On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 11:35:31PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
> On 25 December 2014 at 18:27, Noah Misch wrote:
> > This needs to be conditional on whether the platform supports IPv6, like
> > we do
> > in setup_config(). The attached patch works on these configurations:
> >
> > 64-bit Windows Se
On 25 December 2014 at 18:27, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 03:55:02PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
> > f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
>
> > FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host "::1", user "David", database
> > "postgres"
> > ...
> > FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entr
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 03:55:02PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
> f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
> FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host "::1", user "David", database
> "postgres"
> ...
> FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host "::1", user "David", database
> "postgres"
Thanks.
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 11:55 AM, David Rowley wrote:
> f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
> Having a look at the pg_hba.conf that's been generated by pgregress, it
> looks like it only adds a line for IPv4 addresses.
Indeed. I can see this problem as well on my win7 box, and you
On 30 November 2014 at 15:02, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 02:31:15AM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
> > It then dawned on me that every Windows build of PostgreSQL already has
> a way
> > to limit connections to a particular OS user. SSPI authentication is
> > essentially the Windows e
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 02:31:15AM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
> It then dawned on me that every Windows build of PostgreSQL already has a way
> to limit connections to a particular OS user. SSPI authentication is
> essentially the Windows equivalent of peer authentication. A brief trial
> thereof l
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 11:36:41PM +0100, Magnus Hagander wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
>
> > Noah Misch writes:
> > > One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the
> > back
> > > branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only.
Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-12 <20140712170151.ga1985...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> Thanks. Preliminary questions:
>
> > +#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
> > +/* make_temp_sockdir() is invoked at most twice from pg_upgrade.c via
> > get_sock_dir() */
> > +#define MAX_TEMPDIRS 2
> > +static int n_tempdirs = 0;
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 12:40:09PM +0300, Christoph Berg wrote:
> > > > > > I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
> > > > > > security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
> > > > > > using -c unix_socket_permissions=0700), this behavior is pretty
> > >
Re: To Bruce Momjian 2014-07-11 <20140711093923.ga3...@msg.df7cb.de>
> Re: Bruce Momjian 2014-07-08 <20140708202114.gd9...@momjian.us>
> > > > > I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
> > > > > security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
> > > > > usin
Re: Bruce Momjian 2014-07-08 <20140708202114.gd9...@momjian.us>
> > > > I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
> > > > security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
> > > > using -c unix_socket_permissions=0700), this behavior is pretty
> > > > unexpecte
On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 08:21:48PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
> Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-08 <20140708174125.ga1884...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> > On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
> > > Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 <20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> > > > Here
Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-08 <20140708174125.ga1884...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
> > Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 <20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> > > Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of
> >
On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
> Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 <20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> > Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of /tmp.
> > The first attached patch adds NetBSD mkdtemp() to libpgport. The second,
>
Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 <20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of /tmp.
