RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

In order to understand this, one has to  be able to take the experiential  
standpoint of an embryo, then a fetus as the starting point.  This is something 
one has to train oneself.  – This skill has to be has to be acquired  by 
training oneself .  Preferably daily and for decades. CSP did so.  So have I.

This is a practical logical task, just as is mathematical training.
--
I agree with your 'just as mathematical training' since it requires discipline 
and attention. I am not sure about 'practical logical' as the right term. I 
would call it phaneroscopic experimentation. But, maybe I do not understand 
what you mean. I never went into your exercises. I stopped after experiencing 
the "name tag" pain, not as pain, but as a tuone without a name tag. I never 
came at the point in which the rhythm came into clear sight, i.e. as other than 
just rythm. Nevertheless, it is this experience, together with the recognition 
that your embryo heartbeat hypothesis provides the possibility to look at the 
emotional attachments, interfering with the logical processing of information, 
as modifications of this rhythm, that makes your idea interesting for me. 

K:
Husserl with his bracketing was simply wrong.  Presenting an impossible task.  
But Husserl was an outgrowth of a previous error. That of taking conscience as 
the all there is to human mind.

As far as I know neither Husserl or Kant never saw the unconscious mind as a 
philosophical problem.  The notion is implied, however, but only through 
NEGATION.  To Kant, there were perceptions not strong enough to deserve a place 
in consciousness.  (Too feeble).  Husserl  not even that.
--

AvB: Regarding Husserl, for me, you are preaching for your own parochy.

K:
As you know, CSP was engaged with experimental work (with Jastrow).  
This work he continued throughout his life in the form of everyday 
experimentation.  (Which appears to me the primary way he gained his insight on 
dogs, babes,  ( even slime-moulds)  on the  working of the instintive mind.

I also started my work with experimental  investigations.  With a series of 
experiments using the Uznadze experiment.  So I do have solid experimental 
evidence of the unity of  the senses.  The Tbilisi school has acquired 
thousands of experimental results pointing to the same effect.  An effect we 
are not conscious of, but which can be experimentally shown beyond any doubt.

Of this research  of mine there are several publications in English. But not 
available in the internet.

Out of these I then developed a method for phenomenological experimentation.  
Then a variety of methods.  Applicapble to everyday experimentation.  – BUT a 
word of warning: It does take time and toil.  
Not  for minds preferring  sheer play with words.

CSP points out the phenomenological work takes a lot of mathematical toil.  And 
laments that people ask him to give proof of his theory, but as he proceedes to 
offer it, they get bored and leave.  – Too much toil!

Something similar happened when I was offering a demonstration of my method in 
text analysis & interpretation using Kaina Stoicheia.  Someone got irritated on 
the slowness and meticulousness.  Took hurried steps 
forwards.   – So I left the discussion.
--

AvB: The last sentences are an apt example of the respective contributions of 
logic and emotional attachments (heartbeat) to the exchange of thought. I 
noticed in the home sitting cases that often all what happened was not about 
the child (win -win), but about the effects of the emotional attachments on the 
grown ups discussing the trouble of the child (zero - sum). Yours offers a good 
hypothesis for the germ of this possibility. My educational KiF-model as a 
negotiation tool is a proposed remedy. It pays attention to both: with the 
child I have the trikon: 1. internalization/fear (sheet oriented), 2. 
externalization/anger (object oriented), 3. reasoned (a trade off of self and 
other in the light of trying to reach the desired goal). With the grown ups I 
have the Trikon: 1. indifferent (plans are made, not executed, but nobody 
cares), 2. conflict (divergence of estimation and/or goals), 3. goal oriented 
(given there are different estimations, lets get a clear picture of the 
different options and the wholesome goals, if there is a difference in goal, 
lets start with the option that arguably does least harm if it fails.



K:
Well, enough for now.
--

I agree. My best wishes, 
Auke van Breemen


Best,
Kirsti Määttänen






> 
> 
> - Original Message - From: <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>
> To: "Auke van Breemen" <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> Cc: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
> 
> 
>> Dear Auke,
>> 
>> I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little 
>> time, but I wish to share som

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

 van Breemen" <a.bree...@chello.nl>
Cc: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)




Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little
time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.

First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so
popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It 
is
commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living 
beings

start our individual lives in the midst of chaos.

Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often
classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.

All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I
have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the
experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for 
example

gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes
the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something 
KNOWN.

The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels
unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to 
be

revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean
sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies.

An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found 
in

his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind.
Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the
notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.

CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.

Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related
conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even
recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by
Tetens.  - Nor did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which 
I

find most peculiar).

The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic
division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.

Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in
interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De
Veritate):

"Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a
corner stone of nominalism.

However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) 
carried

a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a
part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different
meaning.)

As we all know CSP took back "common sense".

In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear
meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God.
With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to 
feel

and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.

For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek
counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the
Christian overtones.

It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five
special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of
mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were
secularized, that mysticism was rejected.

And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we 
are

passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone
electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About
which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's
collecion of CSP's mathematical writings).

Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery
already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance).

Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later...

These are very complicated issues.

But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name
tag.

With warmest wishes!

Kirsti Määttänen










Thus feeling comes first.

Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 23.10.2016 19:35:

Dear Kirsti,

As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice.
In discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time
to my detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try 
to

become more clear.

I will add some words between the lines.

K:
Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did
not share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
--

AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.


K:
Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point
was "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even
before I had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.

This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not
much to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde
conference, at Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provid

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

ng,  somebody cut parts
> out of it, replaces them with other stuff or displaces them and
> subsequently pretends that it is a joint work.
>
> I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a
> Buddhist/Christian tradition.  I always thought this is connected to
> meditation/phaneroscopy. The 6 doors of perception mirroring the six senses.
>
> It is a very complicated, and I add, rewarding, issue. That can be
> regarded from different angles, as your comments aptly show. I hope you
> continue your comments. I agree with Jerry that (scientific) progress needs
> the honest communion of minds. Alas, that is not the only game played by
> mankind.  But, I always was of the opinion, that it is the game you play
> and I value that.
>
> With gratitude,
>
> Auke
>
>
> -Oorspronkelijk bericht-
> Van: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> Verzonden: maandag 24 oktober 2016 15:21
> Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Dear Auke,
>
> I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time,
> but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.
>
> First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular
> that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is commonly
> taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings start our
> individual lives in the midst of chaos.
>
> Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often
> classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.
>
> All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I have
> shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential
> flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm
> even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of
> the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN.
> The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels
> unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be
> revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse,
> not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies.
>
> An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in
> his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind.
> Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the
> notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.
>
> CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.
>
> Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related
> conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even recognize
> Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by Tetens.  - Nor
> did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I find most
> peculiar).
>
> The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division.
> This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.
>
> Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in
> interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De
> Veritate):
>
> "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a
> corner stone of nominalism.
>
> However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a
> very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part
> and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different
> meaning.)
>
> As we all know CSP took back "common sense".
>
> In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear
> meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God.
> With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel
> and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.
>
> For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek
> counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the
> Christian overtones.
>
> It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five special
> senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of mysticism. - But
> it was only after sciences (and humanities) were secularized, that
> mysticism was rejected.
>
> And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are
> passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone
> electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About
> which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's collecion
> of CSP's mathematical writings).
>
> Electricity st

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Dear Kirsti,

Thank  you for your kind reply and especially for your historical remarks and 
your remarks on feeling. I did not read Tetens, but I recognize the point you 
are making with it. Fitzgerald for instance only takes the 'feeling of 
recognition' when he discusses the emotional interpretant. Not 'feeling' as a 
technical term dealt with by Peirce:

By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists
in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness
is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality
which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is,
however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is
present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at
every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple
definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort
of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself,
regardless of anything else. CP 1.306.

and again:
Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the
color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle,
the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating
a mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love,
etc. I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings,
whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something
that involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean
the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not
necessarily realized. CP 1.304
--

As you said:
But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag.

And, so I would add after Peirce: once gone they are gone forever. In Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man (if I remember correctly 1867, 
plus or minus 1) Peirce writes about the unintellectual, etc that runs in a 
continuous stream through our lives. Feeling (phenomenology), qualisign (sign 
aspects), emotional interpretant (interpretant aspect of the process of 
interpretation that leads to a response), designate the same phenomenon from 
three perspectives, in my opinion.

I did not use the combination primordial chaos, but primordial soup. It is a 
term coined by Sarbo. The avoidance of chaos is on purpose. As you justly 
argued with your embryo example, it definitely is not chaos. For two reasons, 
lousily formulted:
1. from an analytical point of view
 In our opinion already in the qualisign position everything is present, but as 
long as we don't evolve what is involved in the primordial soup or collection 
of qualia, it only indistinctly is present, without its nametag and, also 
important, without the habits that are associated with this input in habitual 
interpretation, which is the rule. It is very hard phaneroscopic work to get at 
this basic 'material' of any interpretation.  We have to get rid of, only to 
name the proximate interpretation moments, name (sinsign, legisign) and form 
(icon) that are inherent in the primordial soup.

2. from the unfolding reality point of view
The world we interpret is infused with reason, if we interpret we interpret an 
over all orderly reality, not chaos. 

Here https://storyconnect.nl/glossary/knowledge-in-formation/?lang=en, ( even 
the image-author connections suggested for the three images, are mixed up) 
might reside the reason for your reading 'primordial chaos'. I assure you that 
the only relation between my work and these images that can be established can 
be expressed thus; I make a painting,  somebody cut parts out of it, replaces 
them with other stuff or displaces them and subsequently pretends that it is a 
joint work.

I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a Buddhist/Christian 
tradition.  I always thought this is connected to meditation/phaneroscopy. The 
6 doors of perception mirroring the six senses.

It is a very complicated, and I add, rewarding, issue. That can be regarded 
from different angles, as your comments aptly show. I hope you continue your 
comments. I agree with Jerry that (scientific) progress needs the honest 
communion of minds. Alas, that is not the only game played by mankind.  But, I 
always was of the opinion, that it is the game you play and I value that.

