Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-28 Thread James Alexander
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Michelle Paulson
mpaul...@wikimedia.org wrote:
 Hi All,

 I wanted to let you know that I have posted a
 responsehttps://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Access_to_nonpublic_information_policy#Rethinking_the_access_policy:_Response_to_recent_feedbackto
 the recent feedback we have received and very much look forward to
 hearing your thoughts on the ideas proposed.  I also wanted to thank you
 all for the feedback over the past week and a half.  It really helped us
 understand your concerns and go back to the drawing board -- this
 discussion has really reemphasized the value of community consultations
 periods to me.  In the end, we want to do what works for the community and
 the movement.

 Best,

 Michelle


Hi guys,


In addition to the continuing discussion Michelle started above on
whether we should check ID or not the legal team has also started
responding with thoughts and some options on other suggestions and
questions (such as retention time and keeping the data instead of the
id). In all of these they’ve asked for thoughts if you haven’t checked
the page since early/mid last week it would be great if you could
check it again to weigh in. They will also be continuing to respond to
unanswered questions and concerns so please don’t think your specific
concern is being ignored.

We have also reached out to all OTRS agents to make sure they are
aware of a discussion on whether they should be included in the policy
(currently only OTRS admins are). That conversation is ongoing at
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Access_to_nonpublic_information_policy#OTRS_volunteers
and could, again, use more comments whether you’re a member of OTRS or
not.


James


James Alexander
Legal and Community Advocacy
Wikimedia Foundation
(415) 839-6885 x6716 @jamesofur

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread Philippe Beaudette
Hi George -

I can tell you that I was in the room as this was being discussed
today. I'm fairly sure that Michelle is going to be following up on
this question shortly. It wasn't being ignored - we are just in that
territory where lawyers like to be certain that when they answer
clarifying queries like yours, they aren't accidentally muddying the
waters further. More soon.

pb

—
Philippe Beaudette
Director, Community Advocacy
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc



 On Oct 25, 2013, at 9:19 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.com wrote:

 Again I ask:

 Can the WMF either publicly or privately provide enough detailed assurance
 as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

 This is or should be a no-go for requiring IDs (or at least allowing them
 to be transferred that way).

 I would be happy to contribute a free independent security audit to a plan,
 if there is a detailed plan to audit.  And do so under confidentiality
 agreement if you need that, as long as you let me share a non-exploitable
 summary with the community...




 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:21 PM, George Herbert 
 george.herb...@gmail.comwrote:

 Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
 challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host copies
 of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
 sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.

 My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the
 push died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.

 Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the
 SF Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed assurance
 as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

 This is enough data for someone to do an identity theft with.  The
 physical handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper (locked cabinet or
 the like requires a physical office intrusion).  The electronic...



 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Rschen7754 rschen7754.w...@gmail.comwrote:

 Speaking for myself, I have no problems with the overall idea, and I
 doubt that a lot of the others who have signed the petition do either.

 The problem is in the details of how it is implemented, and that
 appropriate safeguards are not written into place to protect the privacy
 and legal rights of those who (re)identify. I know some European users have
 raised concerns about how the overall policy does not work for them and/or
 would cause them to break the law. I don't believe that they should have to
 stand alone.

 Thanks,

 Rschen7754
 rschen7754.w...@gmail.com



 On Oct 23, 2013, at 4:07 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:

 On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:
 (I myself can
 think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)

 I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost certainly
 the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the dissuasive
 effect alone might have made a difference.

 But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus on
 accountability than over any particular incident.

 -- Marc


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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread George Herbert
Ok.  As long as it wasn't missed, in all the other topics.

Thanks, I will be patient.


On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 11:10 PM, Philippe Beaudette 
pbeaude...@wikimedia.org wrote:

 Hi George -

 I can tell you that I was in the room as this was being discussed
 today. I'm fairly sure that Michelle is going to be following up on
 this question shortly. It wasn't being ignored - we are just in that
 territory where lawyers like to be certain that when they answer
 clarifying queries like yours, they aren't accidentally muddying the
 waters further. More soon.

 pb

 —
 Philippe Beaudette
 Director, Community Advocacy
 Wikimedia Foundation, Inc



  On Oct 25, 2013, at 9:19 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
  Again I ask:
 
  Can the WMF either publicly or privately provide enough detailed
 assurance
  as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?
 
