Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

On 4/16/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Maybe temporality, that what distinguishes "t" from "x,y,z",
is the essence of mind?


I think we've exhausted most of the issues.

If you want one word, I'd say semeiotic.

John


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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Helmut Raulien]

John, list,

 

You wrote:

 


"
HR
> graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
> time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
> inventing symbols for time and its flow?

 

Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
mathematics. They also use equivalent words when they talk about
the same subjects in their preferred NLs.

But the discrete words and symbols of any language, natural or
artificial, can't express the full continuity of their experience.
A photograph or movie is better. And systems of virtual reality
are even better. But nothing expresses the full continuity.



".

 

I am not a mathematician, but I guess, that in mathematical equations, e.g. differential equations, the dimension "t" is used and treated like any other dimension, e.g. a spatial dimension. In mathematics there are iterations. Iterations are processes in time. I guess, in mathematics there are also symbols for observations of iterations, like the Ljapunov-exponent in chaos theory. But I guess, to mathematically get a grip at the concept of "presence", one has to be a pretty advanced mathematician.

"Presence" seems to be a very complex thing, like a layer in time-space, connecting all availabe layer-increments/points of temporal actuality to one observer.

But in words-language we have many terms that take "presence" for granted and use it, due to its being part of everyday experience. So, what mathematically is very complex and takes a set of edge conditions to define it, in words-language seems, but is not, trivial. Most terms of reflection contain it, such as "game" or "history".

Maybe "presence" seems to have a double-meaning: A mind´s attention, and a point or a spatial layer connecting points in time. In fact though, perhaps this meaning is not double. In this case, logic is an action of a mind, because logic needs the concept of presence. Maybe temporality, that what distinguishes "t" from "x,y,z", is the essence of mind?

 

Best, Helmut


 16. April 2018 um 06:05 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
a given syntax and vocabulary.

He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
claim: A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.

If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
rage. I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )

>> JFS: every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
>> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...
>
> JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John. In today’s
> terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
> but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
> express human thought or intent or meaning.

Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
among themselves. When designing that notation, they discuss every
definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.

JRLC
> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
> A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.

DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
notations of chemistry.

> Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.

There is no such thing as "common spoken language". Every sentence
anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.

It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
in very loose analogies. I believe that's what you mean by "flow
into the spoken language with time". But the scientists themselves
still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.

JLRC
> Units must be defined! The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
> with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
> the author is communicating with.

Yes. When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
express 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Stephen, list,

Thanks for that clear response,

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 1:47 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Absolutely. The words are from my Kindle book Tractatus which is clearly
> related to Wittgenstein.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 2:21 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Dear Stephen, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Your words are lovely.
>>
>>
>>
>> But pray tell, would you accept the following assertion as one that
>> pragmaticists would boast themselves to be?
>>
>>
>>
>> *'the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the
>> principles of justice in acquisition and transfer .. .'?*
>>
>>
>>
>> With best wishes,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
>>> Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
>>> which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
>>> what happened.
>>>
>>> Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.
>>>
>>> Reality is all.
>>>
>>> All is the case.
>>>
>>> The world is a case.
>>>
>>> A case is a sign.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Facts are claims as well as true.
>>>
>>> Things are what they are.
>>>
>>> Ultimately, what is good is what is true.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Sometime is time to come.
>>>
>>> Future is here in
>>>
>>> The world is determined as we go.
>>>
>>> Things change and remain the same.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> There is no end to all.
>>>
>>>  Continuity and movement reign.
>>>
>>>  Days are units of progress.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> The case is what is true.
>>>
>>> The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.
>>>
>>> Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
>>> disposition of choices.
>>>
>>> Our world is where we are in reality.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Logic tends toward good.
>>>
>>> The world tends toward good.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> The world is not divided by any mental gyration.
>>>
>>> The world is what it is.
>>>
>>> +
>>>
>>> Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
>>> knowing.
>>>
>>> No one has a final answer.
>>>
>>> Most mystery we cannot fathom.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>>
 Edwina and Stephen,

 ET

> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>

 A sentence is just one move in a language game.

