Re: [peirce-l] review of Moore's Peirce edition

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Malgosia:

Thanks for your insights. 

I concur that the concepts of unity (units?, terms?) and consistency are 
critical. 

But, in so far as I understand the concept of logic (logos?, ratio?, rational?) 
the principle objective is the notion of a conclusion (or a consequence).

Apparently, many different pathways between premises and consequences can be 
constructed and given different adjectival names - eg, modal logic, and so 
forth.

In the case of particular interest to me is the dialogue between two category 
theorists. One asserts that category theory includes all logics.  The other 
asserts that Life Itself can not be a formal system, ie, the logic of 
mathematics can not express the dynamics of natural systems.

The definition you give for logic is fine with me as a rhetoric sentence - but 
CSP followed the trivium, rhetoric, grammar and logic / icon, index, symbol.  
In other words, how would I apply the rhetorical definition to a particular 
situation - such as the logic of generating chemical compounds by composing 
components of the arithmetic progression of the atomic numbers?  

Frankly, I think that we are missing something about the nature of codes and 
the encoding of our individual thoughts into symbolic messages.

 I would conjecture that logic is grounded in the codes of human communication. 
 It works only if we understand one another.

What do you think?

Cheers

jerry 



On Jan 26, 2012, at 3:19 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 Jerry Chandler wrote:
 
 So, I remain with the question that has haunted me for more than ten years: 
 What is logic?
 
 I will bite - in the hope that this first attempt will elicit discussion, 
 and, as a result, much improvement:
 
 (A) logic (of something) is the interconnected set of principles of internal 
 connections, interdependencies and relationships that underlie the unity and 
 consistency of a process, a set of processes, or an entity.
 
 This, of course, puts the burden on the concepts of unity and consistency, 
 but I think that's the correct conceptual direction: we first perceive (or 
 decide to perceive) a given process or entity X as a unity and possessed of a 
 consistency, and this perception (or intent) , in turn, leads us to 
 investigate X's underlying logic.
 
 -malgosia
 
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Re: [peirce-l] Doctrine Of Individuals

[Jerry LR Chandler]

 with 
the community and are unique in that regard.  Such is the function of 
adjectives in creating sub-classes.

Cheers

Jerry






On Dec 11, 2011, at 9:51 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

 Jerry, you wrote,
 
 [[ One should also note the inexact usage of the term division when in fact 
 the meaning is separation (with respect to logical atoms.) ]]
 
 But i'm afraid it is your usage that is inexact. A logical atom (for Peirce 
 and every other logician that i know of) is defined by its Greek root, which 
 means exactly indivisible. The current usage of atom in physics and 
 chemistry parted company with logic as soon as it was demonstrated that 
 physical atoms could be divided into component parts -- protons, neutrons, 
 electrons etc.
 
 By the way, you also posted earlier about Peirce's usage of the term special 
 sciences, saying that it is meaningless in contemporary science. Ben already 
 replied to that, but i'd like to add a comment or two. I had never heard this 
 term before i came across it in Peirce, but his usage is so handy and 
 straightforward that i've been using it myself ever since, in reference to 
 any non-cenoscopic science, in other words any science that studies a special 
 (limited) range of phenomena (and generally uses special apparatus to make 
 its observations). Physics, chemistry and psychology are all special sciences 
 in this sense. 
 
 But i came across a very different sense while reading Terrence Deacon's 
 _Incomplete Nature_ -- thanks to Gary Richmond for pointing to it, and i hope 
 we can discuss it next year as Gary suggested, because it makes explicit use 
 of some important Peircean ideas. Deacon implies that the usage of special 
 sciences which he mentions is current within some (unspecified) academic or 
 scientific community with which he is familiar. On page 40, for instance, he 
 speaks of an effort to include the special sciences (e.g., psychology, 
 sociology, economics) within the natural sciences. I gather that by this 
 usage, physics and chemistry are unequivocally natural sciences, and 
 therefore *not* special, while the three sciences named by Deacon are 
 special because their status as natural sciences is questionable. 
 Elsewhere in the book Deacon seems to distance himself from this usage by 
 referring to the so-called special sciences. I recall using the terms 
 hard and soft sciences to make a distinction like that, but have never 
 heard the term special sciences used that way -- but then i don't move in 
 academic circles. I'm wondering whether anyone else on peirce-l has come 
 across this usage of the term.
 