  This is or should be a no-go for requiring IDs (or at least allowing them
  to be transferred that way).
 
  I would be happy to contribute a free independent security audit to a
 plan,
  if there is a detailed plan to audit.  And do so under confidentiality
  agreement if you need that, as long as you let me share a non-exploitable
  summary with the community...
 
 
 
 
  On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:21 PM, George Herbert 
 george.herb...@gmail.comwrote:
 
  Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
  challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host
 copies
  of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
  sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.
 
  My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the
  push died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.
 
  Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the
  SF Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed
 assurance
  as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?
 
  This is enough data for someone to do an identity theft with.  The
  physical handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper (locked
 cabinet or
  the like requires a physical office intrusion).  The electronic...
 
 
 
  On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Rschen7754 rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
  Speaking for myself, I have no problems with the overall idea, and I
  doubt that a lot of the others who have signed the petition do either.
 
  The problem is in the details of how it is implemented, and that
  appropriate safeguards are not written into place to protect the
 privacy
  and legal rights of those who (re)identify. I know some European users
 have
  raised concerns about how the overall policy does not work for them
 and/or
  would cause them to break the law. I don't believe that they should
 have to
  stand alone.
 
  Thanks,
 
  Rschen7754
  rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
 
 
 
  On Oct 23, 2013, at 4:07 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org
 wrote:
 
  On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:
  (I myself can
  think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)
 
  I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost
 certainly
  the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the
 dissuasive
  effect alone might have made a difference.
 
  But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus
 on
  accountability than over any particular incident.
 
  -- Marc
 
 
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  --
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread Florence Devouard
As for I, I have totally given up with the idea of preservation of 
confidential data when the US are somehow involved (if the NSA is 
already involved in recording German president phone conversations or 
French diplomatic department communications, who are we to hope that our 
every steps can be private anyway ?).


My trust in WMF ability to provide security to our private information 
also dramatically dropped with the password leak a couple of months ago.


So what are the risks left ? I see mostly three main ones

1) that a digital version of my passport get in the hands of scammers. 
We know some of the risks associated to this, one of which being 
identity theft. Collection of a bunch of private data (name, email, 
phone number, postal address...) is one thing. Preservation of official 
identity paper is another.

I think that's a non-acceptable risk.

2) that WMF disclose private information about us (OTRS member for 
example) volunteers to other volunteers, who may not even be identified 
in the least (as in arbitration committee members).
Main risk associated imho would go from mild online bullying to severe 
irl mishandling. I have very acute memory of this sick person sending me 
emails threatening my life and the life of my own kids when I was Chair 
of WMF. I was happy he was in the USA and me in France. I was not happy 
he knew of my postal address. And I was scared when I met him at the WMF 
doors irl.
Disclosing private information about us to a lawyer or a policeman is 
one thing. Disclosing private information about us to an unknown 
wikimedia member not bound by similar rules related to private data is 
unacceptable.


3) last, that WMF disclose private information about us without having 
the obligation to inform us it did so.
The draft proposes that The Wikimedia Foundation will not share 
submitted materials with third parties, unless such disclosure is (A) 
permitted by a non-disclosure agreement approved by the Wikimedia 
Foundation’s legal department; (B) required by law; (C) needed to 
protect against immediate threat to life or limb; or (D) needed to 
protect the rights, property, or safety of the Wikimedia Foundation, its 
employees, or contractors.
This is vague enough that it may happen that our private data is 
disclosed to about whoever (who will access our private data thanks to 
this permitted by a non-disclosure agreement approved by the Wikimedia 
Foundation’s legal department ???), possibly without us knowing.
Consequences may be various (being citing in a legal case without even 
knowning; having personal information disclosed to spammers or scammers; 
being sued by an unhappy customer after we failed to fix his case on 
otrs etc.)
A good part of benefit of this agreement would be that covered person 
better feel accountable.
I think a fitting balance would be that WMF agree to mandatorily inform 
ANY covered person WHEN and to WHOM his/her information has been disclosed.


Florence



On 10/26/13 8:20 AM, George Herbert wrote:

Ok.  As long as it wasn't missed, in all the other topics.