 For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
 to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
 Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf

 See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
 games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.

 And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
 The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
 that involve competition.

 It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
 "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement

 SCR

> I claim logic is good.
>

 Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
 the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.

 But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
 is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
 philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
 As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
 prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.

 When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
 historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
 been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.

 I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
 In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
 study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
 natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.

 Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
 makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
 of inference, which preserve truth.

 Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
 constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
 a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.

 To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
 (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
 (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
 Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.

 If you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Stephen, list,



Your words are lovely.



But pray tell, would you accept the following assertion as one that
pragmaticists would boast themselves to be?



*'the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the
principles of justice in acquisition and transfer .. .'?*



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
> Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
> which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
> what happened.
>
> Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.
>
> Reality is all.
>
> All is the case.
>
> The world is a case.
>
> A case is a sign.
>
> +
>
> Facts are claims as well as true.
>
> Things are what they are.
>
> Ultimately, what is good is what is true.
>
> +
>
> Sometime is time to come.
>
> Future is here in
>
> The world is determined as we go.
>
> Things change and remain the same.
>
> +
>
> There is no end to all.
>
>  Continuity and movement reign.
>
>  Days are units of progress.
>
> +
>
> The case is what is true.
>
> The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.
>
> Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
> disposition of choices.
>
> Our world is where we are in reality.
>
> +
>
> Logic tends toward good.
>
> The world tends toward good.
>
> +
>
> The world is not divided by any mental gyration.
>
> The world is what it is.
>
> +
>
> Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
> knowing.
>
> No one has a final answer.
>
> Most mystery we cannot fathom.
>
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Edwina and Stephen,
>>
>> ET
>>
>>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
>>> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>>>
>>
>> A sentence is just one move in a language game.
>>
>> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
>> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
>> Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf
>>
>> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
>> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.
>>
>> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
>> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
>> 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
>> that involve competition.
>>
>> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
>> "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
>>
>> SCR
>>
>>> I claim logic is good.
>>>
>>
>> Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
>> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.
>>
>> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
>> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
>> philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
>> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
>> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.
>>
>> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
>> historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
>> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.
>>
>> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
>> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
>> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
>> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.
>>
>> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
>> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
>> of inference, which preserve truth.
>>
>> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
>> constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
>> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.
>>
>> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
>> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
>> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
>> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.
>>
>> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
>> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
>> further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
>> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
what happened.

Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.

Reality is all.

All is the case.

The world is a case.

A case is a sign.

+

Facts are claims as well as true.

Things are what they are.

Ultimately, what is good is what is true.

+

Sometime is time to come.

Future is here in

The world is determined as we go.

Things change and remain the same.

+

There is no end to all.

 Continuity and movement reign.

 Days are units of progress.

+

The case is what is true.

The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.

Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
disposition of choices.

Our world is where we are in reality.

+

Logic tends toward good.

The world tends toward good.

+

The world is not divided by any mental gyration.

The world is what it is.

+

Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
knowing.

No one has a final answer.

Most mystery we cannot fathom.



amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Stephen,
>
> ET
>
>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
>> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>>
>
> A sentence is just one move in a language game.
>
> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
> Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf
>
> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.
>
> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
> 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
> that involve competition.
>
> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
> "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
>
> SCR
>
>> I claim logic is good.
>>
>
> Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.
>
> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
> philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.
>
> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
> historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.
>
> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.
>
> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
> of inference, which preserve truth.
>
> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
> constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.
>
> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.
>
> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
> further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