With gratitude,

Auke


-Oorspronkelijk bericht-
Van: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Verzonden: maandag 24 oktober 2016 15:21
Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but 
I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.

First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that 
one should get suspicios in front of the popu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within 
> a collection of bits of unorganized matter.
> 
> Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing.

It’s worth noting that the word ‘nothing’ is ambiguous in most western 
languages. An obvious example of this is the infamous debate between Heidegger 
and Carnap over nothing. Carnap and most positivists came away thinking 
Heidegger a loon because of statements like ‘the nothing nothings.’

If one reads Peirce, particularly the passages from the late 80’s that Edwina 
brought up, as a neoplatonist then he’s clearly much more in that Heidegger 
camp. The main distinction is between nothing as ‘empty set’ versus ‘not a 
thing.’ With the neoplatonic conception you have ‘thingness’ as ideas, soul, 
spirit and so forth. You then have the One which typically is a nothing that is 
not a thing but clearly also not an empty set. In some forms of platonism in 
late antiquity such as Plotinus’ you also have prime matter which is conceive 
of as not a thing but a place to receive things and make them possible. All of 
this ends up going back to the Timaeus and the notions there - especially that 
of chora or khora which is usually translated as receptacle or space.

When you look at Peirce subject is a kind of place for predication. So chaos 
for him is this receptical or space. It’s very much the prime matter that was 
common in neoplatonism (and which obviously arose out of Aristotle as much as 
Plato’s Timaeus)

I’d add that Duns Scotus’ conception of the ouisia of God as nothing might also 
be playing into Peirce’s conception. I don’t know if anyone’s done anything on 
that though.

One of the quotes you provided also is quite platonic in its nature.

If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to the 
chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest 
feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing 
still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the 
welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by 
the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its 
relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)

This is very much a kind of relationship of prime matter to the One in 
neoplatonism. The big shift from Platonism is that prime matter is put first 
rather than the One. Although this inversion of the usual process of emanation 
can be found in various types of neoPlatonism as well despite its more 
heretical character. It’s also common in 20th century post-Husserlian 
phenomenology.

I should add that 6.215-219 is well worth reading on this subject as well, 
especially relative to the Heidegger/Carnap debate.

Again, let me note that this part of Peirce’s thought seems to me to be the 
most controversial. I’m not sure it’s necessary for his thought as a whole.

> "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, 
> no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no 
> causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and 
> that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action 
> (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In other words, unless the 
> blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational 
> antecedent"--there can never be a spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness 
> (Firstness) and boundary (Secondness) in the first place.

In a similar way, I might add, to us from a platonic point of view without Soul 
there is nothing. Peirce’s notion of thirdness is very similar to the third 
emanation in Plotinus’ system of emanations. It’s interesting that for some, 
such as Proclus, each of these is a separate god. It’s also here that the late 
platonists tended to inject a lot of Stoicism into their thought. The third god 
who is at the level of soul is the sensible world that is able to think 
discursively. 

Going back to the Neglected Argument I should note that a lot of how Peirce 
talks about God parallels Proclus. But this isn’t an area I’m really that well 
versed. Peirce clearly is well read on these authors though. They do form an 
important context for a lot of his thinking. (Although shouldn’t be reduced to 
it) While it’s not an area I’m that well versed on, some have dealt with the 
issue.

https://books.google.com/books?id=zHDnlYfrbMcC=PA85=peirce+proclus=en=X=0ahUKEwirysj57PPPAhVH1WMKHc-HDfgQ6AEIIDAA#v=onepage=peirce%20proclus=false

The relationship of abduction to Proclus in that paper is quite interesting. 
(As an aside, this is the same book that Kelly Parker’s paper on Peirce as a 
neoPlatonist appears)




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Thanks for clarifying.  I mainly just wanted to emphasize Peirce's
consistent usage, and the conclusion that he ultimately drew from it.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the
> term 'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying
> the same thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing.  So,
> please don't try a 'gotcha' post.
>
>  This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the *popular
> current meaning of *chaos. That *current usage of the term*  is what I
> was referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was
> referring also to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT
> referring to Peirce's usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as
> nothing. Peirce is quite specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point
> out, I refer to that quote very often.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order
> within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.
>
>
> Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*.
>
> CSP:  The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in
> effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really
> happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888)
>
> CSP:  The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated
> feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a
> powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some
> are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no
> relations, for relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891)
>
> CSP:  Without going into other important questions of philosophical
> architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would
> appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most
> ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic
> Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely
> remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without
> connection or regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33;
> 1891)
>
> CSP:  But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as
> consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the
> chaos, namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893)
>
> CSP:  If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational
> antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a
> state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally
> absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it
> is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole
> of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In
> itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is
> everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)
>
> CSP:  In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no
> existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897)
>
> CSP:  Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than
> helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos,
> without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902)
>
> CSP:  Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for
> mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
> nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905)
>
> CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and
> synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early
> volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how,
> with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that
> continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is
> simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like
> generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the
> essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an
> extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those
> cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than
> feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where
> those two elements 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the term 
'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying the same 
thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing.  So, please don't try a 
'gotcha' post.

 This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the popular 
current meaning of chaos. That current usage of the term  is what I was 
referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was referring also 
to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT referring to Peirce's 
usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as nothing. Peirce is quite 
specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point out, I refer to that quote very 
often.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order 
within a collection of bits of unorganized matter.


  Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing.


CSP:  The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in 
effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really 
happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888)


CSP:  The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated 
feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder 
of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer 
together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, for 
relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891)


CSP:  Without going into other important questions of philosophical 
architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would 
appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most 
ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic 
Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely remote--there 
was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or 
regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33; 1891)



CSP:  But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as 
consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, 
namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893)



CSP:  If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, 
to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest 
feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing 
still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the 
welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by 
the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its 
relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893)


CSP:  In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no 
existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897)


CSP:  Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than 
helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, 
without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902)


CSP:  Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for 
mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a 
nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905)



CSP:  Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and 
synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early volumes 
of The Monist ever been written, it would have appeared how, with thorough 
consistency, that theory involved the recognition that continuity is an 
indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality 
becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than 
generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Yet even in 
its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that the 
theory of those cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more 
than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where 
those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing. (CP 
5.436; 1905)


  "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, 
no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no 
causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and that 
is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action 
(Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness).  In other words, unless the 
blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational 
antecedent"--there can never be a spontaneous chalk mark with its w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 the embryo-fetus
> is a good one. Therefore, in my view,  Thirdness is not a priori or
> non-immanent, as some would suggest, but, a fundamental immenent aspect of
> the conversion of mass to matter.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message - From: <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>
> To: "Auke van Breemen" <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> Cc: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Dear Auke,
>>
>> I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very
>> little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.
>>
>> First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even
>> so popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It
>> is commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living
>> beings start our individual lives in the midst of chaos.
>>
>> Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been
>> often classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.
>>
>> All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I have
>> shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential
>> flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm
>> even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of
>> the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. The rhythm is
>> primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels unanimously as
>> something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be revealed and
>> confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse, not in the
>> sense offered by European phenomenologies.
>>
>> An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found
>> in his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of
>> mind. Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted
>> the notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.
>>
>> CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.
>>
>> Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce
>> related conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would
>> even recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works
>> by Tetens.  - Nor did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which
>> I find most peculiar).
>>
>> The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division.
>> This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.
>>
>> Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions
>> in interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas
>> (De Veritate):
>>
>> "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become
>> a corner stone of nominalism.
>>
>> However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a
>> very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part
>> and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different
>> meaning.)
>>
>> As we all know CSP took back "common sense".
>>
>> In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very
>> clear meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God. With the teaching
>> that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel and hear the voice of
>> God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.
>>
>> For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the
>> Greek counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with
>> the Christian overtones.
>>
>> It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the
>> five special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions
>> of mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities)
>> were secularized, that mysticism was rejected.
>>
>> And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we
>> are passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let
>> alone electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. -
>> About which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g.
>> Moore's collecion of CSP's mathematical writings).
>>
>> Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a
>> mystery already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance).
>>
>> Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later...
>>
>> These are very complicated issues.
>>
>> But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not app

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Auke:

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Auke van Breemen  wrote:
> 
> “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
> thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
> his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

Your contention has considerable merit.

In particular, it is my view, that CSP views were strongly shaped by his 
experiences in the chemical sciences and the logic of the chemical sciences.

Unfortunately, the science of chemistry during his lifespan was merely a 
massive collection of empirical observations that provided a basis for 
reproducible experimentation and inquiry.

But it lacked a coherent theory.  Hence, his view of how arguments are formed, 
particularly the assertions about the relations between “blanks”, in the path 
from icons to rhema illustrates your contention very nicely.

Cheers

Jerry



-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Kirsti, list:

Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings. [I 
think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between 
multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc].


I also have a problem with the notion of primordial chaos. After all, chaos 
IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection of bits 
of unorganized matter. But, following Peirce's 1.412, I see the primordial 
as - nothing. As undifferentiated mass. As 'indeterminancy' [1.409, 412] . 
NOT matter, but mass.


As mass, which is in a mode of Firstness, it can start to take on habits - 
and your example of the heartbeat of the mother affecting the embryo-fetus 
is a good one. Therefore, in my view,  Thirdness is not a priori or 
non-immanent, as some would suggest, but, a fundamental immenent aspect of 
the conversion of mass to matter.


Edwina


- Original Message - 
From: <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>

To: "Auke van Breemen" <a.bree...@chello.nl>
Cc: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)




Dear Auke,

I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little
time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it.

First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so
popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is
commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings
start our individual lives in the midst of chaos.

Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often
classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind.

All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus.  But, as I
have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the
experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example
gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes
the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN.
The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels
unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be
revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean
sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies.

An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in
his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind.
Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the
notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher.

CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave.

Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related
conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even
recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by
Tetens.  - Nor did  any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I
find most peculiar).

The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic
division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud.

Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in
interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De
Veritate):

"Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a
corner stone of nominalism.

However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried
a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a
part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different
meaning.)

As we all know CSP took back "common sense".

In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear
meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God.
With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel
and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER.

For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek
counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the
Christian overtones.

It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five
special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of
mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were
secularized, that mysticism was rejected.

And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are
passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone
electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About
which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's
collecion of CSP's mathematical writings).

Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery
already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance).

Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later...

These are very complicated issues.

But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name
tag.

With warmest wishes!

Kirsti Määttänen

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

ow that triadicity forms the key to
all Peircean thought. No taking Secondness as the one and only.
--

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order
of things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is
first. I would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first,
in that it is the triadically structured description of the process of
dyadically related and interacting states and events, that must
account for the response. Our KiF-model is a proposal. The relation
between the two divisions of interpretants was key for me. The
approach of Short and Stamper were the trigger.


K:
With you, Auke, I have had some rewarding exchange of communication
early on, after I joined the List.

This is why I take this time to comment your post. - You do as you 
wish.

- I'll do the same after reading your response. If so happens that
you'll write one.
--
AvB
I do thank you for your responses and wish you all the best!

Auke van Breemen





My very best wishes to you!

Kirsti Määttänen










Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 20.10.2016 13:11:

Jon,

Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.

With regard to sheets I suggest to read for

a. Sheets of assertion:

Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A
Perfusion

of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

b. Descriptive sheets

De Tienne:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscie
nce.pdf
[1]

c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do.

_The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current
discussion._

A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as
follows:

Sign  -proces of interpretation-  interpretant/sign -proces of
interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc.

Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the
interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes
between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process
an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets
reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system.
This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is
a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an
interpreting sign or semiotic sheet.

(1) Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist
(Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).

(2) Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself,
we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of
sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system
interprets a sign (critic).

(3) Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of
semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris
and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter.
Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b
-> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b).

The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants
(emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or
radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and
normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in
2. It sets of with

Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and
then thought together

by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes
every analysis.

What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has
no parts, but which

nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts
consists in this that the

mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are
really not in the first

idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case
of destructive distillation.

W6:449, CP 1.384

So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In
phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the
emotional interpretant:

The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by
it

[. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the
composer's

musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of
feelings (CP

5.475).

From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive
interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate,
dynamical and normal).

In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the
process of interpretation.

Best,  Auke

VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18
AAN: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
Cosmology)

Auke, List:


AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
conclusions.


Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call
semiotic" 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

I still fail to see the point of your remarks. I do get the impression that you 
don’t agree with my:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

Because you hold:

I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less.  

More or less, depending on to what you are looking. 

--

 

But I am not sure about this estimation of your remark. However if this is what 
you mean, then maybe you have the opinion that I hold to the statement that 
Peirce’s work was a complete failure or that he completely was on the wrong 
track. For me the respects in which it is more successful (sign aspects 
interpretant apects, the idea of a sheet, man as a sign, architectonic, X-box, 
both devisions of interpretants, etc) and the respect in which it is less (not 
connecting both divisions of interpretants, what prevented him given that all 
ingredients are there) are of more interest than an assessment in general terms 
like more or less.

 

Best,

Auke

 

 

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 23:07
Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, list:

 

I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for 
same/different in the following:

 

“Only everybody can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less…

 

“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, 
is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the 
real.” ~Peirce

___

 

As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce,

 

“…the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak 
more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds.”…

 

I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and 
old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is, 
nowadays.  Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of 
that community; us and our neighbors.  We seek to do well and by doing well, to 
fare well.  

 

What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share it? 
 But how to share it when a single method appears to lead to different 
convictions about problems and solutions?  I think this is implied of your 
statement:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of 
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by 
his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”

 

I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less.  

More or less, depending on to what you are looking.  

 

Semiotic or abduction?  …Or abduction using semiotic?  Or abduction using 
computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using 
experimentation and computation and semiotic…

Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis… or 
science… or….

 

Best,

Jerry R

 

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl 
<mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

Jerry,

 

I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual 
(whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.

 

With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just 
remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the 
community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite 
truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the 
short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way.  It is my 
contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and 
enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference 
for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only 
account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day 
communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests.

 

Best, Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com <mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com> ] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> >
CC: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, Kirsti, list:

 

You said:

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things 
firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, 
in the order of understanding thirdness is first…

 

But Aristotle also said:

“For learning p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke, list:



I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for
same/different in the following:



“Only *everybody* can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less…



“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real.” ~Peirce

___



As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce,



“…*the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to
speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other
minds*.”…



I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and
old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is,
nowadays.  Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of
that community; us and our neighbors.  We seek to do well and by doing
well, to fare well.



What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share
it?  But how to share it when a single method *appears* to lead to
different convictions about problems and solutions?  I think this is
implied of your statement:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics
by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”



I tend to think he *succeeded* but to say this is a statement of more or
less.

More or less, depending on to what you are looking.


Semiotic or abduction?  …Or abduction using semiotic?  Or abduction using
computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using
experimentation and computation and semiotic…

Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis…
or science… or….



Best,

Jerry R

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual
> (whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.
>
>
>
> With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just
> remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of
> the community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the
> indefinite truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth
> prevails, on the short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along
> that way.  It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both
> strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of
> semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a
> sustem of semiotics must not only account for the scientific enterprise,
> but also for our day to day communication, not regulated by a knowledge
> ideal, but by other interests.
>
>
>
> Best, Auke
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Verzonden:* zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
> *Aan:* Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> *CC:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
>
>
> Auke, Kirsti, list:
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of
> things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I
> would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first…
>
>
>
> But Aristotle also said:
>
> “*For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less
> knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct
> our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without
> qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is
> more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to
> oneself.*”
>
>
>
> Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the
> individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it
> is also about the community knowing.
>
>
>
> So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the
> community.  This, I know.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> wrote:
>
> Dear Kirsti,
>
> As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In
> discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my
> detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become
> more clear.
>
> I will add some words between the lines.
>
> K:
> Dear Auke & al.
>
> It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not
> share. And going along a tract, wich leads 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual 
(whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.

 

With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just 
remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the 
community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite 
truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the 
short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way.  It is my 
contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and 
enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference 
for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only 
account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day 
communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests.

 

Best, Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, Kirsti, list:

 

You said:

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things 
firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, 
in the order of understanding thirdness is first…

 

But Aristotle also said:

“For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less knowable 
by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to 
start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good 
good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable to oneself 
and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself.”

 

Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the 
individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it is 
also about the community knowing.  

 

So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the 
community.  This, I know.  

 

Best,
Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl 
<mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

Dear Kirsti,

As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In 
discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my 
detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become more 
clear.

I will add some words between the lines.

K:
Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not share. 
And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
--

AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.


K:
Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was 
"babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I had 
any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.

This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much to 
rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at Helsinki 
2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with the handout in 
the conference. Which he has quoted several times. Lately in a book chapter of 
his.

The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in taking 
ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the more 
restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a Fichtean 
philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, nor as a 
scientist.

Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in semiotics. - 
C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap.

--
AvB: I do not think here we disagree, at least on this level of detail of 
discussing matters. His animal examples show that he even didn’t confine to 
childhood, but extended the thought to an evolutionary scale. With his 
distinction between a logica utens and a logica docens and his architectonic of 
sciences, each of the cenoscopic sciences preceding the special sciences and 
being devoted  to:
About positive phenomena in general, such as are available to every person at 
every waking moment, and not about special classes of phenomena. Does not 
resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle theoretical 
questions.

What I did intend to state is that it is when we look at a sign that inscribes 
itself, the question of the connection between the two divisions of 
interpretants comes into clear sight. For, I would add now, it is then that we 
must ask for the connection between both trichotomies of interpretants.
If Peirce wouldn't have been of the opinion that nothing is lost if we don't 
pay attention to the
apprehension of the sign as an object, cf 8.2.1, he, as a consequence, probably
could have made the same arrangement as Van Driel, which is the arrangement I 
propose.

K:
Sheets of assertion serve as g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

gn – I/S – I/S, etc.
> >
> > Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the
> > interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes
> > between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process
> > an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets
> > reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system.
> > This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is
> > a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an
> > interpreting sign or semiotic sheet.
> >
> > (1) Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist
> > (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).
> >
> > (2) Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself,
> > we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of
> > sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system
> > interprets a sign (critic).
> >
> > (3) Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of
> > semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris
> > and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter.
> > Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b
> > -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b).
> >
> > The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants
> > (emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or
> > radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and
> > normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in
> > 2. It sets of with
> >
> > Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and
> > then thought together
> >
> > by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes
> > every analysis.
> >
> > What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has
> > no parts, but which
> >
> > nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts
> > consists in this that the
> >
> > mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are
> > really not in the first
> >
> > idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case
> > of destructive distillation.
> >
> > W6:449, CP 1.384
> >
> > So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In
> > phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the
> > emotional interpretant:
> >
> > The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by
> > it
> >
> > [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the
> > composer's
> >
> > musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of
> > feelings (CP
> >
> > 5.475).
> >
> > From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive
> > interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate,
> > dynamical and normal).
> >
> > In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the
> > process of interpretation.
> >
> > Best,  Auke
> >
> > VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> > VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18
> > AAN: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> > CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> > ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> > Cosmology)
> >
> > Auke, List:
> >
> >> AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
> >> conclusions.
> >
> > Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a
> > backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call
> > semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907).
> >
> >> AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested
> >> previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more
> >> properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and
> >> habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought."
> >
> > It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being
> > convinced otherwise.
> >
> >> AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De
> >> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each
> >> other according to the mature division of the sciences.
> >
> > I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more
> > about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently
> > downloaded a whi

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

rts, but which
> 
> nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts 
> consists in this that the
> 
> mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are 
> really not in the first
> 
> idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case 
> of destructive distillation.
> 
> W6:449, CP 1.384
> 
> So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In 
> phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the 
> emotional interpretant:
> 
> The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by 
> it
> 
> [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the 
> composer's
> 
> musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of 
> feelings (CP
> 
> 5.475).
> 
> From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive 
> interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, 
> dynamical and normal).
> 
> In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the 
> process of interpretation.
> 
> Best,  Auke
> 
> VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18
> AAN: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
>> AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no 
>> conclusions.
> 
> Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a 
> backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call 
> semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907).
> 
>> AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested 
>> previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more 
>> properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and 
>> habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought."
> 
> It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being 
> convinced otherwise.
> 
>> AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De
>> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each 
>> other according to the mature division of the sciences.
> 
> I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more 
> about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently 
> downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific 
> relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some 
> additional reading that I could do?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> 
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> 
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> [3]
> 
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen 
> <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote:
> 
>> Jon,
>> 
>> As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no 
>> conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of 
>> his other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only 
>> not being able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character 
>> the sheets of Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that 
>> prevented him from finishing the system. All ingredients are present.
>> 
>> I in particular disagree with your:
>> 
>> ." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants 
>> _themselves _seem to be more properly characterized as possible 
>> (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each 
>> divided into feeling/action/thought.
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants.
>> It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De
>> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each 
>> other according to the mature division of the sciences. From a sign 
>> type perspective Shorts approach makes sense: Each sign has an 
>> element of feeling of action and of thought, but from a processual 
>> approach it is better to apply Ockham’s razor in order to find the 
>> system behind processes of interpretation. Peirce paved the way for 
>> that by his notion of involvement. The logical note books are key, in 
>> combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) criticism of Peirce’s 
>> focus on scientific progress in developing a theory of 
>> interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that 
>> govern comunication).
>> 
>> Best, Auke van Breemen
> 
> -
> 
> Geen v

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Jeff, list

Thanks. That is also my impression, but I was not sure.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 22. oktober 2016 05:29
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

SB:  I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and 
mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and 
outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does 
that also mean that all mind is matter like inside?

No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as 
derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24).  Peirce 
famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere 
specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he 
never described mind as "lively matter."

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon

Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still 
somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from 
which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – 
or inside and outside, which I  find easier to comprehend and  fits with his 
development of Aristotle’s  hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive 
“inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But 
still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to 
day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through 
his theory of the hidden third  
http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf 
, levels of reality and logic of the included middle 
http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf  and 
http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf  and he is 
pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics 
and philosophy.
Best
Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to 
do with it.  Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of 
Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into 
Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the 
whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram.  In semeiotic terms, 
per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the 
aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the 
Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the 
"living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jeff. List

My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is 
that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get 
from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument 
to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get from the 
three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem 
of global warming?

   Best
 Søren

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, list:

I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without 
a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living 
in language and culture.

Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of 
phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that 
is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which 
supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in its

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and
then thought together

by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes
every analysis.

What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has
no parts, but which

nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts
consists in this that the

mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are
really not in the first

idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case
of destructive distillation.

W6:449, CP 1.384

So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In
phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the
emotional interpretant:

The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by
it

[. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the
composer's

musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of
feelings (CP

5.475).

From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive
interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate,
dynamical and normal).

In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the
process of interpretation.

Best,  Auke

VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18
AAN: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
Cosmology)

Auke, List:


AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping,
no conclusions.


Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call
semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907).


AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have
suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be
more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual
(Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into
feeling/action/thought."


It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being
convinced otherwise.


AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De
Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each
other according to the mature division of the sciences.


I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more
about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently
downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific
relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some
additional reading that I could do?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen
<a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote:


Jon,

As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of
his other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only
not being able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character
the sheets of Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that
prevented him from finishing the system. All ingredients are
present.

I in particular disagree with your:

." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants
_themselves _seem to be more properly characterized as possible
(Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each
divided into feeling/action/thought.

--

This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants.
It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De
Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each
other according to the mature division of the sciences. From a sign
type perspective Shorts approach makes sense: Each sign has an
element of feeling of action and of thought, but from a processual
approach it is better to apply Ockham’s razor in order to find the
system behind processes of interpretation. Peirce paved the way for
that by his notion of involvement. The logical note books are key,
in combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) criticism of
Peirce’s focus on scientific progress in developing a theory of
interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that
govern comunication).

Best, Auke van Breemen


-

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[1]
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I haven’t been following this discussion closely due to illness, but it seems 
to me that a lot of the trouble with the role of subjects and predicates can be 
alleviated in favour of predicates) by Peirce’s colocalization. The SP 
distinction can be reinterpreted so that the subject becomes identified by a 
predicate with an index, making it in itself a dicisgn (proposition). So a 
subject-predicate form really combines two (or more) propositions). There is an 
extensive discussion of this in Frederik Sternfelt,  Natural Propositions, 4.2 
Co-localization as the basis of syntax (pp. 108-114). Unfortunately, to fully 
understand what Sternfelt is saying and how it relates to Peirce requires 
reading a good deal more in chapter 4 as well as chapter 3.

I am not sure that this solves the problem of the relation between Categories 
and Universes, but it did help me.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 20 October 2016 3:15 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jeff, List:

JD:  I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes 
of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants.

That is certainly the dominant interpretation.  I only started questioning it 
because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in 
the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that 
Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates 
(including relations).  However, I now notice that he added the caveat that 
whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then 
proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain 
why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the 
Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  So I am back to being confused about the 
distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially 
since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction.

JD:  As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ...

Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hi Jon S,

I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of 
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in 
the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of 
the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the 
basis of this division.

So, we have the following classifications of signs:
A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign
B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, 
Copulatives
C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, 
Relatives
D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives
E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals
F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce 
feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self 
control)
G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), 
Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule)
H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. 
interrogatives), Indicatives
I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), 
Argument (Delome)
J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and 
interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form

So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, 
imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to 
dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How 
might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a 
character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories 
from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic 
and triad relations is meant to work that out.

--Jeff

--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354>


From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Wednesday, Oc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:
By 'mind' being primordial, I understand in its role of governance via 
'reasonable laws'. I don't see 'mind' as separate or a priori. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Søren Brier 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 11:29 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Søren, List:



SB:  I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter 
and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and 
outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does 
that also mean that all mind is matter like inside?


  No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as 
derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24).  Peirce 
famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere 
specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he 
never described mind as "lively matter."


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

Jon



Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still 
somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from 
which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – 
or inside and outside, which I  find easier to comprehend and  fits with his 
development of Aristotle’s  hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive 
“inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But 
still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to 
day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through 
his theory of the hidden third  
http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf 
, levels of reality and logic of the included middle 
http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf  and 
http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf  and he is 
pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics 
and philosophy.

Best

Søren



From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11
To: Søren Brier
    Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)



Søren, List:



I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has 
to do with it.  Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of 
Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into 
Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the 
whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram.  In semeiotic terms, 
per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the 
aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the 
Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the 
"living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument.



Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

Jeff. List



My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist 
– is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we 
get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand 
argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get 
from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real 
problem of global warming?



   Best

 Søren



From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
    Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)



Soren, list:



I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible 
without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects 
living in language and culture.  



Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this 
integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, 
esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, 
synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through 
pragmaticism?  



Best,
Jerry R



On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

Jon and list



Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Jon

Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still 
somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from 
which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – 
or inside and outside, which I  find easier to comprehend and  fits with his 
development of Aristotle’s  hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive 
“inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But 
still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to 
day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through 
his theory of the hidden third  
http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf 
, levels of reality and logic of the included middle 
http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf  and 
http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf  and he is 
pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics 
and philosophy.
Best
Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to 
do with it.  Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of 
Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into 
Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the 
whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram.  In semeiotic terms, 
per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the 
aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the 
Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the 
"living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jeff. List

My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is 
that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get 
from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument 
to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get from the 
three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem 
of global warming?

   Best
 Søren

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, list:

I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without 
a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living 
in language and culture.

Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of 
phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that 
is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which 
supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops 
phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is again combined 
with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with 
Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three 
categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and 
his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I 
still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the 
independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and 
culture.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are 
metaphysical?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop 
into worlds.

Søren

From:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Søren, List:

I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has
to do with it.  Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe
of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came
into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on
the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram.  In
semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's
Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual)
Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final
(habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the
Conclusion of the Argument.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

> Jeff. List
>
>
>
> My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist
> – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how
> we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand
> argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get
> from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically
> real problem of global warming?
>
>
>
>Best
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 21. oktober 2016 01:17
> *To:* Søren Brier
> *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
>
>
> Soren, list:
>
>
>
> I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible
> without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious
> subjects living in language and culture.
>
>
>
> Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this
> integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics,
> esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism
> (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic
> through pragmaticism?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:
>
> Jon and list
>
>
>
> Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with
> pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination
> develops phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is
> again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again
> combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent
> of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process
> semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign
> is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible
> without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious
> subjects living in language and culture.
>
>
>
>     Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 18:22
> *To:* Søren Brier
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
>
>
> Søren, List:
>
>
>
> Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes
> are metaphysical?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Jon
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:
>
> I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will
> develop into worlds.
>
>
>
> Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 15:34
> *To:* Søren Brier
>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Søren, List:
>
> SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct
> different universes.
>
> Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are
> the same?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Jon
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Sorry my last mail was an answer to Jerry not Jeff

  Søren

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, list:

I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without 
a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living 
in language and culture.

Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of 
phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that 
is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which 
supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops 
phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is again combined 
with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with 
Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three 
categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and 
his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I 
still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the 
independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and 
culture.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are 
metaphysical?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop 
into worlds.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List:
SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct 
different universes.
Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the 
same?

Thanks,

Jon


-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Jeff. List

My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is 
that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get 
from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument 
to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get from the 
three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem 
of global warming?

   Best
 Søren


From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, list:

I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without 
a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living 
in language and culture.

Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of 
phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that 
is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which 
supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops 
phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is again combined 
with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with 
Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three 
categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and 
his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I 
still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the 
independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and 
culture.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are 
metaphysical?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop 
into worlds.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List:
SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct 
different universes.
Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the 
same?

Thanks,

Jon


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops 
phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is again combined 
with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with 
Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three 
categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and 
his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I 
still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the 
independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and 
culture.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are 
metaphysical?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop 
into worlds.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List:
SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct 
different universes.
Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the 
same?

Thanks,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - OK - that makes sense. The way you were writing it, I mistook your 
outline for complete openness at each stage, whereas - as you point out now - 
the constraints at each site are immediate...a possible II can only provide a 
specific rather than open actual DI.  

What is interesting is that these sites, i.e., the Representamen and the three 
Interpretants can also at the same time be affected by other semiosic 
interactions from other sites..and so, we could have an II in Firstness in one 
'thread' so to speak..that is affected by indexical information from another 
'thread'..and so...the DI in the first thread might transform into a mode of 
Secondness or more. Again, my point is that the network is not linear but 
complex - at all sites or nodes.

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 10:28 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


  The idea is that the Immediate Interpretant can be a range of possible 
feelings, actions, or thoughts; the Dynamic Interpretant can be an occurrence 
of an actual feeling, action, or thought; and the Final Interpretant can be a 
habit of feeling, action, or thought.  These are all constrained by the rule 
that a Possible can only determine a Possible, and a Necessitant must be 
determined by a Necessitant.  If the Immediate Interpretant only includes 
possible feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual feeling, and 
the Final Interpretant must be a habit of feeling.  If the Final Interpretant 
is a habit of thought, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual thought, 
and the Immediate Interpretant must include possible thoughts.  The other 
combinations are limited accordingly, resulting in ten arrangements from these 
three trichotomies.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon, list:

Jon wrote:
My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the 
Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical 
Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, 
admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible 
Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual 
Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual 
Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be 
trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. 

I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the 
Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final.  I'd add however that 
the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid correlation 
with the Dynamic Object.

Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three 
Interpretants can be further refined within the three categories. I can see the 
Immediate Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1, 2-1 and 
even 3-1 but it must retain some Firstness to function as an internal 
'immediate'.  I can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in 2-2, 
2-1..and even 3-2 because it must have some Secondness to function as an 
Actual.  I am unsure of the Final Interpretant which must include Thirdness. Is 
it 3-3, 3-2, 3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate and Dynamic 
Interpretants. Note that these cross-connections filiate the three 
Interpretants with each other.  I haven't explored these areas of 'fine-tuning' 
and so - can only question the supposition. I'm not sure...

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Auke van Breemen 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)


  Auke, List: 


  I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and 
I reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday.  My initial 
response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, 
and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant.  
Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the 
Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic 
Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final 
Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of 
interpretation.  Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, 
and thought.  In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to 
classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process.  Universes and 
Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines the 
three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividin

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Dear Jeff

A marvelous answer. I agree in your great formulation of the difference between 
Husserl and Peirce, which  hardly any of my philosophical colleagues here in 
Danmark understand. I too agree that you have to start in phenomenology, but I 
do think that from there it is difficult to establish an outer world of nature 
and  a society  of embodied conscious subjects. In cybernetics we see the 
problem in George Spencer Browns mathematical philosophy of distinction, which 
is part of the foundation of Luhmann's systems theory. Merleau-Ponty tried to 
work out a solution for the body and ended pretty much the same place in his 
Phenomenology of Perception as I do in my Cybersemiotics. It is necessary as a 
prerequisite for any philosophy of knowing and science to postulate not only an 
experiential world as the phenomenologists, but also an embodied self and 
other, plus something all these embodied selves are existing in and have 
experiences about. I can find no easy way from phenomenology alone - not even 
from Peirce's triadic phaneroscophy - to the reality of an outer world and 
other embodied conscious subjects. I do not think Peirce solves this problem. 
Do you?

   Best
  Søren

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:50
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


Soren, Jon S, Gary R,



Soren suggests there are two problems with Peirce's semiotic theory. One 
problem is the phenomenological starting point--which starts with a set of 
mathematical reflections on formal relations. Another problem is the attempt to 
build a realistic ontology in the semiotic theory.



Let me offer the converse argument. The real strengths of Peirce's semiotic 
theory--as compared to the theories of other 20th century philosophers--such as 
Russell and Quine or Husserl and Heidegger--are the following. First, the 
phenomenological theory is guided by a remarkably deep set of mathematical 
reflections on what is really essential as a set of elemental formal relations 
in the phenomena that might be observed. Husserl, for example, is working 
towards the same sort of end in his phenomenological theory, but his 
mathematical reflections are overly guided by ideas drawn from arithmetic and 
metrical geometries--and he misses real insights about the character of the 
continuous and discrete features in our observations can be drawn from graph 
theory and topology. As such, he (and Heidegger following him) simply do not 
provide the kind of phenomenological analysis of the elemental formal and 
material features of experience that is really needed. Our aim in generating 
the phenomenological account is to properly analyze the observations, 
articulate what is necessary for the formal elements to be well ordered, 
correct for the various sources of observational error, and determine how it is 
possible to make reasonable comparisons and apply various forms of measurement 
to those observations. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger provides an account of the 
formal elements that are essential for accomplishing these goals.

One reason that Peirce  does not start in the phenomenological  inquiries with 
a division between internal experience and the outside world is that he doesn't 
want to prejudice the analysis. He wants to develop the tools that are needed 
to analyze any sort of phenomena that might be observed--regardless of whether 
those observations are directed inwardly or outwardly. Those who import 
metaphysical conceptions concerning the real nature of external objects or 
internal thoughts into the account will struggle to articulate those formal 
categories that are elemental in any sort of experience--real or imagined. 
Peirce's reason for setting those distinctions aside is that we don't want, at 
the outset, to prejudge the question of which features in our observations of 
the phenomena are erroneous and which are not. Rather, we want to arrive at 
conclusions about the character of our observational errors in a way that can 
be both trusted in some degree and corrected upon further inquiry.

So, I do not think that the phenomenological theory of the categories starts 
from an assumption that realism is true and nominalism is false. Peirce seeks 
to develop a theory of semiotics that starts with a  phenomenological analysis 
of the observations that are needed to develop clear explanations of the sign 
relations that are essential for assertions to be true or false and significant 
or meaningless (in the speculative grammar), and for patterns of inference to 
be valid or invalid (in the critical logic)--and that can be put to the test. 
He wants to keep open the question of whether realism or nominalism is true 
about any given sort of question. He seeks to answer those sorts of questions 
in the development of his theory of metaphysics in a manner that is well-guided 
by an adequate semiotic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Søren, List:

Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes
are metaphysical?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

> I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will
> develop into worlds.
>
>
>
> Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 15:34
> *To:* Søren Brier
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Søren, List:
>
> SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct
> different universes.
>
> Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are
> the same?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
>
> Jon
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

I suggest that  in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop 
into worlds.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct 
different universes.

Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the 
same?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Søren Brier 
<sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote:
Dear Gary, Jon and list

I suggest that  the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his 
semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the 
phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and the 
outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between inside and 
outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy his three 
categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument as a minimum 
conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. Thus inside the 
ontology of phaneroscophy  I think it is fair to say that the categories do 
form three  distinct different universes.

   Best
 Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 00:09
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R., List:
GR:  It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the 
categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here 
and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from 
phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes.  That is why I began my 
post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they 
all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
GR:  To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this 
matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.
Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as 
evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak).  As such, I think that 
the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a 
complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he 
recognizes that the transition occurred over several years.  He simply observes 
in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as 
criteria in the classification of signs."
GR:  Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, 
would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories 
in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in 
Categories).
Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage 
right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context.  Am I 
right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus 
belong in Categories, rather than Universes?

In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that 
encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates?  
Modalities, perhaps?  Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they 
pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three 
Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates 
(possibility/actuality/habituality).

Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of 
Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants 
(Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while 
the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological 
Universes?  What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification 
with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category?

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jon, List,

I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when the 
language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a break 
from the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical 
expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you 
agree?

One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on 
Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce thoroughly 
rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them with entirely 
new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical of Short in this 
(for example, Ransdell wrote a sea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AB:  The immediate interpretant always is specific for a given response as
Short has it.


That is not how I understand it.  The Immediate Interpretant is internal to
the Sign, and corresponds to what Peirce at least once called "the
Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the
utterer" (EP 2.478).  Consequently, it is not tied to any *actual *response
(Dynamic Interpretant) in an interpreter; rather, it defines the range
of *possible
*responses.  "My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each
Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter
... The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a
Possibility" (SS 111).  Analogous to the blackboard diagram in Peirce's
cosmology, the Immediate Interpretant is a continuum of potentiality on
which the Dynamic Interpretant is actualized, and the universal tendency to
take habits then leads to the development of the Final Interpretant.

AB:  So, if an immediate interpretant, being involved in a dynamical
interpretant, has its feeling, action and thought modalities, those very
same modalities may be assumed to be present in the dynamical interpretant.