Thanks, I will be patient.


On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 11:10 PM, Philippe Beaudette 
pbeaude...@wikimedia.org wrote:


Hi George -

I can tell you that I was in the room as this was being discussed
today. I'm fairly sure that Michelle is going to be following up on
this question shortly. It wasn't being ignored - we are just in that
territory where lawyers like to be certain that when they answer
clarifying queries like yours, they aren't accidentally muddying the
waters further. More soon.

pb

—
Philippe Beaudette
Director, Community Advocacy
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc




On Oct 25, 2013, at 9:19 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.com

wrote:


Again I ask:

Can the WMF either publicly or privately provide enough detailed

assurance

as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

This is or should be a no-go for requiring IDs (or at least allowing them
to be transferred that way).

I would be happy to contribute a free independent security audit to a

plan,

if there is a detailed plan to audit.  And do so under confidentiality
agreement if you need that, as long as you let me share a non-exploitable
summary with the community...




On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:21 PM, George Herbert 

george.herb...@gmail.comwrote:



Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host

copies

of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.

My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the
push died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.

Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the
SF Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed

assurance

as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

This is enough data for someone to do an 

Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread Marc A. Pelletier
On 10/26/2013 10:00 AM, Florence Devouard wrote:
 
 2) that WMF disclose private information about us (OTRS member for
 example) volunteers to other volunteers, who may not even be identified
 in the least (as in arbitration committee members)

The members of the English Wikipedia Arbcom, at least, are all identified.

-- Marc


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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread Nathan
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Florence Devouard anthe...@yahoo.comwrote:

 As for I, I have totally given up with the idea of preservation of
 confidential data when the US are somehow involved (if the NSA is already
 involved in recording German president phone conversations or French
 diplomatic department communications, who are we to hope that our every
 steps can be private anyway ?).


This bit is extraneous and unnecessary because (a) no one is asking the WMF
to hide details from the NSA, who let's agree couldn't care less about that
bit of data and (b) anything the NSA is capturing in Germany or France was
already quite certainly being captured by the governments of Germany and
France (or really, both).

That said, I agree with your three main points and think the WMF legal team
should consider them very strongly as they bring their failed policy
proposal back to the drawing board.
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-26 Thread Florence Devouard

On 10/26/13 5:37 PM, Nathan wrote:

On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Florence Devouard anthe...@yahoo.comwrote:


As for I, I have totally given up with the idea of preservation of
confidential data when the US are somehow involved (if the NSA is already
involved in recording German president phone conversations or French
diplomatic department communications, who are we to hope that our every
steps can be private anyway ?).



This bit is extraneous and unnecessary because (a) no one is asking the WMF
to hide details from the NSA, who let's agree couldn't care less about that
bit of data and (b) anything the NSA is capturing in Germany or France was
already quite certainly being captured by the governments of Germany and
France (or really, both).



At 45, I am still perhaps very innocent about my gov.
But really, I do not think the French gov is recording Ms Merkel. If 
only because they very likely do not have the tech means to do so ;)


Still, I disagree with you that the bit is extraneous. The thing is that 
most Europeans were really very shocked to read all that stuff about the 
NSA in the past few months. People are probably more sensitive about 
their private data than they were a couple of days ago because that was 
the opportunity for much talk on the general subject in the past few 
months (which data is recorded, by who, what for and so on).


Flo


That said, I agree with your three main points and think the WMF legal team
should consider them very strongly as they bring their failed policy
proposal back to the drawing board.
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-25 Thread George Herbert
Again I ask:

Can the WMF either publicly or privately provide enough detailed assurance
as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

This is or should be a no-go for requiring IDs (or at least allowing them
to be transferred that way).

I would be happy to contribute a free independent security audit to a plan,
if there is a detailed plan to audit.  And do so under confidentiality
agreement if you need that, as long as you let me share a non-exploitable
summary with the community...




On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:21 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.comwrote:

 Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
 challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host copies
 of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
 sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.

 My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the
 push died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.

 Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the
 SF Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed assurance
 as to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

 This is enough data for someone to do an identity theft with.  The
 physical handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper (locked cabinet or
 the like requires a physical office intrusion).  The electronic...