There's a lot beyond what you have said that is suggestive. But I will say
just two things. If I was starting from scratch I would recognize a
division between any contrived or explicit or mathematical or scientific
language that is logically consistent and what I would call normal language
or some such phrase. This is all the stuff that goes on between us all. It
is imprecise, vague, comprehended, doomed to miss and otherwise as slippery
as a handful of minnows. Even here when not dealing or referring to some
specific logical unity within the whole of language we talk past one
another and as often as not are saying something entirely different than
what is set down. As Isaiah (poet one) said: "See and see but do not
perceive". Now I am probably close to being a musical prodigy but I could
never master the lingo so when I was commissioned to do choral work I sang
into a tape recorder and passed words and tape on to a fellow who knew how
to finish the job. My inabilities in the entire area of what I would call
contrived or explicit languages amount to much more of a disability than
Peirce's lamented left-handedness. My entire project has to do with how we
can communicate better in normal language to the point that we achieve a
slight tilt in our inherited modes of communication which I see as binary.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Stephen, John:
>
> On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose.
>
>
> This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much.
>
> Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post
> here) uses all words in this sense?
>
> That being said (with a bit of sarcasm :-) ), I think you missed the
> intent of my message so I would ask that you broaden the scope of your
> considerations.
> I start from my lifelong experience that human communication is an
> extraordinarily difficult topic to discuss, in part because the huge
> variety of experiences of individuals with different educational
> backgrounds.
>
> The point is that human cultures have constructed *many many many* symbol
> systems.
> Semiotics applies to BOTH natural external signs and to symbols
> externalized by purposeful human intent.
>
> Consider the notation for music.
> This symbol system is a very important to many individuals in our cultural.
> One reference system for a musical notation is often an mathematical
> object, an octave and repetitions of octaves.
> Another reference system is a measure. Compositions into phrases, etc.
> *Both* reference systems invoke the notion of time.
> I think that most would agree that this is a very effective symbol systems
> for communicating information.
> It is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic ambiguity of the two
> temporal reference systems in the notation.
> Are Inferences from the musical notation to mathematics, physics, sound
> perception and emotions logical?  If so, how is the temporal ambiguity
> interpreted?
>
> Since so many different symbol systems are used in so many different
> disciplines, an interpreter of a symbolic message must have some knowledge
> of the symbol system before one can make propositions or sorites that are
> consistent within the symbol system.
>
> In other words, the notation for a particular symbol system is internally
> logically consistent as a whole, not merely a few strings of symbols (that
> is, parts of whole.)  A symphonic score makes sense *to the composer* as
> whole, even though it may be gibberish to an engineer or philosopher or
> theologian!
>
> Numerous other examples of the part-whole (mereological) relationships in
> symbolic meanings are readily apparent.
> But, part-whole relationships are only meaningful *IF the interpreter is
> competent in that species of symbols (language*.)
>
> I hope this has some meaning to you…
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Stephen, John:

> On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose.

This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much.

Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post here) 
uses all words in this sense?

That being said (with a bit of sarcasm :-) ), I think you missed the intent of 
my message so I would ask that you broaden the scope of your considerations.
I start from my lifelong experience that human communication is an 
extraordinarily difficult topic to discuss, in part because the huge variety of 
experiences of individuals with different educational backgrounds.

The point is that human cultures have constructed many many many symbol 
systems.  
Semiotics applies to BOTH natural external signs and to symbols externalized by 
purposeful human intent.

Consider the notation for music. 
This symbol system is a very important to many individuals in our cultural.
One reference system for a musical notation is often an mathematical object, an 
octave and repetitions of octaves.
Another reference system is a measure. Compositions into phrases, etc.
Both reference systems invoke the notion of time.
I think that most would agree that this is a very effective symbol systems for 
communicating information.
It is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic ambiguity of the two 
temporal reference systems in the notation.
Are Inferences from the musical notation to mathematics, physics, sound 
perception and emotions logical?  If so, how is the temporal ambiguity 
interpreted?

Since so many different symbol systems are used in so many different 
disciplines, an interpreter of a symbolic message must have some knowledge of 
the symbol system before one can make propositions or sorites that are 
consistent within the symbol system.

In other words, the notation for a particular symbol system is internally 
logically consistent as a whole, not merely a few strings of symbols (that is, 
parts of whole.)  A symphonic score makes sense to the composer as whole, even 
though it may be gibberish to an engineer or philosopher or theologian!