> The first attached patch adds NetBSD mkdtemp() to libpgport. The second,
> principal, patch uses mkdtemp() to implement this design in pg_regres
On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 07:04:20PM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> > > I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
> > > default, but provide some way for t
y...@netbsd.org (YAMAMOTO Takashi) writes:
>> On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
>>> openvswitch has some tricks to overcome the socket path length
>>> limitation using symlink. (or procfs where available)
>>> iirc these were introduced for debian builds which use de
> On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
>> > Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
>> > socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
>> >
>> > http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20121129223632.ga15
On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
> > Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
> > socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
> >
> > http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20121129223632.ga15...@to
> Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
> socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
>
> http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20121129223632.ga15...@tornado.leadboat.com
openvswitch has some tricks to overcome the socket pat
On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
> Robert Haas writes:
>> On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg wrote:
>>> Oh, right. There's this other patch which apparently works so well
>>> that I already forgot it's there:
>>>
>>> Enable pg_regress --host=/path/to/socket:
>>> http
Re: Tom Lane 2014-03-31 <22183.1396293...@sss.pgh.pa.us>
> >> Enable pg_regress --host=/path/to/socket:
> >> https://alioth.debian.org/scm/loggerhead/pkg-postgresql/postgresql-9.4/trunk/view/head:/debian/patches/60-pg_regress_socketdir.patch
>
> > Wasn't this patch submitted for inclusion in Postg
Robert Haas writes:
> On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg wrote:
>> Oh, right. There's this other patch which apparently works so well
>> that I already forgot it's there:
>>
>> Enable pg_regress --host=/path/to/socket:
>> https://alioth.debian.org/scm/loggerhead/pkg-postgresql/postg
On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg wrote:
> Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-30 <20140330014531.ge170...@tornado.leadboat.com>
>> On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
>> > Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
>> > possibility to run make c
Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-30 <20140330014531.ge170...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
> > Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
> > possibility to run make check EXTRA_REGRESS_OPTS="--host=/tmp". (With
> > the pending
On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
> Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
> possibility to run make check EXTRA_REGRESS_OPTS="--host=/tmp". (With
> the pending fix I sent yesterday to extend this to contrib/test_decoding.)
That doesn't work
Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-24 <20140323230420.ga4139...@tornado.leadboat.com>
> On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> > > I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
> > > default, but provide
On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 07:04:20PM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> > > I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
> > > default, but provide some way for t
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> > I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
> > default, but provide some way for the user to override that choice.
> > If they want to put it in /tmp,
Noah Misch writes:
> On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
>> I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
>> default, but provide some way for the user to override that choice.
>> If they want to put it in /tmp, it's on their head as to how secure
>> tha
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
> > socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
>
> I'm not thrilled with that; it's totally insecure on plat
Noah Misch writes:
> Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
> socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
I'm not thrilled with that; it's totally insecure on platforms where /tmp
isn't "sticky", so it doesn't seem like an appropri
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 07:10:27PM -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 01:35:45PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> > Having that said, I can appreciate the value of tightening the socket mode
> > for
> > a bit of *extra* safety:
> >
> > --- a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
> > +++ b/sr
On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 01:35:45PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> Having that said, I can appreciate the value of tightening the socket mode for
> a bit of *extra* safety:
>
> --- a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
> +++ b/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
> @@ -2299,4 +2299,5 @@ regression_main(int argc, ch
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 08:15:41PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> >> What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
> >> containing directory to keep out bad guys. Permissions on the socket
> >
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 05:38:38PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
> Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
> ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
>
> http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-1999-1402
> http://unix.
I wrote:
> Placing the socket anywhere besides the default location will require
> setting PGHOST anyway, so I don't see that this argument holds much water.
> The cleanup aspect is likewise not that exciting; pg_regress creates a lot
> of stuff it doesn't remove.
There's another point here, if yo
Noah Misch writes:
> On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
>> What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
>> containing directory to keep out bad guys. Permissions on the socket
>> itself might be sufficient, but what does it save us to assume tha
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
> > ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
>
> What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on t
On 03/03/2014 02:00 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
Josh Berkus writes:
The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
target build system. Is that possible?
It's theoretically possible, since having broken i
* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
> > ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
>
> What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of t
Josh Berkus writes:
> The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
> could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
> target build system. Is that possible?
It's theoretically possible, since having broken into the build user's
account they coul
Noah Misch writes:
> Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
> ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
containing directory to keep out bad guys. Pe
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 01:27:18PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the back
> > branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could
> > even
> > do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS support to
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
> Noah Misch writes:
> > One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the
> back
> > branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could
> even
> > do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS support to Windows
* Josh Berkus (j...@agliodbs.com) wrote:
> The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
> could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
> target build system. Is that possible?
