Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Peircers, I think it's true that some of the difficulties of this discussion may be due to different concepts of predicates, or different ways of using the word predicate in different applications, communities, and contexts. If I think back to the variety of different communities of interpretation that I've had the fortune or misfortune of passing through over the years, I can reckon up at least this many ways of thinking about predicates: 1. In purely syntactic contexts, a predicate is just a symbol, a syntactic element that is subject to specified rules of combination and transformation. As we pass to contexts where predicate symbols are meant to have meaning, most disciplines of interpretation will be very careful, at first, about drawing a firm distinction between a predicate symbol and the object it is intended to denote. For example, in computer science, people tend to use forms like constant name, function name, predicate name, type name, variable name, and so on, for the names that denote the corresponding abstract objects. When it comes to what information a predicate name conveys, what kind of object the predicate name denotes, or finally, what kind of object the predicate itself is imagined to be, we find that we still have a number of choices: 2. Predicate = property, the intension a concept or term. 3. Predicate = collection, the extension of a concept or term. 4. Predicate = function from a universe domain to a boolean domain. It doesn't really matter all that much in ordinary applications which you prefer, and there is some advantage to keeping all the options open, using whichever one appears most helpful at a given moment, just so long as you have a way of moving consistently among the alternatives and maintaining the information each conveys. Regards, Jon SE = Steven Ericsson-Zenith SE: Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing fiercely. SE: Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between the wider usage of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you in the dialog, and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments. Having made this distinction he then speaks about the indices that are his categories. SE: As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of the category but the category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. The confusion may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices to its members. That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it (index). Icons are the selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices. SE: Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of predicates, I prefer to say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions which is more generally understood today. SE: Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that the categories that Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those he identifies as early as 1866. -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
GF: Good point, Jon -- we should not neglect the element of performance art in philosophy! :-) GF: However I'm not sure it's right to say that the metaphysical order is more fundamental than the phenomenological. It doesn't seem to jibe with Peirce's classification of the sciences, either. JA: Yes, we always have the choice between first in nature and first for us. I have no strong feelings about which first comes first -- I was just going by Peirce's statement: CSP: Besides, it would be illogical to rely upon the categories to decide so fundamental a question. JA: But you are right, one could just as well say that independent foundations are both fundamental without one foundation being more fundamental than the other. -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Ben, Steven, All ... I may have missed a few posts but I don't understand the fuss about indices. The types of signs not in one-to-one correspondence with the types of objects. You can refer to the same object by means of a pronoun or some other index -- for example, Looky there!, Voila!, or I don't know what it is, but there it goes again -- or you can refer to it by means of a noun, or some figure of speech with iconic properties. It is simply a matter of convenience in certain cases that we use an index or icon when a more definitive symbol might take a lot of work to fashion. Regards, Jon Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing fiercely. Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between the wider usage of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you in the dialog, and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments. Having made this distinction he then speaks about the indices that are his categories. As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of the category but the category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. The confusion may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices to its members. That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it (index). Icons are the selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices. Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of predicates, I prefer to say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions which is more generally understood today. Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that the categories that Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those he identifies as early as 1866. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Jon, I've been reading the section of the Minute Logic that you've been posting bits of (i don't think i've read it before) and i'm looking forward to your way of connecting it to the category of categories ... if that's what you're doing ... but i agree with Gary R. and Ben that it would be easier to follow if you put it together into one message, or at least collect all the Peirce quotes into one and your argument or comments into another one. Gary F. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: March-10-12 11:20 AM Peircers, This passage from Peirce has intrigued me, too, for at least a dozen years, just going by the first discussions that I can remember having about it, and still find scattered about on the web. I am less concerned about the terms of art from Aristotle -- predicables, predicaments, etc. -- than I am about the nature and function of categories in general, with especial reference to the status of Peirce's 3 categories. The larger interest of this question for me is this -- that I see a certain continuity of purpose and uberty that extends from Aristotle's categories, up through Peirce's, and through one potential, as yet unrealized, but perhaps inevitable future development of category theory as it is understood and used in most mathematical work today, either as a practical tool, as most will admit it, or as a foundation more natural and more sure than set theory, as others are inclined to recommend it. But it's Saturday, and I'm due for a bit of RR ... Regards, Jon - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Gary, Ben, Jon,
Gary, I think you got this just right.
Best,
Gary R.
