuesday, 24 November, 2015 6:06 PM To: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

- From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:52 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

;peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Clark - mode is a synonym for category. Check out the ten signs 2.256. Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , which is Thirdness operating in a mode of F

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

certainly see that habits of organization, eg, in the physico-chemical realm will constraint the habits of organization of the biological world. Edwina - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:05 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) > into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. > > Not all signs have feeling and action associated with

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Frances to Edwina and others--- (This topic threads away from the current subject.) It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such representamen that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the > output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise > - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, Franklin, list, I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come across a couple of things that may be of use to it. In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition of pragmatism: “Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 7:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, > strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise > dealing with a similar situation. > Habits are Thirdness and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

secondness [2-2-2]. - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 11:19 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 24, 2015, at 7:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Briefly, a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

List, Clark: On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:19 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > Even a particular belief is always still a general. Is this a logical assertion? If so, what are premises? Is it a deductive argument? Is it an inductive argument? Is it an abductive argument? Or, could is be a conditional

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

ersibility to the purely mechanical realm. Edwina - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:24 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@pri

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

. Exactly as you say, a habit has to be general and deal with a range of contexts. Edwina - Original Message - From: CLARK GOBLE To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:00 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:50 PM, Jerry

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of the > quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits being > reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Hi, Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences ? If so, it would be a great challenge to discern what, if any, impact the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:46 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely > based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be > updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

- Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji To: Clark Goble Cc: PEIRCE-L Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:46 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Hi, Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely based o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:50 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > My recall may be wrong, but it is that CSP introduced the notion of "habits" > in distinction to the notion of "regularity." > Yes I think habits imply regularities but regularities aren’t always habits.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

List, Clark: On Nov 23, 2015, at 11:00 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > Also (and I think this is important) I think Peirce might say that the nature > of the habit is wrapped up in his pragmatic maxim. That is a habit’s meaning > consists not of an index to a particular context but of its

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark: My recall may be wrong, but it is that CSP introduced the notion of "habits" in distinction to the notion of "regularity." In this context, I read the text as a simple recognition that the "regularity" (of geometry?, mathematics? and physical laws?) were not universal features of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

- Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: PEIRCE-L Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:24 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: It’s interesting that while everyone

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits are > reversible? I would consider that they are non-reversible. To have reversible > habits - whew- that would deny adaptation, evolution,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > >> On Nov 23, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky > > wrote: >> >> Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits >> are reversible? I would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 12:50 PM, John Collier wrote: > > I think it is questionable whether Chomsky was really a rationalist, since > he, like Pinker, often spoke of syntax as something that evolved, and > therefore contingent. Mark Bickhard has argued that given a rich

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

of Kempe 1886. > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > > From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM > To: PEIRCE-L >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> Peirce just doesn’t see the whole universe in those terms unlike Leibniz or >> Spinoza. > > Your judgment is hard for me accept. > > I could argue

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I should note that this paper of Parker’s is tied to his book on Peirce, The > Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s an interesting introduction to Peirce as > well as a focus on Peirce’s notion of continuity. I find it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

Just to add to that discussion of the problem of metaphysical origins of continuity and quanta (integers). It’s from Jerome Havenel’s “Peirce’s Clarifications of Continuity.” First a quote from Peirce. In Spencer’s phrase the undifferentiated differentiates itself. The homogeneous puts on

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

gt; Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji > *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29 > *An:* PEIRCE-L > *Cc:* biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; > Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz > *Betreff:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arg

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

e, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov < spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E. Ulanowicz" <

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

a larger semiotic process of interpretation? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 3:10 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

ter putting a lot of thought into this > reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and > signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in > which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any > sign could have no

[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

uldn't help but draw that judgment--I not making this up. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ____________ From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:55 PM To: peirce-l@list.i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Franklin, my responses inserted below. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 1

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

anklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM To: PEIRCE-L Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Jeff, list, Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a thread already underway, that doe

Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list, > > Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title. I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Helmut, To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Franklin, I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

cist.lo...@gmail.com] Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:55 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Jeff, list, I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any reply is made to what I have to say. Afte

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

    Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many other things with each other. Franklin, I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Helmut, The unicorn issue is one that I am uncertain about. There's not much more to say about it at this point, as I don't recall what CSP had to say about such things, and I haven't put much thought into it with respect to the semiotic point of view. One thing I could mention is that Peirce

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Sungchul, list, First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that out. Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Franklin, thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself too, as you have written. I will have to read more before

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Helmut, You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you. I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is going on there

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Franklin, I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Helmut, I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both? I am not

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Helmut, I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list, I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any reply is made to what I have to say. After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments. I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much about this subject for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Franklin: On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are > incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into > arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent by > the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jerry, I am referencing the diagrams that Jeff attached to his last post, under the subject thread "Vol. 2 of CP, On Induction" and never meant to be saying anything theoretical about diagrams in general.. -- Franklin On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Jerry

[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Gary F, list, Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign"

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

  Franklin, Gary, list, I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself,