Hi.  I'm new on the list.  

Some of the issues you're discussing on this thread are being addressed
by an IEEE 802 ECSG on link security (you can subscribe to the mailing
list by sending "subscribe stds-802-linksec your-email" to
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

IMO, if they can fix .11i, the best they'll be able to do is to really
approach wired equivalent security, which will not do away with the need
for VPNs or other end-to-end protection.

Peter

-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Thompson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2003 7:35 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [BAWUG] t-mobile security strategy

        From [EMAIL PROTECTED]  Tue Mar 11 16:52:11 2003
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        Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 16:51:56 -0800 (PST)
        From: Joel Jaeggli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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        To: Jim Thompson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
        Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
        Subject: Re: [BAWUG] t-mobile security strategy
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        On Tue, 11 Mar 2003, Jim Thompson wrote:

        > your tunnel won't protect you from a MIM attack that starts by
de-authing your client.

        sure if you if you're talking about mtm attacks on tunneled
authentication 
        protocols. 

How about IPSEC tunnels?

        mtm attacks against ssh clients where you already have all the
hosts dsa 
        keys is quite another matter. you're going to be able to detect
it.

You're assuming something a lot like certs (so you can sign the key
exchange).  Yes, this is a solution.
But VPNs don't always employ these.
         
        > 802.11i with secured management frames is the way to fix this.


        I'd vastly prefer transport independant end-to-end encryption in
almost 
        every circumstance.

"almost"?

        > if you want to run VPN on top of that, the choice is yours.
Encryption isn't free. 
        > At a minimum, it costs in latency.

        well sure, but when your laptop is a 1.7ghz p4 it can do about
6MB/s worth 
        of 128bit idea, which isn't to shabby... people in the ipsec
business 
        have $10 fpgas doing it at 1.2Gb/s 

You seem to support what I said.  Even if the gates aren't free, you
still pay in latency.  Key scheduling, 
and moving the data, will bite, if nothing else gets in the way.

and your 1.2Gbps is with big packets, I'll bet...

and I haven't seen an IPSEC implmentation that fits in a $10 fpga (those
are pretty tiny).

$10 ASICs, on the other hand...

Jim

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