On 3/9/12, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Ben, Jon and list,
I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me
that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in
question, Peirce does NOT use the term Categories in reference to what he
elsewhere calls categories, or elements of the phaneron, or even sometimes
universes -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
The Prolegomena is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs,
and the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of
propositions. The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP
4.544-5:
[[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs
fail But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote
Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large,
very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily
defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a
single instance, is the collection of all things in the Physical
Universe
Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category
are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of
Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of
Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe
the two correctly is a question for careful study. ]]]
Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to
Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying
that he prefers the term Predicaments for classes of predicates, no doubt
because this avoids confusing them with the different Modes of Being which
are elsewhere called categories. And indeed he never mentions Categories
again in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in
the whole article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only conclude
that the passage you quoted from it, Jon, tells us nothing about *those*
categories, which i guess are the ones you referred to as Peirce's
categories. The connection between them and the triad of first, second and
third *intentions* is very tenuous, as i think Peirce indicates by saying
that his thoughts about the latter triad are not yet harvested --
something he could hardly say in 1906 about his phaneroscopic categories.
Gary F.
} We are circumveiloped by obscuritads. [Finnegans Wake 244] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: March-08-12 11:05 PM
Ben All,
I see that I omitted to give my initial thoughts on that last paragraph of
yours, so let me do that now.
BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
different in the different Modes of Being? Where in his other
writings does he call his own categories predicates of predicates?
It's hard not to think that by Predicates of Predicates he does not
mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional,
2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that
his thoughts are not yet harvested, will end up being treated by him
as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds — instances or applications of his
categories.
There is nothing very exotic about predicates of predicates. We use them
all the time without taking much notice of the fact or bothering to describe
them as such.
For example, terms like monadic, dyadic, triadic are predicates of
predicates.
When a phenomenon requires a k-adic predicate or a k-adic relation for its
adequate description, we say that the phenomenon has k-ness. So category
k is the category of phenomena that need k-adic predicates or relations for
their adequate description.
When it comes to what Peirce means here by Modes of Being, I guess I had
assumed from the words he used — Actuality, Possibility, Destiny — that he
was talking about the traditional triad of modalities, but I'm not so sure
about that now. At any rate, those would not be the first words that come
to mind when I think of the categories. I am more used to the paradigm of
Quality, Reaction, Representation and its later variants, and the only way I
could force an association would be by interpreting those modes of being, or
modalities, if that is what they are, in relational terms. Shy of that, I
have the feeling that Peirce could talk us into any given order he chose on
any given day ex tempore.
But maybe my readings will bring more light tomorrow ...
Regards,
Jon
-
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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list, I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on predicament in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed Aristotle's Categories, or Predicaments. I don't think that he means his own categories by Category in the Prolegomena. And the Modes of Being in Prolegomena correspond to what he says of his own categories elsewhere: Firstness, quality, possibility, chance, some, vagueness, etc. Secondness, reaction, actuality, brute fact, this, determinateness, etc. Thirdness, representation, necessity/destiny, habit, rule, all, generality, etc. Still, Jon, I have to agree with you that it's hard to see why Peirce would refuse to see his categories as predicates of predicates - not predicates as merely grammatical entities but as _accidentia_, just as Peirce tended to regard subject and _substantia_ as nearly the same thing. Peirce even calls his categories accidents (not coincidences but descriptive attributes), see Section 11 in both A New List of Categories (1867) and corresponding section in his rewrite The Categories (1893) (both papers interleaved at http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm). Peirce also has his own Universes correlated to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - the Universes of (1) Ideas, (2) Brute facts, (3) Habits. So the idea of Universes and Categories being not so very different is not what makes it hard to believe that the Prolegomena's Categories are not his own Categories, though the Prolegomena's idea that one needs indices to distinguish Categories (Predicaments) does make it seem unlikely that the Prolegomena's Categories are Peirce's own Categories. Your point about looking for arity or valence because of the mathematical underpinnings of the categories is well taken. Regarding the Prolegomena's Modes of Being and their lack of perspicuous arity, Peirce's use of the word Destiny in place of Necessity suggests that he is not thinking quite about the classical three modalities, or even the simplest Booleanized version (with a hypothetical necessity a la the hypothetical universal) but instead where the hypothetical or conditional necessity or destiny is not simply A(G-H) but something a little more complicated. So one might get closer, if not all the way, to arity or valence by thinking of it a la the classical concept/judgment/reasoning trichotomy, as Possibility - Blue (term, rheme) Actuality - Socrates was a man. (proposition, dicisign) Destiny - If you do X, then Y will result. (argument, more or less). I also agree with Gary R. about all those Objective Logic posts. Sending on one day post after post with nothing but quotes is a bit much. Can't you just send a bunch of quotes together like Joe used to do, then in a next post proceed to a discussion? Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Gary Fuhrman To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 10:40 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Ben, Jon and list, I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in question, Peirce does NOT use the term Categories in reference to what he elsewhere calls categories, or elements of the phaneron, or even sometimes universes -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. The Prolegomena is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs, and the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of propositions. The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP 4.544-5: [[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs fail But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a single instance, is the collection of all things in the Physical Universe Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly is a question for careful study. ]]] Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying that he prefers the term Predicaments for classes of predicates, no doubt because this avoids confusing them with the different Modes of Being which are elsewhere called categories. And indeed he never mentions Categories again in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in the whole article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Ben All, At any rate, there is no particular hurry to come to a decision. As I get time, I'll go back and review the passage in the context of that paper and others. For now, let me make a first pass over your comments and say what I can say off the cuff, subject to the usual risk of backtracking later. BU = Ben Udell JA = Jon Awbrey BU: The passage by Peirce that you quoted below has nagged at me for some time. On your mywikibiz page to which you linked, as regards that passage, you said The first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that Peirce's Categories, or 'Predicaments', are predicates of predicates. Let us call that H_1. Categories = Predicates of Predicates. I was tempted into that interpretation, despite the possibility of becoming the foil of a subsequent aporia, by the simple fact that it appears to help me make sense, not only of what Peirce might mean by a category, but of all the other claims that he makes for their properties. As a general rule, I interpret Peirce's categories as categories of relations. I suppose I am led to do this by the fact that Peirce makes very strong claims about his categories -- the claim that three are necessary and sufficient, etc. -- and I see nothing else that could anchor these claims except the extremely hard facts of mathematics that he emphasizes throughout his work under the heading of triadic irreducibility. If Peirce intends to explain his categories by means of words like Actuality, Possibility, Destiny -- words whose meanings are hardly fixed across traditions of interpretation but range from the fluid to the flighty and fanciful -- then I can but take him at his word, at any given moment, whether he means the same thing by them as he means by First, Last, Middle, in that order or some other, or then again Quality, Reaction, Representation, or any of the other terms. But if he means to turn it about, and explain those arrays of highly variable and traditionally volatile terms by means of mathematical relations, where we have some hope of probating, proving or disproving, the properties attributed to these categories, then that is reason to think we are moving in a positive direction, clarifying obscure words in the light of more determinate concepts. BU: In the editors' footnote to CP 4.549, the editors say that what there Peirce calls the Modes of Being are Usually called categories by Peirce. See vol. 1, bk. III. Maybe they're wrong, but what here he calls the Modes of Being -- Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny) do at least comprise one of his formulations of his categories, even if not the definitive formulation. BU: Peirce says [...] what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates ... Peirce everywhere else prefers the name Categories for his own categories and who is the you who would have been speaking of Peirce's own categories? In Peirce's dialogue, formally speaking, you addresses the Reader. I initially read you as referring to Peirce's alter ego in a dialogue with himself, but it occurs to me that another possibility might be Hegel. BU: Peirce says, CSP: [...] the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Given what I said above, I am content to leave it open at present whether Categories, Modalities, Modes of Being, Predicaments, Predicates of Predicates, and all the rest are exemplifying the same formal structure or not. What is less variable for me is the fact that no other reason is given anywhere in Peirce's work for claiming the necessity and sufficiency of three categories except the mathematical facts about the valences of relations. Regards, Jon BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are different in the different Modes of Being? Where in his other writings does he call his own categories predicates of predicates? It's hard not to think that by Predicates of Predicates he does not mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional, 2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that his thoughts are not yet harvested, will end up being treated by him as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds -- instances or applications of his categories. JA: We have of course discussed the bearing of Peirce's categories on his other triads several times before, even to the point of going through his early writings in excruciating detail. I do not think I have the strength to do that again, but it may be possible to recover the gist of those examinations from various archives here and there on the web. JA: One of the nagging things
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
-Original Message- From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM To: 'Catherine Legg' Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Gary, Cathy and Listers, I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up my next book and send it in. Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results). Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity. However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for computational modeling. This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book: Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to carry on this work. Regards, Phyllis BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact) during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney. -Original Message- From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM To: Phyllis Chiasson Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis! Cathy On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary, Cathy and Listers, I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up my next book and send it in. Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results). Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity. However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for computational modeling. This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book: Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to carry on this work. Regards, Phyllis BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact) during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Catherine Legg Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor analytical
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Hi Phyllis, Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty? | Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000), | The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown, | (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis, | Philadelphia, PA. We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago, so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread: http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318 Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Peircers, Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his original opinion about the connections of the three categories with the principal types of signs and the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third guessing had settled down, and yet leaves the question undecided in his own mind at that time. Working from the understanding that all semiotic phenomena are irreducibly triadic, taking irreducibile in the strictest sense of the word, specific reasons must be given for assigning any number less than 3 to the arity of any aspect or component of a semiotic species, for example, a type of sign relation or a type of inference, in effect, exhibiting an approximate reduction in some looser sense of