_
From: Gary McGraw [g...@cigital.com]
Sent: 08 September 2015 15:44
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]; Peter G. Neumann
Cc: Secure Code Mailing List
Subject: Re: [SC-L] [External] Re: SearchSecurity: Dynamism
As far as I know, Microsoft integrated some reference monitoring into their OS
family un
k cat in a dark room,
especially if there is no cat."
- Confucius
From: Peter G. Neumann [neum...@csl.sri.com]
Sent: 06 September 2015 15:24
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: Alfonso De Gregorio; Johan Peeters; Secure Code Mailing List
Subject: Re: [SC-L]
Does anyone else remember "reference monitors"?
What an old-fashioned idea. But they'd certainly solve a lot of problems.
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP, CSSLP
Senior Lead Scientist
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
"The hardest thing of all is to
find a black cat in a
it is, and more importantly, what it should
be.
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Senior Lead Scientist
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
"Answers are easy. It's asking the right questions which is hard."
- The Doctor
________
Fro
Ever since I read an article about the challenges of remote laser surgery being
done by doctors at the Naval Hospital in Bethesda, MD, via satellite link on
wounded soldiers in Iraq, I've been warning for years about the need to apply
software assurance principles to the development and testing
The one point that's missing from the article is to remind people: What the
heck do you think firewalls are made of? Software! So unless a software
manufacturer has got "software security religion", their product is just as
likely to be "broken" inside than the things it allegedly protects.
==
On the other hand, isn't it somewhat analagous to hiring 24/7 armed security
guards and installing a state of the art physical security system in a museum,
and passing and enforcing strict laws against grand larceny?
The "secure coding" alternative would be for museums to stop displaying
pricel
I agree that ONE end goal of software security is to safeguard data - but it is
not the only goal...and may not even be the primary goal, depending on the type
of system the software is part of. In a safety-critical system, "safeguard the
data" takes on a very different meaning from what one thi
I agree - and grow increasingly frustrated with those who insist on confusing
"cyber war" with "cyber espionage" (and vice versa). But I've found it's quite
easy to get them to understand the difference by simply asking them to drop the
prefix "cyber" from each. Cyber war is simply war fought on
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729045.400-the-computer-that-never-crashes.html
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Lead Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
"If you're not failing every now and again,
it's a sign you're not doing anything very innovative."
- W
hamburg.de]
Sent: 13 May 2012 04:17
To: sc-l@securecoding.org
Cc: Goertzel, Karen [USA]; Peter G. Neumann; Gary McGraw
Subject: Re (badware vs. "goodware"): [SC-L] SearchSecurity: Badware versus
malware
Karen, whereas "flaws and defects" can hardly be argued to have possi
In other words, flaws and defects caused through developer error, ignorance,
negligence etc. can be exploited to cause harm. So even if one could prevent
actual intentional malicious inclusions in software, one hasn't eliminated the
problem of exploitable flawed logic.
The megachallenge, of cou
Oops. I meant to say "touching faith" not "touching lack of faith".
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
____
From: "Goertzel, Karen [USA]"
mailto:goertzel_ka...@bah.com>>
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2012 09:53:18 -0500
To:
Unfortunately, it seems like the SWEBOK folks still believe that if you have
high-quality software, that will be sufficient to assure robustness against
intentional threats. It also shows a touching lack of faith that there will
never be an malicious participant in the SDLC intentionally sabotag
What we need is to start building software that can fight back. Then we could
become part of "cyber warfare" which is much sexier than "software assurance".
:)
===
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
Sorry, you have reached an imaginary number.
There are these:
ISC(2) Secure Software Conference Series -
https://www.isc2.org/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=650
ESSoS - http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/events/essos/2012/
SecSE - http://www.sintef.org/secse
SSIRI - http://paris.utdallas.edu/ssiri11/
But your point is taken. Most of the conf
For those who might be interested. There are still a couple weeks until the
submission deadline
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Associate
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
---
Special Issue of IJSSE
Theme: Software Safety & Dependability - the Art of Engineering Trust
Your Picasso - or, perhaps, Frank Lloyd Wright would be a better analogy -
definitely has a role in software development. I want his creativity up front
in the specification and high-level design of the building (the software
system). But when it comes to detailed design and testing, I'm going
I see your point. On the other hand, there are times I worry that "teach the
hacker mentality" approach to secure development training smacks a bit too much
teaching future policemen the delights of robbery, rape, torture, and murder in
order to prepare the to defend the public against robbers,
I too remember learning proofs in Jr. High. And I also believe the main
objective was to teach 12 and 13 year olds that it is possible to apply a
repeatable, disciplined process to how they approach problem solving. Certainly
not a worthless lesson, even if the mathematics involved are never use
698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
From: Benjamin Tomhave [list-s...@secureconsulting.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 12:27 AM
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: sc-l@securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Where Does Secure Coding Belong In the Curriculum?