 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Rschen7754 rschen7754.w...@gmail.comwrote:

 Speaking for myself, I have no problems with the overall idea, and I
 doubt that a lot of the others who have signed the petition do either.

 The problem is in the details of how it is implemented, and that
 appropriate safeguards are not written into place to protect the privacy
 and legal rights of those who (re)identify. I know some European users have
 raised concerns about how the overall policy does not work for them and/or
 would cause them to break the law. I don't believe that they should have to
 stand alone.

 Thanks,

 Rschen7754
 rschen7754.w...@gmail.com



 On Oct 23, 2013, at 4:07 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:

  On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:
  (I myself can
  think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)
 
  I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost certainly
  the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the dissuasive
  effect alone might have made a difference.
 
  But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus on
  accountability than over any particular incident.
 
  -- Marc
 
 
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-24 Thread Federico Leva (Nemo)

MZMcBride, 24/10/2013 05:47:

Marc A. Pelletier wrote:

Seriously, however, I can understand why some current holders of rights
might have reservations about a policy that tightens greatly how private
information is handled and how much vetting is done on who does the
handling; but that tightening does very much need to take place.


Says who? I've been trying to get a clear answer to this question for the
past few days.


Seconded. The last message by legals on the talk page doesn't address 
this root issue.



The access to non-public info policy is the Board's
creation and the Board's prerogative. Is the Board interested in updating
this policy? If not, then politely: why are we having this conversation?
If so, why and in what ways would the Board like to see the policy updated?


Apparently, legals say that the current policy is too flexible for the 
board to have really meant approving it, so of course the board will 
like to change his mind and make it much stricter, while if one wanted 
to keep it as flexible as it is now one would need the board to change 
his mind. Hmm.


Nemo

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-24 Thread
...
 Apparently, legals say that the current policy is too flexible for the board
 to have really meant approving it, so of course the board will like to
 change his mind and make it much stricter, while if one wanted to keep it as
 flexible as it is now one would need the board to change his mind. Hmm.

 Nemo

Without an explanation of why this was an issue or a priority legal
matter, it seems perfectly reasonable to fill in the gaps with wild
fantasy and speculation. I rather like the idea that someone in the
WMF legal team read something about privacy on their top of the range
internet tablet, while drinking freshly ground top of the range
coffee, and as it was an otherwise dull day on the subpoena front,
decided to give this policy a poke to see the ants scurry about. It
certainly seems to have kept many volunteers busy this week.

Fae
-- 
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-24 Thread Marc A. Pelletier
On 10/24/2013 09:37 AM, Risker wrote:
 Wow, Fae. Justwow.

I think Fae was being highly ironic there.

-- Marc


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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-24 Thread Brad Jorsch (Anomie)
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:

 On 10/24/2013 09:37 AM, Risker wrote:
  Wow, Fae. Justwow.

 I think Fae was being highly ironic there.

If so, I think we just ran into Poe's law.[1]


 [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poe%27s_law (of course)

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread Marc A. Pelletier
On 10/21/2013 08:13 PM, MZMcBride wrote:
 On a typical site, paid staff would deal with problematic users.

The obvious, and perhaps a bit trite, answer would be that we are most
certainly not a typical site by any meaning of the term.  :-)

Seriously, however, I can understand why some current holders of rights
might have reservations about a policy that tightens greatly how private
information is handled and how much vetting is done on who does the
handling; but that tightening does very much need to take place.

It's not clear to me what those people who have signed the petition
think they can accomplish; those new rules (perhaps altered through
feedback) will need to be installed eventually, but nobody is obliged to
abide them if they do not feel comfortable doing so; being a steward,
oversighter or checkuser is not something one is forced into doing.  If
they prefer not to proceed with the new system, they don't actually need
to resign.

As a volunteer, I'd *much* rather those functions be held by active
members of the community than by staff; and as long as there remains
sufficient volunteers to do the job, then this is what should happen.
(We'd probably get more people willing to step forward if we stopped -
collectively - heaping so much crap on the heads of functionaries; but
that's a different issue).

-- Coren / Marc


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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread Newyorkbrad
Although I personally didn't consider identifying to be onerous, I've never
thought the entire identification requirement and process were necessary,
since nothing is ever done with the identification data.  Can anyone think
of a situation that would have been handled differently if the
proposed policy had been in place at the relevant time?  (I myself can
think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)

Newyorkbrad


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 6:45 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:

 On 10/21/2013 08:13 PM, MZMcBride wrote:
  On a typical site, paid staff would deal with problematic users.

