Garrett,
It is important to note that there are some OS related security modes which do not engage the hardware level drive security. The threat model for self-encrypting drives is protection for data at rest, that is, when the machine has been powered down such as when Windows has been put into hibernation mode or completely shut down. I'm not sure, but I do not believe screen locking Windows has any affect on unpowering the disk drive, thereby causing it to lock. If that is the case, then your scenario is likely correct and the machine could be rebooted with an alternate OS to defeat the OS security, not the drive security. For instance, I know that just doing a warm reboot/restart of Windows does not unpower the drive, therefore, during the reboot, the drive will not require authentication since it has remained in an unlocked state. The correct procedure in order to engage the SED drive locking would be for the user to put the system into hibernation mode whenever they leave the system. As I mentioned, the Embassy software will not allow Windows standby mode since it does not unpower the drive either, so if standby mode is selected it will be automatically defaulted to hibernation mode. There is a notable exception for Dell systems shipping today with Seagate encrypting drives and Wave's Embassy software. Dell, Seagate, and Wave engineered a secure standby mode solution, but only on Dell's platforms. All other platforms will need hibernation mode or complete power off in order to engage drive locking. As a side point since there was much discussion about the Princeton Cold Boot attacks, the encryption keys and authentication credentials are always held and used inside the secure hardware of the self-encrypting drives, therefore, none of the described system memory attacks could discover any of these secrets since they are never held in memory. Thanks, Lark Allen From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 2:30 PM To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security Thanks for the info, Lark. So the attack vector is reduced to: 1. the machine is on* (like if the user locks his screen & walks away for a moment), and then 2. someone steals the laptop (leaving it on), and then 3. restarts the machine using a boot disc or bootable USB stick. Begging the question: Are there ways of mitigating that avenue of attack beyond just changing the boot sequence in the BIOS & password-protecting the BIOS setup? * I understand many other vulnerabilities exist on running operating systems, such as buffer overflow attacks on system services via the network, but I find that avenue of attack less likely than simply using a boot disc (as described above), esp as self-encrypting drives become more widespread. ----- Original Message ----- From: Lark Allen To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security Garrett, The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state. The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security. Lark Allen Wave Systems Corp. From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following vector of attack: Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD. Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the same vulnerability. Thanks. _______________________________________________ FDE mailing list FDE@www.xml-dev.com http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde _______________________________________________ FDE mailing list FDE@www.xml-dev.com http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde ----- Original Message ----- From: Lark Allen To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security Garrett, The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state. The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security. Lark Allen Wave Systems Corp. From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following vector of attack: Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD. Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the same vulnerability. Thanks. _______________________________________________ FDE mailing list FDE@www.xml-dev.com http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde ________________________________ ----- Original Message ----- From: Lark Allen <mailto:lal...@wavesys.com> To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security Garrett, The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state. The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security. Lark Allen Wave Systems Corp. From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM To: fde@www.xml-dev.com Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following vector of attack: Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD. Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the same vulnerability. Thanks. ________________________________ _______________________________________________ FDE mailing list FDE@www.xml-dev.com http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________ FDE mailing list FDE@www.xml-dev.com http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