The Immediate Interpretant *determines* the Dynamic Interpretant; i.e.,
whether the Immediate Interpretant is a Possible, Existent, or Necessitant
*constrains* whether the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, Existent,
or Necessitant.  If the Immediate Interpretant is limited to a range of
feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual feeling.  If the
Immediate Interpretant also includes a range of actions, then the Dynamic
Interpretant can be an actual action or feeling, but it cannot be an actual
thought.  If the Immediate Interpretant further includes a range of
thoughts, then the Dynamic Interpretant can be an actual thought, action,
or feeling.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:50 AM, Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> I agree with:
>
> my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the
> Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible *Interpretants, the
> Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual *Interpretant, and
> the the Final Interpretant is the development of a *habitual *Interpretant;
> i.e., a habit of interpretation.
>
>
>
> That is besides one detail. The immediate interpretant always is specific
> for a given response as Short has it. However, in between a sign and its
> interpretant a lot of experimentation in the imagination (as Peirce recalls
> his brother gives as an explanation for an apt reaction on the occasion of
> a dress catching fire) may have taken place. However, in each run through
> the imagination only one immediate interpretant is present.
>
>
>
> With regard to:
>
> Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and
> thought.  In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to
> classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process.  Universes and
> Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines
> the three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividing each
> individual Interpretant on that basis.
>
> -
>
>
>
> I suggest to apply Ockham’s razor in order to get a description of the
> process in which the sign aspects develop their import. In a dynamical
> nterpretant aspect, an immediate interpretant aspect is involved. So, if an
> immediate interpretant, being involved in a dynamical interpretant, has its
> feeling, action and thought modalities, those very same modalities may be
> assumed to be present in the dynamical interpretant.
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

The idea is that the Immediate Interpretant can be a range of possible
feelings, actions, or thoughts; the Dynamic Interpretant can be an
occurrence of an actual feeling, action, or thought; and the Final
Interpretant can be a habit of feeling, action, or thought.  These are all
constrained by the rule that a Possible can only determine a Possible, and
a Necessitant must be determined by a Necessitant.  If the Immediate
Interpretant only includes possible feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant
must be an actual feeling, and the Final Interpretant must be a habit of
feeling.  If the Final Interpretant is a habit of thought, then the Dynamic
Interpretant must be an actual thought, and the Immediate Interpretant must
include possible thoughts.  The other combinations are limited accordingly,
resulting in ten arrangements from these three trichotomies.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> Jon wrote:
> My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the
> Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the
> Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative,
> admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible
> *Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual
> *Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a 
> *habitual
> *Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be
> trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought.
>
> I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the
> Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final.  I'd add however
> that the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid
> correlation with the Dynamic Object.
>
> Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three
> Interpretants can be further refined within the three categories. I can see
> the Immediate Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1,
> 2-1 and even 3-1 but it must retain some Firstness to function as an
> internal 'immediate'.  I can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in
> 2-2, 2-1..and even 3-2 because it must have some Secondness to function as
> an Actual.  I am unsure of the Final Interpretant which must include
> Thirdness. Is it 3-3, 3-2, 3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate
> and Dynamic Interpretants. Note that these cross-connections filiate the
> three Interpretants with each other.  I haven't explored these areas of
> 'fine-tuning' and so - can only question the supposition. I'm not sure...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Auke, List:
>
> I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I
> reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday.  My initial
> response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate,
> Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical
> Interpretant.  Instead, my current understanding--still tentative,
> admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible
> *Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual
> *Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a 
> *habitual
> *Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation.  Each of these can then
> be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought.  In my mind, this
> follows the order of determination that leads to classification, as well as
> the order of semeiotic process.  Universes and Categories come into play
> with the observation that this approach defines the three Interpretants in
> terms of modality, rather than dividing each individual Interpretant on
> that basis.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.
>>
>>
>>
>> With regard to sheets I suggest to read for
>>
>> a.  Sheets of assertion:
>>
>> Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A
>> Perfusion
>>
>> of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
>>
>> b.  Descriptive sheets
>>
>> De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/
>> isphanscience.pdf
>>
>> c.  Semiotic sh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:

Jon wrote:
My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, 
Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical 
Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, 
admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible 
Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual 
Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual 
Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be 
trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. 

I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the 
Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final.  I'd add however that 
the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid correlation 
with the Dynamic Object.

Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three Interpretants 
can be further refined within the three categories. I can see the Immediate 
Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1, 2-1 and even 3-1 
but it must retain some Firstness to function as an internal 'immediate'.  I 
can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in 2-2, 2-1..and even 3-2 
because it must have some Secondness to function as an Actual.  I am unsure of 
the Final Interpretant which must include Thirdness. Is it 3-3, 3-2, 
3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. Note 
that these cross-connections filiate the three Interpretants with each other.  
I haven't explored these areas of 'fine-tuning' and so - can only question the 
supposition. I'm not sure...

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Auke van Breemen 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Auke, List:


  I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I 
reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday.  My initial 
response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, 
and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant.  
Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the 
Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic 
Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final 
Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of 
interpretation.  Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, 
and thought.  In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to 
classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process.  Universes and 
Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines the 
three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividing each individual 
Interpretant on that basis.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote:

Jon,



Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.



With regard to sheets I suggest to read for

a.  Sheets of assertion:

Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A 
Perfusion

of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

b.  Descriptive sheets

De Tienne: 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf

c.  Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do.

The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion.




A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows:

Sign  -proces of interpretation-  interpretant/sign -proces of 
interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc.



Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. My 
interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to get a 
run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever nature) 
must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting 
system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is a 
sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an 
interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. 

(1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist 
(Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).

(2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, 
we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of sciences). 
But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a sign (critic).

(3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of semiotics. 
Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and didn’t get a 
clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we are concerned with 
two 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Søren, List:

SB:  I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct
different universes.


Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are
the same?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:

> Dear Gary, Jon and list
>
>
>
> I suggest that  the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his
> semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the
> phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and
> the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between
> inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy
> his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument
> as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function.
> Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy  I think it is fair to say that
> the categories do form three  distinct different universes.
>
>
>
>Best
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 00:09
> *To:* Gary Richmond
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
>
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the
> categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
>
> Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement
> here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from
> phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes.  That is why I began
> my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file;
> they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
>
> GR:  To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in
> this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.
>
> Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over
> time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak).  As such, I
> think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as
> calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those
> words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several
> years.  He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never
> again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs."
>
> GR:  Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you
> quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes
> from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in
> Universes, Predicates in Categories).
>
> Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that
> passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this
> context.  Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than
> Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes?
>
>
>
> In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that
> encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates?
> Modalities, perhaps?  Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they
> pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the
> three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates
> (possibility/actuality/habituality).
>
>
>
> Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds
> of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants
> (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories,
> while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the
> ontological Universes?  What about the feasibility of constructing a
> 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four
> relations divided by Category?
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Jon
>
>
>
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Jon, List,
>
>
>
> I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least
> when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes
> represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the
> Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at
> all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
>
>
>
> One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on
> Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce
> thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them
> with entirely new theories.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I
reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday.  My initial
response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate,
Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical
Interpretant.  Instead, my current understanding--still tentative,
admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible
*Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any
*actual *Interpretant,
and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a *habitual *Interpretant;
i.e., a habit of interpretation.  Each of these can then be trichotomized
into feeling, action, and thought.  In my mind, this follows the order of
determination that leads to classification, as well as the order of
semeiotic process.  Universes and Categories come into play with the
observation that this approach defines the three Interpretants in terms of
modality, rather than dividing each individual Interpretant on that basis.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.
>
>
>
> With regard to sheets I suggest to read for
>
> a.  Sheets of assertion:
>
> Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A
> Perfusion
>
> of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
>
> b.  Descriptive sheets
>
> De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/
> detienne/isphanscience.pdf
>
> c.  Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do.
>
> *The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion.*
>
>
>
> A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows:
>
> Sign  -proces of interpretation-  interpretant/sign -proces of
> interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc.
>
>
>
> Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign.
> My interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to
> get a run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever
> nature) must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this
> interpreting system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s
> dictum ‘Man is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes
> itself in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet.
>
> (1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist
> (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).
>
> (2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself,
> we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of
> sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a
> sign (critic).
>
> (3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of
> semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and
> didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we
> are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b -> goal of a
> and b,a -> goal of b).
>
> The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants (emotional,
> energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or radical subjectivist
> considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and normal interpretants; fruit
> of semiotics proper) can be established in 2. It sets of with
>
>
>
> Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then
> thought together
>
> by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every
> analysis.
>
> What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no
> parts, but which
>
> nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts
> consists in this that the
>
> mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are
> really not in the first
>
> idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of
> destructive distillation.
>
> W6:449, CP 1.384
>
>
>
> So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it
> is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional
> interpretant:
>
> The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it
>
> [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the
> composer's
>
> musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP
>
> 5.475).
>
>
>
> From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive
> interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical
> and normal).
>
>
>
> In short: The semio

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Dear Gary, Jon and list

I suggest that  the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his 
semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the 
phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and the 
outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between inside and 
outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy his three 
categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument as a minimum 
conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. Thus inside the 
ontology of phaneroscophy  I think it is fair to say that the categories do 
form three  distinct different universes.

   Best
 Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 20. oktober 2016 00:09
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R., List:

GR:  It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the 
categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?

Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here 
and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from 
phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes.  That is why I began my 
post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they 
all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.

GR:  To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this 
matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.

Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as 
evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak).  As such, I think that 
the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a 
complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he 
recognizes that the transition occurred over several years.  He simply observes 
in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as 
criteria in the classification of signs."

GR:  Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, 
would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories 
in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in 
Categories).

Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage 
right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context.  Am I 
right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus 
belong in Categories, rather than Universes?

In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that 
encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates?  
Modalities, perhaps?  Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they 
pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three 
Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates 
(possibility/actuality/habituality).

Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of 
Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants 
(Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while 
the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological 
Universes?  What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification 
with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category?

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jon, List,

I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when the 
language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a break 
from the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical 
expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you 
agree?

One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on 
Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce thoroughly 
rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them with entirely 
new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical of Short in this 
(for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review of Short's Peirce's 
Theory of Signs) for they consider Peirce's thought as essentially evolving 
over his career. To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break 
in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.

Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, 
would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories 
in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in 
Categories).

But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

 

Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.

 

With regard to sheets I suggest to read for

a.  Sheets of assertion:

Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A Perfusion

of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

b.  Descriptive sheets

De Tienne: 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf

c.  Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do.

 

The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion.

 

A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows:

Sign  -proces of interpretation-  interpretant/sign -proces of interpretation- 
interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc.

 

Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. My 
interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to get a 
run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever nature) 
must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting 
system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is a 
sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an 
interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. 

(1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist 
(Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).

(2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, we 
have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of sciences). But 
only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a sign (critic).

(3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of semiotics. 
Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and didn’t get a 
clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we are concerned with 
two sheets conversing with each other (a,b -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b).