 The obvious, and perhaps a bit trite, answer would be that we are most
 certainly not a typical site by any meaning of the term.  :-)

 Seriously, however, I can understand why some current holders of rights
 might have reservations about a policy that tightens greatly how private
 information is handled and how much vetting is done on who does the
 handling; but that tightening does very much need to take place.

 It's not clear to me what those people who have signed the petition
 think they can accomplish; those new rules (perhaps altered through
 feedback) will need to be installed eventually, but nobody is obliged to
 abide them if they do not feel comfortable doing so; being a steward,
 oversighter or checkuser is not something one is forced into doing.  If
 they prefer not to proceed with the new system, they don't actually need
 to resign.

 As a volunteer, I'd *much* rather those functions be held by active
 members of the community than by staff; and as long as there remains
 sufficient volunteers to do the job, then this is what should happen.
 (We'd probably get more people willing to step forward if we stopped -
 collectively - heaping so much crap on the heads of functionaries; but
 that's a different issue).

 -- Coren / Marc


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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread David Gerard
On 24 October 2013 00:07, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:
 On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:

 (I myself can
 think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)

 I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost certainly
 the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the dissuasive
 effect alone might have made a difference.
 But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus on
 accountability than over any particular incident.


I'm thinking of a case, but I can't see how this would have dissuaded
the individual in question, who was almost obsessive.


- d.

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread Katherine Casey
As far as  The physical handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper,
well... Considering that some of our less sane problematic users have, if
I'm remembering correctly, shown up at the WMF office itself and would have
loved to get their hands on the real-life documents of our
advanced-privilege users, I'm not all that confident that *any *storage on
the WMF premises, short of a vault, is adequate. When crazies go crazy
about Wikipedia, they go *very *crazy, and breaking a padlock in an office
isn't that outlandish for some of them.

-Fluff


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 7:21 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.comwrote:

 Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
 challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host copies
 of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
 sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.

 My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the push
 died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.

 Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the SF
 Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed assurance as
 to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?

 This is enough data for someone to do an identity theft with.  The physical
 handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper (locked cabinet or the like
 requires a physical office intrusion).  The electronic...



 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Rschen7754 rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  Speaking for myself, I have no problems with the overall idea, and I
 doubt
  that a lot of the others who have signed the petition do either.
 
  The problem is in the details of how it is implemented, and that
  appropriate safeguards are not written into place to protect the privacy
  and legal rights of those who (re)identify. I know some European users
 have
  raised concerns about how the overall policy does not work for them
 and/or
  would cause them to break the law. I don't believe that they should have
 to
  stand alone.
 
  Thanks,
 
  Rschen7754
  rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
 
 
 
  On Oct 23, 2013, at 4:07 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org wrote:
 
   On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:
   (I myself can
   think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)
  
   I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost
 certainly
   the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the
 dissuasive
   effect alone might have made a difference.
  
   But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus
 on
   accountability than over any particular incident.
  
   -- Marc
  
  
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread George Herbert
Fluff-

When crazies go crazy
 about Wikipedia, they go *very *crazy, and breaking a padlock in an office
 isn't that outlandish for some of them.


It will not happen without staff being fully aware, and an intruder knowing
which cabinet to break into without significant effort is extremely
unlikely, would require either cooperation of an insider and/or office
visits while acting considerably saner (at least; if not much more than
that).

Even if the risk is nonzero, the risk to me that it will happen secretly
(as opposed to, X broke in but the SFPD arrested them with a handful of
docs including your ID photocopies) is very low.

I am much more worried about accidental unrecognized leaks of digital data.
 MUCH.




On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:27 PM, Katherine Casey 
fluffernutter.w...@gmail.com wrote:

 As far as  The physical handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper,
 well... Considering that some of our less sane problematic users have, if
 I'm remembering correctly, shown up at the WMF office itself and would have
 loved to get their hands on the real-life documents of our
 advanced-privilege users, I'm not all that confident that *any *storage on
 the WMF premises, short of a vault, is adequate. When crazies go crazy
 about Wikipedia, they go *very *crazy, and breaking a padlock in an office
 isn't that outlandish for some of them.