 Gary F.
 
 } Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already enough 
 names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32  (Feng/English)] {
 
 www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
 
 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On 
 Behalf Of Jerry LR Chandler
 Sent: December-10-11 11:32 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Doctrine Of Individuals
 
 Jon, List:
 
 Thanks for posting this set of fragments on individuals.
 
 The writings are well worth studying, particularly if one is interested in 
 the leaps in CSP's mental development and his loss of correspondence with 
 modern chemical theories.
 
 The changing views of the notion of individual is amusing.
 
 One should also note the inexact usage of the term division when in fact 
 the meaning is separation (with respect to logical atoms.)
 
 One is forced to conclude that CSP's notion of a logical atom is remote 
 from any sort of relation to chemistry where the reference for an atom is an 
 atomic number and the signs from the indexical object.
 
 It appears that he recognized this distinction and moved toward chemical 
 thinking in his developments of his versions of graph theory.
 
 Cheers
 
 Jerry 
 
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Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jim, List.

Your response is to terse to decipher the source of reasoning.  

So, lets go through it line by line.


On Dec 8, 2011, at 2:14 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

 Thanks Jerry.
  
 Picturesque.  

?  In the sense of images?  Icons?  or your value judgment?

 But that is the problem.

 The molecule is an individual but non-atomic.

In the symbolic mathematics and logic of chemistry, a molecule is defined as a 
polyatomic thing where every atom is referenced as an atomic number with a 
commutative relationship to physical and electrical properties.

 Thus, the molecule is a class of some or all of the children.

What is the mathematical concept / logic concept you are following?
Every molecule is assigned a unique name that corresponds with the unique 
distinctions that differentiate it from all other molecules.
The set theory notion of class is terms a population of molecules.
Lattice theory is not applicable to either individuals or populations of 
molecules because every atom has an internal structure.


 The individual molecule shifts from individual constant to function.

I have no idea what you are seeking to communicate here...

  
 cf. molecule is a universal class (constant)
???
In the sense of predicate logic?
In the sense of the points of a geometric line?

 universal billy is some or all of the molecule (function)

???
  
 JimW

Trans-disciplinary communication is never easy

Keep in mind that the iconic structures created  by mathematics of symbolic 
chemistry distinguishes between an individual as a unique form yet allows 
separation into chemical atoms with a graphic structures without the arithmetic 
operation of division. In turn, chemical atoms (represented as electrical 
graphs) can be separated into parts (Rutherford / Moseley 1912, 1914? ) 
Separation of a whole into parts does not infer a logical division. 

Cheers

Jerry 

 Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2011 11:46:36 -0500
 From: jerry_lr_chand...@me.com
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate 
 for Semiotic
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 
 
 Jim, Irving, list: 
 
 A simple comment.
 
 On Dec 8, 2011, at 12:27 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:
 
 In any case, there is something discomforting to think with syntactical 
 objects which are interpreted as individuals but non-atomic,
 
 Molecules, as syntactical objects, are interpreted as individuals.
 
 Indeed, a DNA molecule (as a pair of graphs) in a simple cell is an 
 individual that gives rise to the individual child of that cell. 
 
 Cheers
 
 Jerry
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Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary, Ben, Steven, List:

With regard to alternative interpretations of Steven's philosophy, a few 
further comments appear to be called for.

Ben, while I admire your faithfulness to Peircean text, I do think that we must 
constantly keep in mine that between 100 and 150 years have past sense CSP 
wrote.  During this time, the sciences and mathematics have created new meaning 
for many.many, many terms that CSP used.  Knowledge of the history of science 
becomes a key element in interpreting CSP views.



 Experience.  One way to get a handle on what Joe is saying about experience 
 and the empirical is Peirce's emphasis on mathematics as experimentation on 
 diagrams. The result of this in Peircean discussions on peirce-l that I've 
 noticed, is an avoidance of the phrase 'empirical science.' Special sciences 
 (physical, chemical, biological, human/social) involve reliance on _special_ 
 classes of experience, _special_ experiments, to study _special_ classes of 
 positive phenomena. The title of the book _The Mathematical Experience_ is 
 entirely congenial to the Peircean outlook. Cenoscopic philosophy, in 
 Peirce's view, deals with positive phenomena in general, not by special 
 classes. I once found Peirce discussing what he meant by positive but 
 unfortunately I didn't make a note of it. I don't recall Peirce anywhere 
 saying that mathematics studies 'hypothetical phenomena' or something like 
 that. But he does see experimentation and experience in mathamatics, in its 
 study - there are all kinds of things in mathematics that one cannot make do 
 whatever one wishes.

The archaic term special sciences has little if any meaning in the structure 
of science today. I wonder what you are seeking to communicate by repeating the 
notion of special in this context?


  
 As regards Peirce's use of the word 'object,' one could call it a fancy word 
 for 'thing.' 

The modern usage of object, either mathematical or philosophical, is, in my 
opinion, remote from the notion of thing.  In the modern sciences a thing is 
marked by its properties - categorized in terms of the systems of units and 
measured in terms the same system of units. CSP refers to these as qualisigns 
 and, if the reference is specific, to sinsign (inferring indexical 
representation.)
 

 It's a semi-technical term for 'thing' and indicates that one is speaking at 
 least somewhat formally, while the word 'thing' indicates a minimum of 
 formality of reference. 'Object' can refer to anything that one can think of, 
 anything that one can discuss. It can be a countable object or it can be 
 stuff (a term which some philosophers embraced at some time during the 20th 
 Century). It can fictive, like Prince Hamlet. It's a very bare conception - 
 hard to say how it differs from _ens_.

While this listing is useful, it misses the basic point.  That is, a 
philosophical object or a mathematical object does not carry the notion of 
necessity of measurable properties - such as mass, volume, length, density and 
so forth. When CSP, in his primitive triad, wrote of Things - Representation - 
Form, he did not include the term 'object' as it fails the representational 
quality. 

Thus I think Gary wrote a very perceptive analysis of the original posting. 

Cheers

Jerry




  
 - Original Message -
 From: Gary Fuhrman
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2011 11:51 AM
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate 
 for Semiotic
  
 Steven, i had to read through your post three times before venturing a reply, 
 because i couldn't believe that you would actually interpret JR's paper -- 
 and the most straightforward part of it, at that -- as saying the opposite of 
 what it really says. But further reading of both your post and JR's paper 
 forces that conclusion. It seems that when you describe your approach as 
 “rigorous”, what you mean is that it gives you a license to bend any text to 
 your own preconceived purpose; and your reading of JR's text carries out that 
 program recursively by ascribing that very idea to JR's text.
  
 JR himself, on the other hand, says that “there is experience when and only 
 when one finds oneself in a confrontation with something other than oneself 
 and one's ideas that has the power to do something to one if one is not doing 
 right by it.” (Notice the inclusion of the idea of “right” here.) This i take 
 to be a paraphrase of Peirce's concept of the “outward clash” or reaction 
 between ego and non-ego, i.e. Secondness, as the essential characteristic of 
 “experience” in the context of scientific inquiry. There are many statements 
 of this crucial idea in Peirce, perhaps the most well-known occurring in his 
 second Harvard Lecture, “On Phenomenology” (EP2:150-55; see also CP 1.431, 
 from The Logic of Mathematics, c. 1896). This is the “paradigm of experience” 
 that JR sets out in his paper to “disentangle ... from certain other 
 

Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 
 
On Nov 25, 2011, at 10:50 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 The sign classifications that we commonly see discussed in semiotics
 are all classifications of different types of sign relation elements,
 and not classifications of sign relations themselves, which is a far
 more difficult task, since it requires classifying the possible sets
 of sign relation elements and not just the individual members alone.

Your usage of grammar makes it rather difficult to understand the content of 
your message.

In German, concatenating three nouns is perfectly acceptable. In English, it is 
frowned upon.
I know not what to make of the sign relation element component of your 
puzzling narrative. 

In 1904, CSP gave a grammar free definition of a relation in terms of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness.
By grammar free, I mean that it was not based on predicate logic and was 
closer to the existential diagrammatic logics he proposed. It is consistent 
with the iconicity of chemical notation.

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and 
without reference to anything else.

Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to 
a second but regardless of any third.

Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a 
second and third in relation to each other.
(Letter to Lady Welby, 1904 Oct 12, CP 
8.328)


Your assertion that :

 classifications of sign relations themselves, which is a far
 more difficult task, since it requires classifying the possible sets
 of sign relation elements and not just the individual members alone.

is exactly why chemical semiotics generates such terms as molecular formula, 
molecular weight, and molecular number. 

Indeed, this is one of the several reasons that mathematicians struggle with 
even the simplest chemical concepts.

But, CSP was well aware of this facet of chemical logic.  Thirdness, in the 
chemical interpretation of these sentences would be that of a single, double, 
triple, quadruple or aromatic bond.

The definition of relation given above by CSP is consistent also with 
constructing a tree, as Cayley had proposed for the categorization of 
hydrocarbons in the 1850s and elaborated on in the 1875(?) masterpiece.


Jon continues:

Viewing sign relations as sets of (o, s, i) triples is the extensional way
of looking at them, but the a posteriori extensional view of data is what
presses itself most characteristically on us in our empirical inquiries,
since we find the welter of data before us long before we can determine
what a priori intensional schemes will organize them most fittingly.

Extension?  This usage of triples (o,s,i) is not consistent with the empirical 
methods of chemical proof of structure. The icons for the representation of the 
symbolic indexes used by CSP and later generations of chemists come directly 
from calculations patterned after the method of John Dalton (1806) and 
logically promoted by Whately. 

For detailed explanations of how these calculations are made, see almost any 
high school chemistry text.  The classic University text by Linus Pauling is 
especially to be recommended. 

The fabulous success of the chemical logic in specifying the exactness of the 
genetic code of organisms which may contain several BILLION separate and 
distinct atoms emerges from the empirical methods to study the logic of 
extension, not from any notion of a posteriori extensional view of data.

Cheers

Jerry

Jerry LR Chandler
Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University

President
Washington Evolutionary Systems Society

 








 

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Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Irving, Jon, List;

From Jon's Post:
Peirce's most detailed definition of
a sign relation, namely, the one given in 2 variants in NEM 4, 20-21  54.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with 
something, C,
its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, 
together
with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles of 
logic.

My question is simple and regards the singular and the plural as grammatical 
units.

In the sentence,  Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic., is the term 
'semiotic' singular or plural?

Did CSP assert that only one formal semiotic exists?
Or, does this sentence allow for multiple formal semiotics?

For example, would the formal semiotic of Aristotelian causality be necessarily 
the same as the formal semiotic of material causality?   By extension, signs 
for music, dance, electrical circuits, genetics,...;  the same formal semiotic 
or different?  

This sentence reflects on the meaning of the following sentence:

Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B,...

In short, what is the nature of the active process of brings - the same 
meaning for all formal semiotic, or is the fetching process tailor-made for the 
category of the sign?


Irving: 
Thank you very much for your comments on the distinction between Hilbert's 
formalism and CSPs philosophy of logic. This crisp distinction had eluded me 
for over a decade!  You cannot possibly know the depth of my appreciation for 
your insightful response.  Thank you once again!

I would like to ask the same sort of question of you - does Hilbert's formalism 
restrict itself to one and only one formal mathematics? If so, would such a 
restriction be a metaphor for formal Aristotelian causality?

This question could be interpreted as either a singular formalism for all of 
mathematics or, a singular formalism with sub-formalisms for different 
axiomatic structures: set, group, ring,..., category.


Jon: Yes, the price of NEM (four volumes) is roughly $400.00, used. 

If anybody on the list is willing to sell the 4 volume set of NEM at a more 
reasonable price, please contact me off-list.  

I am also interested in acquiring older volumes of the Transactions. I would 
pay shipping and a reasonable value for early volumes.

Cheers

Jerry





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Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Irving, Jon, List:

Thanks for your posts on CSP and Logic.

Irving: after reading your recent papers and your post here, I am curious about 
a two questions:

Do you have a crisp exposition on what factors separate CSP's notion of logic 
from Hilbert's formalizations?

Do you have a personal definition of inference?

Jon:

Thanks for posting NEM 4, 20-21.
I do not have NEM in my library and now wonder if I should purchase it.

In reading CSPs various writings, I find that he had a deep understanding of 
the logic of chemistry and his rhetoric about logic was consistent with the 
understanding of chemistry as it stood in his time. This includes the quote 
from NEM 4, 20-21.