I don't see why it wouldn't be- once the attacker is on the box as a
On 03/02/2014 12:17 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
> The issue here is about how much effort to go to in order to secure the
> PostgreSQL system that is started up to do the regression tests. It's
> already set up to only listen on localhost and will run with only the
> privileges of the user running th
* james (ja...@mansionfamily.plus.com) wrote:
> Well, the banks I've contracted at recently are all rather keen on
> virtual desktops for developers, and some of those are terminal
> services. We're a headache, and packaging up all the things we need
> is a pain, so there is some mileage in buying
On 03/02/2014 01:27 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
Also, to what extent does any of this affect buildfarm animals? Whatever
we do for "make check" will presumably make those tests safe for them,
but how are the postmasters they test under "make installcheck" set up?
Nothing special.
"bin/initdb" -
On 02/03/2014 15:30, Magnus Hagander wrote:
Terminal Services have definitely become more common over time, but
with faster and cheaper virtualization, a lot of people have switched
to that instead, which would remove the problem of course.
I wonder how common it actually is, though, to *build
Noah Misch writes:
> One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the back
> branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could even
> do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS support to Windows through named pipes.
+1 for that solution, if it's not an unr
* Dave Page (dp...@pgadmin.org) wrote:
> It's not that rare in my experience - certainly there are far more single
> user installations, but Terminal Server configurations are common for
> deploying apps "Citrix-style" or VDI. The one and only Windows server
> maintained by the EDB infrastructur
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 6:20 AM, Noah Misch wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
> > On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
> > >One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of
> effort
> > >on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people n
> On 2 Mar 2014, at 05:20, Noah Misch wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>>> On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
>>> One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
>>> on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people norma
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 09:43:19PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Andrew Dunstan writes:
> > On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
> >> BTW, a different problem with the proposed patch is that it changes
> >> some test cases in ecpg and contrib/dblink, apparently to avoid session
> >> reconnections.
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
> On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
> >One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
> >on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people normally expect a Windows
> >box to have multiple users at all,
Andrew Dunstan writes:
> On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
>> BTW, a different problem with the proposed patch is that it changes
>> some test cases in ecpg and contrib/dblink, apparently to avoid session
>> reconnections. That seems likely to me to be losing test coverage.
>> Perhaps there
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people normally expect a Windows
box to have multiple users at all, let alone non-mutually-trusting users.
As Stephen said, it's fairly
Magnus Hagander writes:
> For a one-off password used locally only, we could also consider just using
> a guid, and generate it using
> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379205(v=vs.85).aspx.
Not sure if that API is intended to create an unpredictable UUID, rather
than jus
* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
> solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
> in some non-world-accessible directory created by the test scaffolding.
Yes, yes, yes.
> Of course that d
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 12:29:38PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> There are two big problems with the lets-generate-a-random-password
> approach. Noah acknowledged the portability issue of possibly not having
> a strong entropy source available. The other issue though is whether
> doing this doesn't in
On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 7:09 PM, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>
> On 03/01/2014 12:29 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
>
>
>> In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
>> solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
>> in some non-world-accessible directory
On 03/01/2014 12:29 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
in some non-world-accessible directory created by the test scaffolding.
+1 - I'm all for KISS.
Of cou
Noah Misch writes:
> As announced with last week's releases, use of trust authentication in the
> "make check" temporary database cluster makes it straightforward to hijack the
> OS user account involved. The prerequisite is another user account on the
> same system. The solution we discussed on
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 12:48:08PM -0300, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
> I didn't check the patch in detail, but it seems to me that both the
> encode stuff as well as pgrand belong in src/common rather than
> src/port.
Since src/common exists only in 9.3 and up, that would mean putting them in
different
I didn't check the patch in detail, but it seems to me that both the
encode stuff as well as pgrand belong in src/common rather than
src/port.
--
Álvaro Herrerahttp://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
--
Sent via pgsql-hackers mailin
As announced with last week's releases, use of trust authentication in the
"make check" temporary database cluster makes it straightforward to hijack the
OS user account involved. The prerequisite is another user account on the
same system. The solution we discussed on secur...@postgresql.org was
67 matches
Mail list logo
