Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-03-28 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier >> wrote: >>> Patch moved to CF 2017-01. >> >> And nothing has happened since, the patch rotting a bit because of a >> conflict in

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-01-31 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> Patch moved to CF 2017-01. > > And nothing has happened since, the patch rotting a bit because of a > conflict in pg_dump's TAP tests. Attached is a rebased version. Moved to CF

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2017-01-31 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi >> wrote: >>> I applied your fixed patch and new one, and confirmed the applied source >>> passed the tests successfully. And

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-28 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi > wrote: >> I applied your fixed patch and new one, and confirmed the applied source >> passed the tests successfully. And I also checked manually the error >> messages were emitted succe

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-24 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 4:02 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi wrote: > I applied your fixed patch and new one, and confirmed the applied source > passed the tests successfully. And I also checked manually the error messages > were emitted successfully when cr/lf are included in dbname or rolename or > data

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-24 Thread Ideriha, Takeshi
> > [Summary] > > 1. apply patch and make world > > -> failed because was mistakenly coded . > > > > 2.correct this mistake and make check-world > > -> got 1 failed test: "'pg_dumpall with \n\r in database name'" > > because test script cannot createdb "foo\n\rbar" > > The attached versi

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Ideriha, Takeshi wrote: > Here's a summary for what I tested in RHEL7.0, details follow. Thanks for the review. > [Summary] > 1. apply patch and make world > -> failed because was mistakenly coded . > > 2.correct this mistake and make check-world > -> got 1

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-11-22 Thread Ideriha, Takeshi
Hi, Here's a summary for what I tested in RHEL7.0, details follow. [Summary] 1. apply patch and make world -> failed because was mistakenly coded . 2.correct this mistake and make check-world -> got 1 failed test: "'pg_dumpall with \n\r in database name'" because test script cannot c

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-10 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 11:00 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > I count one person disfavoring the patch concept of rejecting these characters > early, and I count two people, plus yourself as author, favoring it. > Therefore, the patch can move forward with the proposed design. The next > step, then, is f

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-10 Thread Noah Misch
On Sun, Oct 02, 2016 at 10:47:04PM +0900, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Michael Paquier > wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > >> I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon of readers > >> who > >> would benefit from thi

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-02 Thread Michael Paquier
On Sun, Oct 2, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > And seeing nothing happening here, I still don't know what to do with > this patch. Thoughts? If we are going to do nothing I would suggest to > just remove the comment in string_utils.c saying that such LF and CR > will be unsupported in a

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-10-02 Thread Michael Paquier
On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: >> I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon of readers who >> would benefit from this knowledge, the error message suffices. For everyone >> else, it would just dil

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-11 Thread Michael Paquier
On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 10:01 AM, Noah Misch wrote: > I discourage documenting LF/CR restrictions. For the epsilon of readers who > would benefit from this knowledge, the error message suffices. For everyone > else, it would just dilute the text. (One could argue against other parts of > our do

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-11 Thread Noah Misch
On Thu, Sep 08, 2016 at 12:12:49PM -0400, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 9/6/16 1:42 PM, Robert Haas wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:43 PM, Peter Eisentraut > > wrote: > > > Everything that is using appendShellString() is now going to reject LF > > > and CR characters, but there is no systemati

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-08 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 9/6/16 1:42 PM, Robert Haas wrote: > If we were talking about pathnames containing spaces, I would agree, > but I've never heard of a legitimate pathname containing CR or LF. I > can't see us losing much by refusing to allow such pathnames, except > for security holes. The flip side of that is

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-07 Thread Michael Paquier
On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 2:32 AM, Tom Lane wrote: > I think probably a better answer is to reject bad paths earlier, eg have > initdb error out before doing anything if the proposed -D path contains > CR/LF. Yes, that's a bug that we had better address. It is not nice to not clean up PGDATA in this

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 9:43 PM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patc

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Tom Lane
Peter Eisentraut writes: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this >> restrict

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-06 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this > restriction in the backend, and I am add

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-01 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 2:44 AM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: >> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against >> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as >> commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patc

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-09-01 Thread Peter Eisentraut
On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this > restriction in the backend, How about s

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Tom Lane
Peter Geoghegan writes: > On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Michael Paquier > wrote: >> There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are >> actually supported. > Bi-directional text support (i.e., the use of right-to-left control > characters) is known to have security implicat

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Peter Geoghegan
On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Michael Paquier wrote: > There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are > actually supported. Bi-directional text support (i.e., the use of right-to-left control characters) is known to have security implications, FWIW. There is an interesting

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Tue, Aug 23, 2016 at 10:19 AM, Peter Geoghegan wrote: > I haven't looked at the patch, but offhand I wonder if it's worth > considering control characters added by unicode, if you haven't already. There is no need to put restrictions on those I think, and they are actually supported. Look for

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Peter Geoghegan
I haven't looked at the patch, but offhand I wonder if it's worth considering control characters added by unicode, if you haven't already. -- Peter Geoghegan

Re: [HACKERS] Forbid use of LF and CR characters in database and role names

2016-08-22 Thread Michael Paquier
On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 10:12 AM, Michael Paquier wrote: > Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against > those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as > commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this > restriction in the backen