In reading your website, 
Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Sign_relation#Definition

I find that your narrative is not consistent with chemical signs in the sense 
of Things - Representation - Form and the calculations used by CSP to relate 
empirical observations to iconic representations.
Thus, I conclude that you are adding something to CSPs meanings. 

Cheers

Jerry





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Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic” (Sally's post)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(Sally is having some challenges migrating to a new email system - JLRC)

From: sa...@ucr.edu
Date: October 6, 2011 1:48:42 AM EDT
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: sally.n...@ucr.edu
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic” 


Dear Jerry,

I'm having email trouble (again) in migrating to a new system, so apologies for 
the 
brief response.  

First, I have to express thanks and relief that you gave the social sciences 
question to 
Gene.  

Second (and seriously), I would pass the buck on the Wittgenstein question to 
Michael J. DeLaurentis, if he is lurking out there, as his response to my post 
indicated 
plainly to me that he would have a much more interesting response to your 
question 
than I could come up with.  Also, Gene and Gary F. would be far better 
respondents 
on this if they would be willing to do so.

However, since you asked me directly, my main association between Wittgenstein 
and the quotes you presented would be to Wittgenstein's comments on aspect-
seeing in relation to Peirce's idea of prescinding.  The ability to shift 
perspectives in 
relation to an (empirical) object and to discern various characters in 
isolation from 
one another that could not in actuality be dissociated from one another was a 
topic 
of interest to Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein was also interested in the 
phenomenon of 
intention, of course, as it related to thought and as it was and wasn't clearly 
evidenced in language use.  When Peirce speaks of what symbols are meant to 
express in the final quote from Lowell Lecture IX, he sounds vaguely like one 
of 
Wittgenstein's interlocutory voices, setting up a plausible perspective, before 
problematizing it in further elaboration.

I have found Peirce's systematicity (as evident in the  triadic relations the 
quotes in 
the main present) to be a basic difference between Peirce's semiotic and the 
writings 
of the later Wittgenstein at least (I have no competence to discuss 
Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus and his other early writings, which may in some ways be understood to 
show a greater similarity to Peirce's formal logic).  Perhaps others can find a 
relation 
there, however.  In my reading of the later work, however, Wittgenstein does 
not 
seem to be motivated, at base, by questions that I would call semeiotic in 
orientation.  Despite all of his work on the subject of language, he really 
isn't 
interested, at heart, in identifying exactly how it is that the signs of 
language 
accomplish their representational work, and he resists generalizing in this 
regard, 
which is just what Peirce is set on doing.  Wittgenstein does wrestle with 
semeiotic 
processes, of course (on a regular basis even and often with great subtlety), 
but it is 
nearly always a means to other ends, a way to get at other philosophical 
questions.  
So, in high contrast to what JR has said about Peirce and how 90% of his work 
is 
dealing with semeiotics (I'm so sorry--one of the maddening things about my 
current email situation is that I can't consult any other emails while I'm in 
the process 
of writing one, so I may well have paraphrased this inexactly), 90% of 
Wittgenstein's 
work is not like this, at least not with regard to its most fundamental, 
guiding 
interests.  

I fear this is digressing way to far afield from the content of this 
paper--apologies if 
so.  

Best,
Sally


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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon:


On Oct 6, 2011, at 12:44 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
 The etymology of community tells us that munus means duty, gift, or 
 service,
 so the original idea seems rooted in concepts of common duty and shared 
 service.
 
 http://depthome.brooklyn.cuny.edu/classics/gladiatr/origins.htm
 
 Our notion of communication appears to be a derivative of that, referring
 to the sort of signaling we do in order to coordinate collaborative work.
 So it doesn't seem like a complete tautology to reconnect those two ideas.
 
 Jon

Human sacrifice? Pitched battles?

Jon, the web site you recommended appears to be remote from the origins of 
human communication, which most scientists relate to further emergence  from 
animal communication by anatomical developments coordinated with brain 
development.

The use of symbols for human communication (clay tablets) dates to prior to 
3000 BC.

(BTW, beer and wine were also known to the Mesopotamians! - apparently 
essential components of emergence of society ; - )  )

The ostension of community, communion, communism, communication, all appear to 
be products of common.  At least, that I how I see the terms as defined by 
the OED.