 

The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants (emotional, 
energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or radical subjectivist 
considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and normal interpretants; fruit of 
semiotics proper) can be established in 2. It sets of with

 

Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then 
thought together

by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every 
analysis.

What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no 
parts, but which

nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts consists 
in this that the

mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not 
in the first

idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of 
destructive distillation.

W6:449, CP 1.384

 

So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it is 
called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional interpretant:

The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it

[. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's

musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP

5.475).

 

>From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive interpretants 
>(mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical and normal).

 

In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the process 
of interpretation.

 

Best,  Auke

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18
Aan: Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl>
CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, List:

 

AB:  As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no 
conclusions.

 

Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in 
the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907).

 

AB:  I in particular disagree with your:  "However, as I have suggested 
previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly 
characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), 
with each divided into feeling/action/thought."

 

It is a working hypothesis, at best.  I am certainly open to being convinced 
otherwise.

 

AB:  It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and 
a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the 
mature division of the sciences.

 

I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more about 
them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently downloaded a while 
ago.  Would you mind elaborating their specific relevance to the current 
discussion, and perhaps suggest some additional reading that I could do?

 

Thanks,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the
classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between
possibles, existents and necessitants.


That is certainly the dominant interpretation.  I only started questioning
it because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and
Necessitants in the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he
seemed to indicate that Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories
only contain Predicates (including relations).  However, I now notice that
he added the caveat that whether this is correct "is a question for careful
study" (CP 4.545), and then proceeded to present a long and complicated
analysis of propositions to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to
view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  So I am
back to being confused about the distinction (if there is one) between
Universes and Categories, especially since a predicate can be turned into a
subject by hypostatic abstraction.

JD:  As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ...


Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jon S,
>
> I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes
> of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles,
> existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues
> in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that
> consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be
> understood on the basis of this division.
>
> So, we have the following classifications of signs:
>
> A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign
> B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives,
> Copulatives
> C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals,
> Categoricals, Relatives
> D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences,
> Collectives
> E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals
> F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional
> (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical
> (scientific-produce self control)
> G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram,
> metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule)
> H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives
> (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives
> I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent
> (Pheme), Argument (Delome)
> J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and
> interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form
>
> So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives,
> imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of
> the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an
> necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical
> interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions
> of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an
> attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the
> nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work
> that out.
>
> --Jeff
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> ----------
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> List:
>
> While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I
> noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents
> of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign
> itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object.  He
> then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here
> called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the
> order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible
> can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by
> nothing but a Necessitant."  However, as I have suggested previously, the
> three Interpretants *themselves *seem to be more properly characterized
> as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each
> divided into feeling/action/thought.
>
> Peirce went on to say that the four semeio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S,


I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of 
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in 
the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of 
the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the 
basis of this division.


So, we have the following classifications of signs:


A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign
B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, 
Copulatives
C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, 
Relatives
D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives
E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals
F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce 
feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self 
control)
G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), 
Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule)
H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. 
interrogatives), Indicatives
I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), 
Argument (Delome)
J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and 
interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form


So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, 
imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to 
dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How 
might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a 
character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories 
from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic 
and triad relations is meant to work that out.


--Jeff


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List:

While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed 
that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the 
three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the 
Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object.  He then implied that 
they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, 
Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination 
after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a 
Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  
However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves 
seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual 
(Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought.

Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical 
Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and 
(triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me 
to be all Trichotomies."  However, he never definitively stipulated on what 
basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive 
terms in each case.  The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to 
all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049.

This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to 
one of the three Universes.  If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to 
be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum?  In particular, 
what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these 
three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of 
rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted 
(manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by 
instinct/experience/form?  Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that 
addresses these specific questions?

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Gary F., List:

I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you 
mentioned.  Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady 
Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  One of these Universes embraces wha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR:  It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the
categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?


Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement
here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from
phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes.  That is why I began
my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file;
they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.

GR:  To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this
matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.


Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time
as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak).  As such, I think
that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it
"a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in
fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several years.  He
simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed
his categories as criteria in the classification of signs."

GR:  Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you
quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes
from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in
Universes, Predicates in Categories).


Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage
right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context.  Am I
right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and
thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes?

In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that
encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates?
Modalities, perhaps?  Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they
pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the
three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates
(possibility/actuality/habituality).

Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds
of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants
(Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories,
while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the
ontological Universes?  What about the feasibility of constructing a
66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four
relations divided by Category?

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least
> when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes
> represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the
> Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at
> all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
>
> One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on
> Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce
> thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them
> with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical
> of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review
> of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought
> as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's
> analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and
> Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.
>
> Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted,
> Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from
> Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes,
> Predicates in Categories).
>
> But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary
>> literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint
>> presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
>> menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt).  It helpfully summarizes
>> various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes.
>>
>>- Basic Categories:  unit, correlate, medium.
>>- Universes of Experience:  ideas, brute events, habits.
>>- Universal Categories:  possibility, actuality, necessity.
>>- Existential Categories:  feeling, action-reaction, thought.
>>- Logical Categories:  vague, specific, general; or may be, actually
>>is, must be.
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when
the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a
break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a
metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at all a complete
break from them. Do you agree?

One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on
Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce
thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them
with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical
of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review
of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought
as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's
analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and
Universes, I believe it confuses the issue.

Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted,
Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from
Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes,
Predicates in Categories).

But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary
> literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint
> presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
> menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt).  It helpfully summarizes
> various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes.
>
>- Basic Categories:  unit, correlate, medium.
>- Universes of Experience:  ideas, brute events, habits.
>- Universal Categories:  possibility, actuality, necessity.
>- Existential Categories:  feeling, action-reaction, thought.
>- Logical Categories:  vague, specific, general; or may be, actually
>is, must be.
>- Valencies:  monad, dyad, triad.
>
> I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found
> to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and
> Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving
> Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of
> which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu
> /TonyJappy/Papers.  His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and
> the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December (
> http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-o
> f-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/);
> unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list).
> Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical
> framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to
> ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three
> trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66
> sign classes).  From the conclusion of the second paper ...
>
> TJ:  The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had
> accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest
> period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad
> ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to
> which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the
> classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later
> typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s
> conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his
> conception of sign-action experienced in those years between 1904 and 1906,
> are, therefore, radically different from those of the earlier approach, and
> it is doubtful that the two will ever be combined in a satisfactory manner
> in the quest for the sixty-six classes that Peirce hoped to identify.
>
>
> In the body of the same paper, Jappy twice quotes from "Prolegomena to an
> Apology for Pragmaticism" to explain the difference between Universes and
> Categories in this context.
>
> TJ:  1906 was the year, finally, in which Peirce explicitly introduced a
> fundamental distinction between categories and universes ... making
> explicit the universes to which the subjects mentioned in the extract
> (RL463 26–28) quoted earlier belonged:
>
> CSP:  Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a
> Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or
> class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of
> Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe
> the two correctly is a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list

1) Agree - the DO  can be in any of the three categorical modes.

2) Ah- I see your point about the categories and universes. Yes, it makes sense.

 I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects 
(Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants 
(Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while 
the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological 
Universes.

3) No - I don't see how the six categorical relations correspond to the six 
correlates. I understand what you are setting up - and such 
relations/correlates ARE possible. BUT -The Representamen can be in any mode, 
eg, in 1-1 Pure Firstness. The Relation between the Representamen and DO can be 
in any mode...and so on. That's what increases the complex adapatability of the 
semiosic actions.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 4:00 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a 
trichotomy.'


  Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a 
Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe.


JS:  ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, 
while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division.


ET:  I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined 
within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean 
here..


  Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain to 
predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545.  I am hypothesizing that the 
distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the 
three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the 
phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate 
is based on the ontological Universes.


  Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od, 
2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)?


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon, list:

1) I'm not sure where or what  function the three universes have; I admit 
that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological 
alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that 
they are quite different but again, I haven't paid enough attention to them to 
conclude what role the universes have.

2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or 
active and passive.  I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still 
divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the  Dynamic is divided in itself into 
the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...]

3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final 
division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought 
division."

I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within 
such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here..

Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see where 
the three universes fits in...

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's 
Cosmology)


  Edwina, List: 


ET:  I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, 
and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses 
of the categories [not universes].


  As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, 
before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative 
to (phenomenological) Categories.  However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does 
include the word "category" several times.


CSP:  The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind 
actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the 
Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and 
the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts 
between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive. 
In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and 
its passive aspect as a resistance.


  The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," 
and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I think 
we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.  It seems like 
this passage migh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:
You'll find his outline of genuine and degenerate categories in  various 
places. See 5.66 and on, where he outlines the genuine and degenerate forms of 
Secondness and Thirdness. It gets VERY complicated

For example, 5.73 ..he writes: 'Of these three genera of representamens, the 
Icon is the qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate 
while the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus'.

In 2.283 he also talks about genuine and degenerate modes. And 8.331 - also 
talks about genuine and degenerate...

So- for example, the R-O relation that acts as an Icon MIGHT be defined as in a 
categorical mode of 3-1; the Indexical is in a categorical mode of 3-2 and the 
Symbol is 3-3. But the Indexical could also be 2-2 or 2-1. And you can do the 
same elsewhere...where the Representamen can be in any one of the three 
categories and also, presumably, in a genuine and degenerate mode. Same with 
the relation between the Representamen and the Dynamical Interpretant - Peirce 
writes that it could be 'active or passive Secondness [2-2 or 
2-1]...but..couldn't it also be in a mode of Firstness?

So- these combinations bring the ten classes up to many more. I admit I haven't 
explored these complexities because the possibilities are enormous. There ARE 
constraints within the categories and within the triad [O-R-I]...butthe 
complexities are beyond me.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:39 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes 
and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the 
categories.


  Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce 
was right to change his theoretical framework from phenomenological Categories 
to ontological Universes.


ET:  I consider that the Relations [and there are not just four] to be 
predicates ...