 -Fluff


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 7:21 PM, George Herbert george.herb...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  Going back to the 2011 discussions on otrs lists, a flag was raised that
  challenged whether the WMF had sufficiently secure servers to host copies
  of ID documents that might be electronically submitted, including
  sufficient firewalling and/or airgapping, internal access controls, etc.
 
  My impression was that once that was raised as a detailed concern, the
 push
  died off rapidly, but I may be misremembering.
 
  Let me now ask - Can the WMF either publicly or privately (I live in the
 SF
  Bay Area and can come over and talk) provide enough detailed assurance as
  to the digital medium storage plan for these IDs?
 
  This is enough data for someone to do an identity theft with.  The
 physical
  handling is relatively easy to ensure is proper (locked cabinet or the
 like
  requires a physical office intrusion).  The electronic...
 
 
 
  On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Rschen7754 rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
  wrote:
 
   Speaking for myself, I have no problems with the overall idea, and I
  doubt
   that a lot of the others who have signed the petition do either.
  
   The problem is in the details of how it is implemented, and that
   appropriate safeguards are not written into place to protect the
 privacy
   and legal rights of those who (re)identify. I know some European users
  have
   raised concerns about how the overall policy does not work for them
  and/or
   would cause them to break the law. I don't believe that they should
 have
  to
   stand alone.
  
   Thanks,
  
   Rschen7754
   rschen7754.w...@gmail.com
  
  
  
   On Oct 23, 2013, at 4:07 PM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.org
 wrote:
  
On 10/23/2013 07:01 PM, Newyorkbrad wrote:
(I myself can
think of one and only one, but am curious if there are others.)
   
I can also think of exactly one off the cuff (and it is almost
  certainly
the same); but I can think of a couple of scenarios where the
  dissuasive
effect alone might have made a difference.
   
But my understanding is that this is prompted by a more serious focus
  on
accountability than over any particular incident.
   
-- Marc
   
   
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-23 Thread MZMcBride
Marc A. Pelletier wrote:
Seriously, however, I can understand why some current holders of rights
might have reservations about a policy that tightens greatly how private
information is handled and how much vetting is done on who does the
handling; but that tightening does very much need to take place.

Says who? I've been trying to get a clear answer to this question for the
past few days. The access to non-public info policy is the Board's
creation and the Board's prerogative. Is the Board interested in updating
this policy? If not, then politely: why are we having this conversation?
If so, why and in what ways would the Board like to see the policy updated?

MZMcBride



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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-21 Thread MZMcBride
Tomasz W. Kozlowski wrote:
The discussion is taking place at
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Access_to_nonpublic_info_policy
and I invite every interested person (with a special invitation to
people holding advanced user rights on any Wikimedia wiki) to take an
active part in it.

This discussion... isn't going great. There's now a talk page section
devoted to users signing a pledge that should the policy, as written, be
enacted by the Board, they'll resign their advanced privileges (steward
access, CheckUser access, etc.). It's up to eight signatories.

Reading through some of the discussion, I have two questions for the
Wikimedia Foundation Board (copied on this e-mail):

* Is the Board interested in updating its 2007 access to nonpublic data
policy?

* Has there been any consideration of removing volunteers from these types
of roles and relying solely on staff?

On a typical site, paid staff would deal with problematic users. There's a
lot of hoopla being put in place (confidentiality pledges, etc.) that
would be much easier to implement if everyone with this type of access
were simply paid staff members or contractors. (Though contractors can
still leak, heh.) But this seems like a legitimate enough question in the
context of the current discussion: should volunteers be filling these
roles or should they be focused more purely on education content creation?

MZMcBride



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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Keegan Peterzell
Thanks for the notice about this discussion.  I knew it was to be a part of
the new privacy policy, but I wasn't aware of the talk page.

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Tomasz W. Kozlowski tom...@twkozlowski.net
 wrote:


 We already went through a similar discussion two and a half years ago,
 when the WMF planned to make all OTRS agents re-identify to them by sending
 a copy (or a scan) of their ID to a secure e-mail address (or by using
 another option provided).