As for the website you referenced, I guess that it is a narrative useful for 
academic purposes of some sort or other. 

Cheers

Jerry  

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Sally, Gary:

The exploration of the term 'debate' was of significant value.  The value of 
debate, it seems to me, is heavily context dependent. I agree that often, when 
the bipolar opposites are firmly held, the act of debating is often futile. 
More frequently, the polarizations are not so fixed and hence debate becomes a 
way to inform ourselves. 

I do think some thought should be given to the internal debate within 
ourselves which I view as closely related to inquiry. This can, on occasion, 
lead to stalemate.

For example, I have been debating with myself for the past month on the 
relations between collective and distributive  in the context of 
'communicational communities'. A complete stalemate exists. I have no idea what 
this phrase might mean logically or socially.   

Good job! Sally!

Cheers

Jerry 

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Re: [peirce-l] Peirce and Hölderlin

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Stefan:

With regard to the Peirce - Holderlin potential relationships, and the 
connection among Hegel, Schelling and Holderlin, see:

The Romantic Conception of Life by Richard J. Roberts, UC Press.

Robert discusses at considerable length the relationships of the three 
roommates from Baden-Wurtenburg and the sad fate of Holderin.

In general, it appears to me, that Peirce eventually rejected Kantianism and 
the Romantics in favor of his self-developed view logic.  When Peirce failed to 
incorporate the Anaximander / Schelling view of polar opposites, he shot 
himself in the foot.  The unintended consequence was that he failed to grasp 
the logic of electricity in its role in valence and molecule structures of 
chemistry and in its extension to life itself. 

Cheers

Jerry


On Sep 4, 2011, at 3:06 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:

 Cassiano, George, Ben, Jay,
 
 maybe there is a indirect connection to Hölderlin. Schelling, Hegel and 
 Hölderlin were close friends when they studied together at the Tübinger 
 Stift. As far as i know they even were room mates (can't find the reference).
 
 Although Hölderlin wrote the poem at the end of his life, the idea could be 
 even older and the three could have shared it somehow (e.g.Das älteste 
 Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. A text fragment whose authorship is 
 open. It is handwritten by Hegel, but the authorship can also belong to 
 Schelling or Hölderlin1). So possible traces to follow are also 
 Peirce-Hegel-Hölderlin or Peirce-Schelling-Hölderlin.
 
 Best
 Stefan
 
 P.S.: Outland seems to me the best translation of Fremde.
 
 1 
 http://books.google.de/books?id=s2_nzshEVUcCpg=PA476lpg=PA476dq=Das+%C3%A4lteste+Systemprogramm+des+deutschen+Idealismussource=blots=a021IdBW2Esig=acJ0nORf-aHobgnFqbi-xem31dQhl=deei=mshjTvm0A4KP4gTE972SCgsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=9ved=0CFIQ6AEwCA#v=onepageqf=false
 
 
 I would be very surprised if Peirce were not at least
 somewhat familiar with Hölderlin. Hölderlin was a major
 19th century poet, and Peirce was steeped in German
 literature. I imagine he read German as fluently as
 English, having read Kant in German as a teenager.
 
 Jay
 
 
 
 
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of 
 gstic...@mindspring.com [gstic...@mindspring.com]
 Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2011 10:51 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Peirce and Hölderlin
 
 I've not found anything in a bit of a cursory search
 George
 -Original Message-
 From: Cassiano Terra Rodrigues
 Sent: Aug 31, 2011 1:46 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: [peirce-l] Peirce and H=?ISO-8859-1?Q?=F6lderlin?=
 
 Hello list:
 
 Does anyone know whether Peirce knew anything by Friedrich Hölderlin?
 I'm thinking specifically about Hölderlins poem called Mnemosyne, where the 
 image of man as sign appears. I found this link to the poem:
 
 http://publish.uwo.ca/~rparke3/documents/mnemosynedrafttrans.pdf
 
 And also this quote from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (I couldn't make 
 sure yet whether or not it's from The Death of Empedocles/ Der Tod des 
 Empedokles, by Hölderlin):
 Der Pathos des Sängers ist nicht die betäubende Naturmacht, sondern die 
 Mnemosyne, die Besinnung und gewordeneInnerlichkeit, die Erinnerung des 
 unmittelbaren Wesens. (sorry, I can't translate that into English and 
 couldn't find the translation online, but it's from the Phenomenology of 
 Spirit, VII.B.c: The Spiritual Work of Art).  This quote seems to indicate 
 to the same general philosophical point as CSP does in his 1868 papers on 
 cognition: the impossibility of an imediate knowledge. Anyway, just a point 
 of historical curiosity; but the Hölderlin case seems more interesting, to 
 me at least.
 All the very best to all,
 cass.
 