Goertze
Not so much anti-social as untrusting, supicious, and paranoid. Actually, being
highly social could provide an excellent "cover" to fool the bad guys into
thinking one is a lot less security-savvy than one actually is.
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Associate
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
Andy Steingruebl [stein...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2009 1:14 PM
To: Goertzel, Karen [USA]
Cc: Benjamin Tomhave; sc-l@securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Where Does Secure Coding Belong In the Curriculum?
On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 7:26 AM, Goertzel, Karen
[USA] wrote:
>
For consistency's sake, I hope you agree that if security is an
intermediate-to-advanced concept in software development, then all the other
"-ilities" ("goodness" properties, if you will), such as quality, reliability,
usability, safety, etc. that go beyond "just get the bloody thing to work" a
Actually, we can't prove programs are bug free if by "bug" we also mean all
possible anomalous behaviours. My colleagues keep pointing this out to me when
I suggest that we should start leveraging the computational power of computing
grids to analyze complex software the same way other researche
I think we need a multifaceted approach that includes supply side, demand side,
insurance companies, consumer protection organisations, etc. etc.
We need regulation with legal penalties - as exist for airlines, for example -
for software firms that fail to meet minimal standards for quality - w
I think we need to start indoctrinating kids in the womb. Start selling Baby
Schneier CDs alongside Baby Mozart. :)
Seriously, though, cyberspace is such an integral part of modern life, parents
need to inculcate online security into their toddlers the same way they teach
them to look both ways
We looked at the problem of voting system security specifically in the context
of insider threat for last year's IATAC State of the Art Report on the Insider
Threat to Information Systems - some of which involved "rogue" developers
engineering backdoors into such systems. Unfortunately the docum
ttle software that can satisfy all three of these
criteria 100%. But even 50% is better than 0%.
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Associate
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
From: Peter G. Neumann [neum...@csl.sri.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2009
A colleague and I have been looking at the problem a bit, in the context of
need for survivability in safety-critical systems. Below is an extract of the
paper "Software Survivability: Where Safety and Security Converge" authored by
Larry Feldman, Ph.D., and myself, and presented by our colleagu
Here's an extract from the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
(part of DTIC) "Software Security Assurance: A State of the Art Report"
(http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf):
Courses on secure software development, secure programming, etc., typically
begin by introducing
I'm more devious. I think what needs to happen is that we need to redefine what
we mean by "functionally correct" or "quality" code. If determination of
functional correctness were extended from "must operate as specified under
expected conditions" to "must operate as specified under all conditi
As far as I'm concerned, being able to understand English is crucial to
meaningful interpretation of literature written in that language, and being
able to write and speak English with mastery is crucial to effective
self-expression as a critic. So English mastery is not just "incidental and
im
I came across this while doing some research into antimalware tools. If it
actually work,s it seems like a nifty little trick to have in one's "secure
coding" back pocket.
http://mocana.com/NanoDefender.html
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.c
The NIST SAMATE Reference Dataset has mainly C code in it, but there is also
Java, C++, and PHP. There's a search function that allows you to search by
programming language to find what you want.
http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goer
Yes, yes. We know. It's April 1st and all's right with the world.
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.698.7454
goertzel_ka...@bah.com
-Original Message-
From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org on behalf of SC-L Reader Dave Aronson
Sent: Wed 01-Apr-09 11:25
To: Secure
I would refer you to Section 7.2.2.2, Professional Certifications, starting on
page 272 of "Software Security Assurance: A State-of-the-Art Report" which can
be downloaded from: http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf
The report was published in July 2007; there may be additional certifi
Except when they're hardware bugs. :)
I think the differentiation is also meaningful in this regard: I can specify
software that does non-secure things. I can implement that software 100%
correctly. Ipso facto - no software bugs. But the fact remains that the
software doesn't validate input bec
The one I've decided to forego is the new ISC(2) CSSLP. Anyone who believes
alphabet soup says more about one's qualifications than one's resume and list
of publications is not someone I particularly want to spend time convincing of
my competence regardless.
I am highly sceptical of those who t
The Department of Homeland Security Software Assurance Program's "Enhancing the
Development Life Cycle to Produce Secure Software" (which supercedes their
previous guidance document on secure software development, "Security in the
Software Life Cycle") can be downloaded - after free online regis
I stumbled across this and thought it was worth sharing in case there's anyone
out there looking for an academic position in Europe:
Two PhD Positions
in
Secure Software and Languages
Department of Computer Science
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belg
Do you really mean "secure coding" only, or are you looking for books on
"secure software development" more generally?
--
Karen Mercedes Goertzel, CISSP
Booz Allen Hamilton
703.902.6981
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Lawson, David L
Sent: Fri
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