Numerous other examples of the part-whole (mereological) relationships in 
symbolic meanings are readily apparent.
But, part-whole relationships are only meaningful IF the interpreter is 
competent in that species of symbols (language.)

I hope this has some meaning to you…

Cheers

Jerry
  






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

Edwina and Stephen,

ET

what's the difference between a 'language game' and
a 'grammatical sentence'?


A sentence is just one move in a language game.

For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf

See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.

And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
that involve competition.

It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
"pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement

SCR

I claim logic is good.


Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.

But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.

When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.

I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.

Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
of inference, which preserve truth.

Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.

To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
(generalization from particular instances) and abduction
(forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.

If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John - what's the difference between a 'language game' and a
'grammatical sentence'?

Thanks

Edwina
 On Mon 16/04/18 12:05 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut, 
 In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language 
 as the totality of all the language games that can be played with 
 a given syntax and vocabulary. 
 He did not state that point in those terms because he died several 
 years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided 
 claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical 
 sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary. 
 If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with 
 rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career 
 spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view: 
 http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf [1] ) 
 >> JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the
artificial 
 >> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer
programming... 
 >  
 > JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s

 > terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial
notations”, 
 > but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans
to 
 > express human thought or intent or meaning. 
 Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game 
 that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter 
 among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every 
 definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions 
 for the corresponding words in their preferred NL. 
 JRLC 
 > Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms
originate 
 > within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time,
or 
 > incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise. 
 > A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”. 
 DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the

 first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.

 The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it

 express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with 
 exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and 
 notations of chemistry. 
 > Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally. 
 There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence 
 anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which
is 
 as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment. 
 It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up 
 and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it

 in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow 
 into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves 
 still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever. 
 JLRC 
 > Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol
varies 
 > with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)

 > the author is communicating with. 
 Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the
speakers 
 express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other
notations. 
 And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for
different 
 kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of
fuzziness?": 
 http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf [2] 
 SCR 
 > Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which
we 
 > can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give
them 
 > more than their due is an error. 
 When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses
special 
 symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the
same 
 meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their
colleagues 
 or students when they're explaining those symbols. 
 SCR 
 > Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the
instruments 
 > for expressing it.  
 No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is 
 nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in 
 a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose. 
 HR 
 > graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize

 > time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by 
 > inventing symbols for time and its flow? 
 Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in 
 mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about 
 the same subjects in their preferred NLs. 
 But the discrete words and symbols of any language, natural or 
 artificial, can't express the full continuity of their experience. 
 A photograph or movie is better.  And systems of virtual reality 
 are even better.  But nothing expresses the full continuity. 
 HR 
 > What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? 
 > Is it the same as logic? 
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

To speak of good as prior to logic is perhaps wrong. I claim logic is good.
Good is only prior to logic in the sense that it represents what
metaphysics used to see as the end of things. I see dualisms as eliminated
by triadic thought. So, for example, metaphysics and logic coexist
triadically. Deridda was not shy about saying our century requires the
unprecedented to avoid repeating the past. Everyone is metaphysical I
sense. Reality is all. Good being prior to logic in that context probably
does deserve a no!

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 12:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,
>
> In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
> as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
> a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
> years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
> claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
> sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
> rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
> spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )
>
> JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
>>> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...
>>>
>>
>> JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s
>> terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
>> but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
>> express human thought or intent or meaning.
>>
>
> Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
> that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
> among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every
> definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
> for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.
>
> JRLC
>
>> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
>> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
>> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
>> A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.
>>
>
> DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
> first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
> The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
> express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
> exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
> notations of chemistry.
>
> Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.
>>
>
> There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence
> anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
> as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.
>
> It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
> and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
> in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow
> into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves
> still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.
>
> JLRC
>
>> Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
>> with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
>> the author is communicating with.
>>
>
> Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
> express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other notations.
> And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for different
> kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of fuzziness?":
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which we
>> can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them
>> more than their due is an error.
>>
>
> When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses special
> symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the same
> meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their colleagues
> or students when they're explaining those symbols.
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the instruments
>> for expressing it.
>>
>
> No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is
> nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in
> a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose.
>
> HR
>
>> graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
>> time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
>> inventing symbols for time and its flow?
>>
>
> Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
> mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about
> the same 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
a given syntax and vocabulary.

