Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

Hi, > On Mar 13, 2018, at 11:03 PM, Russ Housley wrote: > > Stephen: > >>> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach. I >>> would like to find out. >> >> Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how >> you can be in doubt if you

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted. >>> >>> The client in this case is under the control of the operator, so this

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Clarifying question On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:55 PM, Russ Housley wrote: > Ted: > > I do not follow. > > This is a bogus argument. > > > I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't belabor > the point. > > > I'll avoid asking how many sparrows are

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

Stephen: >> I do not know if the TLS WG will want to adopt this approach. I >> would like to find out. > > Did you read the list traffic from Oct/Nov? I have no idea how > you can be in doubt if you did. It's readily apparent that your > draft has not caused a lot of people to change their

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Ted: I do not follow. >> This is a bogus argument. > > I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't belabor > the point. I'll avoid asking how many sparrows are needed ;-) >> First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in >> unmaintained versions

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

> On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:38 PM, Salz, Rich wrote: > > The second paragraph talks about how quickly PCI DSS moved. As a > counterpoint, how quickly did they move to delay TLS 1.0 when organizations > pushed back? SSL3 was "safe" to remove. So far they can't even follow >

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

13 Mar. 2018 г., 18:38 Ted Lemon : > One strategy that's very effective for overcoming resistance to bad ideas > is to keep pushing the idea until nobody who's resisting it can afford to > continue doing so. > There's a name for that tactics, it's called "consensus by

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

Hi Russ, On 13/03/18 21:49, Russ Housley wrote: > The Prague discussion was about draft-green-... Much more was discussed than just that one dead draft. In particular see the minutes for the more general question posed by the chairs. > Nick Sullivan summarized four concerns with that approach.

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Have any of the folks in the “visibility” camp had discussions with browser vendors? And if so, have any of them said they would support this? ___ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:16 PM, Russ Housley wrote: > This is a bogus argument. I'm pretty sure there's a Monty Python skit about this, so I won't belabor the point. > First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in > unmaintained versions of old

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

So I re-read Steve's document. >To keep using TLS1.2 has been proposed and discussed many times over the > past year or so and is not acceptable for many reasons outlined in Steve > Fenters draft. So I will refer to that, rather than add repetition to the > list. But suffice to say it is

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:22 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > I mean, do you *really* think there's any chance of reaching rough > consensus on the list for this draft? If not, then ISTM you're > putting meeting attendees and list participants through a bunch > of pain for no

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted. * Yes, the server cannot use the "tls_visibility" extension unless the client

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

> On Mar 13, 2018, at 6:21 PM, Andrei Popov wrote: > > If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the > visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted. > TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the client does not

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* This is a bogus argument. First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software. Second, using TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue. If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Joe, On 13/03/18 16:09, Joseph Salowey wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > It is not accurate to say that there was consensus to stop discussion of > this topic in Prague. I did not say that. I said numerous times that there was a clear lack of consensus in Prague. Based on the question *you* asked,

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* If the client were to exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques that have been used in the past are thwarted. TLS1.3-visibility will be equally thwarted if the client does not send the empty "tls_visibility" extension, right? (Assuming the server chooses to

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Ted: > There's an easy way to do this, although as a sometime bank security geek I > would strongly advise you to not do it: keep using TLS 1.2. This is a bogus argument. First, staying with an old protocol version often leads to locking in unmaintained versions of old software. Second,

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Richard Barnes and Rich Salz, Thank you for the kind words. They are much appreciated! Best of luck to Rich with the health concerns too. It’s been an interesting journey with a lot of great folks. Will reply to the issues later as I need to head out at the moment. -Darin On Tue, Mar 13,

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

I will pretty much repeat what I said below. Significant fundamental infrastructure changes, are very difficult for very large organizations to assimilate. Because of time and resource issues, large organizations would seek to avoid major, overhaul type changes, wherever possible.

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

>> Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in >> Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly >> divided. > > To clarify, this isn't voting. If there's no agreement in > either direction there's no agreement (and I hope the default > in the IETF is

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

> On Mar 13, 2018, at 3:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael wrote: > > I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how can we > avoid making any changes?" > But we would seek to avoid unnecessary, wholesale, infrastructure > architectural changes. > We

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Mar 13, 2018, at 3:20 PM, Ackermann, Michael wrote: > I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how can we > avoid making any changes?" With respect, Michael, when I have conversed with you about this in the past, that is precisely what you

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:08 PM, Melinda Shore wrote: > On 3/13/18 10:44 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: >> And then there are other options too, like another WG. Even from >> Stephen's list of who is in agreement with him, I've received a few >> messages saying their