reduction. There are plenty of examples in Peirce's early work where he demonstrates the form of reasoning that he uses to make these categorical associations and connections, and I had intended to go hunt a few of these up, but the niche of the web where I last copied them out is down right now, so I will have to try again later. Regards, Jon CL = Cathy Legg GR = Gary Richmond CL: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. GR: And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier post and commented on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote: CSP: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. ... [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. CSP, ''Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking : The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism'', Turrisi (ed.), 276-277. GR: Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. CSP: [In] the book called ''Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University'', while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit., 277]. GR: [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.] GR: So, as he sees here, for those few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations. In that sense Peirce is certainly at least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating: GR: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness, nor induction with anything but 2ns. GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry — as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468–6.473; also, EP 2:440–442] — he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. GR: But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved confusing even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for now). -- academia:
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Peircers, Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the Logic of Science at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866). • http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension Here is a link to an archival copy in case the current web page goes off-line again: • http://web.archive.org/web/20100702011126/http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent students in many fields. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction GR = Gary Richmond JD = Jonathan DeVore JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive. JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. I agree with Gary that this point is well taken. If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative terms, that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon, then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning, are basically category three. Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal sense that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties relatively well, at least, for many practical purposes. That recognition allows the categorical question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific means. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent students in many fields. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction GR = Gary Richmond JD = Jonathan DeVore JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive. JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. I agree with Gary that this point is well taken. If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative terms, that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon, then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning, are basically category three. Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal sense that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties relatively well, at least, for many practical purposes. That recognition allows the categorical question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific means. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Jon, All, Jon, I'm glad my post was for a helpful summary for you in the matter of at least Peirce's changing views of the three inference patterns in relation to the categories. Just a brief comment on your 'Subject' line. Ben and I would like to encourage you and everyone here to follow Joe Ransdell's advice when changing a subject line (and I think it was quite proper for you to change this one, Jon) that after the change that one adds was, [whatever the former Subject was] including enough of the former Subject line for identicatory purposes. This will be helpful in any number of ways for use of whatever archive or folder may end up containing these posts in the future. Best, Gary and Ben On 3/2/12, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary. Jon cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List Gary Richmond wrote: Cathy, Stephen, list, Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier post and commented on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277]. [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.] So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness, nor induction with anything but 2ns. I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved confusing even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for now). Best, Gary -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ -- Gary Richmond Humanities Department Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College--City University of New York
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary. Jon cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List Gary Richmond wrote: Cathy, Stephen, list, Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier post and commented on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277]. [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.] So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness, nor induction with anything but 2ns. I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved confusing even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for now). Best, Gary -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Jonathan, list, I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. Best, Gary On 3/2/12, Jonathan DeVore devor...@umich.edu wrote: Dear List, It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon under consideration--without being mutually exclusive. So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be thought of as the 2ndness of deduction--which is put to good use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). Best, Jonathan Quoting Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net: Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary. Jon cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List Gary Richmond wrote: Cathy, Stephen, list, Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier post and commented on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277]. [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.] So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness, nor induction with anything but 2ns. I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved confusing even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for now). Best, Gary -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
GR = Gary Richmond JD = Jonathan DeVore JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive. JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. I agree with Gary that this point is well taken. If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative terms, that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon, then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning, are basically category three. Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal sense that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties relatively well, at least, for many practical purposes. That recognition allows the categorical question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific means. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