He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.

If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )


JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...


JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s
terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
express human thought or intent or meaning.


Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every
definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.

JRLC

Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.


DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
notations of chemistry.


Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.


There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence
anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.

It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow
into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves
still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.

JLRC

Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
the author is communicating with.


Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other notations.
And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for different
kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of fuzziness?":
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf

SCR

Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which we
can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them
more than their due is an error.


When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses special
symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the same
meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their colleagues
or students when they're explaining those symbols.

SCR

Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the instruments
for expressing it. 


No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is
nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in
a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose.

HR

graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
inventing symbols for time and its flow?


Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about
the same subjects in their preferred NLs.

But the discrete words and symbols of any language, natural or
artificial, can't express the full continuity of their experience.
A photograph or movie is better.  And systems of virtual reality
are even better.  But nothing expresses the full continuity.

HR

What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"?
Is it the same as logic?


According to my interpretation of Peirce and Wittgenstein, I would
say that all our language experience, from infancy on up, involves
learning language games for expressing our perceptions and actions.

But language is not the same as logic.  It's more accurate to say
that every version of logic, from Aristotle to the present, is
a special-purpose notation for some language game.

The primary advantage of using some logic notation is that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

Logic is in my view good -- the good toward which things tend when logic is
understood and followed. Words are a sort of utility by which we can
perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them more
than their due is an error I think even world-class philosophers like LW
make though in Wittgenstein's case it was substantially modified. Logic is
definitely prior to words through words are the instruments for expressing
it. I am speaking of course of logic as a universal that is devalued
whenever it is limited in its employment, Yet another argument for making
ethics a central term in a triadic approach to thinking.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Apr 15, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> John F, Steven,List
>
> On Apr 14, 2018, at 3:19 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
> fallible but consequential truth.
>
>
> I very strongly agree.
>
> The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.
>
>
> JLRC
>
> This may true if the author decides not to a logical language. The choice
> here at the discretion of  the author.
> Very few author’s choose to use common spoken language formally.  Thus,
> Tarsi’s notion of meta-languages which was used by Malatesta to specify the
> meanings of terms in different disciplines.  (I have written on this
> subject recently in the online journal, Information.)
>
>  Instead,
> every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
> of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming…
>
>
> JLRC
> I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.
> In today’s terminology, Symbol systems  are not the same as “artificial
> notations”, but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by
> humans to express human thought or intent or meaning.
>
> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise. A
> PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.
>
>
> is based on
> a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
>
> JLRC:
> This is a tricky statement in that the creation of new terms is often from
> outside of the standard spoken language OF THE PUBLIC.  The meaning of new
> terms is often first acquired in the meta-language and slowly abused until
> it acquires some sort of public face.  (One of the regular posters to this
> List-serve is particular keen on abusing technical terminology, re-shaping
> it beyond recognition or reason.)
>
> For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
> The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
>
> JLRC
> Yes, one can use the notation of standard arithmetic such that this
> deployment of the symbol “+” is logically exact.
> BUT, THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY, as you are well aware.  Units must be
> defined!
> The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies with the purpose of author and
> the logical notation (system system) the author is communicating with.
> Take genetic symbols as examples
>
> Secondly, the same term have different meanings in different
> meta-languages. This problem is particularly acute when the meta-languages
> are concatenated together with syzygies / sublations.  This is often
> necessary in relational meta-languages, such as physics and geology or
> molecular biology and medicine.
>
> Or, viewed from Tarski’s theory, the number of possible signatures for a
> meta-language is very large.
> I have sought passages in CSP communications that could possibly represent
> the notion of “signature” without success.
> I wonder if anyone else has explored this topic?
>
> Just some thoughts of possible interest to some readers.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John F, Steven,List

> On Apr 14, 2018, at 3:19 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking its 
>> meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is achieved 
>> fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by scientific 
>> parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a fallible but 
>> consequential truth.
> 
> I very strongly agree.
> 
> The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.