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

I think that most Enterprises are not espousing any conversations "how can we avoid making any changes?" But we would seek to avoid unnecessary, wholesale, infrastructure architectural changes. We want to stay with standards wherever/whenever possible and keep the number of standards to the

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

All, The time has gotten away from me. I have to leave for the airport. I am taking my daughter to London & need to get us all packed & out of the house. I will write respond to all at length either from the airport or in London. Rich, so sorry about your health issues. My best wishes for a

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

On 3/13/18 10:44 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > And then there are other options too, like another WG. Even from > Stephen's list of who is in agreement with him, I've received a few > messages saying their text wasn't what he thinks it was. More > discussion here would be good to figure out a

Re: [TLS] draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Melinda Shore wrote: > On 3/13/18 6:48 AM, Jim Reid wrote: >> Stephen, the opposite PoV is equally valid. There was no consensus in >> Prague NOT to work on the topic. The mood of the room was evenly >> divided. > > To clarify, this

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* "We" is a consortium of organizations. I would say over 50 so far. They operate large data centers. They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, and others. * Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define the standard, then? Indeed, if a “TLS13-visibility” standard has to be

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:52 PM, Ted Lemon wrote: > In addition, you are reducing compartmentalization with your keying > strategy—in order to make communications easily decryptable, you have to > have broadly-shared keys, and that reduces the amount of > compartmentalization

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Yes, I've read all that through, and I've been in Prague, and I still feel that the problem statement lacks some clarification. This is, by the way, the reason draft-fenter is published; who would need that if the reasons all this visibility thing is proposed would have been transparent for

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Mar 13, 2018, at 12:37 PM, nalini elkins wrote: > "We" is a consortium of organizations. I would say over 50 so far. They > operate large data centers. They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, > and others. Nalini, why don't you (the consortium) define

Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 is vulnerable to externally set PSK identity enumeration

On Tuesday, 13 March 2018 16:18:48 CET Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 04:27:46PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote: > > When the server supports externally set PSKs that use human readable > > identities (or, in general, guessable identities), the current text makes > > it trivial to

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* I am happy to set up an informal session where all can meet and talk quietly. Not everyone will be there on Sunday but maybe Monday breakfast or during a break? Just let me know if you are interested & we can make intros. I won’t be there (health issues), but I’ve already turned down

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

> On Mar 13, 2018, at 16:31, Artyom Gavrichenkov wrote: > > Hi Nalini, > > вт, 13 мар. 2018 г., 11:59 nalini elkins : > The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure > for the individual user.We feel that there

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

+1 > On 13 Mar 2018, at 17:23, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > >> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins >> wrote: >> Stephen (and TLS group) >> >> We need to look at the bigger picture. >> >> The TLS working group has been concentrating on

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:58 AM, nalini elkins wrote: > Stephen (and TLS group) > > We need to look at the bigger picture. > > The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure > for the individual user.We feel that there is also an

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

* "We" is a consortium of organizations. I would say over 50 so far. They operate large data centers. They are in manufacturing, insurance, finance, and others. See, I have a bit of a problem with that. As you should know (since you are a Mentor coordinator), participation is on the

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Rich, A clarification: > Well, I’d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky for the public Internet. What I meant about being fine with is a solution INSIDE the enterprise. But, we need a

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

*>>* I hope that we can all work together to craft a solution. We don't want fragmentation and multiple DIY solutions. > Well, I’d be fine with a bunch of point solutions that were only sold and deployed in an enterprise because, as I said last time, this is too risky for the public Internet.

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

On 3/13/18 8:09 AM, nalini elkins wrote: > I agree that the room hummed to "continue the discussion". This might be a good time to review RFC 7282 ("On Consensus and Humming in the IETF") so that everybody is more-or-less on the same page with respect to what a roughly 50/50 split hum means.

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Hi Nalini, вт, 13 мар. 2018 г., 11:59 nalini elkins : > The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure > for the individual user.We feel that there is also an underlying > motivation to help the underdog and protect the political

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Hi Stephen, It is not accurate to say that there was consensus to stop discussion of this topic in Prague. There are vocal contingents both for an against this topic. We did not have discussion of this draft in Singapore because the authors could not make the meeting due to several issues and

Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Hiya, Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the -00

Re: [TLS] Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)

Okay, just wanted to check! > Am 13.03.2018 um 09:30 schrieb Martin Thomson : > > On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) > wrote: >> Just to double-check, there is also no requirement or maybe recommend to not >> send cleartext

Re: [TLS] Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26: (with COMMENT)

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) wrote: > Just to double-check, there is also no requirement or maybe recommend to not > send cleartext and 0-RTT data in the same packet? You mean in the same TCP segment? We do nothing to prevent that, and nor