This isn't 100% correct.  The idea was to have agents who had not already
identified do so, since OTRS agents have access to a massive amount of
non-public information.  For those interested in the result, it was posting
a public list of OTRS agent usernames on meta.  There is no current
requirement for agents to ID.

not wearing OTRS admin hat, just sayin'


-- 
~Keegan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Keegan
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Keegan Peterzell
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:14 AM, Tomasz W. Kozlowski tom...@twkozlowski.net
 wrote:

 Keegan Peterzell wrote:

  This isn't 100% correct. �The idea was to have agents who had not already
 identified do so, since OTRS agents have access to a massive amount of
 non-public information. �For those interested in the result, it was posting
 a public list of OTRS agent usernames on meta. �There is no current
 requirement for agents to ID.


 Not really. The discussion on the OTRS wiki clearly states that the
 intention was for all OTRS volunteers to [be] identified just like
 CheckUsers, Oversights, and Stewards in accordance with the non-public
 data and privacy policies. which, at that time required people to
 satisfactorily identify themselves to the Foundation (and they still do),
 which in effect means that they need to send a copy of their ID to the WMF.


The discussion, as I was clarifying, was about requiring agents that had
not Identified to do so.  There was no re-identifying require, which is th
point that I was making.



 The posting of a public list of OTRS agents usernames was result of an
 entirely different discussion, which was only started in January 2013; the
 one I was referring to took place in February 2011 (and later on).


The two are related. Both measures seek transparency, one to the WMF and
one to the community.  The fact that the community side has worked is
interesting when there is pushback to private transparency.

-- 
~Keegan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Keegan
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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Tomasz W. Kozlowski

Keegan Peterzell wrote:

The discussion, as I was clarifying, was about requiring agents that had 
not Identified to do so.  There was no re-identifying require, which is 
th point that I was making.


Oh yes, that's right. Thanks for the clarification, Keegan; I'm sorry 
about the confusion.


The two are related. Both measures seek transparency, one to the WMF and 
one to the community.  The fact that the community side has worked is 
interesting when there is pushback to private transparency. 


The community side, as you call it, has received its share of comments, 
criticism, and suggestions from OTRS volunteers when the issue was 
brought to their (our) attention.


There have been many voices opposing the publication or at least 
concerned about the possible implications of the change, just as there 
are some voices expressing concerns about the apparent lack of details 
and deeper thought behind some parts of the policy.


I don't think this is something new or interesting per se; people 
usually tend to ask tough questions when it comes to their privacy, and 
I can only hope we will be able to work out the details, and that the 
WMF will be able to respond to people's concerns.


  Tomasz

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Federico Leva (Nemo)

Keegan Peterzell, 15/10/2013 10:24:

The two are related. Both measures seek transparency, one to the WMF and
one to the community.  The fact that the community side has worked is
interesting when there is pushback to private transparency.


This is an interesting point, thanks for making it. I would never have 
considered the identification via private means something relating to 
transparency, but it's clear that – as you say – people are more 
likely to accept a transparency which benefits the public.


Nemo

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Nathan
This is directed at the Wikimedia legal team, whom I have cc'd: Even
though the pace of contributions to the discussion page of the policy
has picked up in the last couple of days, no one from the legal team
has commented in about a month. I think it would help the discussion
if the legal team would engage while members of the community are also
engaged, so that it is truly a discussion and not people talking past
each other at different moments in time.

Nathan

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-15 Thread Michelle Paulson
Hi Nathan,

My apologies for the delay.  We will begin responding asap.

-Michelle


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Nathan nawr...@gmail.com wrote:

 This is directed at the Wikimedia legal team, whom I have cc'd: Even
 though the pace of contributions to the discussion page of the policy
 has picked up in the last couple of days, no one from the legal team
 has commented in about a month. I think it would help the discussion
 if the legal team would engage while members of the community are also
 engaged, so that it is truly a discussion and not people talking past
 each other at different moments in time.