 George Stickel
 Southern Polytechnic State University
 Cell: 404-388-7162
 
 
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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your efforts in this slow read. It is instructive.

 I am rather reluctant to comment as history dictates that my scientific 
approach to reading C S Peirce are idiosyncratic with respect to the surfaces 
of philosophy which are used to base these discussions and which, in my 
opinion, do not cohere with the mathematical, chemical and empirical roots of 
his thinking. 

My principle purpose of this post is to point to the role of indexing in the 
indexical symbol systems. In these symbol systems, the presupposition is that 
the composition of messages (signs of all ilk) is constructed from the 
indexical components of the communications system and use purposefully designed 
signs to point to the roles of indexing. For example, the transitivity sign or 
the equivalence sign. For example, one notes with dismay that indexing 
indexical signs are nearly absent from modern set theory. This is, in my 
opinion, among the reasons that CSP declined to give set theory serious 
consideration for a generalized inductive logic.  [ Purposefully, this is a 
wide-sweeping statement!] 

In this sense, the indexical symbol systems are self - referential. 

In this sense, the indexical symbols can be composed into icons and iconic 
representations of qualisigns. 

In this sense, the indexical symbol systems can operate with a logical grammar 
that differs from the usual utterances of the spoken language where the 
indexing plays a trivial role.

From my idiosyncratic perspective, the indexical symbol systems are constructed 
to communicate with symbols, utterances (sounds) being a secondary mode of 
expressing the meaning. Thus, the empirical content of indexical symbol systems 
can be used to construct logics that a ostensive with nature.  This is to be 
contrasted with the alphabetic systems that intrinsically focus on the telic 
choices of the utterer, the personal emotional choices of the individual.).

CSP's teleologic perspective was extremely wide and used the concepts of logic 
is all three of the trivium, not merely the grammar of the relative pronoun.

Idiosyncratically Yours

Jerry 


On Aug 14, 2011, at 4:11 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

 List,
 
 Gary Fuhrman sent me the following response to Section 3 of Joe's paper. He 
 will be away from his home and, it would appear offline for a few weeks for 
 personal reasons, thus unable to participate in the remainder of this slow 
 read. He offered this post on the off chance that it might be of some use 
 in the small read. I think he makes some interesting and controversial  
 points regarding especially the treatment of indexicality in Joe's paper. 
 I'll only make a very few brief comments as I'm preparing to send my last 
 post (Section 4, paragraph 16)  on this read to the list tomorrow and need to 
 work on that. Gary F. wrote:
 
 GF: With reference to your comment on paragraph 12 of JR's essay, I couldn't 
 agree more [[ that indexicality necessarily has a crucial job to perform in 
 bringing about the unified object Joe intends (the meaning of his essay), 
 never allowing the reader to forget that there is this unified object. ]]
 
 GF: Well, i might prefer to say that the meaning of his essay is the 
 interpretant rather than the object of it ... but it's the object, and the 
 sign's connection with it through its indexical function, that i'm concerned 
 with here.
 
 GR: I would agree with Gary that the meaning of the essay is the 
 interpretant--I should have written something like Joe's 'purpose' or 
 'purpose in writing the essay' (that is, his own understanding of the meaning 
 of the topic of his essay).
 