JLRC

This may true if the author decides not to a logical language. The choice here 
at the discretion of  the author.
Very few author’s choose to use common spoken language formally.  Thus, Tarsi’s 
notion of meta-languages which was used by Malatesta to specify the meanings of 
terms in different disciplines.  (I have written on this subject recently in 
the online journal, Information.)
>  Instead,
> every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
> of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming…

JLRC
I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.
In today’s terminology, Symbol systems  are not the same as “artificial 
notations”, but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans 
to express human thought or intent or meaning.

Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate within a 
discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or incorporated into a 
different technical language or otherwise. A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS 
“DNA”.   


> is based on
> a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
> 
JLRC:
This is a tricky statement in that the creation of new terms is often from 
outside of the standard spoken language OF THE PUBLIC.  The meaning of new 
terms is often first acquired in the meta-language and slowly abused until it 
acquires some sort of public face.  (One of the regular posters to this 
List-serve is particular keen on abusing technical terminology, re-shaping it 
beyond recognition or reason.)
> For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
> The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
JLRC
Yes, one can use the notation of standard arithmetic such that this deployment 
of the symbol “+” is logically exact.
BUT, THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY, as you are well aware.  Units must be 
defined!
The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies with the purpose of author and the 
logical notation (system system) the author is communicating with.  Take 
genetic symbols as examples  

Secondly, the same term have different meanings in different meta-languages. 
This problem is particularly acute when the meta-languages are concatenated 
together with syzygies / sublations.  This is often necessary in relational 
meta-languages, such as physics and geology or molecular biology and medicine.

Or, viewed from Tarski’s theory, the number of possible signatures for a 
meta-language is very large.
I have sought passages in CSP communications that could possibly represent the 
notion of “signature” without success.
I wonder if anyone else has explored this topic?

Just some thoughts of possible interest to some readers.

Cheers

Jerry 




-
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: I think, that fallibility is not a thing that applies to words language, but not to mathematical language. It just is something that applies to hypotheses (abductions). These you can express with both words and mathematical language. In mathematics they are assumptions not yet proven. So I guess that both languages are, in principle, just different languages. In both of them there are vagueities: In words language e.g. the term "is", in mathematic symbolic language e.g. the Venn-diagram, which does not say if it is about classification or composition, though both are different, in some ways even opposite matters.




John, Stephen, list,

John, you wrote:


"He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them."

 

I wonder, is that so, because graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by inventing symbols for time and its flow?

Stephen, you wrote:

 

"> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth."

 

I wonder, is this superiority of language not based on its fallibility, but just on the fact, that it, other than the mathematical language, has terms ready for temporality?

If the answers to both my wonderings are "yes", then it would be so, that both word language and mathematical symbols language don´t have to be different regarding their viability in principle, they are just different existing languages.

 

What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? Is it the same as logic?

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 

Gesendet: Samstag, 14. April 2018 um 22:19 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth.

I very strongly agree.

The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,
every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.

For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.

> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
> that made them interchangeable

See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
and Wittgenstein:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM

Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote
after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.

He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them.

That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a
combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

John

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Rep

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Helmut Raulien]

John, Stephen, list,

John, you wrote:


"He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them."

 

I wonder, is that so, because graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by inventing symbols for time and its flow?

Stephen, you wrote:

 

"> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth."

 

I wonder, is this superiority of language not based on its fallibility, but just on the fact, that it, other than the mathematical language, has terms ready for temporality?

If the answers to both my wonderings are "yes", then it would be so, that both word language and mathematical symbols language don´t have to be different regarding their viability in principle, they are just different existing languages.

 

What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? Is it the same as logic?

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 

Gesendet: Samstag, 14. April 2018 um 22:19 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine
> a fallible but consequential truth.