 Nathan




-- 
Michelle Paulson
Legal Counsel
Wikimedia Foundation
149 New Montgomery Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
mpaul...@wikimedia.org
415.839.6885 ext. 6608 (Office)
415.882.0495 (Fax)




NOTICE: *This message might have confidential or legally privileged
information in it. If you have received this message by accident, please
delete it and let us know about the mistake. For legal reasons, I may only
serve as an attorney for the Wikimedia Foundation. This means I may not
give legal advice to or serve as a lawyer for community members,
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[Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-14 Thread Tomasz W. Kozlowski

Hi,
I would like to bring your attention to yet another discussion that's 
currently taking place, namely the one about the new privacy policy, and 
the related access to non-public information policy.


The privacy policy consultation is obviously important to all of us. but 
I'm personally more interested in the draft access to non-public 
information policy, which influences my daily work as an oversighter on 
Commons, and also the not-so-regular work as an OTRS agent.


It seems that the Wikimedia Foundation is planning to require users with 
access to non-public information to re-identify to them, this time with 
the intention to retain copies of the submitted IDs, for as long as 
those users have access to such information, and additional three years.


We already went through a similar discussion two and a half years ago, 
when the WMF planned to make all OTRS agents re-identify to them by 
sending a copy (or a scan) of their ID to a secure e-mail address (or by 
using another option provided).


This time, the new requirements are going to concern /all/ users with 
access to non-public information (such as OTRS agents, checkusers, 
oversighters, and stewards), and their IDs are planned to be kept by the 
Foundation, something which was never required before.


The discussion is taking place at 
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Access_to_nonpublic_information_policy 
and I invite every interested person (with a special invitation to 
people holding advanced user rights on any Wikimedia wiki) to take an 
active part in it.


Thanks,
  Tomasz

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-14 Thread Nathan
Thanks for the pointer, Tomasz. I made a couple of points I'll reiterate here:

1) Under Secure and Confidential Storage this is a sentence
describing how the WMF will share / release the information submitted
by volunteers. Part A allows the WMF to disclose the information to
third parties with a WMF-approved non-disclosure agreement, without
limitation. Part D allows it to disclose the information to third
parties to protect the rights and property of the WMF, contractors
and employees. Both of these parts need to be substantially tightened,
in my opinion, to limit the purpose for which information is disclosed
and the circumstances under which any recipient of the information can
retain copies.

2) The policy really doesn't make an effort to justify the data
retention. Data is retained for three years in case an Arbitration
Committee (project undefined, no limitations expressed) needs to see
it? Honestly, I'm struggling to understand why any ArbCom would need
access to the preserved copy of a government issued ID to begin with.
ArbComs are evidently on the need to know list for access to stored
IDs? That's concerning. I think the policy needs to make a strong
argument for why this type of data retention is necessary and useful,
and it needs to consist of more than convenience for the WMF.

3) The process for data destruction is pretty weak. It doesn't mention
anything about data that has been shared (nowhere in the document is
it discussed how and in what form the data will be shared), the
process it describes doesn't currently exist, and it relies on the
actions of volunteers. Destroying data at the end of the retention
period ought to be a WMF responsibility, assigned to an employee, and
treated with the seriousness it deserves.

Overall I don't know that the legal team has taken into account the
likely reaction of European functionaries in particular; those
countries have very popular, and very strict, rules and expectations
around the use and retention of private information. Given the
conditions set by all the surveillance revelations recently... I'd
hate to see an exodus of advanced users on our non-English projects
because of this policy.

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-14 Thread Tomasz W. Kozlowski

Federico Leva (Nemo) wrote:

Just checking: considering that this is a rather limited set of users, I 
assume they've all been notified by the WMF via email or talk page about 
the discussion?


You must be new here.

  Tomasz

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Re: [Wikimedia-l] New access to non-public information policy, re-ID requirements and data retention

2013-10-14 Thread Risker
On 14 October 2013 16:39, Tomasz W. Kozlowski tom...@twkozlowski.netwrote:

 Federico Leva (Nemo) wrote:

  Just checking: considering that this is a rather limited set of users, I
 assume they've all been notified by the WMF via email or talk page about
 the discussion?


 You must be new here.


That made me smile. :)

In answer to Tomasz's question:  Not unless they suddenly forgot my email
address, and that of every other checkuser, oversighter, or steward that I
know.  I was well aware of the ongoing discussion of the revised draft
privacy policy, and I was aware that there was *going* to be a discussion
about access to non-public information; however, I was unaware that the
latter discussion had started.

Risker
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