  As should have been clear from my earlier post, the four relations that I 
have in mind are S-Od, S-Id, S-If, and S-Od-If; i.e., the last four of the ten 
1908 trichotomies.  In that arrangement, Peirce seems to have moved away from 
treating S-Oi and S-Ii as distinct relations, presumably because Oi and Ii are 
"immediate"; i.e., internal to S.  I am inclined to agree with you that 
relations are predicates, rather than subjects, and thus should be divided by 
Categories, rather than Universes.  If this is correct, it obviously 
complicates--or perhaps renders impossible--Peirce's late and unrealized 
project of combining the six correlate trichotomies that are divided by 
Universe with the four relation trichotomies that are divided by Category in 
order to determine 66 sign classes.


ET:  ... SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1.


  I should probably know this by now, but would you mind explaining briefly 
where these relations occur within the three trichotomies and ten sign classes?


  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same 
as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' 
version of the categories. 

I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in 
explaining the dynamics of semiosis. 

I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral 
component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential capacity 
in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of mediation and 
transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object Relation.

I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be 
predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or rather, 
SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  List: 


  I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary 
literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint presentation 
on "Trikonic" 
(http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt).  
It helpfully summarizes various characterizations of the three 
Categories/Universes.
a.. Basic Categories:  unit, correlate, medium. 
b.. Universes of Experience:  ideas, brute events, habits. 
c.. Universal Categories:  possibility, actuality, necessity. 
d.. Existential Categories:  feeling, action-reaction, thought. 
e.. Logical Categories:  vague, specific, ge

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a
trichotomy.'


Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a
Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe.

JS:  ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division,
while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division.

ET:  I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined
within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you
mean here..


Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain
to predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545.  I am hypothesizing that the
distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among
the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the
phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual
correlate is based on the ontological Universes.

Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od,
2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)?

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> 1) I'm not sure where or what  function the three universes have; I admit
> that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an
> ontological alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first
> impression is that they are quite different but again, I haven't paid
> enough attention to them to conclude what role the universes have.
>
> 2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or
> active and passive.  I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still
> divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the  Dynamic is divided in itself
> into the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...]
>
> 3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final
> division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought
> division."
>
> I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within
> such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean
> here..
>
> Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see
> where the three universes fits in...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on,
> and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as
> analyses of the categories [not universes].
>
>
> As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904,
> before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological)
> alternative to (phenomenological) Categories.  However, 8.315 is from 1909,
> and does include the word "category" several times.
>
> CSP:  The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind
> actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the
> Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active
> and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative
> contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and
> More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active
> aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance.
>
>
> The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action,"
> and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I
> think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.  It
> seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in
> Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the
> Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the
> feeling/action/thought division.
>
> ET:  My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations,
> which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this
> outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there
> are four semiotic relations.
>
>
> Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes
> of 1903.  As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of
> Categories, rather than switching to Universes.  I think that it is an open
> question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change
> his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working
> out the details of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes
and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the
categories.


Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce
was right to *change *his theoretical framework from phenomenological
Categories to ontological Universes.

ET:  I consider that the Relations [and there are not just four] to be
predicates ...


As should have been clear from my earlier post, the four relations that I
have in mind are S-Od, S-Id, S-If, and S-Od-If; i.e., the last four of the
ten 1908 trichotomies.  In that arrangement, Peirce seems to have moved
away from treating S-Oi and S-Ii as distinct relations, presumably because
Oi and Ii are "immediate"; i.e., internal to S.  I am inclined to agree
with you that relations are predicates, rather than subjects, and thus
should be divided by Categories, rather than Universes.  If this is
correct, it obviously complicates--or perhaps renders impossible--Peirce's
late and unrealized project of combining the six correlate trichotomies
that are divided by Universe with the four relation trichotomies that are
divided by Category in order to determine 66 sign classes.

ET:  ... SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1.


I should probably know this by now, but would you mind explaining briefly
where these relations occur within the three trichotomies and ten sign
classes?

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same
> as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better'
> version of the categories.
>
> I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in
> explaining the dynamics of semiosis.
>
> I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral
> component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential
> capacity in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of
> mediation and transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object
> Relation.
>
> I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be
> predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or
> rather, SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> List:
>
> I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary
> literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint
> presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
> menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt).  It helpfully summarizes
> various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes.
>
>- Basic Categories:  unit, correlate, medium.
>- Universes of Experience:  ideas, brute events, habits.
>- Universal Categories:  possibility, actuality, necessity.
>- Existential Categories:  feeling, action-reaction, thought.
>- Logical Categories:  vague, specific, general; or may be, actually
>is, must be.
>- Valencies:  monad, dyad, triad.
>
> I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found
> to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and
> Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving
> Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of
> which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu
> /TonyJappy/Papers.  His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and
> the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December (
> http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-o
> f-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/);
> unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list).
> Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical
> framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to
> ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three
> trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66
> sign classes).  From the conclusion of the second paper ...
>
> TJ:  The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had
> accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest
> period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad
> ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to
> which the sign and its correlates could be referred 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:

1) I'm not sure where or what  function the three universes have; I admit that 
I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological 
alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that 
they are quite different but again, I haven't paid enough attention to them to 
conclude what role the universes have.

2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or 
active and passive.  I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still 
divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the  Dynamic is divided in itself into 
the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...]

3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final 
division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought 
division."

I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such 
terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here..

Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see where the 
three universes fits in...

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and 
also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of 
the categories [not universes].


  As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, before 
Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative to 
(phenomenological) Categories.  However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does include 
the word "category" several times.


CSP:  The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind 
actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the 
Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and 
the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts 
between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive. 
In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and 
its passive aspect as a resistance.


  The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," and 
it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I think we 
agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.  It seems like this 
passage might even support my working hypothesis that in Peirce's later 
thought, the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, 
while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division.


ET:  My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, 
which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined 
in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four 
semiotic relations.


  Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes of 
1903.  As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of Categories, 
rather than switching to Universes.  I think that it is an open question 
whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change his 
theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working out the 
details of the second approach.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon, List
I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also 
in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the 
categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas 
the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. 

My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which 
are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the 
Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic 
relations. 

You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I.
But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and 
Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the 
number of Relations up to a basic Six.

Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with 
restrictions of course.

The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of 
Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of 
Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact 
mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic 
mode.

Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself 
which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AB:  As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
conclusions.


Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman,
in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488;
1907).

AB:  I in particular disagree with your:  "However, as I have suggested
previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly
characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual
(Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought."


It is a working hypothesis, at best.  I am certainly open to being
convinced otherwise.

AB:  It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne)
and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according
to the mature division of the sciences.


I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more
about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently downloaded
a while ago.  Would you mind elaborating their specific relevance to the
current discussion, and perhaps suggest some additional reading that I
could do?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
> conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of his
> other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only not being
> able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character the sheets of
> Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that prevented him from
> finishing the system. All ingredients are present.
>
>
>
> I in particular disagree with your:
>
> ."  However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants 
> *themselves
> *seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual
> (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into
> feeling/action/thought.
>
> --
>
>
>
> This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants. It
> disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a
> sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the
> mature division of the sciences. From a sign type perspective Shorts
> approach makes sense: Each sign has an element of feeling of action and of
> thought, but from a processual approach it is better to apply Ockham’s
> razor in order to find the system behind processes of interpretation.
> Peirce paved the way for that by his notion of involvement. The logical
> note books are key, in combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied)
> criticism of Peirce’s focus on scientific progress in developing a theory
> of interpretation.  (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that
> govern comunication).
>
>
>
> Best, Auke van Breemen
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on,
and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as
analyses of the categories [not universes].


As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904,
before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological)
alternative to (phenomenological) Categories.  However, 8.315 is from 1909,
and does include the word "category" several times.

CSP:  The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind
actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the
Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active
and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative
contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and
More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active
aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance.


The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action,"
and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I
think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.  It
seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in
Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the
Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the
feeling/action/thought division.

ET:  My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations,
which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this
outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there
are four semiotic relations.


Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes
of 1903.  As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of
Categories, rather than switching to Universes.  I think that it is an open
question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change
his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working
out the details of the second approach.

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:

> Jon, List
> I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, and
> also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses
> of the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these
> three ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness,
> Secondness and Thirdness.
>
> My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which
> are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in
> the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four
> semiotic relations.
>
> You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I.
> But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and
> Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings
> the number of Relations up to a basic Six.
>
> Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with
> restrictions of course.
>
> The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of
> Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode
> of Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct
> contact mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in
> a symbolic mode.
>
> Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself
> which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I...
>
> But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are
> SIX: We have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But
> Secondness functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1.
> And Thirdness functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and
> 3-1.  I have written on all of this...
>
> The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or informational
> interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I and
> F-I. PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX
> categorical modesprovides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological
> semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> List:
>
> While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I
> noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents
> of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign
> itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object.  He

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, List
I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in 
the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the 
categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas 
the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. 

My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, 
each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set 
of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic 
relations. 

You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I.
But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and Representamen-and 
two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the number of 
Relations up to a basic Six.

Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with 
restrictions of course.

The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of 
Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of 
Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact 
mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic 
mode.

Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself which 
can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I...

But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are SIX: We 
have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But Secondness 
functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. And Thirdness 
functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and 3-1.  I have 
written on all of this...

The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or informational 
interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I and F-I. 
PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX categorical 
modesprovides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological semiosis.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  List:


  While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed 
that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the 
three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the 
Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object.  He then implied that 
they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, 
Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination 
after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a 
Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  
However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves 
seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual 
(Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought.


  Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical 
Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and 
(triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me 
to be all Trichotomies."  However, he never definitively stipulated on what 
basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive 
terms in each case.  The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to 
all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049.


  This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to 
one of the three Universes.  If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to 
be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum?  In particular, 
what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these 
three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of 
rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted 
(manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by 
instinct/experience/form?  Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that 
addresses these specific questions?


  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

Gary F., List:


I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you 
mentioned.  Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady 
Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument."


  CSP:  One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being.  It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to