 GF: Referring to “a complex written sign, such as the present essay”, JR says 
 that “the indices proper which this or any such sign contains are themselves 
 sinsigns.” But surely there's more to proper indexicality than a sign being a 
 sinsign. And i'm wondering whether a verbal sign (signsign or not) can ever 
 be a proper index. Consider JR's example:
 
 [[ ... if a child simply says ball in the immediate presence of a ball, 
 that sinsign--the word ball considered as something actually occurring--may 
 index that ball even though the legisign it replicates is symbolic rather 
 than indexical. If, on the other hand, the ball is indicated with the use of 
 a pointing finger or demonstrative pronoun the indexing does indeed occur 
 under the control of a specifically indexical legisign. ]]
 
 GF: In the case of a one-word utterance like the example given in the first 
 sentence, i think it is questionable whether the word ball can properly 
 index that ball at all (as a pointing finger can). And if we add “a pointing 
 finger or demonstrative pronoun” to the utterance, it's not entirely clear 
 what it means to say that “the indexing does indeed occur under the control 
 of a specifically indexical legisign.”
 
 GR: At first I didn't think I agreed with Gary F. here, and not only because 
 his argument would seem to 

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Ben:

Your message is too cryptic for me to understand exactly what it is that your 
presupposing, asserting and and concluding.
 
Are you referring to biosemiotics? DNA? diagrammatic logic? categories? 
identity? the distinction between predicate logic and antecedent / consequent? 
universals?  
 All of these terms bear on the meaning of such terms as 
identity/singularity/individuality/uniqueness.

Can you point to the particular sentence in my post that you are referring to?

BTW, nearly a century of enquiry since Peirce past means that new 
interpretations of CSP writings are essential, at least to me, if I am to give 
a coherent account of biosemiotics as the origin or source of communicating 
signs used by humans and other living organisms. More specifically, my text 
presupposes that the logic of biosemiotics is functionally different from the 
logic of information theory. 

Cheers

Jerry 



On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:46 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 Jerry,
  
 That can all be the case without contradicting anything that Peirce said. 
 Peirce never, so far as I know, denied that there could be a unique character 
 to something or denied that it could matter - but it's just not what he was 
 mainly discussing when he used words like singular and individual. He 
 meant the stubborn _this_, not the _uniquely such_, even when many an actual 
 individual is unique in important or essential characters.
  
 Best, Ben
  
 - Original Message -
 From: Jerry LR Chandler
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Cc: Benjamin Udell
 Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 8:22 PM
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
 Semiosis Process
 
 Ben, List:
 
 You write:
 
  I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about 
 _this_ or _that_ molecule.
 
 I respond simply:
 
 Your DNA is about YOUR DNA molecule and the encoding of YOUR life.  It is 
 an Identity, it is singular.
 It is also about your individuality.  This is the very heart and sole of 
 molecular biology, biosemiotics, and Jesper's semethic. 
 
 This modern conceptualization of the logic of chemistry and the unique 
 genetic molecules of every individual was not inductively constructed until 
 several decades after CSP died.
 
 Cheers
 
 Jerry 
 
 
 
 
 On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 
 Jerry, list,
  
 Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) general 
 icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or diagrammatic 
 generals, instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic sinsigns) which are 
 individual diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. Peirce would call general 
 many of the things which you call singular - including molecules in general 
 and their adjacent parts in general. When he calls something singular he 
 means, for example, just _this_ actual individual hydrogen molecule and no 
 other actual individual hydrogen molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a 
 certain place where people could come view at least its container, a 
 molecule singular like you, me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or 
 unique in quality, I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general 
 is not just about _this_ or _that_ molecule.
  
 For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. 
 special sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals in a 
 way that more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for example, 
 is an actual individual; but what we want to learn about such subject matter 
 is not just its individualities but its kinds, its totalities and 
 parameters, and its laws, such as could not be learned purely from more 
 general or mathematical considerations, and such that we would come to have 
 good reason for confidence in our opinions as to those kinds, totalities, 
 and laws, as pertaining to indefinitely many actual individuals that we 
 would not have the actual opportunity to single out or observe.
  
 The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is 
 independent of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is discoverable 
 such that investigators would come to agree about it if they were to push 
 investigation about it far enough. So we suppose that intelligent life 
 elsewhere in the galaxy might announce its presence by broadcasting the 
 first score or so prime numbers, because we figure that prime numbers are 
 _real_ or, as many prefer to say, _objective_. Peirce also allows of 
 generals that are not real but are instead figments, e.g., the objects of 
 false universal propositions.
  
 Best, Ben
  
 - Original Message -
 From: Jerry LR Chandler
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
 Semiosis Process
 
 Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List:
 
 Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. 
 I would only add a footnote or two, based