I very strongly agree.

The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,
every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.

For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.

> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
> that made them interchangeable

See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
and Wittgenstein:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM

Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote
after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.

He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them.

That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a
combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

I appreciate your reply and will parse it out a bit. I certainly do not
defend words and language as final in any sense. My feeling words are sort
of like pincers that vastly limit whatever the sign may be. Democracy, for
example, is an impossible term minus all manner of elaboration yet it would
hardly profit from being collapsed into D and having its aspects denoted by
other symbols or abbreviations. The struggle is to take such a term and
make it resonate with those meanings which together suggests its
ontological merit. I am very interested in the Wittgenstein connection
because I feel he and Peirce are peas on a pod, both captives as we all are
of their time, but equally monumental in breaking open the horizon so that
something unprecedented and evolutionary can occur. Thanks again, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 14, 2018 at 4:19 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
>> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
>> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
>> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
>> fallible but consequential truth.
>>
>
> I very strongly agree.
>
> The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.  Instead,
> every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
> of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
> a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
>
> For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
> The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
>
> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
>> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
>> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
>> that made them interchangeable
>>
>
> See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
> and Wittgenstein: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/m
> enu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM
>
> Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
> Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
> that was much closer to Peirce.  Following is a paper I wrote
> after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
> was also an invited speaker:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
>
> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
>> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
>> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.
>>
>
> He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
> but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs.  That means
> they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity.  His
> search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
> completely satisfied with any one of them.
>
> That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
> arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
> of an EG.  Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
> an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
> finger or a name) could state a proposition.  If so, such a
> combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
> inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[John F Sowa]

On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking 
its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is 
achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by 
scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine 
a fallible but consequential truth.


I very strongly agree.

The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.  Instead,
every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.

For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.


the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
that made them interchangeable


See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
and Wittgenstein: 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM


Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
that was much closer to Peirce.  Following is a paper I wrote
after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
was also an invited speaker:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf


If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.  


He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs.  That means
they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity.  His
search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
completely satisfied with any one of them.

That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
of an EG.  Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
finger or a name) could state a proposition.  If so, such a
combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose. If logic
it actually universal its universality is not served by locking its
meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
fallible but consequential truth.. If one seeks as I do to show that a
value such as tolerance or helpfulness or democracy is logical I can only
do so in words. It is my problem to determine universal statements that
have a scientific basis. I would add an ontological basis. I do not claim
success but words are the medium. The terms used for the logic of graphs
and other forms of representation that are not verbal may have interest but
they hardly are relevant to what I am suggesting. Of course, the notions I
have, built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even Nietzsche, are hardly
Peircean because my impression is that he may have felt there was a
correspondence between words and his graphs that made them interchangeable
or even above words in ontological relevance. If he elevated graphs of his
or any other sort to the exalted position of qualifying as a viable
conclusion to any practical iteration of the pragmatic maxim, I think he is
possibly wrong. Words have to do, and I make that as a logical statement
based on fallibility and history. Graphs and such are a language game and
they may have use, but then again they may be ethically neutral or a
temptation to play god.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 14, 2018 at 11:32 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> In 1992, the book _Semantic Networks in Artificial Intelligence_
> contained about 25 chapters on graph notations for logic.
> It was also published as a collection of related articles in
> the journal _Computers and Mathematics with Applications_.
>
> After 20 years (2002), the articles became available for free
> download, but I just discovered them today.  Three of them
> discuss existential graphs:
>
> Don D. Roberts, The existential graphs
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901274
>
> Robert W. Burch, Valental aspects of Peircean algebraic logic
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901285
>
> John F. Sowa, Conceptual graphs as a universal knowledge representation
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901377
>
> But the following article from 2014 is much better than the above:
> From existential graphs to conceptual graphs
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf
>
> To view or download any of the other articles, see
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/computers-and-mathemat
> ics-with-applications/vol/23/issue/2
>
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/computers-and-mathemat
> ics-with-applications/vol/23/issue/6
>
>
>
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